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ABSTRACT
HYLARIE KOCHIRAS: Force, Matter, and Metaphysics in Newton's Natural Philosophy
(Under the direction of Alan Nelson)
Metaphysical principles may be intuitively appealing by making the world intelligible,
yet they are very difficult to justify. The role that such principles should play in the development
of a physical theory becomes a pressing question for Newton, for he seeks a causal explanation of
gravity that will eliminate the spectre of matter acting at distance, with sun and planets attracting
one another across empty space.  Does Newton reach an answer to his question about gravity's
causal story, and if not, what stands in the way?  Despite his empiricism, he is strongly drawn to
the metaphysical principles that matter is passive and that causation is local, so at one level, his
problem about gravity seems to be that of discovering some immaterial medium that might
possess active powers.  Yet I identify in Newton's reasoning a more fundamental problem about
gravity, Newton's Substance Counting Problem.  His ontology includes immaterial substances as
well as material ones, and while his penchant for certain metaphysical principles keeps the search
for an immaterial medium alive, his empiricism prevents him from postulating such a medium.
He also allows, on empirical grounds, the possibility that substances of different kinds can co-
occupy regions of space.  Yet if two things can be in the same place at the same time, I argue,
Newton has no empirical means of determining how many substances are present on the basis of
perceived properties, or of associating those properties with one substance rather than another.
Nor will he make those determinations by asserting the metaphysical principles he suspects to be
true.  Thus he has no means of associating active powers with an immaterial medium rather than
with matter, and Newton's problem of discovering gravity's complete causal story is one that
cannot be solved.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The gravitational force is a persistent problem for Newton.  He famously solves the
mathematical problem set by Kepler, that of finding a mathematical expression for the force
governing the planetary orbits.  Once that is accomplished, however, he struggles to solve
Kepler's other problem—that of finding a causal explanation of gravitational effects.  Does
Newton reach an answer to his question about gravity's cause, and if not, what stands in the way?
I examine Newton's efforts to find a causal explanation of gravity, and the role that metaphysical
principles play in his efforts, for despite his empiricism, he is strongly drawn to certain
metaphysical principles, including the principle that matter cannot cause effects from a distance,
without any intervening medium.
I begin in chapter II with a history of the problem about the planetary orbits, examining
the conceptual changes that transformed it into a problem about force.  I trace this transformation
from Aristotle, who shared Newton's belief that the universe contains some generative source of
new motion, to Hooke, whose presentation of the problem turned Newton's attention away from
the Cartesian blind alley of outward endeavors.  Between these two figures, Kepler's work is a
watershed, for he transforms the problem about the orbits by taking them to be caused by a
central force; and he sets himself the dual goals of expressing the force mathematically, and
explaining it physically and causally.  Newton conceives the problem about the force governing
the orbits as Kepler did, and having achieved the first goal, struggles to accomplish the second.
In chapter III, I examine the two components of Newton's explanation of the planetary
orbits, the vis inertiae, or force of inertia as it is translated, and the gravitational force.  For each
2of these, there are grounds for thinking that Newton considered it a genuine force, and grounds
for thinking that he did not.  The status of the vis inertiae depends upon how Newton defined
'force' generally, and so I ask whether he retains the one general definition that he does give, or
whether he abandons that definition, to identify all forces with impressed forces.  I do not reach a
definitive conclusion about whether he considered the vis inertiae to be a genuine force; I instead
explore the problems with both the affirmative and negative answers to the question.  Further
exploring Newton's concept of the vis inertiae, I examine its relation to Law 1, opposing those
commentators who argue that Newton takes the persistence of state to be uncaused and thus
denies universal causation.  I also examine the vis inertiae's relation to Law 3, arguing that the
conceptual basis of one of its functions and of the related Law 3 may be found in Descartes'
principle of reciprocal action.  I then examine Newton's relational concept of the gravitational
force.  Questions about the status of this force arise from a possibility implied by the
Principia—that gravitating matter might be acting distantly, with sun and planets attracting one
another across vast reaches of space.  I distinguish two senses in which we may ask whether
Newton considers the gravitational force to be genuine or real, a question I take it up in
subsequent chapters.
I examine Newton's ontology of substance in chapter IV, as well as his hypotheses about
gravity's cause.  Since Newton is drawn to certain metaphysical principles—by which I mean
principles not derived empirically—most notably the principle that matter cannot act where it is
not, some commentators have interpreted him as attributing gravitational effects to God.  I
provide a new argument against that position, showing that while he does consider that
explanation, Newton repeatedly treats the gravitational force as independent of God, and thus as
real in the sense that its causal story belongs to the created world.  Examining the texts in which
Newton speaks of action at a distance, I argue that despite initial appearances, these texts do not
attribute active powers of attraction or repulsion directly to the particles of matter, such that no
intermediate substance is required for bodies to affect one another.  Here I do not distinguish
3between essential and inessential powers of acting distantly.  The possibility of the latter power
remains for me to address in the final chapter.  In chapter IV I also examine the electric spirit and
its associated force, and I oppose the argument that Newton takes some electrical effects to occur
by matter acting distantly.  Finally, I explore some of the difficulties in the aethereal hypothesis
of gravitational effects that appears in Query 21.
Newton speculatively denies that the quantity of motion in the world remains constant, or
that it would so absent some generative source of new motion, and he classifies nearly all
motions, including gravitational effects, as new motions.  In chapter V, I examine the reasons
Newton presents in Query 31 for thinking that the universe contains a generative source of new
motion—some "active principles".   Focusing upon his internal reasoning rather than the concepts
that he lacks, such as energy and the conservation of angular momentum, I examine the collision
cases and two-globe case of Query 31.  I show that in both cases, there are means by which
Newton could have denied that motion is lost—and so denied the need to invoke active
principles.  Yet he passes those opportunities by, for he strongly associates active principles with
distance forces—that is, forces acting between spatially separated bodies.  Although Newton
associates active principles with distance forces, they are conceptually distinct, and he is
uncertain what active principles might be.  Since he at one point identifies them with laws of
nature, I examine the possible conceptions of laws that he might have in mind.
In the sixth and final chapter, I consider how Newton's empiricism intersects with certain
metaphysical principles that guide his search for gravity's cause, and I show how this intersection
generates a problem about gravity.  I examine three explanations of Newton's overall view of
gravity, matter, and action at a distance, beginning with a view mentioned earlier—that Newton
took active powers of attraction to be inessential powers of matter, and so he allowed action at a
distance.  I oppose this view, arguing that it would require a distinction between properties that
are merely universally realized and those that are essential in the strong sense that matter could
not exist without them—a distinction that Newton's empiricism cannot accommodate. According
4to the closely related second and third explanations that I consider, Newton accepts a general
principle of local causation, or he accepts the principle that matter is passive.  Newton does not
assert these principles, since they lack empirical warrant, but neither does he free himself of them.
They guide his search for a medium that might convey gravitational effects locally, by contact,
and the principle of local causation determines the nature of the only available models for an
inanimate immaterial medium, namely, God and minds.
At one level, then, Newton's problem about gravity seems to be that of discovering some
immaterial medium, such as an aether, that might possess active powers to produce gravitational
attraction.  However, I identify a more fundamental problem about gravity, Newton's Substance
Counting Problem. His ontology includes immaterial substances as well as material ones, and
while his penchant for certain metaphysical principles keeps the search for an immaterial medium
alive, his empiricism prevents him from postulating such a medium.  He also allows, on empirical
grounds, the possibility that substances of different kinds can co-occupy regions of space.  Yet if
two things can be in the same place at the same time, I argue, Newton has no empirical means of
determining how many substances are present on the basis of perceived properties, or of
associating those properties with one substance rather than another.  Nor will he make those
determinations by asserting the metaphysical principles he suspects to be true.  Thus he has no
means of associating active powers with an immaterial medium rather than with matter, and
Newton's problem of discovering gravity's complete causal story, I argue, is one that cannot be
solved.
By way of preliminaries, I note that intend the term 'distance forces' to be neutral with
respect to causal questions.  It refers to forces that operate between spatially separated material
bodies, and which therefore appear to involve action at a distance, but the term itself implies no
answer to the question of what gravity's full causal story might be.  Also, my discussion considers
Newton's speculations as well as those propositions that he asserts.  In his mature work, he came
to draw that distinction sharply, confining hypotheses—whose proper role is only to furnish
5experiments—to unpublished manuscripts or to the queries of the Opticks.  Finally, my analysis
focuses upon Newton's internal reasoning, which is to say the arguments and concepts that he
employs.  So while I do mention certain concepts that Newton lacks, such as energy, and the role
that that absence plays in his reasoning, the problem about gravity that I investigate is a problem
as Newton conceives it, on the basis of his own concepts.
CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM ABOUT THE PLANETARY
MOTIONS
How is the problem about the planetary motions transformed into the problems
 that Newton takes up?
In attempting to explain the planetary motions, Newton sets himself two problems.  First,
he attempts to find the mathematical expression of the force that governs the elliptical planetary
orbits, and in this he brilliantly succeeds.  Second, he attempts to find a physical, causal
explanation of the gravitational force whose mathematical expression he has discovered, by
discovering the substance that communicates the effects and its means of operation. In large
measure, Newton inherits these related problems from Johannes Kepler, and Kepler is therefore a
turning point in the history I trace in this chapter.  I examine some of the conceptual changes that
transformed the problem about the planetary motions, and I note the developments that variously
pushed either the causal problem or the mathematical one into the foreground.  Due to the scope
of this historical path, I cover only the most central figures, beginning with Aristotle.  Newton's
own natural philosophy, that is, his attempt to explain natural phenomena, will differ dramatically
from Aristotle's, however, as we shall see, he shares Aristotle's belief that the universe contains
some generative source of new motion.
ARISTOTLE’S TELEOLOGICAL NATURAL PHILOSOPHY
Aristotle's natural philosophy—his account of natural phenomena—is strongly
teleological.  Natural kinds have internal principles or essences that determine their natural
7changes in accordance with some characteristic telos or end.  This is so of inanimate as well as of
animate substances, and so understanding why a dropped stone falls to earth requires
understanding the end it seeks, just as understanding the growth of a tree, the activity of an
animal, and the motions of the celestial spheres requires understanding their respective ends.
Indeed, understanding why the cosmos is arranged as it is requires an understanding of the
characteristic ends of the substances comprising it.  In reviewing Aristotle's explanations of
change, of motion, and of the cosmos, then, I begin with his account of matter, substance, and
form.
Matter, Substance, and Form
In answer to the question of what basic constituents comprise the world we see, Aristotle
rejects both atomism and monism.  He rejects the views of 5th century atomists such as
Democritus (c. 460 – 360 B.C.), who argued that the universe's basic constituents are tiny,
impenetrable, indivisible, material atoms moving in void space.  Instead, Aristotle denies
atomism and rejects the very possibility of a vacuum or void as incoherent (a position that will
avoid any troublesome implications that matter can act distantly).  And instead of following
monists such as Thales, Anaximenes, or Heraclitus, who tried to reduce all existents to water, air,
or fire, respectively, Aristotle follows Empedocles in accepting four basic material elements:
earth, water, air, and fire.  However, these elements exist only in the region below the moon, and
the celestial spheres in the superlunary region are made of a fifth element, the quintessence or
aether, which is not material.
These elements are not to be identified with substances, for a substance is that which can
exist independently.1  Neither matter nor form can exist independently, and forms, Aristotle
argues against Plato, are immanent; according to Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism, forms are
contained within material substances, as the essence or organizing principle.  In virtue of this
                                                                 
1 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.5: "Some things can exist apart and some cannot, and it is the former that are
substances."
8form or essence, a substance is a kind of thing, as opposed to a mere lump of stuff, having
properties that are characteristic of it as that kind of thing.  The forms of most substances are
complex, in that they cannot be identified with a single property or with a static set of properties.
This is most evident in living organisms, which develop in characteristic ways over time,
actualizing in maturity the potencies possessed in youth.  In living substances the form is the soul.
Aristotle distinguishes three types of soul, nutritive, sensitive, and rational, but common to these
is the shared, fundamental notion of a soul as a principle of self-motion.  Thus the self-moving
celestial spheres are living and indeed intelligent substances.
Aristotle eventually distinguishes three kinds of substance, two of which are sensible.
The first kind of sensible substance is material, and as already noted, there are four material
elements comprising the sublunary realm, earth, water, air, and fire.  Although these elements
differ in their qualities—cold, dry, hot, and moist—they can be converted into one another
because they are all material.  They can also be combined, and to characterize them quite
generally, they are mutable; the nature of matter, and thus of the four sublunary elements, is to
have the potency for change.  The second sort of sensible substance is immutable.  This is the
fifth element, the immaterial aether, which comprises the celestial spheres of the superlunary
realm, of which the heavenly bodies are the visible part.  The third kind of substance is
immaterial, insensible, and immutable.  This is the deity, or Unmoved Mover.  Engaging in pure
contemplation of thought itself, the Unmoved Mover is pure actuality, having no potency for
change.
Change and the Four Causes or Explanatory Principles
Rejecting the Parmenidean position, Aristotle claims on empirical grounds that change is
real.2  And rejecting the atomists' explanation of changes as the results of chance collisions,
                                                                 
2 Whereas Parmenides argued that the appearance of change is illusory, Aristotle (Physics, I.2) argues that changes in
material things are real, for such changes are evident to us by observation:  "To investigate whether Being is one and
9which break up existing aggregates of matter and form new ones, Aristotle presents a strongly
teleological account of change.
All change involves the actualization of some potency existing in a thing capable of being
altered, and is brought about by something capable of producing change.3   In the case of self-
motion, the thing itself brings about the alteration (except insofar as all change must ultimately
have its source in the unchanging and purely actual Unmoved Mover).  For example, the
changing of an acorn into a tree is brought about by the acorn's own form, or internal organizing
principle, which actualizes its potency for being a tree. As this potency is actualized, the matter
persists, but a tree form takes the place of an acorn form.  Since one form takes the place of
another in this example, this is also a case of substantial change, as opposed to qualitative change.
The qualities essential for being an acorn are replaced by those essential for being a tree, and thus
one substance ceases to exist as another takes its place.  In qualitative change, by contrast, only
inessential qualities change, and so the self-same substance persists through the change. Notably,
there is something that persists through substantial change as well as through qualitative change,
namely the matter or substrate.  This notion of a substrate, or prime matter, will prove a vexing
problem over the centuries, and as we will see in a later chapter, Newton's concept of body
eliminates the notion of prime matter.
To understand any change or substance is to understand it in terms of four explanatory
principles, or four causes, as they are more often known.  The material cause is the matter
comprising the entity, while the formal cause is, as already noted, the organizing principle that
gives the entity its essential form.  Aristotle's remaining kinds of causes may be said to
characterize the scientific revolution to the extent that those seeking causal explanations tended to
seek efficient rather than final causes.   The efficient cause is the agent or force that brings about
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
motionless is not a contribution to the science of Nature....We physicists...must take for granted that the things that
exist in nature are, either all or some of them, in motion which is indeed made plain by induction."
3 See Aristotle, Physics, VIII.1: "There must be something capable of being burned before there can be a process of
being burned, and something capable of burning before there can be a process of burning."
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the change, and the final cause is the telos or end—the purpose for which the change occurs.
Crucially, Aristotle does not take the end-seeking behavior in nature to involve any intelligence
or deliberation.4
Although the four causes are conceptually distinct, a single agent often plays the role of
several causes.   This is the case with case with living organisms, whose formal explanation or
essence is also their final explanation or telos.  Thus the essence and telos of a human being is to
live a life of virtue and rational activity; the essence and telos of the celestial spheres is to emulate
the Unmoved Mover, insofar as they can, by moving eternally in perfectly circular motion; and
the essence and telos of the Unmoved Mover is the activity of pure contemplation.
A telos may be internal or external.  The telos of the Unmoved Mover is wholly internal,
depending upon nothing outside that entity; as such, it is not a process that reaches completion
and is therefore eternal.  The perfectly circular motion of the celestial spheres is also an eternal
activity rather than a process reaching completion, though in this case the entities' telos is not
fully internal, depending as it does upon the Unmoved Mover.   By contrast, the telos of a rock is
the center of the universe, and once it reaches the closest point to the center that it can, which is
typically the surface of the Earth, the process is completed and its rectilinear motion ends.  More
generally, any object made up primarily of one or another of the four sublunary elements also has
a telos external to itself; this telos is a spatial location, for the elements have natural places in
Aristotle's cosmos.
                                                                 
4 In Physics, II. 8, Aristotle writes, "Those things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an
internal principle, arrive at some completion: the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any chance
completion, but always the tendency in each is towards the same end, if there is no impediment....It is absurd to
suppose that purpose is not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating.  Art does not deliberate.  If the
ship-building were in the wood, it would produce the same results by nature.  If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is
present also in nature.  The best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself: nature is like that.  It is plain then that nature
is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose."
11
Aristotle's Cosmos
Aristotle's cosmos is geocentric, finite and spherical, comprising three distinct realms.
The inner, sublunary realm is distinct from the outer superlunary realm that contains the celestial
spheres. The moon itself is connected to the innermost celestial sphere, and so moves with the
circular motion characteristic to those spheres.  Each realm has its distinctive kinds of elements
and its distinctive kind of natural motion.
In the inner, sublunary or terrestrial realm, the four material elements are found, as noted
earlier. Each element has its natural place, and occupying the regions closest to the earth's center
were those elements with gravitas.  Thus gravitas or heaviness is a monadic property, as opposed
to a relation, as Newton would later claim.  Gravitas is possessed by both earth and water, but as
the heaviest element, earth's natural place is at the center of the universe.  Therefore the cosmos is
geocentric, with the center of the body Earth coinciding with the center of the universe. Water's
natural place is at the next level, followed by air and then fire, for air and especially fire tend to
rise, having the property of levitas or lightness.
The kind of motion natural to the elements of this realm is rectilinear motion, which is
finite motion.  Since Aristotle denies the possibility of any actual infinitude, including an infinite
line, a straight line must have a starting point and an end point,5 which means that the rectilinear
motions of the sublunary realm must be completed.  For earth and water, the rectilinear motion
natural to them is downward, whereas for air and fire it is upward.  Thus a stone dropped from the
hand will return to the earth in a downward path; since it is made primarily of earth, it seeks the
center of the universe.  (This stone is moving according to its nature, unlike a stone hurled
                                                                 
5 See Aristotle, Physics, VIII.9: "The straight line traversed in rectilinear motion cannot be infinite: for there is no such
thing as an infinite straight line....Now rotary motion can be eternal: but no other motion, whether locomotion or
motion of any other kind, can be so, since in all of them rest must occur and with the occurrence of rest the motion has
perished.  Moreover...rotatory motion is single and continuous, and rectilinear motion is not....In rectilinear motion we
have a definite starting-point, finishing-point, and middle-point, which all have their place in it in such a way hat there
is a point from which that which is in motion can be said to start and a point at which it can be said to finish its course
(for when anything is at the limits of its course, whether at the starting point or at the finishing point, it must be in a
state of rest).  On the other hand in circular motion there are no such definite points: for why should any one point on
the line be a limit rather than any other?"
12
sideways, to which non-natural motion has been imparted and which must be explained in part by
different principles.)  Similarly, the rain falls downward, seeking water's natural place at the
region outside the Earth.  An air bubble trapped in water, by contrast, moves upward, but still its
motion is rectilinear process.  In all of these cases, the rectilinear motion is a process that seeks
completion, and terminates once the natural place is reached.  The air bubble stops once it breaks
free of the water's surface, and the stone stops once it lands on the Earth's surface, which is an
impediment to its actual telos, the universe's center.6  Consequently, if a hollow passage allowed
the stone to reach the Earth's center, the stone would stop immediately upon reaching its telos,
rather than oscillating about the point; and if the body Earth suddenly ceased to exist, the stone
would still seek the same point.
Since the motions natural to elements in the sublunary realm seek completion, will
motion in this realm eventually cease, as each element eventually reaches its natural place?  One
reason that terrestrial things continue to move is that they interfere with each other's efforts to
reach their natural places, as when an air bubble is trapped in water, or twigs are moved by a bird.
Yet the air bubble eventually breaks free of the water.  If sublunary motions seek completion, and
the elements seek their natural places, why has the sublunary realm not become a static set of
nested, concentric spheres of motionless elements?  Aristotle reasons that since motion in the
sublunary continues, it must ultimately derive from some external source. Terrestrial processes,
including the changing seasons, derive their motion from the circulating motions of the
superlunary realm's celestial spheres.
In the outermost, superlunary realm, then, are the celestial spheres, and as noted
previously, the element distinctive to this realm is quintessence or aether.  Unlike the mutable
elements of the sublunary realm, quintessence is incorruptible, that is, unchanging.  (The moon
                                                                 
6 Aristotle, Physics, II. 8: "Those things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal
principle, arrive at some completion: the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any chance
completion, but always the tendency in each is towards the same end, if there is no impediment....In natural products
the sequence is invariable, if there is no impediment."
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too is made of quintessence and therefore smooth and incorruptible.  Galileo's telescopic
observations of a cratered lunar surface would undermine the longstanding belief that celestial
and terrestrial bodies were composed of fundamentally different elements.7)
To explain the planetary motions, Aristotle adopts from his predecessors, Eudoxus and
Calippus, the mathematical device of homocentric spheres, but modifies it by taking the spheres
to be real entities.8  Since the planets are wanderers, their motions could not be explained simply
by claiming each planet was embedded in a single sphere; Aristotle therefore has a more complex
account, in which several spheres are associated with certain planets,9 and a planet is the visible
part of some sphere.  Since much of each sphere is not visible, we see through them to the outer
planets, and finally to the stars.  The motion distinctive to the superlunary realm is, again, the
perfectly circular motion by which the intelligent celestial spheres attempt to emulate the
Unmoved Mover, insofar as they can.  Unlike rectilinear motion, rotatory motion can be eternal,10
and in the immutable, superlunary realm, the celestial spheres engage in a motion that does not
seek completion.11  The claim that the superlunary realm is characterized by eternal and perfectly
circular motion has implications for the location of comets and meteors.  Since any body that
appears only briefly or that moves in a non-circular motion cannot belong to the eternal,
superlunary realm, Aristotle says that comets and meteors are below the moon.12
Although the celestial spheres are, as living, intelligent entities, self-movers, they also in
some manner derive their motion from something outside themselves.  As the motions in the
                                                                 
7 See Galileo's descriptions in Siderius Nuncius, 36, and 40-49, with his drawings to be found on 16 and 44-46.
8 See Munitz, Theories of the Universe, from Babylonian Myth to Modern Science, 62-63.
9 For a discussion of the concentric sphere system, treated generally for Aristotle and for his predecessors, Eudoxus and
Callipus, see Cohen, The Birth of a New Physics, 26.
10 See Aristotle, Physics VIII.9: "Rotatory motion can be eternal: but not other motion...since in all of them rest must
occur and with the occurrence of rest the motion has perished."
11 As Michael Ferejohn noted to me, this may ultimately turn upon the distinction between kinesis and energeia.   I
thank him for a discussion of this issue.
12 See Munitz, Theories of the Universe, from Babylonian Myth to Modern Science, 64.
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sublunary realm would cease if not for the circulating celestial spheres, the spheres themselves
would not move if not for the Unmoved Mover.  For as mentioned earlier, the telos of the
celestial spheres is to emulate the perfect, Unmoved Mover insofar as they can, and the most
perfect activity they can undertake is perfectly circular motion.  For Aristotle, then, a deity is part
of natural philosophy in that he invokes it to explain the ultimate source of motion.  In very
different ways, Newton too will take a deity to belong to natural philosophy, and seek a
generative source of motion.
Physics
In the Physics, Aristotle attempts to explain, among other things, change and especially
motion.  All motion requires a mover.
Everything that is in motion must be moved by something.  For if it has not the source of
its motion in itself it is evident that it is moved by something other than itself, for there
must be something else that moves it.13
Motion is classified as either natural or non-natural ('violent', as it is sometimes termed),
according to the motion's source.  In natural motion, a thing moves itself, in accordance with an
internal principle, that is, its nature, form, or essence.  The animate celestial spheres move
themselves in perfectly circular motion, and an inanimate stone dropped from the hand naturally
moves toward the center of the universe, according to its internal principle.  In these cases, the
explanation of the motion depends primarily upon the formal and final causes.
Non-natural motion, by contrast, is explained primarily by efficient causes, for the
motion produced is not in accordance with the object's nature.  When I push a heavy stone across
the ground, it remains by its nature on the ground, as opposed to traveling upward as is the nature
of fire; however, its sideways motion is non-natural, forced by the continual contact of my hand.
                                                                 
13 Aristotle, Physics, VII.1.
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Similarly, when I hurl a stone through the air to my left, the downward component of its arc
depends upon its own nature, and explains why it eventually lands on the ground, but the
horizontal component is non-natural motion imparted by me. If every motion requires a mover,
why does the stone arc through the air, as opposed to dropping straight down the moment it
leaves my hand?  Since its natural tendency is to move downward in a straight path toward the
Earth's center, and since Aristotle both denies the void and holds that every motion requires a
mover, he must supply an efficient cause of the horizontal component of the stone's arcing
motion.  That cause, he concludes, must be the air; once the stone leaves my hand, the air before
it is pushed around and behind the stone, where it continues to push the stone from the back.
Aristotle's medieval followers would replace this unlikely explanation of projectile
motion, however much of Aristotelian physics would remain compelling for centuries, largely
because it agrees with common experience.  We do not feel the Earth's rotation, and Aristotle
holds that the Earth is stationary.  It looks to us as though the sun and stars are revolving around
the Earth, and Aristotle says that they are. It seems that every motion requires a mover, just as
Aristotle asserts in his Physics, for we never observe objects moving inertially, in the absence of
any force.  It seems that no force is needed for a rock tossed up by force to fall back to Earth, and
Aristotle agrees, saying that the falling rock is not responding to a force but only seeking its
natural place.  Eventually, the geocentric model would be replaced by a heliocentric one; circular
motions would give way to elliptical orbits; efficient causes would largely supplant final ones; the
law of inertia would do away with the belief that all motion requires a mover; the beliefs in
distinct kinds of matter and distinct sublunary and superlunary realms would be erased; and
Newton would unify the phenomena of earthly projectiles and planetary orbits under a single
explanation. Some first steps away from Aristotle would be taken by the medievals, who yet
preserved much of his system.
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THE MEDIEVALS AND COPERNICUS
The medieval view of the natural world was fundamentally Aristotelian, in that it was
fundamentally teleological.  Scholastic thinkers retained Aristotle's belief that natural kinds have
essential natures, and that each natural change undergone by an entity, including so-called natural
motions, is explicable in terms of the telos or end peculiar to that kind of entity.  The belief that
things in the celestial realm were composed of a fundamentally different element than those of
the terrestrial realm retained its grip, as did the belief that the celestial spheres were characterized
by perfectly circular motion. This latter belief would, ironically, prove instrumental to
Copernicus' model, which split with its geocentric forerunners and led Kepler to realize that the
planetary orbits were not circular but elliptical.
Medieval Accounts of Motion
In the Aristotelian scheme, it will be recalled, there was no categorical difference
between a natural motion through space and any other kind of natural change, since a natural
motion through space was explicable in terms of an internal principle.  However, the Aristotelian
scheme did distinguish between natural and non-natural motions, since the former's explanation
lay in an internal principle and the latter's in some external body that forced the motion.
Medieval explanations of motion retained this distinction, and much of Aristotle's account of
natural and non-natural motions.
Yet Aristotle's explanation of projectile motion was unconvincing.  Without the law of
inertia introduced much later by Descartes, the medievals continued to believe, with Aristotle,
that every motion requires a cause.  Therefore, replacing Aristotle's account of projectile motion
meant fashioning a replacement cause for the horizontal component of the motion.  Whereas
Aristotle held that the cause was something external that must remain in contact with the
projectile, specifically, the air that pushed the object from behind, John Buridan (1300-1358) and
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his followers introduced the concept of impetus.14  In throwing the stone, they argued, I transfer
an impetus, a capacity for motion to it; but since impetus gradually wears away, the stone
eventually falls to earth, following its natural tendency to seek the earth's center.  While the
concept of impetus was distinctively medieval, it was easily incorporated into the fundamentally
Aristotelian explanatory system.  It retained the common-sense assumption, held universally until
the 17th century, that any motion not produced by an object's own power or principle requires
some continual force or action, whether by an external agent that remains in continual contact or
by an external agent that is transferred to the body.
Since the medievals retained not only the belief that all motion requires a mover but also
the belief that the celestial and terrestrial realms are fundamentally different, the impetus theory
for projectile motion has no counterpart in their explanation of planetary motions.
The Medieval Geocentric Cosmos
Ideas about the cosmos were strongly influenced by Aristotle during the medieval period,
however the period was also characterized by a separation between causal explanations and
geometric models of the cosmos, with the latter taking precedence over the former.  Aristotle's
causal story about the planetary motions now bore the stamp of some Islamic thinkers; the nested
spheres carrying the planets, formerly made of quintessence, had become solid, crystalline
spheres.15  This causal account lacked serious competitors, but still did not invite conviction.  The
geometric models needed to account for observations tended to undermine belief that the
crystalline spheres could be real.
The model that served as the basis, being modified rather than replaced by medieval
thinkers, was that of Ptolemy (Claudius Ptolemaeus, c. 90-168 A.D.).  The model was both
                                                                 
14 Buridan's notion of impetus had precursors in the 6th century thought of John Philoponus, and according to
Philoponus, in Hipparchus, a Hellenistic astronomer whose theory Philoponus cites.  On this point see Kuhn, The
Copernican Revolution, 119.
15 Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 20. See also Cohen, The Birth of a New Physics, 27.
18
geocentric and geostatic, to borrow Cohen's term, with sun and planets circling an immobile
earth.  To account for observations such as the apparently retrograde motion of some planets,
Ptolemy employed a complex set of epicycles and other devices inherited in part from his
predecessors.  These devices included the equant, which characterized a body as moving
circularly about a point but at a non-uniform rate.16  The equant would become a target of
criticism by Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543), and its elimination a significant advantage that he
would claim for his own, non-geocentric model.  For Copernicus remained committed to
Aristotle's attribution of perfectly circular, uniform motion for the celestial bodies, a commitment
compromised by Ptolemy's equant.17  Ptolemy had his own Aristotelian commitments, however.
While he might have developed a simpler model by following the heliocentric example of
Aristarchus (c. 310-230 B.C.), he rejected Aristarchus' model on the grounds that a moving Earth
conflicted with Aristotle's doctrine of the element earth's gravitas and natural place.18
Ptolemy made no realist claims for the geometric devices of his model,19 and the
medieval astronomers who produced variants of his model similarly tended to leave such
questions aside.  Their task was only to develop geometric models that "saved the
phenomena"—that were consistent with observations—not to represent physical reality or explain
how the celestial bodies moved.  The position that astronomy's goals were so circumscribed
perhaps drew some strength from the crystalline sphere hypothesis.  It was an unlikely causal
explanation, since real crystalline spheres could not easily be reconciled with the deferents and
epicycles needed to account for the astronomical data.20 Yet the existence of a possible or even
                                                                 
16 On the equant and Copernicus' objections to it, see Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, 70-72.  See also Butterfield,
The Origins of Modern Science, 25.
17 See Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 25.
18 See Butterfield, ibid., 33.
19 Cohen, The Birth of a New Physics, 29.
20 The epicycles needed to account for apparently retrograde motion immediately give rise to vexing questions such as
the following.  Would a circular epicycle drawn itself represent a solid sphere, one smaller than the main sphere it
intersects, and if so, how might a planet move from the greater sphere to the smaller one?
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unsatisfactory explanation can keep a question at bay.  As we shall see later, it was after the
existence of real crystalline spheres had been definitively disproved that one theorist at least
(Johannes Kepler) became preoccupied with the causal question.  In trying to answer that causal
question, Kepler would defend a model for which he was indebted to Copernicus.
Copernicus
The model that Copernicus set out in De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (On the
Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres21) had revolutionary potential, but was not in itself
revolutionary. Indeed, a prime advantage that Copernicus claimed for his theory, one mentioned
earlier, is that it did away with Ptolemy's equants, thereby preserving the uniform circular motion
that Aristotle had associated with the immutable, celestial realm.  And though Copernicus' model
was nearly as complex as Ptolemy's—and no more accurate—he had good grounds for
considering it more geometrically elegant.  Among other things, it implied the retrograde motion
observed for some planets to be only apparent; it explained why such observations were not made
for Mercury and Venus, except when those planets lay at inferior conjunction; and it explained
why those same planets are never observed at 180o away from the sun, as is the case for Mars,
Jupiter, and Saturn.22  All of these results were implied by Copernicus' placement of the bodies,
for his model was not geocentric.
But while the model was not geocentric, neither was it heliocentric, as were some of the
so-called Copernican models it would later inspire. (I shall follow the tradition of using the term
'Copernican' to refer to such models, which derive from Copernicus but differ from it in critical
features.)  The heliocentric model that Galileo would defend placed the sun at the center of
circular planetary paths.  Kepler's model might be called 'heliofocal', for it located the sun at the
                                                                 
21 Ernan McMullin notes that the title of Copernicus' work should be translated using the term "spheres" rather that
"bodies", since "'orbis' for him meant a [crystalline] sphere, not a planet or merely a 'body,' as the more usual
translation of the title would suggest."  See McMullin, "The Origins of the Field Concept in Physics", 17.
22 On these and related points, see Cohen, The Birth of a New Physics, 38.
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focus of elliptical orbits. Copernicus' own model, however, was not heliocentric but only
heliostatic, to borrow Cohen's term.  The sun was immobile, but it did not coincide with the
center of the universe or the planetary paths.  Instead, Copernicus took the center to be the mean
of the planetary paths, paths given by inaccurate data that were not to be improved upon until
Tycho Brahe's meticulous observations. This point lay slightly outside the sun, and did not
correspond to any real body—a feature that would be critical to Kepler's response.  (Also critical
to Kepler's response would be the absence of causal claims, for Copernicus made no claims about
the sun acting upon the other celestial bodies.23)
Copernicus' non-geocentric model had revolutionary potential, then, because it would
inspire heliocentric and heliofocal models, but also because it had causal implications.
Copernicus himself made no causal claims, avoiding the question of whether the crystalline
spheres were real.24  Since disproof of that hypothesis would wait until the next generation, and
since astronomers were agreed upon the goal of saving the phenomena, there was no call to
augment his geometric model with causal claims.  Yet the model had causal implications.  If it
represented the actual positions of the celestial bodies (and the question of whether Copernicus
himself thought so remains controversial25), then the Aristotelian physics could not be correct.
According to the Aristotelian view, the celestial bodies were light whereas earth was very
heavy, possessing the monadic property of gravitas.  To suppose that the Copernican model
represented actual relations among the celestial bodies was to suppose that the Earth was simply a
planet, along with Mercury, Venus, and Mars.  This suggested in turn that the Earth and the
                                                                 
23 See Hesse, Forces and Fields, 127.
24 See McMullin, "The Origins of the Field Concept in Physics", 17: "Despite his [Copernicus'] frequent references to
'spheres,' he prudently stayed away from the long-disputed issue of their nature.  It was not clear how, if the spheres
were taken to be solid to perform their carrier function, they could be compatible with the minor epicycles that the
Copernican system still required."
25 When Copernicus' work was finally published in 1543, it contained a cautionary preface stating that the model's
relations among the heavenly bodies that need not be taken as physically real, however as Johannes Kepler later
discovered, the preface's author was not Copernicus but a Lutheran clergyman Andreas Osiander.  As McMullin notes
(Newton on Matter and Activity, 280), Galileo argued that Copernicus did believe his model to represent the celestial
bodies' actual relations.
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planets had the same composition, undermining the claim that the element earth possessed
gravitas, while the planets were made of the aethereal quintessence.  And without the claim that
different elements had different natures and, concomitantly, both different characteristic kinds of
motions (rectilinear for earth and circular for quintessence) and different natural places, one was
left without any explanation of how the celestial bodies move. If the heavy Earth moved, then the
motion of planets could not be a function of their aethereal composition. Similarly, without the
claim that the nature of the element earth is to seek the center of the universe, one was left
without an explanation of why stones released from heights fall to Earth.  The motion of celestial
bodies and of terrestrial gravitational effects became mysterious.  Such concerns prompted
political philosopher Jean Bodin to reject the notion of a moving earth.
No one in his senses, or imbued with the slightest knowledge of physics, will ever think
that the earth, heavy and unwieldy from its own weight and mass, staggers up and down
around its own center and that of the sun; for at the slightest jar of the earth, we would
see cities and fortresses, towns and mountains thrown down....For if the earth were to be
moved, neither an arrow shot straight up, nor a stone dropped from the top of a tower
would fall perpendicularly, but either straight ahead or behind....Lastly, all things on
finding places suitable to their natures, remain there, as Aristotle writes.  Since therefore
the earth has been allotted a place fitting its nature, it cannot be whirled around by other
motion than its own.26
These objections, which because of the inaccessible nature of Copernicus' book were raised
significantly after its first appearance, would persist through Galileo's famous defense of a
heliocentric cosmos. The question of why, on the hypothesis of a moving earth, objects projected
straight up into the air fall back to the launching spot, rather than ahead or behind it, would not be
answered until the old belief that all motion requires a mover had been abandoned.27  The
                                                                 
26 Jean Bodin, Universae Naturae Theatrum, 1597, trans. by Dorothy Stimson, quoted in Kuhn, The Copernican
Revolution, 190.
27 Galileo gives an experimental argument against the Aristotelians in his Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World
Systems.  When asked whether an object dropped from the mast of a ship will land at different points on the deck,
depending upon whether the ship is resting or moving, Simplicio, the Aristotelian, replies that it will; it will land at the
foot of the mast for the resting ship, but behind the mast for a moving ship.  The character of Salviati then presents
Galileo's experimental results that in fact the object will land at the mast's foot regardless of whether the ship is resting
or moving.  Kepler's response, part of his incorrect theory of attractive force, is that the earth's magnetic virtue would
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questions of how the earth could move, and why stones released from heights fall to Earth, if not
because seeking their natural places, would of course be taken up by Newton.  Yet Newton's
theory would not provide a causal explanation to satisfy either himself or his critics.  Aristotle's
theory, meanwhile, supplied causal explanations that to Copernicus' critics were preferable to his
more elegant geometrical model, and to those of his defenders, Galileo and Kepler.
GALILEO AND KEPLER
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), contemporaries and
correspondents, applied mathematical methods to motion.  Kepler's most enduring contributions
were his empirical laws for the elliptical orbits, while Galileo's were his quantitative treatment of
terrestrial motion and his steps toward a concept of inertia.  The contributions of the two thinkers
would converge with Newton's unification of terrestrial projectiles and planetary orbits under a
single explanation.
Galileo
 Galileo helped set the course of modern science largely by abandoning the Aristotelian
worldview.  In The Assayer of 1623, Galileo rejects the Aristotelian doctrine of substantial forms
by distinguishing subjective or sense-dependent properties, such as color and warmth, from
objective properties such as shape and speed.28  He also abandons the Aristotelian preoccupation
with final causes, a critical move for his quantitative treatment of motion.
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
hold and drag the projectile, is given in Mysterium Cosmographicum, vol. 16, 196 (quoted in Max Jammer, Concepts of
Force, 84-85): "How is it possible that a sphere, thrown vertically upward—while the earth rotates meanwhile—does
return to the same place?  The answer is that not only the earth, but together with the earth, the magnetic invisible
chains rotate by which the stone is attached to the underlying and neighboring parts of the earth and by which it is
retained to the earth by the shortest, that is, the vertical line." The problem would be solved by Huygens.
28 Galileo classifies shape (length in particular) and motion (speed) as objective, observer-independent qualities; his
view would of course be overturned centuries later with Einstein's relativistic physics.  Galileo explains in these
excerpts from The Assayer: "Tastes, odors, colors, etc., so far as their objective existence is concerned, are nothing but
mere names for something which resides exclusively in the sensitive body (corpo sensitivo), so that if the perceiving
creatures were removed, all of these qualities would be annihilated and abolished from existence.  But just because we
have given special names to these qualities, different from the names we have given to the primary and real properties,
we are tempted into believing that the former really and truly exist as well as the latter....If ears, tongues, and noses be
taken away, the number, shape, and motion of bodies would remain, but not their tastes, sounds, and odors....I confess
myself to be very much inclined to believe that heat, too, is of this sort." (The Assayer, 56-57, 59, 60.)
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Galileo's Aristotelian predecessors and contemporaries explained motion as a kind of
change, and explained all changes in terms of a substance's telos, which is to say a future-directed
end.  In many cases, an object's telos was a spatial location, because each of the elements had
some natural place. Understanding the motion of a released stone therefore meant discovering the
element of which the stone was primarily composed (earth), and the spatial location natural to
that element (the center of the universe, and thus of the body Earth).  On the Aristotelian view,
then, only one spatial point in an object's trajectory was salient to an understanding of its motion,
namely, the terminal point.  Since the rest of the trajectory was not relevant to the motion, this
account of motion was not conducive to the quantitative treatment of trajectories critical to the
scientific revolution.
When it is said, then, that Galileo asked how bodies move instead of asking why they
move, we should not understand this to mean that Galileo took no interest in causation at all.  For
he did sometimes seek the efficient causes of motions, that is, the prior events and conditions
producing the motions.29 We should instead understand this slogan to mean that Galileo eschewed
the search for final causes.  In so doing, he turned his attention not only to the terminal point in a
body's trajectory, but to the entire trajectory. Thus he advanced from the known fact that falling
bodies accelerate to a discovery of their rate of acceleration, and from the known fact that
projectiles have curved paths to the discovery that the curve is parabolic.30
Galileo did not fully break free of Aristotelian assumptions, and this is evident in his
concept of inertia.  His concept was an advance, for unlike Kepler, who took inertia to be a
tendency toward rest, Galileo's concept broke with the old idea that all motion requires a mover,
by allowing some continuous states of motion to qualify as natural.  However, it was not
                                                                 
29 According to E.A. Burtt, Galileo distinguished secondary (immediate) causes, which were specific motions, from
primary (ultimate) causes, which were forces such as gravity.  Galileo managed to avoid the temptation to speculate
about gravity's nature, instead conceding that it was unknown to him. See Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of
Modern Physical Science: A Historical and Critical Essay, 91-92.
30 Galileo's early, unfinished book, De motu, would use the concept of impetus to try to explain motion, but as his work
in mechanics progressed, he abandoned the notion, moving closer to the concept of inertial motion.  He did not fully
articulate it because he continued to identify natural motion with circular motion.
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rectilinear motion that he took to be natural or unimpeded, but circular motion.  An object moving
without restraint, Galileo held, would follow the curve of the earth.31  Hence Galileo did not
construe circular motion as motion produced by a force.  His attachment to ancient ideas about
circular motion is also evident in the model of the cosmos he defended.  In his heliocentric model,
one that was much simpler than Copernicus' and which he took to represent the real relations
among the celestial bodies, the planetary paths were circular.32   Thus Galileo followed the
ancient belief in circular path, taking no account of Kepler's results, which showed the planetary
paths to be elliptical.
Kepler and the Astronomical Tradition of Geometric Models
Kepler's model of the cosmos, though inspired by Copernicus' model,33 differed on
several critical points.  First, Kepler rejected all elements of a model that he regarded as "purely
geometric assumptions", including some epicycles that Copernicus had retained.  Instead, Kepler
                                                                 
31 See Westfall, "Galileo was thinking in similar terms [i.e., in terms of natural, circular motion] when he confronted
the problem of motion on a spinning earth, and the concept of inertia that he formulated reflects [this]....What is a
horizontal plane? It is of course a plane which is everywhere 'equally distant from the center.'  Inertial motion was
conceived as uniform circular motion, the natural motion of a body in its natural place in a well-ordered universe." (The
Construction of Modern Science, 19.)
32 On this point, see Westfall: "Even in formulating a new conception of motion, he [Galileo] was bound by elements of
the old cosmology.  His universe was not an impersonal universe of mechanical laws and matter in motion.  It was a
cosmos, rather, organized by infinite intelligence.  As such, it was ordered, inevitably, according to the perfect figure,
the circle. Following the old tradition, Galileo held that...circular motion alone is compatible with an ordered cosmos.
Only in a circle can a body move forever in its natural place, maintaining always the same distance from the same
point, and only in circular motions can the bodies of the cosmos retain forever their primordial relations. Rectilinear
motion implies disorder; a body removed from its natural place returns to it along a straight line. Once there, it remains
in its place by resuming a natural circular motion.  Thus the astronomy of the Dialogue was such as no professional
astronomer could have accepted.  Published over twenty years after Kepler's Astronomia Nova, the Dialogue, which
intended to support the heliocentric system, ignored Kepler's conclusions....It discussed the Copernican system as
though each planet moved in a simple circular orbit." (Ibid., 18.)
33 Galileo similarly defended a model based upon that of Copernicus, but dispensing with many elements.   As Peter
Machamer notes, "The Copernican theory that Galileo was constructing was a physical realization of parts of
Copernicus' theory, which, by the way, dispensed with all the mathematical trappings (eccentrics, epicycles, Tusi
couples and the like)." ("Galileo", 6-7.)  There were also important differences between Kepler and Galileo. In
particular, Galileo followed Copernicus in accepting circular paths for the planets.
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sought a physical explanation of the planetary motions, and the only paths to appear in his model
would be those correlated with the motions of real bodies.34
Second, Kepler abandoned the longstanding belief that planetary paths were circular.
Although Kepler shared his predecessors' tendency to associate circular motion with divine
providence35, and though they shared his goal of devising models that accounted for the empirical
data, Kepler had far more data at his disposal, inherited from Brahe.  Once his laborious efforts to
understand Mars' motions were complete, Kepler achieved the result that would be the basis for
his so-called First Law of elliptical orbits.36  He concluded that the planet's path was elliptical,
and that the sun was positioned at one focus of the ellipse.
The sun's position was a third, key departure from the Copernican system.  In Copernicus'
model, the sun was merely near the center of the planetary paths, as noted previously.  Its position
therefore did not suggest any causal relation to the planetary paths.   Kepler, however, became
preoccupied with causal questions, partly because Tycho Brahe's observations of the 1577 comet
had translated earlier misgivings about the crystalline spheres into a sure demonstration that they
did not exist.  The comet's trajectory passed through the area allegedly occupied by the crystalline
spheres carrying Mercury and Venus.  Since those spheres would have been shattered by the
comet had they been real, Brahe concluded that they could not exist as solid bodies.37   For
Kepler, this result shifted the question of how the planets moved into the foreground.  If no
spheres existed to carry the planets around, what caused them to move?
                                                                 
34 Kepler's notes on a 1616 letter from Maestlin:  "I call my hypotheses physical for two reasons...My aim is to assume
only those things of which I do not doubt they are real and consequently physical, where one must refer to the nature of
the heavens, not the elements.  When I dismiss the perfect excentric and the epicyle, I do so because they are purely
geometric assumptions, for which a corresponding body does not exist.  The second reason for my calling my
hypotheses physical is this...I prove that the irregularity of the motion [of planets] corresponds to the nature of the
planetary sphere, i.e., is physical." The quote appears in Holton, "Johannes Kepler's Universe: Its Physics and
Metaphysics", 346.
35 See Brackenridge: "Despite his description of planetary motion as elliptical, the circle remained the primary element
for Kepler in his understanding of the archetypal cause central to God's plan of the universe, and that understanding
was strengthened by his complementary concern for physical cause." (The Key to Newton's Dynamics, 12.)
36 Kepler discovered his so-called Second Law—that equal areas are swept out in equal times—before the other two.
See Holton, "Johannes Kepler's Universe: Its Physics and Metaphysics", 344.
37 See Stephenson, Kepler's Physical Astronomy, 26.  See also Donahue, "Kepler", 251.
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The empirical "laws" that Kepler produced brought him a partial answer to that causal
question.   The fact of elliptical rather than circular paths eliminated the ancient explanation of
the planets' motion, according to which circular motion was natural to them.  The sun's position at
a focus instead suggested that the planetary paths were caused by the sun.  This causal relation
was further suggested by Kepler's Third Law, which related a planet's speed to its distance from
the sun.
Because it is apparent that in so far as any planet is more distant from the sun than the
rest, it moves the more slowly—so that the ratio of the periodic times is the ratio of the
3/2th powers of the distances of the sun.  Therefore we reason from this that the sun is the
source of movement...The closer any one planet approaches the sun during any time, it is
borne with an increase of velocity in exactly the ratio of the square.38
This was a critical break not only with his predecessors, but also with his contemporaries,
including his teacher Michael Maestlin, who urged him to "leave physical causes out of account,
and explain astronomical matters only according to astronomical method with the aid of
astronomical, not physical, causes and hypotheses."39  Yet Kepler resisted such circumscribed
goals, sharing the view that perhaps motivated Plato in his Timaeus—though the universe
operates according to mathematical harmonies, mathematics can only describe motion, not
produce it.  Thus he emphasized that a geometric point cannot determine motion:  "A
mathematical point, whether or not it is the centre of the world, can neither effect the motion of
heavy bodies nor act as an object toward which they tend".40  In his model and his causal
conception, he therefore replaced Copernicus' mathematical point with a body, the sun.
The seat to be assigned to this same source of movement is not in any mathematical
point, very near to the most noble body [the sun], but rather in that most noble body, for
                                                                 
38 Kepler, Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, IV.3: 55.
39 Michael Maestlin, Letter of October 1, 1616, quoted in Holton, "Johannes Kepler's Universe: Its Physics and
Metaphysics", 345.
40 Kepler, Author's Introduction, New Astronomy, 54.
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three reasons:  first, in order for us to avoid the absurdity that the source of
movement...should be very near to the heart of the world, but nevertheless should not be
at the very heart of the world, namely the sun; secondly, because the motor force cannot
reside in a mathematical point but requires a body, namely the heart of the world, the sun;
thirdly, because the motor force absolutely demands for itself the centre of the world,
where the sun itself is: just as stillness belongs to the surface of the world, so movement
belongs to the inside....Copernicus...places that common node of the planets very near to
the sun, but not in the sun itself.41
In asserting that the sun causes the planetary motions, Kepler was, as Goldstein and Hon have
argued, forging the new concept of a planetary orbit:  the path of a body through space, as
governed by a force.42  The planetary paths were not natural circular motions produced by
teleological internal principles, as the Aristotelians had argued, nor should they be treated as mere
geometrical forms; they were the elliptical trajectories of bodies moving under the influence of
the sun's "motor force" (anima motrix).
So, setting himself against the astronomical tradition of his time, Kepler includes the
sun's force upon the planets as one of the "physical forces", or as he sometimes writes, "bodily
forces"43 that he is trying to explain, as the causal power of one body to act upon another.
Kepler's "physical forces", Presented through "calculation and geometry"
Having identified the sun as the source of the motor force, Kepler hoped to discover the
nature of the physical force that produced elliptical orbits, and to be able to represent it
mathematically.  He expressed these related goals in1605, while composing his Astronomia Nova.
                                                                 
41 Kepler, Epitome of Copernican Astronomy IV.3: 70-71.
42 Goldstein and Hon argue that the concept of an orbit originates with Kepler, and that he considered an orbit to be
"the trajectory of a planet that results from physical causes expressed as laws." ("Kepler's Move from Orbs to Orbits:
Documenting a Revolutionary Scientific Concept", 105.)  In Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, Kepler gives this
definition:  "What is understood by the name 'orbit'?  Properly speaking, it is that line [i.e., curve] which the planet
describes around the sun by means of the centre of its body.  For example, in the diagram, if ECGD is a part of the
plane of the ecliptic, HCFD will be the orbit." (Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, 999m quoted in Goldstein and Hon,
op.cit., 94.)
43 Kepler states in his 1607 letter to D. Fabricius that he uses "bodily forces".  This excerpt appears in Holton,
"Johannes Kepler's Universe: Its Physics and Metaphysics", 345.
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I am much occupied with the investigation of the physical causes.  My aim in this is to
show that the celestial machine is to be likened not to a divine organism but rather to a
clockwork...insofar as nearly all the manifold movements are carried out by means of a
single, quite simple magnetic force...This physical conception is to be presented through
calculation and geometry.44
As a number of commentators have observed, the full title of this work—Astronomia Nova:
Physica Coelestis—expressed Kepler's goal of uniting astronomy and physics.  He sought to
extend the search for physical causes to the heavens, and then bring astronomy's mathematical
methods to bear upon them.  It was the formulation of this goal, rather than success in achieving
it, that would be an enduring contribution.  For Kepler's pursuit of this goal, together with his
empirical laws, paved the way for a belief that would be fully accepted only later, with Descartes'
law of inertial motion: the belief in a central, attractive force.  Kepler's efforts to characterize the
sun's force mathematically failed, and though he had sufficient confidence in his theory of the
orbits to continue developing it in qualitative terms, it turned out to be fundamentally incorrect.
Newton would pursue similar goals, but after succeeding in the mathematical quest, write that
gravity's "physical cause" eluded him.45
 According to Kepler's physical theory, which drew upon William Gilbert's magnetic
theory, the planetary orbits are produced by a combination of the sun's active faculty upon the
planets' passive but resistive tendency.
Besides the motor force of the sun there is also a natural inertia of the planets themselves
with respect to movement: hence by reason of their matter they are inclined to remain in
their own place.  So the motor power of the sun [potentia vectoria] and the powerlessless
or material inertia of the planet are at war with one another.  Each has its share of victory:
the motor power moves the planet from its seat; the material inertia removes its own, i.e.,
the planetary, body somewhat from those bonds by which it was laid hold of by the sun,
so that it is laid hold of first by one part and then by another part of this circle of
                                                                 
44 Letter to Herwart von Hohenburg, February 10, 1605, quoted in Holton, "Johannes Kepler's Universe: Its Physics and
Metaphysics", 342.
45 Galileo, like Newton, considered gravity's ultimate nature a mystery.
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virtue...that is, by the part which comes next after the part from which the planet has just
loosed itself.46
The sun has an active power or "motor soul", by which it moves the planets.  This active power
should not be identified with intelligence, however.  Kepler emphasizes in the Epitome that the
sun's motor soul is not intelligence but rather something like "material necessity".47  Here Kepler
rejects Aristotle's notion that the celestial bodies are living and intelligent.  Of course, the notion
of material necessity could be compatible with an Aristotelian picture if one construed it
teleologically, in terms of a form or essence that guides end-seeking motions.  And Kepler does
not free himself of ideas about form.  When the analogy to magnetism fails, he tries to explain the
causal interaction of the sun and planets by drawing upon Neo-Platonic ideas.  Yet the passive
faculty is associated with matter, he writes opaquely, the active "smells more of form".48  Still, he
has abandoned the ancient preoccupation with final causes, and is instead trying to explain the
action of the sun in terms of efficient causes.
Unlike the sun, the planets lack a motor soul, and consequently would not move if they
were not in the vicinity of the sun's active faculty.  The planets are made of matter, matter is inert,
and according to Kepler, inertia is a tendency toward rest.49  However, to be inert is not to lack
                                                                 
46 Kepler, Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, IV.3, 59.
47 See Kepler: "There is no need of these intelligences, as will be proved....On the contrary, the elliptic figure of the
route of the planet and the laws of the movements whereby such a figure is caused smell of the nature of the balance or
of material necessity, rather than of the conception and determination of the mind." (Epitome of Copernican
Astronomy, IV.2, 52-53.)  In the next section, Kepler continues: "There is absolutely no need of mind for the functions
of movement....The laying hold of the planetary bodies, which the rotation of the sun makes to revolve, is a bodily
virtue, not animal, not mental." (Ibid., IV.3, 57.)  So again, the sun and planets are not intelligent, contra Aristotle.  Of
course, the notion of material necessity could be compatible with an Aristotelian picture if one construed it
teleologically, in terms of an internal principle or essence that guides end-seeking motions and other changes.  Kepler's
concept of material necessity, however, seems to be one of efficient rather than final causation.
48 Kepler, Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, IV.3, 58.  See also IV.3, 60-61, where Kepler rhetorically raises the
question of whether the sun's material power, once extended into the ether, constitutes a power without a subject.  He
replies that he has not postulated a power without a subject:  "At the very source the subject of the natural faculty is the
body of the sun, or the threads stretching out from the centre to its circumference; thus even in this very emanation, I
think a rational distinction should be made between the immaterial form [speciem] of the solar body, which flows as far
as the planets and beyond, and its force or energy which actually lays hold of the planet and moves it—so that the form
is the subject of the force, though it is not a body but an immaterial form of a body."
49 See Kepler, Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, IV.2, 54 and 55: "A celestial globe is not heavy in the way in which
a stone on the earth is said to be heavy...nevertheless by reason of its matter it has a natural...powerlessness of crossing
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resistive powers.  Kepler recognizes that a body lacking resistive power could be accelerated to
infinite velocity, contrary to observations.
If the celestial bodies were not endowed with inertia, something similar to weight, no
force would be needed for their movement from their place; the smallest motive force
would suffice to impart to them an infinite velocity.50
Since the inert or powerless nature of matter still includes a resistive tendency, the planets resist
the sun's attractive force.  This resistance is the "share of victory" that Kepler mentions, and the
explanation of why the planets remain in their orbits rather than being drawn into the sun.
Yet recognition of matter's resistive tendencies does not begin with Kepler.  His concept
of inertia is the tendency toward rest, the old concept that supports the belief that all motion
requires a mover.  His theory therefore includes a force to provide the tangential component of
the planets' motion, as well as a force to explain the radial component.   The tangential
component is supplied by a "bodily virtue", emitted in straight lines by the sun as it revolves on
its axis.  Kepler suggests that these lines of virtue lay hold of the planets and move them, in a
manner similar to that by which a loadstone turns an iron pointer, without bodily contact.  The
radial component is supplied by the sun's "energetic faculty of attracting or repulsing and
retaining the planet".51
Kepler would therefore be remembered for his three "laws"—empirical generalizations
which Newton would later derive from the laws of motion and gravity's inverse square relation to
distance—for his physical theory was fundamentally incorrect.  He thought the attractive force
was restricted to certain kinds of bodies rather than being universal, and that it held in virtue of
some affinity between like forms.  He had not distinguished mass from weight and thus could not
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
from place to place, and it has a natural inertia or rest whereby it rests in every place where it is placed alone....Any
globe, placed in any place on the world beyond the motor virtues, naturally rests in that place, because matter, as such,
has no faculty of transporting its body from place to place."
50 Kepler, De causis planetarum, quoted in Jammer, Concepts of Mass, 55.   
51 Kepler, Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, IV.3, 58.
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construe the attractive force as proportional to mass.  He retained the old concept of inertia as a
tendency toward rest, he construed force as the cause of motion rather than acceleration, and he
attributed the tangential component of the planets' motions to the sun's activity.  He believed the
attractive force to hold between like substances rather than among matter universally.52  And
because he thought that the sun's virtue was emitted only in the plane of the planetary orbits, he
rejected his initial suggestion of an inverse square relation, concluding instead that the sun's force
on the planets diminishes as1/r.
But though Kepler's physical theory cannot be construed as a preliminary version of
Newton's, there are still some interesting similarities.  Kepler and Newton are both committed to
the old physics of finding physical causes even as they develop the new physics of mathematical
deducibility, devoting a great deal of effort to understanding the force that explained the planetary
orbits in terms of some substance.  And the search for causes aside, Newton in some manner
unifies physics and astronomy, a project Kepler had begun.  Both retain the Scholastic notion that
matter has a resistive power, though Kepler pairs this with the ancient concept of inertia, and
Newton with the Cartesian concept.   (Thus Kepler holds matter to be powerless to move itself,
and in need of some external power for continued motion. Newton, on the other hand, attributes
the continuance of any state of motion or rest to the vis inertiae, which gives rise to his three laws
of motion.  Newton's variant of Kepler's claim that matter is powerless is, as we shall see, the
principle that matter cannot initiate motion.) Also, Kepler and Newton both try to explain natural
phenomena in terms of both active and passive faculties.  Descartes, by contrast, eliminates active
powers from his physics, holding matter to be passive and explaining all changes in motion as the
transfers of motion by contact among the passive material bodies.
                                                                 
52 But see Jammer, Concepts of Force, 84, who quotes Kepler as saying the following: "The familiar behavior of falling
bodies and the majestic sweep of the moon in its orbit were all part of the same great scheme."
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DESCARTES
In his Principles of Philosophy, Descartes develops what comes to be known as his
mechanical philosophy, a physics that strictly distinguishes matter from minds and that he hopes
will replace the Scholastic philosophy's teleological explanations.  Material bodies do not have
the variety of diverse natures ascribed to them by the Scholastics.  Instead, all matter has the same
nature, and its nature is to be extended:  "The nature of body consists not in weight, hardness,
colour, or the like, but simply in extension."53  Thus space and body are identical: "There is no
real difference between space and corporeal substance....The difference between space and
corporeal substances lies in our way of conceiving them."54  This implies a plenum, clearly
enough, and Descartes states the implication directly; since there is no distinction between the
extension of space and the extension of body, all space is filled and to suppose a void area of
space would be a contradiction.55   Descartes rejects atomism as well as the void, on the grounds
that the doctrine of atomism holds the particles to be indivisible, yet such a claim would diminish
the power of God, who surely could divide any substance he created.56
In this material plenum, there is no real distinction between action and passion.  Whereas
Kepler treated the distinction between action and passion as real, attributing active powers to the
                                                                 
53 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Part II.4 in CSM, 224.
54 Ibid., II.11-12 in CSM, 227-228.
55 Ibid., II.16-17 in CSM, 229: "16.  It is a contradiction to suppose there is such thing as a vacuum, i.e. that in which
there is nothing whatsoever. The impossibility of a vacuum, in the philosophical sense of that in which there is no
substance whatsoever, is clear from the fact that there is no difference between the extension of a space, or internal
place, and the extension of a body.  For a body's being extended in length, breadth and depth in itself warrants the
conclusion that it is a substance, since it is a complete contradiction that a particular extension should belong to
nothing; and the same conclusion must be drawn with respect to a space that is supposed to be a vacuum, namely that
since there is extension in it, there must necessarily be substance in it as well.  17. The ordinary use of the term 'empty'
does not imply the total absence of bodies.  In its ordinary sense the term 'empty' [void] usually refers not to a place or
space in which there is nothing at all, but simply to a place in which there is none of the things we think ought to be
there."
56 Ibid., II.20, CSM, 231.  In II.34, Descartes goes on to say, "The number of particles into which matter is divided is in
fact indefinite, although it is beyond our power to grasp them all."  This is not an assertion of atomism since he is not
suggesting that there are indivisible particles. Instead, he explains that minute particles shifting position are actually
undergoing subdivisions.  Unlike Descartes, Newton embraces atomism, and does not consider it to imply any
diminution of God's powers.  In the Opticks' Query 31 (an essay whose original version was composed around the time
of the Principia but which Newton revised over the years), he writes that the particles of matter cannot be divided by
any "ordinary power".
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sun but very different, passive qualities to the planets it moves, Descartes holds that the
distinction between action and passion is not real.  Only substances can be really distinct from
one another.57  The distinction between action and passion, both in the case of collisions between
material bodies, and for interactions among substances generally,58 is only a distinction in reason.
We will realize that two attributes are only rationally distinct if we find that when we attempt to
separate the one attribute from the other, we can no longer perceive it clearly and distinctly.59
Such is the case with the attributes of mover and moved for any body in a plenum.  Since there is
no space separating any body from other bodies, the body cannot be moved without moving some
other bodies; it expels the body contiguous to it on one side, and is expelled by the body
contiguous on the other side.60  If we assume a plenum, the body's being a mover cannot be
conceived without its also being moved, and so there is only a rational distinction between mover
and moved, that is, between action and passion.  This will be important for Newton.
 If all matter has the same nature, what explains the differences among bodies that we
observe?  The motions of the component parts, Descartes answers: "All the variety in matter, all
                                                                 
57 Only substances can be really distinct, that is, able to exist apart from one another.  See Descartes, Principles of
Philosophy, II.60, CSM, 213.
58 In The Passions of the Soul, I.1, CSM, 328, Descartes writes, "What is a passion with regard to one subject is a
always an action in some other regard....Although an agent and patient are often quite different, an action and passion
must always be the same thing which has these two names on account of the two different subjects to which it may be
related."
59 "What is meant by a 'conceptual distinction'.  Finally, a conceptual distinction is a distinction between the substance
and some attribute of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible; alternatively, it is a distinction
between two such attributes of a single substance.  Such a distinction is recognized by our inability to form a clear and
distinct idea of the substance if we exclude from it the attribute in question, or, alternatively, by our inability to
perceive clearly the idea of one of the two attributes if we separate it from the other." (Descartes, Principles of
Philosophy, I.62, CSM, 214.)  On the Scholastic provenance of the notion of a rational distinction, see Garber,
Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 69.  See also Nolan, "Reductionism and Nominalism in Descartes' Theory of
Attributes", 137, which discusses Francisco Suarez as an important source of Descartes' ideas about the rational
distinction.
60 "How in every case of motion there is a complete circle of bodies moving together.  I noted above that every place is
full of bodies, and that the same portion of matter takes up the same amount of space, <so that it is impossible for it to
fill a greater or lesser space, or for any other body to occupy its place while it remains there>.  It follows from this that
each body can move only in a <complete> circle <of matter, or ring of bodies which all move together at the same
time>: a body entering a given place expels another, and the expelled body moves on and expels another, and so on,
until the body at the end of the sequence enters the place left by the first body at the precise moment when the first
body is leaving it." (Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.33, CSM, 237.)
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the diversity of its forms, depends on motion."61  These claims—that all matter has the same
nature and that variety arises from the shape, size, and motions of the component parts—are
central to the philosophy of nature that becomes known as the mechanical philosophy.  (This will
do as a rough characterization, but there is disagreement about what constitutes the mechanical
philosophy—whether it must include the claim that motion can be communicated only by contact
action, for instance—and who its proponents were.  The canonical figures are, at least, Descartes
and Boyle.62 Some commentators include the early 17th century atomist, Gassendi, though he did
not explain observable properties of bodies in terms of motion,63 explaining heat and cold in
terms of calorific and frigorific particles.  Commentators also disagree about whether to include
Newton; he took all matter to have the same nature, but instead of explaining all phenomena in
terms of matter and motion, he introduced forces that did not operate by contact action between
the surfaces of bodies.64)
In Descartes' system, motion must be communicated by contact.  This is first because in a
plenum no other mechanism is needed, and second because he considers matter to be inert in the
sense that bodies lack Aristotelian, end-seeking natures.  Teleological notions are properly
                                                                 
61 Ibid., II.23, CSM, 232.
62 For a discussion of Descartes' mechanical philosophy, see Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics. In Boas, "The
Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy", see Section V for a discussion of Descartes and Sections VI-VIII for a
discussion of Boyle's mechanical philosophy.  Before Descartes and Boyle, Bacon and Galileo had both taken the
motion of particles to figure in the explanation of observable properties in bodies.  Newton, though he introduced
forces that do not operate by surface action, remained a mechanical philosopher to the extent that he too explained
observable properties by matter and motion.  See Boas on this point:
The early seventeenth century atomists explained the sharp taste of acids by assuming that the acid particles
had sharp points that pricked the tongue….According to Newton, however, acids had a sharp taste because,
under the influence of the force of attraction, the acid particles rushed to the tongue with such violent haste as
to bruise it, thus causing the pricking sensation.  No longer is the shape of the atoms their most salient
features; it is their motions. (Boas, op.cit., 521.)
Newton is not, however, what Westfall terms an "orthodox mechanical philosopher", since he allows that some some
causes are not mechanical; in the 1713 General Scholium, he writes that gravity's cause "acts not in proportion to the
quantity of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the
quantity of solid matter." (Principia, 943.)
63 See Boas: "Though Gassendi, like the ancients, assumed that the atoms were in motion, he never attempted to
explain any of the properties of bodies in terms of variation of this motion."  ("The Establishment of the Mechanical
Philosophy", 434.)
64 For a discussion of mechanist views and Newton's stance toward them, see Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 118-129.
Janiak identifies four distinct mechanist views, and argues that Newton rejects each of them.
35
attributed only to minds, and so contra the Scholastics, a body cannot have any internal tendency
to seek one spatial location over another.  When vapors rise, it is not because they seek a higher
place, nor are rocks pushed from a cliff seeking the center of the Earth.   Because the concept of
force that Descartes inherits from his predecessors is animistic, he attempts to eliminate that from
his system as well.  (He is not entirely successful, for his vortex theory of gravitation relies
crucially upon pressure.)   Like Kepler and the Scholastics, Descartes does attribute to matter the
power to resist, but there is an important difference, one that Newton would incorporate.
Descartes grounds the resistive power of matter in his first law of nature, the tendency of bodies
to maintain their states.65
Having eliminated all teleological and animistic notions from his concept of matter,
Descartes overthrows the old concept of inertia as a tendency toward rest, realizing that passive
matter could have no preference for rest over motion.  From this he derives his first law:
The first law of nature: each and every thing, in so far as it can, always continues in the
same state; and thus what is once in motion always continues to move.66
With this law of nature, Descartes can do away with the medieval concept of impetus and other
forces supplying the continuation of motion.
Our everyday experience of projectiles completely confirms this first rule of ours. For
there is no other reason why a projectile should persist in motion for some time after it
leaves the hand that throws it, except that what is once in motion continues to move until
it is slowed down by bodies that are in the way.  And it is clear that projectiles are
normally slowed down, little by little, by the air or other fluid bodies in which they are
moving, and that this is why their motion cannot persist for long.67
                                                                 
65 "43.  The nature of the power which all bodies have to act on, or resist, other bodies.  In this connection we must be
careful to note what it is that constitutes the power of any given body to act on, or resist the action of, another body.
This power consists simply in the fact that everything tends, so far as it can, to persist in the same state, as laid down in
our first law.  Thus what is joined to another thing has some power of resisting separation from it....what is at rest has
some power of remaining at rest and consequently of resisting anything that may alter that state of rest; and what is in
motion has some power of persisting in its motion." (Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.43, CSM, 243.)
66 Ibid., II.37, 240.
67 Ibid., II.38, 241.
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This realization was historically momentous.  While his own analyses of collisions and his vortex
theory of gravity were fundamentally flawed, Descartes' law of inertia set the course for his
successors, replacing the old problem of explaining the persistence of motion with the new
problem of explaining changes in motion.
With his second law of nature, Descartes corrected Galileo's erroneous understanding of
inertial motion as a tendency to follow the curve of the earth, stating that it is in fact rectilinear.
The second law of nature: all motion is in itself rectilinear; and hence any body moving
in a circle always tends to move away from the centre of the circle which it describes.68
The second conjunct of this law, however, became an obstacle for the development of mechanics.
Instead of suggesting a tendency to move off along the tangent, Descartes suggests that bodies in
circular motion have a tendency to move outward from the center.69  Huygens would later coin
the term 'centrifugal force' for this endeavor, and Newton would initially follow his predecessors.
In his early attempts to explain gravitational effects, he expected the sun's inward force to be
balanced by the planets' outward endeavor, which he had not yet understood as an inertial effect.
Another flaw was Descartes' third law of nature.  Based upon the belief that the force of
motion supplied by one body in a collision need not equal the resistance of the other, the law
erroneously indicated that a lighter body's momentum is unchanged when it collides with a
heavier one.70
                                                                 
68 Ibid., II.39, 242.
69 Ibid., II.39, 241: "The second law of nature: all motion is in itself rectilinear; and hence any body moving in a circle
always tends to move away from the centre of  the circle which it describes."
70 On this point, see Herivel:  "In the case of a collision between a moving and a stationary body Descartes supposed
that the 'resistance' of the latter could exceed the force of motion of the former.  In this case, if the two bodies were soft
the moving body would be brought to rest, its motion being absorbed in some unspecified manner; whereas if the
bodies were hard it would be reflected without loss of motion.  On the other hand, if the force of the motion of the
moving body exceeded the resistance of the stationary one the two would move on together the total quantity of motion
being conserved, the quantity of motion in a body being proportional the magnitude of the body and its velocity.  As for
the conservation, this was necessary to ensure that the total quantity of motion in the universe was unaffected by such
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The third law: if a body collides with another body that is stronger than itself, it loses
none of its motion; but if it collides with a weaker body, it loses a quantity of motion
equal to that which it imparts to the other body.71
This flawed description of collisions was significant because impact was the only causal
mechanism in Descartes' natural philosophy.72  He had not achieved his goal of explaining
material phenomena by mathematical concepts alone,73 for he not only had to ascribe
impenetrability to bodies, but also employ a force, pressure.  He rejected action at a distance
entirely, however.  To suggest that spatially separated bodies could act upon one another was to
retreat into Scholasticism's occult properties and animism.  Material bodies can affect one another
by transferring motion to one another; this requires contact, but no intelligence.  If the bodies are
not in contact with one another, to suggest that one could act upon the other is, Descartes held, to
suppose it to have the intelligence to be aware of the other body's existence.74  Descartes argued
that all of the variety and diversity of matter depends upon motion,75 and all changes in motion
occur through impacts.
Ultimately, these actions communicated by contact depended upon God, and from God's
nature Descartes derives a principle of the preservation of motion (as I shall call it, in order to
distinguish it from Newton's conservation principle, which I discuss later.)  It follows from God's
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
encounters between bodies in accordance with the general law of conservation derived from the immutability of God's
working in the universe." (Background, 50.)
71 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.39, CSM, 241.
72 Descartes holds that God continually recreates the world, writing in the Principles of Philosophy, II.36, CSM, 240:
"He now preserves all this matter in the same way, and by the same process by which he originally created it."   On the
basis of such passages, one might argue that strictly speaking, Descartes' natural philosophy contains no causal
mechanism, for he accepts occasionalism.   The attribution of occasionalism is explored, and opposed, by Daniel
Garber; see especially Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 301-302.
73 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.64, CSM, 247: "The only principles which I accept, or require, in physics are
those of geometry and pure mathematics; these principles explain all natural phenomena, and enable us to provide quite
certain demonstrations regarding them."
74 See Jammer, Concepts of Force, 104.  For a discussion of Descartes' criticism of Roberval's explanation of the solar
system, which employed attractions acting at a distance, see Westfall, Force, 86-87.
75 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.23, CSM, 232.
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immutable nature that the quantity of motion in the world is constant.  Speaking in terms of
secondary causation, this quantity is held constant as the quantity of motion in some individual
bodies changes, because those bodies transfer their motions to other bodies in collisions.76  Alan
Gabbey notes that Descartes was probably reacting to an implication of Isaac Beeckman's work
on collisions, namely, that if motion could be lost in collisions, the world could run down.77  As
we shall see, Newton will side with Beeckman in the observation that motion is lost in collisions,
and in consequence will speculatively invoke active principles or powers, active powers which
Kepler had included but which Descartes eliminated.
 Descartes explains the planetary motions with the vortex theory he develops in Part III of
his Principles of Philosophy.  Having distinguished two senses of motion earlier in Part II,
Descartes now uses these distinctions to avoid attributing motion to the earth.  Motion in the
ordinary sense is "the action by which a body travels from one place to another",78 and in this
sense, the earth moves relative to the other planetary bodies over the course of a year.  In the
strict, or "philosophical" sense, however, motion is the transfer of a body away from bodies that
formerly were contiguous with it.  In this sense, the earth is at rest because it remains contiguous
with the fluid aether in which it travels.79  The heavens are filled with celestial matter, the aether;
                                                                 
76 Ibid., II.36 and II.42, CSM 240 and 243: "36.  God is the primary cause of motion; and he always preserves the same
quantity of motion in the universe....The nature of motion....is in fact twofold: first, there is the universal and primary
cause—the general cause of all the motions in the world; and second there is the particular cause which produces in an
individual piece of matter some motion which is previously lacked.  Now as far as the general cause is concerned, it
seems clear to me that this is no other than God himself.  In the beginning <in his omnipotence> he created matter,
along with its motion and rest; and now, merely by his regular concurrence, he preserves the same amount of motion
and rest in the material universe as he put there at the beginning.....42. The proof of the second part of this [third law of
nature: if a body collides with a weaker body, it loses a quantity of motion equal to that which it imparts to the other
body]...Since God preserves the world by the selfsame action and in accordance with the selfsame laws as when he
created it, the motion which he preserves is not something permanently fixed in given pieces of matter, but something
which is mutually transferred when collisions occur."
77 See Barbour's discussion of Gabbey in Absolute or Relative Motion, 459: "Gabbey has pointed out that this fruitful
idea of Descartes was probably in large part introduced in reaction to a problem in Beeckman's work, in which motion
could be lost in collisions, so that the world would eventually run down."
78 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.24, CSM, 233.
79 Descartes, op.cit. II.25, CSM, 233, contains the definition of motion in the strict sense; and in III.19 (CSM, 251)
Descartes indicates that he has avoided attributing motion to the earth: "My denial of the earth's motion is more careful
than the Copernican view and more correct than Tycho's view."  Worried by the Church's reaction to Galileo, Descartes
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and with the sun's rotation producing a vortex, the planets are carried around the sun.  To explain
the motions of satellites, including the earth's moon, Descartes posits local vortices produced by
the planets to carry their satellites.
Vortex theories remained influential after Descartes' death, despite their shortcomings,
with variants being developed by Leibniz and Huygens.  Such theories could not account for
Kepler's empirical laws, and they were difficult to reconcile with the motion of comets.  Another
failing, once Newton introduced the concept of mass, was that they failed to explain why
gravitational effects are proportional to mass rather than surface area.  Yet vortex theories had
one strongly appealing feature.  They avoided action at a distance, which despite Kepler's efforts
to explain as some sort of "material necessity" seemed animistic and occult.
Newton will be strongly influenced by Descartes in his early efforts, but will then react
strongly against much of the Cartesian system.  Newton's unpublished manuscript, De
Gravitatione,80 marks a clear break with Descartes.  There, Newton rejects the identification of
body with extension, asserting instead that space exists independently of matter, and that matter is
particulate.81   This particulate matter is not mere extension, but is endowed with the properties of
mobility and impenetrability.  Newton also attacks Descartes' doctrine of relative motion, in part
by noting that it implies the possibility that motion can be generated without force.  Yet in his
early efforts to explain the planetary orbits, Newton is still working within the Cartesian tradition,
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
hoped that his doctrine of relative motion would make the rest of his theory acceptable to the Church.  On this point,
see Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science: A Historical and Critical Essay, 105-106.
80 The manuscript is undated. The Halls argue that it belongs to a very early period, c. 1664-1668 (see Unpublished
Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 89).  B.J. T. Dobbs argues for a much later date, shortly before Principia.  Stein's
remarks in "Newton's Metaphysics" weigh against Dobbs, and in favor of an earlier dating.  According to Stein, the
Halls' translation of De Gravitatione contains a number of errors, including an incorrect suggestion that in the opening
sentence, Newton indicates that he will discuss a "science of gravity".  Relying upon this, Dobbs concludes that the
manuscript represents, as Stein puts it, "an abortive draft of an introduction to Newton's Principia."   In fact, Stein
writes, "Newton's phrase has nothing to do with a 'science of gravity'; he is speaking of the weight of fluids and of
solids in fluids, which is the exact subject of the classic treatise, 'On Floating Bodies' of Archimedes." (Stein,
"Newton's Metaphysics", 298-299, n. 27; see also 302-303, n.39.)
81 Newton's acceptance of atomism is first seen in his undergraduate Questiones.  See McMullin, Newton on Matter
and Activity, 75.
40
by seeking the planets' outward endeavor.  It is Hooke who turns Newton away from that
Cartesian expectation.
HOOKE
Robert Hooke (1635-1703) made a critical contribution to Newton's theory of gravity by
posing a question that set Newton on the right path.  Prior to that event, Newton had been
working in the Cartesian tradition.  Descartes' second law of nature moved from the claim that
motion in itself is rectilinear, rather than circular, to the claim that a body moving in a circle will
tend to recede from that circle's center; and in vortex theories, the inward pressure produced by
the material plenum must be balanced by some outward endeavor for a body to remain in an orbit.
Newton, having ignored the Aristotelian philosophy still taught in the universities, initially
worked in the tradition of Descartes' mechanical philosophy, and like Huygens, took the fictitious
centrifugal force to be real.  His early efforts to understand the planetary orbits therefore involved
an attempt to characterize this centrifugal force—the planets' outward endeavor.
Hooke around this time was also considering the problem of the orbits, along with other
problems of natural philosophy that he discussed with Edmund Halley and Sir Christopher Wren.
On the basis of Kepler's results—in particular the Third Law's result that a planet's speed varies as
a function of distance—Hooke expected the sun to exert a force upon the planets, a force
diminishing as the inverse square of distance. This had been Kepler's initial idea too, however
Kepler discarded that in favor of the proportion 1/r, thinking that the sun's anima motrix was
emitted, like chains taking hold of the planets, only in the plane of the planetary orbits.  Hooke by
contrast expected the sun's force to diminish with distance as 1/r2, just as light's intensity
diminishes.
In 1679, Hooke wrote to Newton, setting the problem of deriving a planet's path, given
the assumption of a force proportional to 1/r2.  This letter critically reoriented Newton's thought,
and upon receipt of it, he dropped the Cartesian notion of an outward endeavor from a center.
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The rectilinear motion that would figure in Newton's solution to the problem of the orbits did not
emanate from the center but instead lay along the tangent; for Hooke presented the problem as
that of combining one motion toward the focus of an ellipse with another motion along the
tangent to the curve.82  Using a method of limits, Newton solved the problem without fanfare,
having first recast it.83  Whereas Hooke assumed the proportion of the force and then sought the
planet's path, Newton assumed Kepler's elliptical orbit and then proved that such an orbit requires
an inverse-square force from a focus.84  When Halley visited Newton in 1684—his offer of a
prize having failed to elicit a solution to the problem of the orbits from Hooke—Newton reported
that he had solved the problem. Having mislaid the papers containing his solution, he solved the
problem again in the unpublished manuscript known as De Motu.  This he later sent to Halley,
and upon Halley's urging to publish, used it as the basis for his 1687 Mathematical Principles of
Natural Philosophy (Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica).
Concluding Remarks
In solving the so-called Kepler Problem,85 Newton drew upon Hooke's formulation of the
problem, as well as upon his predecessors' work, including Kepler's empirical laws and the
                                                                 
82 See McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 48.
83 In terminology used contrariwise to that used today, inverse problems were problems of finding a body's path about a
center of force, and direct problems those of finding the force given the path.  Thus Hooke presented Newton with the
inverse problem, and he tackled and solved the direct one. See Brackenridge: "The direct problem that challenged
mathematicians in the seventeenth century was determining the nature of the gravitational force acting on
planets....Kepler determined that the path of Mars is an ellipse, with the sun located at a focal point. He published the
result in 1609. The direct problem, however, remained unsolved until after 1679, when Newton determined the
functional dependence on distance of the force required to sustain such an elliptical path of Mars about the sun as a
center of force located at a focal point of the ellipse." (The Key to Newton's Dynamics, 15-16.)
84 See Westfall, Never at Rest, 387.
85 Bruce Brackenridge refers to this mathematical problem as the 'Kepler problem'.  As emphasized previously, Kepler
and Newton both sought a physical, causal explanation of gravity in addition to a solution to the problem of
characterizing the gravitational force mathematically. As Brackenridge notes, Newton's pursuit of the physical
characterization was confined mainly to his unpublished writings.  See Brackenridge, The Key to Newton's Dynamics,
13: "For Newton, the problem....was the dynamic challenge of seeking the mathematical description of the force that
produces the Keplerian planetary ellipses.  In his published work, he set aside his concern with physical cause and
emphasized the mathematical form of the force.  Newton offered this limited type of mathematical answer amid the
seventeenth-century concern for the physical causes of gravity, and his approach was not immediately or universally
found to be fulfilling.  The technique that Newton employed, a unique combination of limits and approximations, was
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concept of inertia partially developed by Galileo and fully articulated by Descartes.  Newton
would give the credit for the law of inertia to Galileo alone, as he rejected much of Descartes'
system—and Aristotle's. Yet as we shall see, as Newton sought to augment his solution to
Kepler's mathematical problem with a causal explanation of gravity, he remained drawn to
Aristotle's belief in a generative source of motion, and to Descartes' claim that matter cannot act
at a distance.
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
rapidly replaced on the continent by alternate techniques that employed the calculus more directly.  Nevertheless, the
Principia would set the stage for the mathematical, mechanical model of the world that would follow."
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CHAPTER III
FORCE, THE VIS INERTIAE, AND GRAVITY
What is a force for Newton, might the vis inertiae be a genuine force, and
 how do questions about gravity's status as a force arise?
Introduction
Newton solves the problem of the planetary orbits in terms of inertia and gravity.  Inertia
supplies the tangential component of the planets' motions,86 and gravity supplies their radial
component, pulling them away from the rectilinear paths they would have followed without
gravity's impressed force.   For Newton's successors, there was no kind of force other than
impressed force, and so gravity was a force while inertia was not.  For Newton himself, however,
matters are less clear, and this is so for both inertia and gravity.  Surprising as it seems today,
there are some reasons for thinking that Newton considered the vis inertiae, or "force of inertia"
as it is translated, to be a genuine force.  (And because it is surprising, I shall from this point
onward use the Principia's term, 'vis inertiae', rather than the English term 'inertia'; for while
Newton does in some texts use the Latin 'inertia', the term as adopted in English has
                                                                 
86 The initial tangential motion was supplied by God, at the creation.  Although Newton vacillates about the cause of
gravity, he seems consistently to hold that since the laws of motion could not have produced the initial tangential
motions, they must have been supplied by God.  He expresses this position in a 1692/93 letter to Bentley, and later in
the 1713 General Scholium. In Newton's third letter to Bentley, February 11, 1692/3  (Philosophical Writings, 101), he
writes, "The diurnal rotations of the planets could not be derived from gravity, but required a divine arm to impress
them.  And though gravity might give the planets a motion of descent toward the sun, either directly or with some little
obliquity, yet the transverse motions by which they revolve in their several orbits required the divine arm to impress
them according to the tangents of their orbits. In the General Scholium of 1713 (Principia, 940), he writes, "Planets and
comets must revolve continually in orbits given in kind and in position, according to the laws set forth above.  They
will indeed persevere in their orbits by the laws of gravity, but they certainly could not originally have acquired the
regular position of the orbits by those laws."  (For an explanation of the slash date in the correspondence with Richard
Bentley, see note 371 in chapter VI.)
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contemporary associations that may prejudice the question.) Equally surprising, perhaps, we
cannot hastily assume that Newton considered gravity to be a genuine force.
In this chapter, I examine the concepts of the vis inertiae and gravity, and I show how, in
different ways, questions about their statuses arise.  The question about the vis inertiae's status
arises from questions about Newton's concept of force, in particular the question of whether he
identifies impressed forces with forces generally.  That particular question arises because of a
quite broad definition appearing in an early manuscript, De Gravitatione, together with the
absence of any general definition in subsequent texts. So the question of whether the vis inertiae
is a genuine force is, at bottom, a question about whether the mature Newton's concept of force
extends beyond impressed forces, to include other sorts of causes. The next section therefore
begins by asking what general concept of force Newton held.  While I cannot here do justice to
that question, I argue that he later retains some and perhaps all components of the early definition.
One component remains unclear, however.
I then examine the vis inertiae, including its relation to Law 1.  While some
commentators have argued that Newton considers the persistence of inertial states to be uncaused,
and hence denies universal causation, I oppose this, showing that Newton consistently attributes
causal efficacy to the vis inertiae.  I also examine the vis inertiae's relation to Law 3, arguing that
Descartes' principle of reciprocal action is the conceptual basis of the vis inertiae's exercised
function and of Law 3.   Turning to the question about status, is Newton's talk of the "vis inertiae"
or "force of inertia" simply a manner of speaking, or does he consider the vis inertiae to be a
genuine force?  There are two features in virtue of which the vis inertiae might qualify as a
genuine force, one as the force is unexercised, the other as exercised.   Neither feature yields a
conclusive answer to the question.   Knowing whether the vis inertiae is a genuine force in virtue
of its unexercised functions requires knowing whether Newton retained all components of De
Gravitatione's general definition of 'force', yet one component of that distinction remains unclear,
as we shall see.  And claiming that the vis inertiae is a genuine force in virtue of its exercised
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function requires overlooking some serious conceptual problems in that exercised function.  One
way to avoid those problems, and to deny that the vis inertiae is a genuine force, is to identify it
with mass.  But however congenial that solution is, I argue, it does not fit well with some textual
evidence.
I then examine Newton's concept of gravity. I show how the question about its status
arises, reserving answers about that question for later chapters. The question about gravity's status
is quite different from that of the vis inertiae.  For even if the mature Newton does restrict his
concept of force generally to impressed forces, gravity as an impressed force would clearly meet
the definition.  With gravity, questions about its status are questions about whether the force that
Newton identifies via his law of universal gravitation has causal efficacy.  Such questions are due
to a disturbing possibility raised by the Principia—that gravitating matter might act across empty
space without a medium.  This disturbing possibility raises the question of whether the
gravitational force is real, and here there are two senses to consider.
First, to say that a force is real or genuine is to say that it is not due to primary causation
but rather to secondary causation.  That is, the effects are not produced directly by God, but rather
by some means in the created world.  Whereas the vis inertiae is a secondary cause, and
(regardless of whether it is a force) unproblematically, gravity is associated with the possibility of
action at a distance, and primary causation offers a clear means of denying that possibility.
According to the second sense, to say that a force is real or genuine is to say that it
genuinely has causal efficacy.  It is not a mere fiction, instrument, or calculating device, nor a
provisional placeholder, useful until the actual cause of gravitational effects is identified.  Within
Newton's lifetime, his gravitational force was interpreted in such instrumentalist terms, notably
by Berkeley.  Limiting real existents to perceptible objects and relations, Berkeley considers
Newton's forces to be unreal, and attributes that view to Newton:  "Force, gravity, attraction…are
useful for computations about motion and bodies in motion, but not for understanding the simple
nature of motion itself….As for attraction, it was certainly introduced by Newton not as a true,
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physical quality, but only as a mathematical hypothesis."87  This second sense became the focus
of debate for Newton's critics.
In subsequent chapters, I shall argue that Newton takes gravity to be real in both of these
two senses.88  I shall focus mainly upon the first sense, arguing that he did not attribute
gravitational effects directly to God.  I shall also defend the claim that he considered his
gravitational force to be real in the second sense, presenting textual evidence showing that he did
not consider the force to be a calculating device but instead took it to be causally efficacious.89
FORCE
The kernel of Newton's solution to the mathematical problem about the orbits is
contained in the unpublished manuscript De Motu, and it is only afterward, once he begins at
Halley's urging to write the Principia, that he adds the concepts we find in that treatise's
Definitions.90  However, some of the Principia's concepts have antecedents in the earlier,
unpublished manuscript, De Gravitatione.91 Interestingly, that manuscript contains a general
definition of force, whereas the Principia does not. This omission in the Principia raises the
question of whether Newton retains the definition set out in De Gravitatione.   It is possible that
by the time of the Principia, Newton has abandoned parts of the manuscript's general definition.
Yet it is also possible that Newton retains the definition in full, and that its absence in the
                                                                 
87 Berkeley, De Motu, published 1721 (quoted in Downing, "Berkeley's Natural Philosophy and Philosophy of
Science", in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, 247-248).  Berkeley is writing some eight years prior to Newton's
death.  Earlier, in his correspondence with Leibniz, Samuel Clarke takes a similar stance, by treating Newton's
gravitational force as referring only to gravitational effects.  See Clarke's fifth letter in Leibniz-Clarke, 115.  See also
Andrew Janiak's discussion of Clarke's interpretation in Newton as Philosopher, 65-74.
88 It is possible to hold that a force is real in the first sense but not the second.  One might hold, for instance, that
gravitational effects have some secondary cause, and thus that there is a real gravitational force yet to be identified, but
that the force as Newton has identified it is not real.
89  I shall not address the question of how exactly Newton could consider the force causally efficacious, while also
acknowledging that its causal story is incomplete.  The question of how Newton could hold this position is tackled by
Andrew Janiak in chapter 3 of Newton as Philosopher, and in "Newton and the Reality of Force".
90 See McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 49.
91 The manuscript is undated, and its date is a matter of controversy, as note 80 in chapter II explains in more detail.
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Principia is due only to that treatise's restricted aims; for as its full title indicates, the Principia is
concerned with the mathematical principles of natural philosophy—of natural
phenomena—whereas De Gravitatione is quite philosophical.
Force in De Gravitatione
De Gravitatione sets out the following general definition of force:
Definition 5.  Force is the causal principle of motion and rest.  And it is either an external
one that generates, destroys, or otherwise changes impressed motion in some body, or it
is an internal principle by which existing motion or rest is conserved in a body, and by
which any being endeavors to continue in its state and opposes resistance.92
The first notable point in the definition is that force is a causal principle—forces have causal
efficacy.  Like Kepler, but unlike some of his successors, Newton does not appear to take
causation to be an epistemologically troubling concept. This is not for lack of an empiricist's
values.  Those values are evident in the concept of body he develops in De Gravitatione.93 Instead
of associating accessible properties with an inaccessible and indeed unintelligible notion of
"prime matter", as the Aristotelians did, he eliminates prime matter or substratum by associating
properties with regions of space.  Matter might have some "essential and metaphysical nature",
but it is not accessible to us.  As for causal connections, however, they are not analogous either to
                                                                 
92 De Gravitatione in Philosophical Writings, 36.  Newton's original Latin reads as follows: "Def 5 Vis est motus et
quietis causale principium.  Estque vel externum quod in aliquod corpus impressum motum ejus vel generat vel
destruit, vel aliquo saltem modo mutat, vel est internum principium quo motus vel quies corpori indita conservatur, et
quodlibet ens in suo statu perseverare conatur & impeditum reluctatur." (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac
Newton, 114.)  Earlier, in the Waste Book of his student years, Newton set out a different general definition of force,
one that accepts the mechanical's philosophy's insistence upon contact action:  "Force is ye pressure or crouding of one
body upon another."  See Herival, Background, 138.
93 In speaking of Newton's experimentalism or empiricism, I mean to contrast his approach to that pursued by thinkers
such as Descartes.  For Descartes, the laws of nature cannot be revised on the basis of any experience, since they have
been derived a priori from God's nature.  Newton, by contrast, claims to derive his laws from phenomena, and
accordingly he considers them to be revisable. The revisability of the physical theory is set out explicitly in the
Principia.  Rule 4 seems to envision less dramatic revisions; further research may reveal the need to make the
propositions "more exact", or show that they are "liable to exceptions".  The possibility of more dramatic revisions is
allowed in the Author's Preface, as Newton expresses the hope that his principles will shed light on this mode of
philosophizing, or "some truer one" (Principia, 796 and 383.)
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unintelligible prime matter, which should be eliminated, or to matter's essential nature, which is
inaccessible.  Instead they are unproblematic.
It is also notable that forces are responsible not only for changes of state, but also for the
persistence of state.  This means that in De Gravitatione, at least, the vis inertiae or force of
inertia is a genuine force, as we shall see in more detail below.
A third notable point is that Newton has natural forces in mind here, that is, forces
belonging to the created world. Yet an implication of Newton's definition is that there are both
natural forces and the divine force, since God meets the definition of 'force'.  Newton's God is an
omnipotent creator, who brought the universe into existence, who impressed the planets' first
transverse motions upon them, and who, Newton suggests in Query 31,94 occasionally reforms the
planetary orbits, which over time develop irregularities from the mutual actions of planets and
comets.95  Since God has caused and continues to cause motion, he is a "causal principle of
motion and rest".96  It therefore makes sense to call a natural force unreal if the effects once
attributed to it are subsequently attributed instead to the divine force.  I have in mind of course
the case of gravity.
                                                                 
94 Query 31 is an essay with much earlier roots.  It appears in the English Opticks in 1717/18, but this version is a
modification of Query 23, which appeared in the Opticks predecessor, the 1706 Latin Optice.  Query 31/23, as it is
sometimes known, was in turn was based on an essay written c. 1687).  On this point see the commentary of Cohen and
Westfall in Newton: Texts, Backgrounds, Commentaries, 5.
95 "Some inconsiderable Irregularities...may have risen from the mutual actions of Comets and Planets upon one
another, and...will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Reformation." Query 31 (Opticks, 402), but Query 23 in
the edition upon which Leibniz was commenting. Newton's suggestion here was the probable provocation to Leibniz's
charge, in his 1715 Letter 1, that Newton's God is like an imperfect watchmaker.  See H. G. Alexander, Leibniz-Clarke,
11, n.a.
96 The suggestion that God might qualify as a force raises a number of problems.  Although De Gravitatione's
definition treats forces as causes in a quite general way—unlike the Principia's definition of 'impressed force'—the
notion that God is a force does not fit easily with either of the definition's two categories of force, namely, internal and
external.  God would not be a force internal to bodies in the sense of being properties of those bodies; in that sense,
God would be external to the bodies.  And spatially, God could not be clearly designated as either internal or external;
being substantially omnipresent, God shares space with bodies, yet he is also present at their peripheries and beyond.
There is also the question of whether Newton wants to retain De Gravitatione's broad view of forces, in which the
causes of changes in state are not the only forces.  If in his mature writings he restricts forces to impressed forces, then
all forces are causes, but not all causes are forces.  This latter, more restrictive view would treat force as part of a
physical view of the world, as opposed to part of a metaphysical picture, such as that we find in Leibniz.  For Leibniz,
forces at the phenomenal, or physical level, are not real because accelerations are not real; instead, forces belong to the
metaphysical level, that is, to monads.  Yet there are grounds for thinking that Newton might consider God as a force.
In Query 28 (Opticks, 369, 370), Newton sketches a process of discovery in which by deducing causes from effects, we
are eventually led to the first cause, that is, God.  If God can in some sense be deduced from forces, then perhaps
Newton allows forces to include causes other than those appearing in the Principia.
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Force in the Principia
Force is prominent in the Principia's section, Definitions, which defines the concepts that
Newton considers less well known, which is to say the theoretical concepts that he introduces.  A
Scholium discusses some "very familiar" concepts, and while force is not explicitly among those
very familiar concepts, it creates the need for the Scholium's explanations of space, time, and
motion.  I shall consider those very familiar concepts first, before turning to those defined in the
Definitions, but as I cannot here engage the extensive literature about space and time, my
comments will be brief.
The Scholium sets out the concepts of space, time, place, and motion that the Principia
will use.  Space, time, and motion themselves are not defined, since in Newton's view (carried
over from De Gravitatione), duration and space are very familiar.97  Elsewhere he has more to say
about the nature of space, in that it is an emanative effect of God, but the Scholium's goal is to
define the concepts needed for the Principia. These are the "absolute", "true" and "mathematical"
senses of the terms 'space', 'time', 'place', and 'motion', and Newton distinguishes these from the
commonly used senses of the terms, that is, the "relative", "apparent" and "common" senses,
which depend upon perceived objects.  Although the concepts of absolute space, time, and motion
are critical to the Principia, it turns out that they are not different in kind from the relative or
common concepts.  Absolute space is three-dimensional and so too is relative or common space
(though in the 17th century this went without saying, as the discovery of non-Euclidean
geometries was a long way off).   Relative, common spaces are "the same in species, and in
magnitude",98 Newton writes, which is to say that a relative space is three-dimensional and can be
mapped directly onto a portion of absolute space.  The difference is that absolute space is infinite
and immobile, whereas relative space is finite and mobile, being conceived or determined in
terms of perceptible objects.  For example, the space in a room is determined by the room's walls,
                                                                 
97 Newton prefaces the definitions stated in De Gravitatione by remarking, "The terms 'quantity', 'duration', and 'space'
are too well known to be susceptible of definition by other words." (Philosophical Writings, 12.)
98 Scholium to the Definitions, Principia, 409.
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and it is finite in that it is bounded by those walls.  It is mobile in that the room is part of a house
that stands on a moving Earth, and indeed, everything that we perceive may be moving.  As the
Earth moves, relative space contained by the walls of the room does not remain the same
"numerically",99 for different parts of absolute space are being enclosed by the walls from
moment to moment.   Is relative or common space the relationist concept that Leibniz will
defend?100  There is no indication that Newton has this in mind, even though relative space is
determined or known by perceptible objects.  For while we mark out relative spaces by means of
perceived objects, such as the walls of a room, Newton does not suggest that space is commonly
conceived to arise as a result of those objects (or of possible objects, as Leibniz will hold).101
The concept of absolute place derives from absolute space—it is that part of absolute
space that a body occupies.  So a room in a house is continually changing one absolute place for
another, for it occupies any given region of absolute space only momentarily, being located on a
moving Earth.
Absolute time, like absolute space, has no reference to external objects or events.  It
"flows uniformly",102 and thus even if the absence of any objects or events in the universe, there
is such a thing as a time interval, and a given time interval will be equal to some time intervals
but unequal to others.
Newton's concept of absolute motion, which depends upon the concepts of absolute space
and place, is critical for his dynamics.103 Absolute motion is "the change of position of a body
                                                                 
99 Ibid.
100 The debate with Leibniz's relationalist concepts of space and time is played out much later, with Samuel Clarke
advancing a Newtonian position in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence.
101 This point was first recognized by Howard Stein.  See Stein's discussion in "Newtonian Space-Time".
102 Scholium to the Definitions, Principia, 408.
103 For an extensive discussion of this and related issues, see Stein, "Newtonian Space-Time", and also Robert DiSalle,
"Newton's Philosophical Analysis of Space and Time".  Building upon Stein's work, DiSalle argues that Newton's
critics are mistaken in thinking that (i) he is trying to prove the existence of absolute space, time, and motion, (ii) that
these are metaphysical concepts, and  (iii) that he gives metaphysical arguments for them.  DiSalle traces the critics'
error to their assumption that an empiricist account of space and time must define motion as a change of relative place.
Since Newton rejects that particular empiricist account, the critics presume that he is giving metaphysical arguments
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from one absolute place to another",104 and is thus a very different notion than Descartes' doctrine
of relative motion.  According to Descartes' philosophical sense of motion, the Earth is at rest
even as it orbits the sun, because it remains contiguous to the fluid aether surrounding it.  Since
there is no relative motion between the Earth and the aether, the Earth is at rest.  This sense of
motion cannot facilitate the development of a dynamical physics, which requires being able to say
that a force is acting when there is a change of motion.  In the case of the Earth, saying that the
Earth is subject to a force requires being able to say that it is drawn back from the tangent—it
requires being able to say whether a given motion is rectilinear or not.  For this, Newton employs
the thought experiment of the bucket filled with water and set to spin, via the release of a twisted
rope.  As the bucket begins to spin, the relative motion between it and the sides of the bucket is
great, but the height of the water at the edges of the bucket is small, which is to say that its
inertial effects are small.  By the time that the water and the bucket move more or less as one,
with very little relative motion between them, the water has climbed farther up the edges of the
bucket, exhibiting much greater inertial effects.  Newton takes the water's inertial effects, as it
tries, so to speak, to continue in rectilinear motion, though the edges of the bucket prevent that, to
constitute absolute motion.  Although we cannot perceive absolute motion or absolute space
itself, we can say that the direction in which the water attempts to move (so to speak) is absolute,
rectilinear motion.  And this, unlike Descartes' philosophical sense of motion, enables Newton to
say that a force is acting to prevent that rectilinear motion; the bucket supplies a force that
prevents the water from moving inertially.  Absent a concept of inertial frames, by which he
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
for metaphysical concepts of absolute space, time, and motion.  In fact, DiSalle argues, Newton's concepts are not
metaphysical; they are exemplars of empirical meanings assigned to theoretical notions.  For Newton, to call a quantity
absolute is not to infer that it is an existing substance.  It is rather to say that the quantity can be defined by physical
laws.  Thus Newton is giving empirical definitions of space, time, and motion, in that these definitions are drawn from
the laws of empirical science.
104 Scholium to the Definitions, Principia, 409.
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could identify accelerations by affixing a coordinate system to some body, he needs the notion of
absolute space in order to identify when a force is acting.105
Turning to the Definition section itself, here we find eight "less familiar" terms.  Newton
begins with quantity of matter, which is "a measure of matter that arises from its density and
volume jointly".106  As mentioned above, Newton does not attempt to define matter itself.  For
one thing, he intends, as his title indicates, to restrict the Principia to the mathematical principles
of natural philosophy.  Additionally, however, he does not think the nature of matter is accessible
to us, a point I shall discuss at greater length subsequently.  Quantity of motion is next defined.  It
is "a measure of motion that arises from the velocity and the quantity of matter jointly",107 and
thus what subsequently came to be known as momentum.  I set out the next three definitions,
Definitions 3, 4, and 5, together with some of their explanatory remarks, as I shall refer to them
subsequently.
Definition 3. Inherent force of matter is the power of resisting by which every body, so
far as it is able, perseveres in its state either of resting or of moving uniformly straight
forward.  This force is always proportional to the body and does not differ in any way
from the inertia of the mass except in the manner in which it is conceived.  Because of
the inertia of matter, every body is only with difficulty put out of its state either of resting
or of moving.  Consequently, inherent force may also be called by the very significant
name of force of inertia.  Moreover, a body exerts this force only during a change of its
state, caused by another force impressed upon it, and this exercise of force is, depending
on the viewpoint, both resistance and impetus: resistance insofar as the body, in order to
maintain its state, strives against the impressed force, and impetus insofar as the same
body, yielding only with difficulty to the force of a resisting obstacle, endeavors to
                                                                 
105 The concept of an inertial frame was introduced in 1884 by James Thomson, who referred to it as a 'reference
frame'.   Newton's Corollary 5 to the Laws of Motion begins to suggest the concept of inertial frames, by indicating that
the laws of motion are the same for uniform rectilinear motion as for rest, and that these cannot be distinguished in a
closed space: "Corollary 5.  When bodies are enclosed in a given space, their motions in relation to one another are the
same whether the space is at rest or whether it is moving uniformly straight forward without circular motion.  For in
either case the differences of the motions tending in the same direction and the sums of those tending in opposite
directions are the same at the beginning (by hypothesis), and from these sums or differences there arise the collisions
and impulses [literally, impetuses] with which the bodies strike one another.  Therefore, by law 2, the effects of the
collisions will be equal in both cases….On a ship, all the motions are the same with respect to one another whether the
ship is at rest or is moving uniformly straight forward."  (Principia, 423.)  For a discussion of Corollary 5, see Janiak,
Newton as Philosopher, 138-139.  Janiak identifies a tension between Newton's concept of absolute space and his three
laws, together with their corollaries.  The concept of absolute space implies that bodies have true or absolute velocities;
yet absolute velocity cannot be measured, according to Corollary 5, which is implied by the laws of motion.
106 Principia, 403.
107 Ibid., 404.
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change the state of that obstacle.  Resistance is commonly attributed to resting bodies and
impetus to moving bodies; but motion and rest, in the popular sense of the terms, are
distinguished from each other only by point of view, and bodies commonly regarded as
being at rest are not always truly at rest.108
Definition 4. Impressed force is the action exerted on a body to change its state either of
resting or of moving uniformly straight forward.  This force consists solely in the action
and does not remain in the body after the action has ceased.  For a body perseveres in any
new state solely by the force of inertia.  Moreover, there are various sources of impressed
force, such as percussion, pressure, or centripetal force.109
Definition 5.  Centripetal force is the force by which bodies are drawn from all sides, are
impelled, or in any way tend, toward some point as to a center.  One force of this kind is
gravity, by which bodies tend toward the center of the earth; another is the magnetic
force, by which iron seeks a lodestone; and yet another is that force, whatever it may be,
by which the planets are continually drawn back from rectilinear motions and compelled
to revolve around curved lines.110
So the vis inertiae is introduced at least in name as a force, followed by impressed force and the
centripetal force, of which gravity is an example.  The term 'force' then figures in all of the
remaining definitions: absolute quantity of centripetal force; accelerative quantity of centripetal
force; and motive quantity of centripetal force.  Yet no general definition of force is included in
this list.
Is there reason to think that Newton has abandoned De Gravitatione's general definition
of 'force', either entirely or in part?   He has not abandoned the fundamental claim that a force is a
causal principle; he has merely put causal questions aside to focus upon mathematical ones.  This
is evident in his explanatory remarks to the motive quantity of centripetal force, (Definition 8):
"This concept is purely mathematical, for I am not now considering the physical causes and sites
of forces."111  And in the Scholium to Section 11 of Book I, he explicitly presents the
mathematical problem as a first stage, to be followed by an attack upon the physical problem.
                                                                 
108 Ibid., 404-405.
109 Ibid., 405.
110 Ibid.
111 Definition 8, ibid., 407.
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Mathematics requires an investigation of those quantities of forces and their proportions
that follow from any conditions that may be supposed.  Then, coming down to physics,
these proportions must be compared with the phenomena, so that it may be found out
which conditions [or laws] of forces apply to each kind of attracting bodies.  And then,
finally, it will be possible to argue more securely concerning the physical species,
physical causes, and physical proportions of these forces."112
If we focus upon the gravitational force (and in this passage Newton has gravity in particular in
mind, for reasons to be discussed below), Newton appears to view the gravitational force largely
as Kepler did.  Kepler's goal, as we saw in chapter II, was to investigate the "physical cause" of
the orbits and present his "physical conception" of the force "through calculation and
geometry".113 In the Principia, Newton presents the force "through calculation and geometry", but
as his above-quoted remarks indicate, that knowledge of the mathematical proportions of the
force is only one stage, while knowledge of the physical species and causes is another.  So De
Gravitatione's conception of force as a causal principle still stands.  So too does another
component of the manuscript's definition, namely, that some forces produce changes of state; that
Newton retains this is obvious from his definition of 'impressed force'.
What about De Gravitatione's position, however, that the principle causing the
persistence of state is a force—does Newton abandon this?  There is no clear indication that he
does, but one suggestion that he does may be seen in the above-quoted explanatory remark to
Definition 8.  When he writes that "this concept" is purely mathematical and that he is "not now
considering the physical causes and sites of forces", he is referring to the centripetal force, which
is an impressed force.  Perhaps he means here to identify impressed forces with forces generally,
for though he is not considering the physical sites of "this concept", he has indicated the physical
site of the vis inertiae.  It is inherent in matter—it is a quality of matter.  Yet this is hardly
                                                                 
112 Book I: Section 11, Scholium, ibid.,  588.
113 "I am much occupied with the investigation of the physical causes.  My aim in this is to show that the celestial
machine is to be likened not to a divine organism but rather to a clockwork...insofar as nearly all the manifold
movements are carried out by means of a single, quite simple magnetic force...This physical conception is to be
presented through calculation and geometry." (Letter to Herwart von Hohenburg, February 10, 1605, quoted in Holton,
"Johannes Kepler's Universe: Its Physics and Metaphysics", 342.)
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decisive, since Newton could easily be restricting his attention to the centripetal force while
continuing to regard the vis inertiae as a force in virtue of its causing persistence of state.   I do
not have an answer to the question of whether Newton retains this aspect of De Gravitatione's
definition of 'force', though I think it is likely he does.114  In any case, even if he does abandon
that part of the general definition, it is possible that the vis inertiae would yet qualify as a genuine
force, for reasons I explain next.
THE VIS INERTIAE
If we relied upon terminology alone, we might assume that the vis inertiae is a genuine
force.  For as noted earlier, Newton uses the Latin 'vis' not only in his term for impressed
forces—'vis impressa'—which clearly are genuine forces, but also in the phrases designating the
vis inertiae—'vis inertiae' and 'vis insita'.   Similarly, Newton sometimes uses the term 'force'
when writing in English about the vis inertiae.115  This terminology is hardly decisive, however,
for Newton sometimes adopts existing terms while endowing them with a new meaning.  This is
the case with the term 'impetus', which in medieval usage referred to a conferred power that
gradually diminishes, but which Newton uses to mean a momentary action that changes a body's
state.  Similarly, the term 'vis insita', translated as "inherent force", is not one that Newton
invents.  As Newton found the term, it referred to an inherent or natural power as opposed to a
"violent" one, the former being a power in accordance with the body's nature, and the latter a
                                                                 
114 In this section, I have considered the suggestion that Newton retains De Gravitatione's general definition of force.
As Andrew Janiak pointed out to me, one might object to the suggestion on the grounds that Newton did not have the
concept of mass in De Gravitatione; and that he is unlikely to retain a definition of force developed without the concept
of mass.  This objection merits further investigation.  It also raises further questions, generated by questions about the
concept of mass.  If mass is resistance, for instance, as characterized by the three laws of motion, then Newton has
made some steps toward a concept of mass by De Gravitatione, simply in virtue of sharing the widely acknowledged
view of matter as resistive.
115  In Query 31 for instance, Newton writes the following. "It seems to me farther, that these particles have not only a
vis inertiae, accompanied with such passive laws of motion as naturally result from that force, but also that they are
moved by certain active principles, such as is that of gravity, and that which causes fermentation, and the cohesion of
bodies."  Also, in an ultimately unpublished note for a future edition of the Principia (quoted in Cohen's "Guide", 404),
he writes, "I do not mean Kepler's force of inertia, by which bodies tend toward rest, but a force of remaining in the
same state either of resting or moving." (Opticks, 401.)
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power opposed to it.116  Newton adopts the term, endows it with his own meaning in Definition 3
of the Principia, and then states that he shall give his concept of inherent force an additional
name: 'vis inertiae'.  Newton's thoughts about vis inertiae do not begin with the Principia, but
have antecedents in De Gravitatione.
Vis Inertiae in De Gravitatione
In De Gravitatione, the vis inertiae is a genuine force.  According to that manuscript's
general definition, a force is a "causal principle of motion and rest", and the kinds of forces he
distinguishes are external and internal.  As seen in De Gravitatione's Definition 5, quoted above,
an internal principle of motion and rest is one that conserves existing motion or rest in a body and
that causes a body to attempt to continue in its state, opposing resistance.  What does Newton call
this internal principle?  He tells us in Definition 8 of De Gravitatione:  'inertia', which he then
refers to as 'vis'.  So this is the vis inertiae, or force of inertia.
Definition 8. Inertia is the inner force of a body, lest its state should be easily changed by
an external exciting force.117
Putting Definition 8 together with the relevant clause of Definition 5, De Gravitatione's vis
inertia is a force which is internal to a body, which conserves the body's existing state of motion
or rest, and which causes the body to try to continue in its existing state by opposing any
resistance.  A similar definition may be found in the Principia's near ancestor, De Motu.118
                                                                 
116 See Cohen, "Newton's concepts of force and mass, with notes on the Laws of Motion", 60-61.
117 De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 36. Newton's original Latin reads as follows: "Def 8. Inertia est vis interna
corporis ne status ejus externa vi illata facile mutetur." (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 114); and the
Halls' translation reads: "Inertia is force within a body, lest its state be easily changed by an external exciting force."
(Ibid., 148.)
118 Newton writes in De Motu:  "Definition 2.  And I call that the force of a body or the force innate in a body by reason
of which it endeavors to persist in its motion along a straight line." (Background, 299.)
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All of these effects of the vis inertia reappear in the Principia, however De Gravitatione's
general definition of 'force', which decides the vis inertiae's status in that manuscript, does not.
Vis Inertiae in the Principia
In the Principia, the vis inertiae has three kinds of effects (or strictly speaking, only two,
as we shall see).119  One effect is the conservation of state—the conservation of the body's
existing state of either motion or rest.  Newton mentions this effect not in the Principia's
definition of vis inertiae (Definition 3), but his explanatory remarks to the definition of impressed
force (Definition 4).  There, Newton writes that an impressed force does not remain in the body
once the action has ceased, indicating a crucial difference between this new concept of impressed
force and the old, medieval concept of impetus.  The medievals' concept, based on the old belief
that any non-natural motion requires an external mover, was that of an externally conferred power
that remains for some time in the body, diminishing only gradually.  Newton distinguishes his
quite different concept of an impressed force, writing that this force does not remain in the body
to preserve the new state.  Any state, once attained, is preserved not by an impressed force but by
the vis inertiae: "For a body perseveres in any new state solely by the force of inertia."
The vis inertiae's remaining effects, stated in the above-quoted Definition 3, are
resistance and impetus—for though Newton rejects the medieval concept, he adopts the term
'impetus', endowing it with his own meaning. Resistance is the striving against an impressed
force, as the body attempts to preserve its state; as Kepler remarked earlier, without resistance,
matter could be accelerated to an infinite velocity by the slightest force.  Impetus is the body's
endeavor to change the state of an obstacle.  Unlike the vis inertiae's first effect, which operates
continually to preserve the body's state in the absence of an impressed force, resistance and
                                                                 
119 For an extended discussion of the functions of the vis inertiae, see McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 36-42.
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impetus are episodic, to borrow Stein's term.120  They are exercised only when an impressed force
is encountered.
Resistance and impetus are in reality one and the same. There is no real distinction
between them, Newton writes, only a rational distinction, that is, a difference in viewpoint.  When
exercised, the vis inertiae of a given body, A, may be considered in terms of its effect upon A
itself as it encounters the impressed force supplied by another body, B.  When A's vis inertiae is
considered in terms of its effect upon A, it is resistance.   It is the striving by A to preserve its
state as it encounters B's impressed force, a striving without which A could be infinitely
accelerated by B's impressed force.  A's vis inertiae may also be considered in terms of its effect
upon the encountered obstacle, B; considered from this viewpoint, it is impetus, an endeavor to
change B's state.  Newton therefore appears to be suggesting that when exercised, the vis inertiae
actually constitutes an impressed force. The exercised vis inertiae appears to be half of an action-
reaction pair, since A's resistance, the reaction, may also be seen as its impetus, an action or
impressed force, upon B.  Likewise, B's vis inertiae may be considered in terms of itself, the body
in which it is inherent, in which case it is resistance or reaction; or it may be considered in terms
of its effect upon A, in which case it is impetus, that is, an action, or impressed force.121
                                                                 
120 Stein, "Newton's Metaphysics", 284.
121 In connection with this point, see Howard Stein and Lars-Göran Johasson.  Stein writes: "Whereas the "force of
inactivity" is a permanent attribute of a body—not always exercised, but always present—impressed force is by its
nature episodic.  The explanation ends with the remark, "Impressed forces are of different origins; as from percussion,
from pressure, from centripetal force." ("Newton's Metaphysics", 284.) The phraseology here—a force is said to be
"from" another (kind of) force as its "origin"—is rather odd.  But the point is this: the "intrinsic force of matter" is, in
Newton's terminology, one of the "natural powers" or forces of nature.  The various "origins" of impressed forces, too,
are natural powers: permanent features of material nature, not transient episodes.  An impressed force is the action
upon a body of one of these natural powers."  See also Lars-Göran Johasson:
In definitions III, IV and V Newton successively defines vis insita, vis impressa, and centripetal force; this
suggests that they are different things.  However, in the comment quoted above [i.e., Newton's explanatory
remark in Definition III that the exercise of the vis insita may be considered both resistance and impetus] he
writes that vis insita (i.e. inertia) and vis impressa (also called impulse) are in fact one and the same thing.  The
difference is whether the body in question is moving or at rest, and this difference is only a relative matter; it
has to do with our choice of frame of reference, not with the objects described.  ("An anti-Humean account of
causation in classical physics", 10-11.)
Yet Johasson denies that the vis insita (vis inertiae) is an inherent quality of matter, as Newton describes it in Rule 3,
writing that it denotes a change of motion (since it is identical to vis impressa), not the cause of that change:
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The suggestion that the exercised vis inertiae is an impressed force has obvious
implications for the vis inertiae's status as a force.  If this suggestion were indeed Newton's view,
then the vis inertiae would qualify as a genuine force regardless of which of the two above-
mentioned definitions of 'force' Newton accepted.   If Newton accepts the definition of 'impressed
force' as a definition of 'force' generally, then the vis inertiae, when exercised, would qualify, for
when exercised it is an endeavor to change the obstacle's state, which is to say an impressed
force.  If, on the other hand, Newton retains De Gravitatione's general definition of force, which
classifies as a force not only that causing change of state but also that causing the persistence of
state, then the vis inertiae would qualify twice over.  For when exercised, it is an impressed force
as well as resistance, and when unexercised, it causes the body's current state of either motion or
rest to be preserved.
Nonetheless, I do not conclude that the vis inertiae is a genuine force, since the
suggestion that when exercised it constitutes an impressed force is quite problematic, as a
subsequent section will show.  Before examining those problems, let us consider the relation of
the vis inertiae to matter and to the laws of motion.
Relation of the Vis Inertiae to Matter and to the Three Laws of Motion
The vis inertiae's relation to matter is indicated by its other name, indeed the name by
which Newton first introduces it: 'inherent force of matter' ('vis insita').  Newton does not invent
the term 'vis insita', but he presumably uses it because he finds it apt. Thus the vis inertiae is
inherent in, or inseparable from, matter.  This accords with De Gravitatione's earlier description
of the vis inertiae as an "internal principle", and also with his later remarks in Rule 3, a rule
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The definition of vis impressa as 'that which changes the body's state of rest or uniform motion' suggests that
vis impressa is the cause of changes.  But the comment quoted above tells us that there is no real difference
between vis impressa and vis insita; hence, since vis insita is not the cause of inertia but inertia itself, vis
impressa cannot differ from the change of motion.  Both expressions are in fact only different expressions
signifying changes of motion, not the causes of these changes….It appears that Newton intended these three
definitions as explications of concepts that are satisfied by one and the same force. (Ibid.,10.)
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added for the 1713 edition.122  This rule states the conditions for inferring the universal qualities
of bodies, and thus for extending the qualities of observed bodies to unobserved ones.  The
resultant picture is one in which the micro world is much like the macro world, only smaller;
observable bodies have are extended, massive, and hard because their unobservable, component
particles are extended, massive, and hard.
Rule 3.  These qualities of bodies that cannot be intended or remitted [i.e., qualities that
cannot be increased and diminished] and that belong to all bodies on which experiments
can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally.123
Then in his explanatory remarks, Newton states that the vis inertiae is, unlike gravity, an inherent
quality of matter, along with extension, hardness, impenetrability and mobility.124
The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of the whole arise
from the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of each of the
parts; and thus we conclude that every one of the least parts of all bodies is extended,
hard, impenetrable, movable, and endowed with a force of inertia…. I am by no means
affirming that gravity is essential to bodies.  By inherent force I mean only the force of
inertia.  This is immutable.125
                                                                 
122 With the second edition of the Principia, published in 1713, Newton eliminates Hypothesis III, which stated, "Every
body can be transformed into body of any other kind, and can assume successively all intermediate degrees of quality",
and replaces it with Rule 3, which states the essential qualities of matter, and provides grounds for inferring the
existence and qualities of unobservable particles of matter from those of observed bodies.  This translation of
Hypothesis III is by J.E. McGuire, who examines Newton's reasons for rejecting it in "Transmutation and Immutability:
Newton's Doctrine of Physical Qualities"; see 262-263 in particular.  See also Cohen, "Guide", 198-200.
123 Book III, Rule 3, Principia, 795-96.
124  It is interesting that in Query 23/31 (the slash indicating that Query 31 in the 1717/18 Opticks is a revision of the
1706 Optice's Query 23), which contains an argument severely restricting the scope of motions explicable by passive
principles, Newton does not include inertia in his list of the qualities endowed upon matter by God.  There, Newton
mentions the properties of Rule 3, minus inertia:  "It seems probable to me, that God in the beginning formed Matter in
solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of such Sizes and Figures, and with such other Properties, and in
such Proportion to Space, as most conduced to the Ends for which he formed them; and that these primitive Particles
being Solids, are incomparably harder than any porous Bodies compounded of them; even so very hard, as never to
wear or break in Pieces: no ordinary Power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first Creation."
(Query 31, Opticks, 400.)
125 Rule 3, Principia, 795-796.  The passage quoted concludes with the remark, "Gravity is diminished as bodies recede
from the earth."
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The constellation of terms that Newton associates with the vis inertiae while disassociating them
from gravity—'inherent', 'essential', 'immutable'—raises some questions since those terms are not
obviously synonymous with one another.  For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that
the vis inertiae belongs to the least part of matter and is thus inseparable from matter. Does this
inseparability explain its causal means of operation? Newton appears to think that no explanation
is required; his remarks in an unpublished letter indicate that he regards manifest, inherent
qualities of matter as primitives that require no explanation.126
The inherent vis inertiae, Newton writes in Query 31, is a "passive principle" that gives rise
to the three laws of motion.127 The laws are as follows.
Law 1.  Every body perseveres in its state of being at rest or of moving uniformly straight
forward, except insofar as it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed."
Law 2.  A change in motion is proportional to the motive force impressed and takes place
along the straight line in which that force is impressed."
Law 3.  To any action there is always an opposite and equal reaction; in other words, the
actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal and always opposite in direction.128
                                                                 
126 Newton to the Editor of the Memoirs of Literature, unpublished, written c. May 1712:  "But Mr. Leibniz goes on.
'The ancients and the moderns, who own that gravity is an occult quality, are in the right, if they mean by it that there is
a certain mechanism unknown to them whereby all bodies tend towards the center of the earth.  But if they mean that
the thing is performed without any mechanism by a simple primitive quality or by a law of God who produces that
effect without using any intelligible means, it is an unreasonable and occult quality, and so very occult that it is
impossible that it should ever be done through an angel or God himself should undertake to explain it.'  The same ought
to be said of hardness.  So then gravity and hardness must go for unreasonable occult qualities unless they can be
explained mechanically.  And why may not the same be said of the vis inertiae [force of inertia] and the extention, the
duration and mobility of bodies, and yet no man ever attempted to explain these qualities mechanically, or took them
for miracles or supernatural things or fictions or occult qualities.  They are the natural, real, reasonable, manifest
qualities of all bodies seated in them by the will of God from the beginning of the creation and perfectly incapable of
being explained mechanically, and so may be the hardness of primitive particles of bodies." (Philosophical Writings,
116-117.)
127 In Query 31 Newton writes, "It seems to me farther, that these Particles have not only a Vis inertiae, accompanied
with such passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that Force, but also that they are moved by certain active
Principles." (Opticks, 401). In draft material for the 1706 Optice (specifically, for Query 23), dated by McGuire as c.
1705, Newton is more specific, mentioning each of the three laws: "Matter is a passive principle & cannot move itself.
It continues in its state of moving or resting unless disturbed.  It receives motion proportional to the force impressing it,
and resists as much as it is resisted.  These are passive laws & to affirm that there are no other is to speak against
experience.  For we find in orselves a power of moving our bodies by or thought.  Life & Will (thinking) are active
Principles by wch we move our bodies, & thence arise other laws of motion unknown to us." (ULC, Add. 3970, fol.
619r, a draft variant of the 1706 Optice's Query 23, written in English and quoted in McGuire, "Force, Active
Principles, 171.)
128 Principia, 417.
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There is an evident connection between the vis inertiae and Law 1, which expresses the view
adopted from Descartes' that uniform rectilinear motion is as natural as rest.129  (It will also be
noted that the states of rest and uniform motion mentioned in Law 1 are distinct, since Newton
asserts absolute space and time, and thus absolute motion.)  Law 1 is associated with the
unexercised vis inertiae, for as stated in Definition 4, the unexercised vis inertiae preserves a
body's state of motion or rest.130 The second and third laws pertain to impressed force, and so are
connected to the vis inertiae when exercised.  In the next sections, I shall look a bit more closely
at the vis inertiae's relations to Law 1 and Law 3.
The Vis Inertiae, Law 1, and the Preservation of State
In saying that the unexercised vis inertiae preserves a body's state, I am rejecting Robin
Collingwood's claim, later defended by Menno Hulswit.131  They argue that Newton attributed the
continuation of state to Law 1, but not to any cause, and that he therefore denied universal
causation, holding that some events are law like but uncaused.  (I take this to mean that some
events have no natural cause; since everything that happens requires at least God's concurrence,
God is in some sense the cause of everything.)  In defending this claim, Hulswit draws upon a
passage from the Scholium to the Definitions in which Newton distinguishes true (absolute) from
relative motion.  In the translation used by Hulswit, and with the latter's added italics, the passage
reads as follows.
                                                                 
129 In response to Leibniz's charge that he adopted his notion of inertia from Kepler, Newton drafts (though eventually
discards) a clarificatory note distancing himself from Kepler's concept of inertia. See Cohen, "Guide", 404: "Newton's
interleaved copy of ed. 2 adds the following, which was never printed: "I do not mean Kepler's force of inertia, by
which bodies tend toward rest, but a force of remaining in the same state either of resting or moving."
130 One difficulty here is that while Newton writes in Query 31 that all three laws of motion arise from the vis inertiae,
Law 1 also helps explicate impressed force.
131 See Hulswit, "A Short History of Causation", and Collingwood, "On the So-called Idea of Causation." For a similar
view, see also Lars-Göran Johasson: "Uniform motion, i.e., change of position with constant velocity, is, according to
Galileo and Newton a natural state which doesn't require a cause….A cause, i.e., a force, is needed only for the change
of motion." ("An anti-Humean account of causation in classical physics", 15.)
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The causes by which true and relative motions are distinguished, one from the other, are
the forces impressed upon bodies to generate motion. True motion is neither generated
nor altered, but by some force impressed upon the body moved; but relative motion may
be generated or altered without any force impressed upon the body. For it is sufficient
only to impress some force on other bodes with which the former is compared, that by
their giving way, that relation may be changed, in which the relative rest or motion of this
body did consist. Again, true motion suffers always some change from any force
impressed upon the moving body.132
Hulswit reaches his conclusion because he takes Newton to be defining 'cause' generally:
Thus, Newton means by cause precisely the above mentioned (in the first two laws of
motion) "motive force impressed upon" a body, which "compels" it to move differently.
Put more precisely: causes are forces or constraints that compel moving bodies to behave
differently than they would have done without them.  Thus 'caused' means constrained or
compelled.  Newton used the expression "free" motion to refer to unconstrained motions.
Thus Collingwood rightly concluded that "in Newton there is no law of universal
causation; he not only does not assert that every event must have a cause, he explicitly
denies it."  Any movement that happens according to the first law of motion is an
uncaused event. Thus if a body moves freely from A to B to C, the event which is the
movement from A to B, is in no way the cause of the event which is the movement from
B to C; it is not caused at all. The first law of motion is in fact a law of free or causeless
motion (Collingwood [1938] 1991, 159; italics mine).133
Yet there is no indication in this Scholium passage that Newton is setting out a general definition
of 'cause', nor does he define it elsewhere.134
Newton's point in the passage is this: the difference between a given body's true motion
and its relative motion depends upon which bodies suffer the impressed force—that body itself,
or the bodies to which it is related. Take a body A.  How could true motion be generated in it, or
                                                                 
132 Newton, The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica), 1726
edition, trans. A. Motte, 1729; Hulswit's italics. Cohen and Whitman translate the passage as follows: "The causes
which distinguish true motions from relative motions are the forces impressed upon bodies to generate motion.  True
motion is neither generated nor changed except by forces impressed upon the moving body itself, but relative motion
can be generated and changed without the impression of forces upon this body.  For the impression of forces solely on
other bodies with which a given body has a relation is enough, when the other bodies yield, to produce a change in that
relation which constitutes the relative rest or motion of this body.  Again, true motion is always changed by forces
impressed upon a moving body, but relative motion is not necessarily changed by such forces." (Principia, 412.)
133 Hulswit, "A Short History of Causation", 3.2.2.
134 On this point, see Janiak: "Since Newton never defines 'cause,' or various related terms such as 'action,' and does not
distinguish an ordinary from a more precise conception of causation, he apparently thinks that our ordinary conception
is adequate for interpreting the Principia." ("Newton and the Reality of Force", 134.)
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how could its existing true motion be altered?  —Only by an impressed force upon that body, A.
How could we generate relative motion in A, or alter A's existing relative motion?  It would be
sufficient to impress forces upon bodies other than A.  So again, Newton's point has to do with
which body suffers the impressed force.  He is not making any claim about what qualifies as a
cause.  Specifically, he has not identified causes with impressed forces.  There could be other
kinds of causes, including the vis inertiae, which is not an impressed force (at least as
unexercised), but to which Newton attributes the preservation of state, in his remarks in
Definition 4 and elsewhere.
To obtain the Collingwood-Hulswit thesis, one would need to show that Newton
identifies causes with impressed forces.  Yet textual evidence runs against that identification.
Newton consistently attributes the continuation of a body's state to the vis inertiae, which he
considers to have causal efficacy.  This is evident in the early manuscript, De Gravitatione, where
he refers to it explicitly as a "causal principle", but also in the Principia itself.  In the explanation
of Rule 3 he writes, "That all bodies are movable and persevere in motion or rest by means of
certain forces (which we call forces of inertia) we infer from finding these properties in the bodies
that we have seen."135  Over a long period of time, in texts stretching from De Gravitatione to
later editions of the Principia and the Opticks, Newton attributes a body's persistence of state not
directly to Law 1, but to the vis inertiae itself, as an inherent quality of matter.136  So even if
                                                                 
135 Principia, 795.
136 The relevant texts include: De Gravitatione; De Motu; Definition 4 of the Principia; Rule 3 of the Principia; and
Query 31 of the Opticks.  In De Motu Newton writes:  "Definition 2.  And I call that the force of a body or the force
innate in a body by reason of which it endeavors to persist in its motion along a straight line." (Background, 299.) In
the explanation of Rule 3 he writes, "That all bodies are movable and persevere in motion or rest by means of certain
forces (which we call forces of inertia) we infer from finding these properties in the bodies that we have seen."
(Principia, 795.)  In an ultimately unpublished note for a future edition of the Principia Newton writes, "I do not mean
Kepler's force of inertia, by which bodies tend toward rest, but a force of remaining in the same state either of resting or
moving." (This appears in Cohen, "Guide", 404.) In a Draft variant for the 1706 Optice, Newton writes, "Bodies (alone
considered as long, broad & thick...) are passive. By their vis inertiae they continue in their state of moving or resting &
receive motion proportional to ye force impressing it & resist as much as they are resisted." (ULC Add. 3970, folls.
620r, quoted in McGuire, "Force, Active Principles" 170-171.)  Finally, in Query 31, Newton again attributes
conservation of state, as well as opposition to resistance, to the inertial force: "The Vis inertiae is a passive Principle by
which Bodies persist in their Motion or Rest, receive Motion in proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as
much as they are resisted.  By this Principle alone there never could have been any Motion in the World." (Opticks,
397.)
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Newton did not consider the vis inertiae to be a genuine force, he did consider the vis inertiae to
have causal efficacy (in which case it would be a cause but not a force).
The Vis Inertiae, Law 3, and the Debt to Descartes
The third law concerns opposite and equal action-reaction pairs.  As noted earlier,
Newton holds that a body's resistance is only rationally distinct from its endeavor to change the
state of an encountered obstacle, which suggests that he considers the exercised vis inertiae to be
an impressed force upon the obstacle.  I will subsequently discuss the reasons that this suggestion
is problematic.  First, however, I want to trace Newton's merely rational distinction between
resistance and impetus, and also Law 3, to their conceptual basis in Descartes—specifically, to
Descartes' rational distinction between action and passion.137
As we saw in chapter II, Descartes holds that action and passion are distinct only in
reason,138 a claim connected to his belief in a plenum.  In a plenum, there is no space separating a
body from other bodies, and so a body cannot be moved without moving some other bodies.  The
body expels the body contiguous to it on one side, and is expelled by that contiguous on the other
side.139  Under the assumption of a plenum, then, the body's being a mover cannot be conceived
without its also being moved, and so there is only a rational distinction between mover and
moved, that is, between action and passion.
If we turn to Descartes' discussion of motion in the strict sense, which is to say his
doctrine of relative motion, we find the following principle of reciprocal action:
                                                                 
137 I thank Alan Nelson for an influential discussion of the ideas in this section.
138 Only substances can be really distinct, that is, able to exist apart from one another.  See Descartes, Principles of
Philosophy, II.60, CSM, 213.
139 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.3, CSM, 237: "How in every case of motion there is a complete circle of
bodies moving together.  I noted above that every place is full of bodies, and that the same portion of matter takes up
the same amount of space, <so that it is impossible for it to fill a greater or lesser space, or for any other body to occupy
its place while it remains there>.  It follows from this that each body can move only in a <complete> circle <of mater,
or ring of bodies which all move together at the same time>: a body entering a given place expels another, and the
expelled body moves on and expels another, and so on, until the body at the end of the sequence enters the place left by
the first body at the precise moment when the first body is leaving it."
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Transfer occurs from the vicinity not of any contiguous bodies but from the vicinity of
those which 'are regarded as being at rest'.  For transfer itself is a reciprocal process: we
cannot understand that a body AB is transferred from the vicinity of a body CD without
simultaneously understanding that CD is transferred from the vicinity of AB.  Exactly the
same force and action is needed on both sides.  So if we wished to characterize motion
strictly in terms of its own nature, without reference to anything else, then in the case of
two contiguous bodies being transferred in opposite directions, and thus separated, we
should say that there was just as much motion in the one body as in the other.140
The claims I have italicized may belong to a doctrine of relative motion. But this principle of
reciprocal action—"Exactly the same force and action is needed on both sides"—will reappear in
Newton's writings.
We know that Newton read Descartes' doctrine of relative motion very closely; a large
portion of De Gravitatione is devoted to its refutation.  And we know that Newton viewed
Descartes' system with some animosity.  In De Gravitatione, he positions himself dramatically
against Descartes, declaring, "I shall venture to dispose of his fictions".141  The fictions Newton
proceeds to dispose of, there and in subsequent writings, include not only the doctrine of relative
motion but also the material plenum, the vortical theory of gravity, Descartes' erroneous laws of
collision, and the identification of matter with extension, which Newton considered a path to
atheism.  In the Principia, it is Galileo rather than Descartes whom Newton credits with
discovering the inertial principle that he formulates as Law 1.  So if Newton knowingly derived
from Descartes the principle of reciprocal action, perhaps he would not have acknowledged it.142
However, I shall not attempt the historian's task of tracing the causal path from Newton's reading
of Descartes' rational distinction between action and passion and the associated principle of
reciprocal action.  It is sufficient to note that Newton did read the passages containing those ideas,
and to show that they serve as a conceptual basis for some of Newton's fundamental ideas.
                                                                 
140 Ibid., II,.29, CSM 235. The second and third sets of italics are mine.
141 De Gravitatione in Philosophical Writings, 14.
142 However, in writing to Hooke, "If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants", Newton
acknowledges Descartes as one of those giants.  See Correspondence of Isaac Newton, Vol. I, 416.
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To make use of an idea, as opposed to adopting it wholesale, is to extract it from its
current context, and put it to use in a different one.  In the passages quoted above, Descartes
considers cases of bodies sliding past one another, in the context of a doctrine of relative motion;
he explains why, if motion is relative, we say of a body sliding along the earth that it is in motion,
rather than saying that the earth is in motion.  Newton has something else in mind.  Rejecting
Descartes' doctrine of relative motion along with the plenum, which together grounded Descartes'
merely rational distinction between action and passion, Newton extracts the principle of
reciprocal action and puts it to his own use.  This principle becomes the conceptual basis for the
exercised vis inertiae and for the closely related Law 3.
As discussed earlier, Newton sees no real distinction between a body's attempt to
maintain its own state (resistance), and its attempt to change the state of the obstacle (impetus).  If
we consider the effect upon the one body, as it encounters an impressed force, it is exercising
resistance, an attempt to maintain its prior state; but if we consider the effect upon the
encountered body, the force of our original body is an impressed force, which the encountered
body resists.
It seems then, that Newton has taken Descartes' principle of reciprocal action—"Exactly
the same force and action is needed on both sides"—and used it to develop his concept of the
inertial force.  For if the force that one body exerts on another body is only rationally distinct
from the effect it experiences itself, as it endeavors to maintain its own state, then "exactly the
same force and action is needed on both sides", just as Descartes said.  Law 3 generalizes the
principle of reciprocal action, stating, "To any action there is always an opposite and equal
reaction; in other words, the actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal and always
opposite in direction."
But while Law 3 generalizes a principle drawn from the Cartesian system of action by
contact, it does not itself imply action by contact.  The law is neutral with respect to the question
of whether forces act by contact or over a distance.  One difficulty with the merely rational
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distinction between resistance and impetus—that is, with the suggestion that when exercised, the
vis inertiae is an impressed force—is that it appears to presume action by contact.
Problematic Implications for the Rational Distinction
between Resistance and Impetus
It is difficult to make sense of Newton's claim that there is no real distinction between a
body's resistance and its "endeavors to change the state of that obstacle", if not by seeing the
endeavor as an impressed force, yet there are serious problems with supposing that this is indeed
Newton's meaning.  First of all, if the exercised vis inertiae is an impressed force, what are we to
make of Newton's explanatory remark, "This force is always proportional to the body"?  We
would need to suppose that the remark is incomplete, for the vis inertiae would be proportional
not only to the body (the quantity of matter), but also to acceleration.
Second, the suggestion that a body's resistance is in reality identical to the force it
impresses upon another body may be plausible for contact action, but it is implausible for forces
that seem to act over distances.  Impressed forces include not only percussion and pressure but
also centripetal forces, and thus gravity.  For gravity, the suggestion under consideration implies
the following. When two bodies mutually gravitationally attract, the inertial resistance that each
exercises is identical to the gravitational force it impresses upon the other body; the only
difference between each body's resistance to the other body's force, and its attraction of the other
body, is in how we conceive this.  So, given bodies A and B, we could conceive A's inertia as its
power of resisting B's attraction of it, or as its endeavor to attract B. If we consider a ball dropped
near the surface of the earth, this interpretation implies that the ball's resistance to moving is only
rationally distinct from the gravitational attraction by which it endeavors to change the earth's
state.  Yet the resistance that causes the ball to accelerate over time, as opposed to attaining
infinite velocity and hitting the earth instantly, is not easily seen as an effort to change the earth's
state.
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Such an identity, a mere rational distinction, is not only implausible, it is contradicted by
Rule 3, and this is a third problem.  At the end of Rule 3, Newton states explicitly that the inertial
force is inherent to matter, while the gravitational force is not.  Indeed, he classifies only the vis
inertiae, not gravity, as inherent because the latter varies with distance while the former does not.
Clearly he does not consider gravity and the vis inertiae's effect of resistance as two ways of
conceiving a single force or effect. (And since gravity serves as the model for the additional
distance forces about which Newton speculates, the problem extends to those forces as well.)
One possible explanation of these difficulties is that Newton developed the concept of the
vis inertiae with contact action in mind.  Yet this does not satisfactorily explain Newton's claim
that resistance and impetus are merely rationally distinct, because there is one strong indication
that Newton was satisfied with the claim: he carried it from the Principia's first edition into later
ones.
A Less Problematic Interpretation of the Vis Inertiae
One way out of these difficulties is to argue that Newton's vis inertiae is simply identical
to mass.  This view is defended by Cohen.
He [Newton] identified mass and inertia.  The vis insita of a body, he writes in Definition
3, "is always proportional to the body," that is, proportional to the mass.  Furthermore, it
"does not differ from the inertia of the mass" save for "the manner in which it is
conceived."  Hence, he writes, we may give vis insita a new and "very significant name,"
force of inertia (vis inertiae).143
The virtue of this view is that it avoids all the problems noted above.  On this view the vis
inertiae is proportional to body alone, not to body and acceleration both, and there is no
counterintuitive identification between resistance and impressed forces such as gravity.
                                                                 
143 Cohen, "Newton's concepts of force and mass, with notes on the Laws of Motion", 61.
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Yet Cohen's view does not fit well with some of Newton's remarks.  First of all, Newton
does not say that the vis inertiae (vis insita) is identical to body (mass or quantity of matter), but
merely that the two are proportional.  Further, it is difficult to square Cohen's view with Newton's
claim that resistance is only rationally distinct from a body's endeavor to change an obstacle's
state.  What could Newton mean by this, if he simply identified the vis inertiae with the quantity
of matter?  Also, Rule 3 presents the vis inertiae as a quality of matter, not as the quantity of
matter.144  I therefore do not think Cohen's view captures Newton's intent.  The view seems best
understood as a modification offered to Newton, though one that is more congenial than allowing
the exercised vis inertiae to qualify as an impressed force.145
GRAVITY
The status of gravity as a force is not in question in the Principia, as noted earlier.
Gravity is a centripetal force and thus an impressed force, so its status is not in question in this
mathematical treatise, which does not attempt to explain gravity's causal means of action.
Gravity's status as a force comes into question only once that causal question is considered.  Yet
even in the Principia, the causal question waits in the wings.  This is in part because of Newton's
positive claims about the gravitational force.  Additionally, Newton provokes the question in his
own mind in the way that Brahe provoked it for Kepler: by undermining an existing causal
                                                                 
144 An additional question is raised by a speculation from Query 31.  If the vis inertiae gives rise to the three laws of
motion, but is itself simply mass (quantity of matter), must any matter God creates be described by the three laws of
motion?  To locate this question in the text, can we reconcile this interpretation of inertia with Newton's remark in
Query 31 that God could have created matter having different densities and forces. (See Opticks, 403-404.)  Elsewhere
in Query 31, Newton speaks of inertia as a power of matter rather than as matter itself; inertia is something that the
particles of matter "have", and the three laws of motion "result from that force".  Then, in speculating that God could
vary the laws of nature by creating matter of "different densities and forces", he seems to allow that God could create
particles that lacked resistance, and had other traits instead.   Is the way around this difficulty to consider Newton's use
of the term 'force' redundant, adding nothing to his suggestion that God could vary the density of matter?  For if inertia
just is the quantity of matter, then by varying the density of matter, God would be varying the quantity of matter, which
is to say, inertia.  And particles of different densities, or different densities combined with other differences in
properties, might obey different laws.
145 Alternatively, one might defend Cohen's view—and without taking it as a modification of Newton's own view—by
holding that the vis inertiae can be both a quality of matter, as Newton indicates in Rule 3, and the quantity of matter,
as stated in Definition 1.  As a person's height is both a quality of that person and a quantity that can be measured, mass
could be both a quality and a quantity of matter.  I thank Andrew Janiak for this point.
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explanation.  As Tycho Brahe disproved the crystalline sphere hypothesis, Newton attacks the
material plenum critical to Descartes' vortex theory.
Newton's Attack on the Material Plenum
Earlier, in De Gravitatione, Newton attacked Descartes' identification of matter and
extension. Then using realizations developed in De Motu,146 he attacks Descartes' material
plenum in Book II of the Principia.  According to Descartes' mechanical explanation of celestial
motions, a dense aether pushes celestial bodies along in their orbits.  Newton, tackling problems
of both celestial and terrestrial motion, shows that while celestial bodies conform to the predicted,
idealized elliptical paths, terrestrial projectiles deviate from those idealized paths.  He accounts
for these deviations by assuming that atmospheric air provides resistance to the projectiles'
motion.  So, he assumes that the medium in which terrestrial projectiles travel provides
resistance, but when treating celestial motion, he needs no such assumption.  His results, in which
only terrestrial bodies deviate from the idealized elliptical path, raise a problem for any Cartesian
explanation of celestial motions that employs the notion of resistive matter.147
If Descartes’ material fluid were dense enough to push the planets, it would produce
enough resistance to make the planets deviate from Kepler's idealized elliptical paths, just as
terrestrial projectiles do; indeed it would eventually bring the planets to a stop.  Yet the planets do
not deviate from those paths, and they are not brought to a stop, so such a dense medium must not
exist.  If, on the other hand, the material fluid were too rare to produce deviations from the
elliptical paths, it would not be capable of pushing the planets.  Thus the existence of a medium
                                                                 
146 Westfall argues that a pendulum experiment c. 1679 convinced Newton that no material aether exists.  See Force,
376-377.
147 Defenders of Cartesian vortex theories might sidestep Newton's argument by denying the claim on which it depends,
namely, that a material medium would be resistive and act by impact; defenders might hold that the vortical matter
somehow carries the planets without pushing them.  And Newton's arguments did not defeat vortical theories; they
remained influential despite the Principia's attack, with Leibniz, for one, inferring a material medium from his claim
that action by contact belonged to the very nature of matter.  Yet versions that sidestepped Newton's attack were still
unable to explain Kepler's laws, the motion of comets, or the proportionality of the gravitational force to mass rather
than surface area.
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having enough resistance to push the planets is contradicted by observations; and a medium rare
enough to conform to the observations could not perform the function Descartes assigns to it.148
However gravitational motions are caused, then, they cannot be caused by the impact of a
material medium.  As Newton writes to Leibniz in 1693, "The heavens are to be stripped as far as
may be of all matter, lest the motions of planets and comets be hindered or rendered irregular".149
This reopens the causal question, though Newton does not speculate about its answer in the
Principia.  (Apropos of that question, it is notable that Newton does not use the term 'void' to
mean a space empty of all substance.  This is not only because God is substantially present
everywhere, but also because of the possibility of a very rare medium.  In Definition 1, he does
not deny the existence of an aether, he simply takes no account of it; if it exists, it has no sensible
mass, and thus no relevance to his definition of mass.  In Query 28, Newton reiterates that the
heavens cannot contain a Cartesian, material medium, but he allows that there could be a medium
lacking sensible resistance:  "To make way for the regular and lasting Motions of the Planets and
Comets, it's necessary to empty the Heavens of all Matter, except perhaps some very thin
Vapours, Steams, or Effluvia…and from such an exceedingly rare Aethereal Medium as we
described above."150)
Gravity in the Principia: Some Central Claims
The Principia famously demonstrates that terrestrial projectile motion and celestial
motions are explicable by the same principles, eventually overthrowing the Aristotelian
distinction between the sublunary and superlunary realms.  However, Newton does not initially
                                                                 
148 On this point, see Brackenridge:  "If Newton accounted for this celestial behavior by assuming that the ether was so
diffuse that it caused no resistance, then he could no longer assume that the ether was dense enough to provide the
mechanical collisions needed for the gravitational interaction.  Such a conclusion would have called for a major
revision in the way Newton saw the celestial world.  It was not a step to be taken lightly.  Nevertheless, Professor Jo
Dobbs has recently argued that Newton did take such a step and that the exact nature of the area law played a major
role in his decision to reject mechanical celestial collisions." (The Key to Newton's Dynamics, 23.)
149 Newton to Leibniz, 1693 in Philosophical Writings, 108-109.
150 Query 28, Opticks, 368..
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identify the force that produces the orbits as gravity.  In Book I, which analyzes motions resulting
from a variety of forces, he refers to gravity as an example of a centripetal force; but thus far,
gravity is only that force "by which bodies tend toward the center of the earth".  The force that
keeps the planets in their orbits, meanwhile, is simply a "centripetal force" throughout Books I
and II.   In Book III, Newton derives from observed phenomena his law of universal
gravitation—the force of gravity between any two bodies is proportional to the product of their
masses, divided by the square of the distance between them.151  And it is not until Book III that he
identifies the inverse square, centripetal force holding the planets in their orbits as gravity, that
same force governing projectile phenomena on earth.
Hitherto we have called "centripetal" that force by which celestial bodies are kept in their
orbits.  It is now established that this force is gravity, and therefore we shall call it gravity
from now on.  For the cause of the centripetal force by which the moon is kept in its orbit
ought to be extended to all the planets, by rules 1, 2, and 4.152
Having identified the force responsible for the orbits with gravity, Newton asserts his principle of
universal gravitation, and the proportionality of the gravitational force to mass in Book III,
Proposition 7.
Gravity exists in all bodies universally and is proportional to the quantity of matter in
each.153
A corollary to Proposition 7 asserts that the gravity toward the whole arises from the gravity
toward the individual parts.  And since universal gravitation implies that any body, even an acorn,
attracts the earth, Newton defends this against the charge of implausibility.
                                                                 
151 Whereas Newton expresses his law in terms of proportionality, modern expression uses the gravitational constant.
152 Book III, Prop 5, Scholium, Principia, 806.
153 Book III, Prop 7, ibid., 810.
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Therefore the gravity toward the whole planet arises from and is compounded of the
gravity toward the individual parts.  We have examples of this in magnetic and electric
attractions.  For every attraction toward a whole arises from the attractions toward the
individual parts.  This will be understood in the case of gravity by thinking of several
smaller planets coming together into one globe and composing a larger planet.  For the
force of the whole will have to arise from the forces of the component parts. If anyone
objects that by this law all bodies on our earth would have to gravitate toward one
another, even though gravity of this kind is by no means detected by our senses, my
answer is that gravity toward these bodies is far smaller than what our senses could
detect, since such gravity is to the gravity toward the whole earth as [the quantity of
matter in each of] these bodies to the [quantity of matter in the] whole earth.154
The claim that gravitational force is proportional to quantity of matter or mass—mass being a
concept original to Newton155—is of course a clear departure from the Cartesian Tradition.  If
gravity were to operate by contact action, as the Cartesians held, its intensity would be
proportional to surface area, rather than to the quantity of matter, compounded from a body's
parts.156  Much later, Newton would emphasize this point in the General Scholium added to the
Principia's 1713 edition.
This force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and
planets without any diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the
quantity of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to
do) but in proportion to the quantity of solid matter, and whose action is extended
everywhere to immense distances, always decreasing as the squares of the distances.
Gravity toward the sun is compounded of the gravities toward the individual particles of
the sun, and at increasing distances from the sun decreases exactly as the squares of the
distances.157
                                                                 
154 Book III, Prop 7, Corollary 1, ibid., 811.
155 Although some of Newton's predecessors, including Galileo, William Gilbert, and Kepler, employed the term 'mass',
they did not distinguish it from weight.  As shall be discussed in a later chapter, Newton is the first to make that
distinction.  He defines 'body' or 'mass' as quantity of matter, and distinguishes it from weight by stating that it is
"proportional" to weight. See Definition 1, Principia, 403.
156 See Principia, Book I, section 12 and Book III, Propositions 8, 19, 20.  See also Cohen, "Guide", 54-6.
157 General Scholium, Principia, 943.
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So matter is particulate,158 and the heavens are nearly void of matter.  Gravity is proportional to
the quantity of matter rather than to surface area, and it decreases with distance in an inverse
square relation.  All of this suggests the possibility that material bodies may be causally affecting
one another across empty space. (The theory also implies instantaneous action between bodies,
but in the 17th century this was not regarded as problematic.159)
Aware that he will be charged with allowing action at a distance, Newton carefully
circumscribes the Principia's goals. Of the two related problems he inherited from Kepler, the
physical and the mathematical, it is only the latter that he claims to have solved.  Thus in his
Author's Preface to the Reader, Newton reiterates the point communicated already by his
treatise's title: "our present work sets forth mathematical principles of natural philosophy."160  He
makes the same point again in connection with the centripetal force—of which gravity is of
course an example—writing in his explanatory remarks for the definition of the centripetal force's
motive quantity, (Definition 8):  "This concept is purely mathematical, for I am not now
considering the physical causes and sites of forces."161  Furthermore, he continues, the term
'attraction' refers only to a "propensity toward a center".  It does not define "a species or mode of
action or a physical cause or reason"; the reader must "beware of thinking that....I am attributing
                                                                 
158 Query 31 contains an atomist hypothesis, according to which God created primitive particles that cannot be divided
by an ordinary power, but this is confined to a query because it is a hypothesis, meant to furnish experiments.  Newton
does not assert the existence of indivisible atoms; Rule 3 of the Principia allows for the possibility that the least parts
of matter could turn out to be divisible.
159 Hesse discusses the basis of this implication in Newton's treatment of Law 3:  "Newton's own discussion of the third
law is not quite satisfactory.  He regards it as empirical in the case of collisions, and describes experiments by which he
has established it, but he gives what appears to be a logical proof from the first law in the case of
attractions….Furthermore, Newton assumes without comment that when bodies at a distance are moving relative to one
another, the [third] law still holds, and this implies that action between them takes place instantaneously, for if the
transmission takes time, the action of A on B may not be simultaneous with that of B on A and therefore in general not
equal to it at all times." (Forces and Fields, 137.)
160 Author's Preface to the Reader, 8 May, 1686, Principia, 382.
161 Definition 8, Principia, 407.
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forces in a true and physical sense to centers (which are mathematical points) if I happen to say
that centers attract or that centers have forces".162
Following a discussion of terrestrial gravity and the laws of attraction in Section 11,
Newton again distinguishes the mathematical from the physical problem, indicating that the
Principia's solution to the former problem sets conditions for the latter problem, whose solution
has yet to be found.
I use the word 'attraction' here in a general sense for any endeavor whatever of bodies to
approach one another, whether that endeavor occurs as a result of the action of the bodies
either drawn toward one another or acting on one another by means of spirits emitted or
whether it arises from the action of aether or of air or of any medium
whatsoever—whether corporeal or incorporeal—in any way impelling toward one
another the bodies floating therein.  I use the word 'impulse' in the same general sense,
considering in this treatise not the species of forces and their physical qualities but their
quantities and mathematical proportions, as I have explained in the definitions.
Mathematics requires an investigation of those quantities of forces and their proportions
that follow from any conditions that may be supposed.  Then, coming down to physics,
these proportions must be compared with the phenomena, so that it may be found out
which conditions [or laws] of forces apply to each kind of attracting bodies.  And then,
finally, it will be possible to argue more securely concerning the physical species,
physical causes, and physical proportions of these forces.163
What Newton's readers are intended to understand, especially in preparation for Book III, is that
since he claims to have solved only the mathematical problem and not the physical one, the
possibility that matter attracts across distances is only that, a possibility.  Mathematics set out the
proportions following "from any conditions that may be supposed", and provides one set of
constraints; thus with the gravitational force, accelerations between bodies are constrained to be
directly proportional to their masses and proportional to distance in the inverse square.  Yet while
mathematics provides one set of constraints upon what can be true, physical conditions may
provide a further set of constraints, and those physical conditions may rule out action at a
distance.  The physical conditions could be such that gravitational effects are produced by some
                                                                 
162 Ibid., 408.
163 Book I: Section 11, Scholium, Principia, 588.
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immaterial agent or medium, but while Newton speculates about that elsewhere, he does not do
so here.
Yet despite all the disclaimers, the possibility of action at a distance still looms large, in
part because Newton does not strictly confine himself to mathematical propositions or to an
acausal talk of "tendencies" (the only talk to which he is entitled, Bishop Berkeley will charge).
At various points he indicates his belief in the causal efficacy of the gravitational force, saying for
instance that gravity is the force "by which the moon is kept in its orbit".164  Since he has
eliminated the Cartesian causal explanation without providing anything in its place, action at a
distance may be only a possibility, but it is the most obvious possibility.
Gravity's Relation to Matter
What exactly is the relationship of gravity to matter?  Gravity is universal to matter, as
Newton indicates in the above-quoted Proposition 7 of Book III.  He reiterates this claim in his
explanatory remarks to Rule 3 (also quoted above).  At the same time, he states definitively that
while the vis inertiae is an inherent quality of matter, gravity is not.
If it is universally established by experiments and astronomical observations that all
bodies on or near the earth gravitate [lit. are heavy] toward the earth, and do so in
proportion to the quantity of matter in each body, and that the moon gravitates [is heavy]
toward the earth so in proportion to the quantity of its matter, and that our sea in turn
gravitates [is heavy] toward the moon, and that all planets gravitate [are heavy] toward
one another, and that there is a similar gravity [heaviness] of comets toward the sun, it
will have to be concluded by this third rule that all bodies gravitate toward one another.
Indeed, the argument from phenomena will be even stronger for universal gravity than for
the impenetrability of bodies, for which, of course, we have not a single experiment, and
not even an observation, in the case of the heavenly bodies.  Yet I am by no means
affirming that gravity is essential to bodies.  By inherent force I mean only the force of
inertia.  This is immutable.  Gravity is diminished as bodies recede from the earth.165
                                                                 
164 Only in Book III does Newton identify the centripetal force keeping planets in orbit as gravity: "Hitherto we have
called "centripetal" that force by which celestial bodies are kept in their orbits.  It is now established that this force is
gravity, and therefore we shall call it gravity from now on.  For the cause of the centripetal force by which the moon is
kept in its orbit ought to be extended to all the planets, by rules 1, 2, and 4." (Book III, Prop 5, Scholium, ibid., 806.)
165 Book III, Rule 3, ibid., 795-96.
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So gravity is universal but not inherent or essential to matter, and Newton remains consistent in
this position over time.166  To allow gravity as an inherent quality of matter would make the
charge of action at a distance impossible to deny.  However, Newton states a different reason for
denying that gravity is inherent to matter.  Gravity varies with distance, whereas the properties
that Newton classifies as inherent and essential are immutable.  Newton thus appears to accept the
Scholastic classification of essential properties as those that cannot be "intended and remitted",
that is, increased or decreased.  Such properties are, in McMullin's terminology, intensity-
invariant.167
Yet there is a potential problem with this classification, one that I shall say more about
later.  According to the classification Newton sets up, gravity differs from the inherent, essential
properties, such as mobility, impenetrability, and hardness in that these latter qualities are
immutable, while gravity is not.  But is Newton's stated condition, immutability, really the
classification condition he employs?   He counts hardness as an inherent essential quality, but
there are two problems with this.  First, not all bodies are hard;168 fluids for instance are not.
Second, hardness is not immutable.  A body's hardness may vary with pressure or with heat.
Insisting upon the Scholastic condition of immutability therefore suggests that hardness should be
removed from the list of inherent, essential qualities.  Yet it remains on the list in Rule 3.  (One
                                                                 
166 See Newton's second letter to Bentley, Jan. 17, 1692/3: "You sometimes speak of Gravity as essential and inherent
to Matter. Pray do not ascribe that Notion to me; for the Cause of Gravity is what I do not pretend to know."
(Correspondence of Isaac Newton, 240.) See also the 1717 advertisement for the Opticks: "In this Second Edition of
these Opticks I have omitted the Mathematical Traets publish'd at the End of the former Edition, as not belonging to the
Subject.  And at the End of the Third Book I have added some Questions.  And to shew that I do not take Gravity for an
essential Property of Bodies, I have added one Question concerning its Cause, chusing to propose it by way of a
Question, because I am not yet satisfied about it for want of Experiments. July 16, 1717, I.N." (Advertisement II,
Opticks, cxxiii.)  The comparison with Roger Cotes' preface to the Principia is notable, for while Cotes does not use the
terms 'inherent' or 'essential', he does state that gravity is a primary quality of matter:  "Among the primary qualities of
all bodies universally, either gravity will have a place, or extension, mobility, and impenetrability will not.  And the
nature of things either will be correctly explained by the gravity of bodies or will not be correctly explained by the
extension, mobility, and impenetrability of bodies." (Philosophical Writings, 50.)  However, Cotes' preface was not
reviewed or approved by Newton prior to publication; see Westfall: "Newton declined even to see Cotes's preface
because he feared being taxed with writing it.  Cotes did eventually get Samuel Clarke to read over what he wrote."
(Never at Rest, 749.)
167 On this point, see McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 58.
168 See McMullin, ibid., 22-23.
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might reply that such variation is a property only of aggregate bodies, not of particles; and
Newton does imply in Query 31 that particles are perfectly hard.  Yet if sensible bodies are the
basis for inferring the properties of insensible particles, then variations of aggregate bodies'
hardness, due to pressure and heat, suggests that the hardness of particles may also be mutable.)
This suggests that behind Newton's stated condition for classifying qualities as he does, there may
be some other condition.  Perhaps a belief that matter cannot act from a distance is behind his
claim that hardness is inherent and essential while gravity is not.  I will consider this possibility in
the final chapter.
Newton's Relational Concept of Gravity
Newton conceives of gravity as a relational force.  And since gravity is universal to
matter, this force is an enormously complex relation, holding among all existent matter.169 Using
the simpler case of two bodies, Newton explains the force's relational character in A Treatise of
the System of the World, a manuscript that, while published posthumously, dates from the first
edition of the Principia.  (Newton originally intended Book III to be accessible to a general
readership, and this manuscript was the result.  However, once he decided instead to exclude a
general readership, however, he replaced it the more technical version that appeared in 1687.)
Since the action of the centripetal force upon a body attracted is, at equal distances,
proportional to the matter in this body, it accords with reason that it should be
proportional also to the matter in the body attracting.  For action is mutual, and [by the
third Law of Motion] makes bodies by a mutual tendency approach one another, and
hence must be conformable with itself in each body.   One body may be considered as
                                                                 
169 In draft material written prior to the Principia, "On the Motion of Bodies in Non-Resisting Mediums", Newton's
work on orbits leads him to the following conclusion:
"Each time a planet revolves it traces a fresh orbit, as happens also with the motion of the moon, and each
orbit is dependent upon the combined motions of all the planets, not to mention their actions upon each other.
Unless I am much mistaken, it would exceed the force of human wit to consider so many causes of motion at
the same time, and to define the motions by exact laws which would allow of any easy calculation."
(Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 281.)
Commenting upon this passage, Cohen notes that Newton's recognition of orbital perturbations was an essential step
toward the principle of universal gravitation.  See Cohen, "Guide", 19.
83
attracting, another as attracted; but this distinction is more mathematical than natural.
The attraction really is of each body towards the other, and is thus of the same kind in
each.  And hence it is that the attractive force is found in each.  The sun attracts Jupiter
and the other Planets, Jupiter attracts the Satellites; and by parity of reason, the Satellites
act among themselves reciprocally and upon Jupiter, and all the Planets mutually among
themselves.  And though the mutual actions of two Planets may be distinguished from one
another, and considered as two actions, by which each attracts the other: yet in so far as
these [actions] are intermediate, they are not two, but a single operation between two
terms.  By the contraction of a single interceding cord two bodies may be drawn each to
the other.  The cause of the action is twofold, indisputably [that cause is] the disposition
of each body; the action is likewise twofold in so far as it is upon two bodies; but as
between two bodies it is sole and single.  It is not one operation by which Jupiter attracts
the Sun, but it is one operation by which the Sun and Jupiter mutually endeavor to
approach one another.  By the action by which the Sun attracts Jupiter, Jupiter and the
Sun endeavor to come nearer together [by the third Law of Motion] and, by the action by
which Jupiter attracts the Sun, Jupiter and the Sun likewise endeavor to come nearer
together: but the Sun is not attracted towards Jupiter by a double action, nor Jupiter by a
double action towards the Sun, but it is one intermediate action by which both approach
nearer together.  Iron draws the loadstone as much as the loadstone draws the iron; for all
iron in the neighborhood of the loadstone also draws other iron.  But the action between
the loadstone and the iron is single, and is considered as single by the
Philosophers...Conceive a single operation arising from the conspiring nature of both to
be exerted in this way between two Planets; and this will be disposed in the same way
towards both: hence being manifestly proportional to the matter in one of them, it will be
proportional to the matter in the other.170
Whereas the Aristotelians conceived gravity as an essential, monadic property of a single body,
specifically the natural tendency of earthy bodies to seek the center of the universe, Newton
asserts instead a relation.  Gravity would exist if the universe contained only one aggregate body,
since by the principle of universal gravitation, the component particles of the body would attract
one another.  However, there would be no gravity if the universe contained only a single particle.
Without at least two relata, there can be no relation, and so without at least two particles in the
universe there can be no gravitational force.  The contributions of individual particles to this
relation are their "dispositions".171
                                                                 
170 Excerpt from:  De Mundi Systemate Liber (London, 1728), translated by Howard Stein, with his explanatory
comments in brackets and his italics in "Newton's Metaphysics", 287-288.
171 In the first of four letters to Bentley, Newton speaks of gravitating powers arising not from dispositions but from the
quantities of matter.  He writes, "Ye Motions wch ye Planets now have could not spring from any naturall cause alone,
but were imprest by an intelligent Agent."  After providing a number of reasons, including that no natural cause could
put the planets in the same plane, Newton concludes, "To make this systeme therefore wth all its motions, required a
Cause wch understood & compared together the quantities of matter in ye several bodies of ye Sun & Planets & ye
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What are these dispositions?  Newton does not attempt to say.  One might say that each
particle is disposed to attract other particles, should they exist.  This would not amount to saying
that gravity itself is inherent and essential to matter, since as a relation, the force itself cannot be
the quality of any single particle.  So the view that particles have the disposition to attract other
particles would be consistent with Newton's remarks in Rule 3.  Yet the view would invite the
charge that matter acts distantly in Newton's system.172  So if Newton classifies gravity as he does
in Rule 3 precisely to avoid that charge, a possibility I raised earlier, then he would not accept this
view, despite its consistency with his remarks in Rule 3.  The question of what these dispositions
could be is part of the vexing question of what the "physical causes and sites"173 of gravity might
be, which raises the question of whether the force is real.
The Question of Gravity's Status as a Force
Although Newton sets causal questions aside in the Principia, he nonetheless speaks of
gravity as a force that meets De Gravitatione's conception of a force as a causal principle.  He
speaks of the Earth holding the moon in its orbit, and in the 1713 General Scholium, he affirms
that gravity "really exists", and "suffices for all the motions for the heavenly bodies".174
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
gravitating powers resulting from thence."  (Newton's first letter to Bentley, December 10, 1692, Correspondence of
Isaac Newton, 235; italics added.)
172 Would a claim that matter can act distantly in turn undermine Newton's view of gravity as a relation?  It might
initially seem so, for the following reason.  A force arises from some substance or substances, and Newton's condition
for a substance's existence is that it be spatially located and extended.  Moreover, spatial continuity seems required for
a substance to be unitary. Although we may speak of air as a substance, even though it is made up of spatially separated
particles, we still consider those particles to be numerically distinct, and we consider the Sun and Jupiter to be
numerically distinct from one another, because of their spatial separation.  We might therefore think that the
gravitational force between any two particles can exist as the single, intermediate action that Newton describes only if
it exists at each point between the bodies, from center to center, with no spatial gaps.  Thus we might think that if
matter acted distantly, with particle A exerting its attractive power upon B, and B doing the same upon A, there would
be two distinct actions, rather than a single, mutual action.  Yet upon reflection, this does not follow.  Although particle
A could exist if particle B did not, the force could not in that case exist.  Since the force can arise only if there are at
least two material particles in the universe, and since it cannot happen that the one particle is accelerated while the
other is not, there are grounds for denying that in acting distantly, the particles are the sources of two distinct forces.
173 This phrase is from Newton's explanatory remarks to Definition 8 (Principia, 407), as he cautions that his concept of
force is purely mathematical.
174 For a recent and influential discussion of the question of whether and why Newton considers gravity to be a real
force, despite the incomplete understanding of it, see Janiak, "Newton and the Reality of Force".  Janiak argues that
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Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the force of
gravity [Hactenus phaenomena coelorum & maris nostri per vim gravitatis exposui], but
I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity.  Indeed, this force arises from some cause that
penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and the planets without any diminution of its
power to act….I have not as get been able to deduce from phenomena the reason for
these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses [hypotheses non fingo]….And it
is enough that gravity really exists [Et satis est quod gravitas revera existat], acts
according to the laws that we have set forth, and suffices for all the motions of the
heavenly bodies and of our sea [&ad corporum caelestium & mari nostri omnes
sufficiat].175
Yet as he notes in the passage, he has not been able discover gravity's causal workings. The
Principia both proves that gravitational effects cannot be produced by impact (material contact
action), and raises the possibility that the causal explanation could be a power of material
particles to affect one another at distances, without any intermediary to convey the force by
impact.  Newton's qualifying remarks in the Principia underscore his belief that the physical
problem has not been solved, which is to say that matter acting distantly is not the answer.  And
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Newton's "mathematical treatment of force" should not be understood as providing a mere calculating device, as Clarke
erroneously represents Newton as doing, but as identifying a force whose "physical characterization" has not yet been
specified.  Janiak argues that Newton takes himself to have identified a real force, as opposed to a mere calculating
device, because he has shown that (i) a wide range of phenomena that previously seemed disparate in fact have the
same cause; (ii) mass and distance are the only salient variables in the causal chain; and (iii) gravity is not a mechanical
cause in the commonly accepted sense of operating by surface action.
175 This translation of the General Scholium passage, by Janiak, appears in his article, "Newton and the Reality of
Force", 129.  I concur with Janiak's conclusions that though Newton cannot provide the causal story, he nonetheless
regards gravity as causally efficacious.  In support of that view, Janiak notes that while the Cohen and Whitman
translation says gravity "is sufficient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies", Newton's Latin lacks a
correlate for the verb 'explain'.  Janiak notes that his more literal translation, that gravity "suffices for all the motions",
presents the force as causally efficacious:
The translation of the text is my own.  In Principia, Cohen and Whitman translate Newton's phrase,  '&ad
corporum caelestium & mari nostri omnes sufficiat' as follows: 'and is sufficient to explain all the motions of
the heavenly bodies and of our sea'….The notion that gravity explains the motions of the heavenly bodies and
of the sea may accurately reflect Newton's view, but the verb itself is missing from the original
Latin….Cohen's translation in this particular case may reflect his interpretation of the General Scholium, and
of Newton's view of force more generally. (Janiak, ibid., 129.)
For purposes of comparison, I include the translation of the entire passage by Cohen and Whitman:
Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and or our sea by the force of gravity, but I have not
yet assigned a cause to gravity.  Indeed, this force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers
of the sun and planets without any diminution of its power to act….I have not as yet been able to deduce from
phenomena the reason for these properties of gravity, and I do not feign hypotheses.  For whatever is not
deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis; and hypotheses….And it is enough that gravity
really exists and acts according to the laws that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain all the motions
of the heavenly bodies and of our sea.  (Principia, 943.)
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in a letter written to colleague and theologian Richard Bentley several years after the Principia's
publication, he appears to reject the possibility of distant action out of hand.176
'Tis unconceivable that inanimate brute matter should (without ye mediation of
something else wch is not material) operate upon & affect other matter without mutual
contact….That gravity should be innate inherent & essential to matter so yt one body
may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of any thing
else by & through wch their action or force may be conveyed from one to another is to
me…an absurdity.177
 Since Newton has proved that the heavens are void of any material medium, he appears
to be faced with the following options.  First, he could abandon the second part of Kepler's quest,
that of understanding the physical means by which gravitational effects are produced, and treat
the mathematical solution to the problem about the orbits as complete.  In other words, he could
leave off being a natural philosopher by abandoning the search for causes, and wholly affirm the
new physics of mathematical deducibility. He could then take the goal of physics to be that of
prediction, and the forces of this physics as mere predictive tools.
Such an option does not figure in Newton's thinking, however.  He remains a natural
philosopher, and the business of natural philosophy is, as he later writes in Query 28 of the
Opticks, is "to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very first Cause, which certainly is
not mechanical; and…to unfold the Mechanism of the World."178  For Newton the world has been
causally ordered by God, that first cause, who certainly is not mechanical, and the task ahead is to
understand the world's causal workings, including the causal workings of the gravitational force.
Second, since Newton retains his commitment to causal explanations, he could accept
that matter acts distantly.  Since material bodies seem to affect one another, and yet there could
                                                                 
176 I say that Newton appears to reject the possibility of action at distance because some commentators, in particular
John Henry, deny that interpretation. I examine Henry's very different interpretation in my final chapter.
177 Newton's fourth letter to Bentley, Feb. 25, 1692/3, Correspondence of Isaac Newton, 253-254.
178 Opticks, 369.
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not be a material medium to convey the effects, Newton might simply conclude that bodies can
and do accelerate one another without contact or a medium, even across millions of miles of
empty space.  This option might mean (but perhaps need not require179) rescinding Rule 3's claim
that gravity is not an essential power of matter.  Although Newton seems, prima facie, to reject
the option of matter acting distantly, it merits closer examination.
Third, if Newton both retains the commitment to causal explanations and rejects action at
a distance, he might take gravitational effects to be produced by primary causation, by which I
mean God's direct action.  This contrasts with secondary causation, in which God brings about
events through the causal mechanisms or means he has instituted in the natural world, which is to
say the created world.  To say that gravitational effects are produced by primary causation would
be to say that as a natural force, gravity is unreal.   The gravitational force would be real in the
sense of being part of the divine force, but it would not be a real physical force.180  From here
onward, when I speak of a force being unreal, I shall mean that as a physical force it is unreal.
Finally, if Newton retains his commitment to causal explanations, his apparent denial of
action at a distance, and an expectation that gravity is a physical force, a means of producing
accelerations that belongs to the natural or created world, then he will seek some immaterial
medium that could be part of the causal story.  Newton might avoid action at a distance if the
immaterial medium were continuous, but would have difficulty doing so if it were particulate.
Since Newton does not consider the first option, it remains to investigate the remaining
three, which I begin to do in the next chapter.
                                                                 
179 See also John Henry, "God and Newton's Gravity"; I discuss Henry's view in the final chapter.
180 Again, my suggestion that God might qualify as a force is subject to a number of difficulties, as mentioned in an
earlier footnote.
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CHAPTER IV
SUBSTANCE AND GRAVITY
What is Newton's ontology of substance, what hypotheses does he consider for gravity's "physical
cause", and which of those explanations involve action at a distance?
As we saw previously, Newton considers his solution to the problem of the planetary orbits
incomplete because he has not discovered the causal means by which gravity acts.  In this
chapter, I examine the substances in Newton's ontology, especially those that he thinks might
figure in gravity's causal story.  Most of the hypotheses I consider are candidates for gravity's
"physical cause", which is to say that they involve natural (created) substances.  However, I also
examine the possibility that Newton attributed gravitational effects directly to God.  I first
examine Newton's concepts of these various substances, and I then consider the related
hypotheses about gravity's cause.
SUBSTANCE: MATTER AND SPIRITS
Newton recognizes several kinds of substance.  If we consider the features that he attributes
to all substances generally, we notice both epistemological and metaphysical departures from the
Cartesian Tradition.  Descartes held that substances are known through the understanding, but for
Newton an epistemological feature common to all substances is that they cannot be known
directly.  We have access only to properties, and so in keeping with his experimentalism, Newton
writes that we can only infer substances:  "We do not know the substances of things.  We have no
idea of them.  We gather only their properties from the phenomena and from the properties [we
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infer] what the substances may be."181  Metaphysically, Descartes' system is characterized by its
sharp distinction between spirit and matter, with only inert matter being spatially extended.
Newton, however, rejects this, arguing in De Gravitatione that a metaphysical feature common to
all substances, including God and minds, is spatial location.
No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way.  God is everywhere,
created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space it occupies; and whatever is neither
everywhere nor anywhere does not exist.  And hence it follows that space is an emanative
effect of the first existing being.182
Newton's ultimate response to a third Cartesian claim is less clear. According to Descartes, matter
can both resist and transfer motion by contact, but it cannot initiate motion; in McMullin's terms,
matter cannot act in the "full agent sense".  Does Newton follow Descartes in thinking that matter
cannot initiate motion?  This question has no straightforward answer.  I shall continue to address
it, as it is bound up with the question of whether Newton considered or perhaps accepted distant
action by matter as gravity's causal means.
                                                                 
181Draft Conclusion for the General Scholium, MS. C (MS. Add 3965 fols. 361-362), Unpublished Scientific Papers of
Isaac Newton, 360.  Newton left this Draft Conclusion unpublished, replacing it with his far more compressed General
Scholium.  It is worth quoting the passage at greater length, since Newton is expansive in his point that we cannot
know substance directly:
We do not know the substances of things.  We have no idea of them.  We gather only their properties from
the phenomena and from the properties [we infer] what the substances may be.  That bodies do not penetrate
each other we gather from the phenomena alone; that substances of different kinds do not penetrate each
other does not at all appear from the phenomena.  And we ought not rashly to assert that which cannot be
inferred from the phenomena.  We know the properties of things from phenomena, and from the properties
we infer that the things themselves exist and we call them substances: but we do not have any more idea of
substances than a blind man has of colors. From the phenomena alone we gather that bodies do not penetrate
each other; that substances of different kinds do not penetrate each other is not evident from the
phenomena….From the phenomena we know the properties of things, and from the properties we infer that
the things themselves exist and we call them substances: be we do not have any idea of substances.  We see
but the shapes and colours of bodies, we hear but sounds, we touch but external surfaces, we smell odours
and taste flavours; but we know the substances or essences themselves by no sense, by no reflex action, and
therefore we have no more idea of them than a blind man has of colours.  And when it is said that we have an
idea of God or an idea of body, nothing other is to be understood than that we have an idea of the properties
or attributes of God or an idea of the properties by which bodies are distinguished from God or from each
other.  (Draft Conclusion for the General Scholium, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 360-62.)
182 De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 25.  Hall and Hall translate the passage as follows: "No being can exist
which is not in some way related to space.  God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the space
it occupies.  Whatever is neither everywhere nor somewhere does not exist. Hence it follows that space is an effect
arising from the first existence of being." (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 136.)
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Matter
In keeping with the rules of his experimental philosophy, Newton develops his concept of
body or matter by trying to derive its characteristics from phenomena rather than reason.  While
he defines mass or quantity of matter, and attributes to all matter a set of properties he claims to
have reached by induction, he does not define matter itself, considering its essential nature to be
inaccessible to us.  Yet as we will see here and especially in later chapters, Newton does have
some ideas about what matter's essential nature might be, and even though he does not assert
them, those ideas guide his investigations.
Mass
In accordance with the intention of presenting the mathematical principles of natural
philosophy, stated in his Author's Preface,183 the Principia does not define matter, but rather
quantity of matter, that is, mass.
Definition 1. Quantity of matter is a measure of matter that arises from its density and
volume jointly.  If the density of air is doubled in a space that is also doubled, there is
four times as much air, and there is six times as much if the space is tripled.  The case is
the same for snow and powders condensed by compression or liquefaction, and also for
all bodies that are condensed in various ways by any causes whatsoever.  For the present,
I am not taking into account any medium, if there should be any, freely pervading the
interstices between the parts of bodies.  Furthermore, I mean this quantity whenever I use
the term "body" or "mass" in the following pages.  It can always be known from a body's
weight, for—by making very accurate experiments with pendulums, I have found it to be
proportional to weight.184
                                                                 
183 Author's Preface, appearing first in the 1687 edition: "Since we are concerned with natural philosophy rather than
manual arts, and are writing about natural rather than manual powers, we concentrate on aspects of gravity, levity,
elastic forces, resistance of fluids, and forces of this sort, whether attractive or impulsive.  And therefore our present
work sets forth mathematical principles of natural philosophy.  For the basic problem of philosophy seems to be to
discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these
forces.  For in book 3, by means of propositions demonstrated mathematically in books 1 and 2, we derive from
celestial phenomena the gravitational forces by which bodies tend toward the sun and toward the individual planets.
Then the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea are deduced from these forces, by propositions that
are also mathematical.  If only we could derive the other phenomena of nature from mechanical principles by the same
kind of reasoning!" (Principia, 382.)
184 Principia, 403.
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This concept of mass is original to Newton, for unlike Kepler and Galileo, Newton distinguishes
mass from weight, the two being merely proportional rather than identical.  Two events enabled
Newton to distinguish mass from weight.185  One was a discovery made during Jean Richer's
1672-73 scientific expedition to Cayenne.  Weight is not invariant across terrestrial locations,
Richer found, but rather depends upon latitude.  (In addition to leading Newton toward the
concept of mass, this discovery is incorporated directly in the Principia.  In Book III, Proposition
20, Problem 4, Newton sets the problem of comparing the weights of bodies located at different
regions of the earth.)  A second influential event came in 1680 with the appearance of a comet.
In studying the comet, Newton concluded that it was affected not only by the sun but also by the
planets, and that the effect must occur in virtue of their quantity of matter.
Because he is defining quantity of matter rather than matter itself, Newton sets aside
questions about an aether.  An aether with sensible resistance does not exist, as he proves in Book
II.  If there is an aether pervading the pores of bodies, it is too rare for its resistance to be
detected, and it therefore can be set aside.
The Concept of Matter (Body)
Although Definition 1 is confined to mass, some other passages and other texts state the
properties of matter that Newton has determined.  He first develops a concept of body or matter in
De Gravitatione, and that concept persists in later texts, including the Principia.  The concept is
strongly empirical and otherwise anti-Cartesian.  Descartes derived his concept of matter a priori,
claiming matter and other substances are known through the understanding, and he identified
matter with extension.  Whereas Descartes defined matter itself, Newton does not.  We can sense
hardness and mobility, but if matter has some "essential and metaphysical constitution"186 it is not
                                                                 
185 On both of these events, see Cohen, "Guide", 19-20.
186 De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 27.  This a view that Newton may never have abandoned, for it is
suggested by his remark in Query 31 that God might vary the laws of nature by varying the forces and properties of
matter.  One might object, however, by arguing that to vary the forces and properties of matter would be to create a
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accessible to us.  In general, Newton will write in a later text, we have access only to properties,
and so we can only infer substances from the sensed properties.187  This means that if we were
presented with two substances, one of which was a material body and the other of which shared
matter's sensible properties while differing in its essential and metaphysical constitution, we
would be unable to distinguish them.  Therefore, instead of saying what bodies are, De
Gravitatione identifies the characteristics of the things that we call bodies.  Such things have
powers to produce sensations in us, are mobile and impenetrable, and are reflected according to
certain laws.188  And instead of associating properties as the Aristotelians did with prime
matter—an inaccessible substrate that persists through qualitative changes—he associates sensed
properties with determined regions of space.  "It is not necessary that we suppose some
unintelligible substance to exist in which as subject there may be an inherent substantial
form….Extension takes the place of the substantial subject in which the form of the body is
conserved by the divine will."189  So the notion of prime matter is eliminated, producing a concept
of body that is strongly empirical—but not fully so, as explained below.
Since bodies are considered as regions of space associated with sensed properties, they are
not identical to extension as Descartes thought, but instead have the power to produce sensations
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
substance that is not matter.  Also, some commentators would object to my suggestion that Newton's skeptical stance
toward matter's essence extends past De Gravitatione; a number of commentators interpret the Principia as asserting
the essential qualities of matter.  (And here I intend a strong sense of 'essential', such that to be an entity of a given
kind, the entity must possess the essential property.  I am not referring to the Scholastic sense of 'essential' that I take
Newton to mean in Rule 3, which is, in McMullin's terms, "intensity-invariant.") For a discussion of matter's essence in
that stronger sense, see Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 118-129.
187 In his Draft Conclusion for the General Scholium, Newton writes, "We do not know the substances of things.  We
have no idea of them.  We gather only their properties from the phenomena and from the properties [we infer] what the
substances may be."  (Draft Conclusion for General Scholium, MS. C (MS. Add 3965 fols. 360-362), Unpublished
Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 360-361.)
188 "We can define bodies as determined quantities of extension which omnipresent God endows with certain
conditions.  These conditions are: (1) that they be mobile...(2) that two of this kind cannot coincide anywhere, that is,
that they may be impenetrable, and hence that oppositions obstruct their mutual motions and they are reflected in
accord with certain laws; (3) that they can excite various perceptions of the senses...in created minds and conversely be
moved by them." (De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 28-29.)
189 De Gravitatione in Philosophical Writings, 29.  (The Halls' translation, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac
Newton, 140, is identical.)
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in us.190   (For this reason Newton considers his concept of body to be immune to the charge of
atheism which he leveled at Descartes.  Descartes' concept faces the charge because space is the
one thing that can be conceived without God, whereas Newton thinks bodies have powers to
cause sensations, which we cannot conceive apart from God.)  And while extension is continuous,
matter is particulate.  The heavens are nearly void of matter, and aggregate bodies have interstices
or pores, as Newton frequently remarks.
How can we infer the existence of the particles comprising aggregate bodies?  Since the
particles or "least parts of matter" are unobservable, we need grounds for believing that they
exist, and for accepting the properties Newton will attribute to them.  The 1713 edition of the
Principia provides these grounds with Rule 3.  This new rule of reasoning is a rule of induction,
permitting the inference to the existence and properties of unobservable particles of matter.
Rule 3. The qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted [i.e., qualities that
cannot be increased and diminished] and that belong to all bodies on which experiments
can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies universally....The extension,
hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of the whole arise from the
extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inertia of each of the parts; and
thus we conclude that every one of the least parts of all bodies is extended, hard,
impenetrable, movable, and endowed with a force of inertia....Further, from phenomena we
know that the divided, contiguous parts of bodies can be separated from one another, and
from mathematics it is certain that the undivided parts can be distinguished into smaller
parts by our reason.  But it is uncertain whether those parts which have been distinguished
in this way and not yet divided can actually be divided and separated from one another by
the forces of nature.  But if it were established by even a single experiment that in the
breaking of a hard and solid body, any undivided particle underwent division, we should
conclude by the force of this third rule not only that divided parts are separable but also
that undivided parts can be divided indefinitely.191
So according to Rule 3, we can infer the existence of particles—the "least parts of
                                                                 
190 Referring to Descartes, Newton writes, "Let us abstract from body (as he demands) gravity, hardness, and all
sensible qualities, so that nothing remains except what pertains to its essence.  Will extension alone then remain?  By
no means.  For we may also reject that faculty or power by which they [the qualities] stimulate the perceptions of
thinking things.  For since there is so great a distinction between the ideas of thought and of extension that it is not
obvious that there is any basis of connection or relation [between them], except that which is caused by divine power,
the above capacity of bodies can be rejected while preserving extension, but not while preserving their corporeal
nature."   (De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 33-34.)
191 Principia, 796.
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matter"—because we have experience of being able to separate bodies into parts, and
mathematical divisibility enables us to conceive of those parts being further divided.  Newton is
uncertain about whether the particles of matter can be indefinitely, that is, infinitely divided.192
Mathematical divisibility is unlimited, but mathematical truths alone provide only one constraint
upon facts about the world; there could be others.  Thus an experiment demonstrating the actual
divisibility of a particle would, together with infinite mathematical divisibility, establish the
infinite divisibility of particles, but absent such an experiment, Newton considers the question
undecided.193  Accordingly, Newton's suggestion in the Opticks that the "primitive particles" of
matter are so hard that only God is able to divide them is speculative, which is why it is confined
to a Query.194  Newton also speculates there that these primitive particles are "permanent", and
that change is explicable through "the various separations and new associations and motions" of
these particles, not through their destruction.195
Rule 3 also sets out the properties of these particles, which appear to be qualitatively
identical to one another.196  The set largely agrees with that given in De Gravitatione.   The
particles have extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and the force of inertia.  The stated
                                                                 
192 See Cohen, "Guide", for a view that there is  no distinction between the concepts of indefinite and infinite
divisibility.
193 Principia, 796.
194 It is "probable" that God formed particles so hard that "no ordinary power" can divide; see Query 31, Opticks, 400.
195 See Query 31: "That Nature may be lasting, the changes of corporeal Things are to be placed only in the various
separations and new Associations and Motions of these permanent Particles." (Opticks, 400.)
196 On this point, see Westfall: "Matter was qualitatively neutral and homogeneous, differentiated solely by quantity."
(Force, 346.) Still, Newton's remarks about the transformability of bodies raise some questions about whether he
consistently takes all particles to be qualitatively identical.  In Query 30, Newton suggests that light and matter might
be tranformable into one another: "Are not gross Bodies and Light convertible into one another, and may not Bodies
receive much of their Activity from the Particles of Light which enter into their composition?  For all fixed Bodies
being heated emit Light, so long as they continue sufficiently hot." (Opticks, 374.)  This suggestion has an antecedent
in Hypothesis III, which appears in the Principia's first edition but is eliminated from the second and there replaced by
Rule 3.  (For a discussion of Newton's reasons for eliminating Hypothesis III, see McGuire, "Transmutation and
Immutability: Newton's Doctrine of Physical Qualities".)  Hypothesis III asserted that a body of any kind can be
transformed into a body of any other kind:  "Every body can be transformed into a body of any other kind whatever and
endued successively with all the intermediate grades of qualities" (quoted in Westfall, Force, 388).  Is Newton referring
here to any body, including particles, or only to aggregate bodies?  If the former, are we to think that there are
intermediate grades of qualities between a particle of matter and a particle of light?  If the latter, are light particles just
particles of normal matter, and is that the reason that only aggregate bodies could pass through intermediate grades of
qualities?  We cannot answer these questions, because Newton is not certain about the nature of light.
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basis for this inference is that (a) these properties cannot be intended or remitted, that is, they are
immutable and cannot vary in intensity, and (b) they are known to belong universally to all bodies
on which experiments can be made. We might question whether (b) justifies the inclusion of the
vis inertiae on the list of inherent and essential properties, for we do not observe bodies moving
inertially or resting (though some bodies appear to rest), without being subject to impressed
forces.  This raises questions about the extent to which the phenomena that Newton appeals to are
in fact bound up with his theory.   As for (a), we saw a problem with this condition earlier.
Again, Newton closes his explanatory remarks to Rule 3 by emphasizing that while gravity is
universal to matter, it is not inherent or essential to it.  The suggestion made earlier was that
Newton's apparent reluctance to believe that matter could act distantly might be behind his
classification.  For again, not all of the properties that he classifies as inherent and essential are in
fact immutable; hardness was the problematic case discussed in chapter III.
By denying that gravity is inherent and essential to matter, Newton leaves open the
possibility that bodies might gravitate in virtue of some immaterial substance that acts upon
them—a possibility that would preserve the expectation that matter is passive.  In a later chapter,
I will consider what I shall call the 'principle of the passivity of matter' (PPM) more closely,
arguing that (i) it means that matter can neither change its own state nor initiate new motion in
other matter, and (ii) it is a metaphysical principle for Newton, since he lacks empirical grounds
for it.  However, I shall simply assume (i) throughout this chapter.
Why is Newton Drawn to the Principle that Matter is Passive?
Why does Newton even try to retain the claim that matter is passive in the sense of being
unable to initiate action?  One might argue, with McMullin, that the notion of active matter
conflicts with Christianity's tenet that everything depends upon God for its existence; to say that
matter can act in the full sense of initiating motion would amount to saying that it is independent
of God.  According to McMullin, this diagnosis of Newton's reasoning is supported by a remark
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from De Gravitatione: "We find almost no other reason for atheism than this notion of bodies
having, as it were, a complete, absolute and independent reality in themselves...so that it is only
verbally that we call bodies created and dependent."197  Yet this particular remark does not
support McMullin's diagnosis, as an examination of the passage containing it reveals.
Throughout the passage in question, the notion that matter could be active is not Newton's target.
While Newton is attacking Descartes' concept of body as a path to atheism, he does not mention
activity.  It is Descartes' identification of body with extension that implies that bodies could exist
independently of God.  Extension (space) has existed eternally, and so to identify body with
extension is to imply that body is not dependent upon God, and could exist if God did not.198
Space is the one thing we could conceive independently of God, since space would be the effect
of any first existent, be that God or particle.
Yet McMullin has another reason for his diagnosis: "To locate the active principles
responsible for motion in matter, as Leibniz did, was to make matter, once created, a self-
sufficient entity."199  This claim is more difficult to evaluate.  On the one hand, no created thing is
fully self-sufficient.  All things are sustained by God to the extent that their continued existence
requires his concurrence.  And direct divine intervention would still be required for some
                                                                 
197 De Gravitatione, Halls' translation (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 144.)  The Halls' translation is
the one that McMullin cites in Newton on Matter and Activity, however the translation by Johnson et al. (Philosophical
Writings, 32) is identical for the quoted passage.
198 In the Halls' translation, which McMullin cites, the passage reads as follows: "If we say with Descartes that
extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to Atheism, both because extension is not created but has existed
eternally, and because we have an absolute idea of it without any relationship to God, and so in some circumstances it
would be possible for us to conceive of extension while imagining the non-existence of God?" (Unpublished Scientific
Papers of Isaac Newton, 142-143).  The translation by Johnson et al. does not differ significantly: "If we say with
Descartes that extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to atheism, both because extension is not created but
has existed eternally, and because we have an idea of it without any relation to God, and so in some circumstances it
would be possible for us to conceive of extension while supposing God not to exist?"  (Philosophical Writings, 31.)
199 McMullin relies not only upon the passage from De Gravitatione, but also points to other influences: "The second
consideration which may have influenced Newton in his decision to make matter as inert a principle as a consistent
mechanics would allow was specifically theological in its inspiration.  He believed the Christian doctrine of Creation to
imply the total dependence of the world on God's activity, and he often tended to interpret this to mean that the activity
in the world had to come directly from God, without any secondary intermediary.  To locate the active principles
responsible for motion in matter, as Leibniz did, was to make matter, once created, a self-sufficient entity….Cudworth
in his True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678) argued against atomists and atheists (who find, he says, only
"passive principles" in the universe) the need for active principles to explain the various sorts of change.  Newton read
and annotated this work and was undoubtedly influenced by it." (Newton on Matter and Activity, 54-55 and n.103.)
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processes even if matter possessed active powers; for gravity alone is not sufficient to preserve
the orbits without God's occasional intervention to reform them.200  Yet Newton may not have
thought that matter could be as independent of God as minds are.
Thus one possible reason that Newton is reluctant to believe that matter has active powers
is that doing so would come too close to erasing the distinction between bodies and minds.
Newton does not accept the Cartesian's sharp distinction between matter and spirits, as we will
see shortly.201  Yet he might still expect minds to be distinguished from bodies by their ability to
initiate motion.  In De Gravitatione, Newton suggests that when we move our bodies, we imitate
God's power of creation; God makes certain region of space impenetrable by creating bodies to
fill them, and we make certain regions of space impenetrable by moving existing bodies into
those regions.  To attribute active powers to "inanimate brute matter"202 would amount to saying
that bodies too can imitate God's power of creation in this way.
Spirits
Newton speaks about both perceiving spirits, namely God and minds, and non-perceiving
spirits, namely the electric spirit and the aether.  Newton is confident that God and minds exist;
yet the other two spirits (if they are indeed two distinct spirits, for that is a point of controversy)
remain speculative. (In an early text, he also speaks of light as a spirit, but later suggests that it
consists in corpuscles, like all bodies.203)
While Newton is influenced by the Cartesian distinction between matter and spirits, he
does not sharply distinguish them by denying that they share any properties. For Descartes, matter
is identical to extension, while spirits are unextended.  Newton, however, takes spatial location to
                                                                 
200 Query 31, Opticks, 402.
201 On this point, see McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 55.
202 This phrase, contained in Newton's earlier-quoted letter to Bentley, actually originates with Bentley, in the letter to
which Newton is responding.  I discuss this in my final chapter.
203 "All Bodies seem to be composed of hard Particles....Even the Rays of Light seem to be hard Bodies; for otherwise
they would not retain different Properties in their different Sides." (Query 31, Opticks, 389.)
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be a condition of existence, and he therefore considers not only matter but also spirits to be
spatially located and extended.  Descartes also takes matter to be passive, attributing activity to
spirits alone; only spirits are capable of self-motion and the initiation (as opposed to transfer) of
motion in bodies.  Newton, however, as I argue in a later chapter, lacks the evidence to assert this
view, though he is drawn to it.
Another similarity between matter and at least some spirits is that Newton expects them to
be particulate.  Vapors and exhalations appear to be particulate, as does the aether if it exists. It is
extremely subtle, which is to say that its particles are very small,204 and also extremely rare,
which is to say that its particles are very few.205  (Newton also refers to the magnetic "effluvia" as
being "rare and subtile", but these are material.206)   The nature of the electric spirit, on the other
hand, is not always clear.  At one point (in the Draft Conclusion), Newton says that it is
continuous207, while at some points (e.g., Query 22), he says it is "rare and subtile", terms he does
                                                                 
204 In De Gravitatione, Newton tells us that for a fluid to be 'subtle' is for it to be divided: "If the aether were a
corporeal fluid entirely without vacuous pores, however subtle its parts are made by division, it would be as dense as
any other fluid."  (Philosophical Writings, 35.)
205 In De Gravitatione, Newton holds that an aether would have to have vacuous pores, for otherwise it would have
inertial properties that would slow bodily motions, contra experience:  "It should be observed from what was said
earlier that there are empty spaces in nature.  For if the aether were a corporeal fluid entirely without vacuous pores,
however subtle its parts are made by division, it would be as dense as any other fluid, and it would yield to the motion
of passing bodies with no less inertia; indeed with a much greater inertia if the projectiles were porous, because then
the aether would enter its internal pores, and encounter and resist not only the whole of its external surface, but also the
surfaces of all the internal parts.  Since the resistance of the aether is on the contrary so small when compared with the
resistance of quicksilver as to be over ten or a hundred thousand times less, there is all the more reason for thinking that
by far the largest part of the aetherial space is empty, scattered between the aetherial particles." (De Gravitatione in
Philosophical Writings, 35.)
206 Newton follows Boyle in supposing the magnetic force to be communicated by some material effluvia.  Concerning
Boyle, see Boas: "Boyle, of course, recognized the existence of magnetic attraction, but he was convinced that it too
could be explained mechanically, by means of the emission of corporeal effluvia from the loadstone." ("The
Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy, 480; Boas references Boyle, Mechanical Production of Magnetism, 1675;
Works IV, 340-45.) To suppose that Newton too thought the magnetic effluvia to be a material conveyer of the force
explains why he remarks in draft material for the Principia, "Magnetic force is communicated by contact; the other
forces are not."  For this remark, see A Draft Conclusion to the Principia (ULC MS Add. 3965, fols. 351-352; MS
3970, fols. 602-604, c. 1704–1712) translated by Cohen, "Guide", 287.
207 See A Draft Conclusion to the Principia, ibid., 292: "Hence also the heat of a body is most easily and most quickly
propagated into contiguous bodies.  For when the electric spirit that lies hidden in two bodies (a hot body and a cold
body) becomes continuous through the contact of the bodies, its vibrations in the hot body will not be reflected at the
common surface of the bodies but will be propagated into the second body through the continuous spirit."
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not associate with those spirits that clearly are not particulate, God and minds.208
Still, all of these spirits differ from matter in some ways.  God and minds lack hardness,
impenetrability, and resistance.209  God poses no resistance to bodies,210 Newton writes, and the
same should be true of minds, given that they are unified with bodies.  The speculated spirits,
including the electric spirit, the spirit or vapor emitted by comets (which, Newton suggests in the
Principia, makes up the most subtle part of our air211), and the non-Cartesian aethers lack at least
sensible resistance.  The aether, if it exists, is particulate, but again, it is extremely subtle and
rare.  Indeed, the lack of sensible resistance is the reason that Newton excludes it from Definition
                                                                 
208 The description appears in Query 22:  "If any one would ask how a Medium [the very rare, elastic aether described
in Queries 21-22] can be so rare, let him tell me how the Air, in the upper parts of the Atmosphere, can be above an
hundred thousand times rarer than Gold.  Let him also tell me how an electrick Body can by Friction emit an
Exhalation so rare and subtile, and yet so potent, as by its Emission to cause no sensible Diminution of the weight of
the electrick Body, and to be expanded through a Sphere, whose Diameter is above two Feet, and yet to be able to
agitate and carry up Leaf Copper, or Leaf Gold, at the distance of above a Foot from the electrick Body?  And how the
Effluvia of a Magnet can be so rare and subtile, as to pass through a Plate of Glass without any Resistance or
Diminution of their Force, and yet so potent as to turn a magnetick Needle beyond the Glass?" (Opticks, 353.)  On the
question of whether the electric spirit is particulate, see McMullin:  "In the General Scholium there is no hint of the
electric spirit's itself being particulate….In Query 22, however…the "exhalation" is represented in corporeal terms with
some suggestion of its being particulate ('subtle' was most often used to emphasize the small size of constituent
particles).  Newton quite evidently moved easily from one to the other model, which is not too surprising since he
regarded them both as quite speculative." (Newton on Matter and Activity, 149.)
209 While this is so of God and minds, Newton speculates that other entities that he classifies as (non-perceiving) spirits
might gain or lose resistance if they change "in respect of their forms".  Thus Newton continues to speculate about the
transformability of matter:
Body I call everything tangible which is resisted by tangible things...Vapors and exhalations on account of
their rarity lose almost all perceptible resistance, and in the common acceptance often lose even the name of
bodies, and are called spirits.  And yet they can be called bodies if they are the effluvia of bodies and have a
resistance proportional to density.  But if the effluvia of bodies were to change thus in respect of their forms
so that they were to lose all power of resisting and cease to be numbered among the phenomena, these I
would no longer call bodies, for I speak with the common people. (ULC, Add. 396, f. 437v, quoted by
McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 100, and identified by him as a definition of 'body' drafted for the
Principia's third edition but not ultimately included; my italics.)
Matter is resistive, but Newton appears here to be speculating that some material effluvia might lose that quality.
Would the result be matter in a different form, or something immaterial? The passage in any case indicates the
indistinct boundary between at least some matter and some spirits.
210 "He is omnipresent not only virtually but substantially, for virtue cannot subsist without substance, the substance is
already imagined. In him are all things contained and moved, yet God and matter do not interfere.  God suffers nothing
from the motions of bodies, and these suffer no resistance from the omnipresence of God." (Draft Conclusion for
General Scholium, MS. C (MS. Add 3965 fols. 361-362), Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 359-360.)
211 In Book III, Proposition 41, Newton indicates that comets might supply the spirit needed for life on earth:  "For the
conservation of the seas and fluids on the planets, comets seem to be required, so that from the condensation of their
exhalations and vapors, there can be a continual supply and renewal of whatever liquid is consumed by vegetation and
putrefaction and converted into dry earth….the bulk of dry earth is increased from day to day, and fluids—if they did
not have an outside source of increase—would have to decrease continually and finally to fail.  Further, I suspect that
that spirit which is the smallest but most subtle and most excellent part of our air, and which is required for the life of
all things, comes chiefly from comets." (Principia, 926.)
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1 of the Principia.  (Of course, it remains possible that while the aether lacks sensible resistance,
because it is so rare and subtle, its particles are nonetheless material, in which case it would have
some resistance that we failed to sense; Newton does not claim to know the aether's nature, or
whether it exists.)
Below, I examine three spirits, asking which Newton considers in seeking gravity's causal
story.  Before proceeding, a general problem should be noted.  There will be no obvious means of
providing a naturalistic explanation of gravitational effects that avoids action at a distance.  If
action at a distance is to be avoided, then the spirit would need to act by contact.  (I will explain
what action by contact amounts to in the final chapter.)  Most of Newton's speculations about
non-perceiving spirits suggest a particulate spirit rather than a continuous one.  Moreover, the
aether appears to act distantly, with the particles repelling one another.  To invoke a further
particulate medium to explain the apparently distant action of the first might invite a regress.
Action at a distance could be eliminated via a continuous medium, and Newton does speak about
the electric spirit as being continuous.  Yet the notion of a continuous medium filling the heavens
also does not seem to fit well with Newton's atomism, and it is even farther removed from
sensible phenomena than is the (speculated) particulate aether, which is at least an extrapolation
from sensible particulate media such as air.
God, the Infinite Spirit
Newton's God is the infinite spirit, the perfect, necessarily existing, active substance who
created the world and continually sustains it. This active God is both the temporally first cause,
but also the most fundamental level of explanation, as indicated by Newton's Query 31 remarks
about the method of analysis.  That method will lead us from motions to the forces producing
them, "from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general",
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and to the first cause, God.212  Space is an "emanative effect"213 of God, and as noted earlier, God
poses no resistance to matter, though he is spatially extended: "In him are all things contained and
moved, yet God and matter do not interfere.  God suffers nothing from the motions of bodies, and
these suffer no resistance from the omnipresence of God."214
In asserting that God is spatially extended, Newton departs from the prevailing view that
God is only virtually omnipresent.  On that prevailing view, God can be outside space and time,
and thus not substantially omnipresent, while yet being omnipotent, for it is not God himself that
is omnipresent but his virtus or active power.  Aquinas explains this in part as the reach of God's
knowledge—all things are subject to God's inspection—and in part by the reach of God's power.
For the latter he gives this analogical example: "A king, for example, is said to be in the whole
kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present."215   On Newton's view, however,
it is not only God's active power that is everywhere present, it is God himself, the divine
substance: "He is omnipresent not only virtually but also substantially; for action requires
                                                                 
212 Query 31: "By this way of Analysis we may proceed from…Motions to the Forces producing them; and in general,
from Effects to their Causes, and from particular Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most
general.  This is the Method of Analysis: And the Synthesis consists in assuming the Causes discover'd, and establish'd
as Principles, and by them explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations....For so
far as we can know by natural Philosophy what is the first Cause…so far our Duty towards him…will appear to us by
the Light of Nature." (Opticks, 404-405.) Similarly, in Query 28, Newton asserts that that the business of natural
philosophy is to use phenomena to deduce causes from effects, until one reaches "the very first Cause, which certainly
is not mechanical". (Opticks, 369.)  While Newton's references to God are clear, Cotes does not mention God when
referring to Newton's expectation of compound causes being explained by simpler ones.  See his preface to the 1713
edition of the Principia: "For causes generally proceed in a continuous chain from compound to more simple; when
you reach the simplest cause, you will not be able to proceed any further.  Therefore no mechanical explanation can be
given for the simplest cause; for if it could, the cause would not yet be the simplest." (Philosophical Writings, 51.)  A
few other divergences may be found between Newton's writings and Cotes' preface; according to Westfall, Never at
Rest, 749, Newton chose not to review Cotes' preface prior to publication.
213 De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 21.  Space would be the effect of any first existent. God exists necessarily,
and space is an emanative effect of this necessarily existing being. Newton also speaks of space as "an affection of
every kind of being", which is to say that it is not peculiar to any kind of being, as the affection of thought is peculiar to
minds, and motions to bodies. For a discussion of the ontology of space, including how Newton takes an affection to
differ from both substances and attributes, see Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 139-150.
214 "He is omnipresent not only virtually but substantially, for virtue cannot subsist without substance, the substance is
already imagined. In him are all things contained and moved, yet God and matter do not interfere.  God suffers nothing
from the motions of bodies, and these suffer no resistance from the omnipresence of God. By the same necessity he is
always and everywhere the same.  He is wholly like to himself." (Draft Conclusion for General Scholium, MS. C (MS.
Add 3965 fols. 361-362), Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 359-360.)
215 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I. 8. 3.
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substance [lit. for active power [virtus] cannot subsist without substance.]"216  Since God is
present at the site of every effect, he is an obvious means by which Newton could give a causal
explanation of gravitational effects without saying that matter acts distantly.
Newton is often described as a voluntarist, as he thinks God at least sometimes acts directly
in the world.  Most notably, God occasionally reforms the planetary orbits, Newton suggests in
Query 31.  The claim that God causes gravitational effects directly would be consistent with this
understanding of God, but the scope of God's direct action—his primary causation—remains in
question.  I shall take up that question in the section about causal hypotheses for gravity's cause.
Minds
In De Gravitatione, Newton rejects Descartes' conception of mind on two grounds.
Descartes takes the mind to be unextended, being only virtually present in the body, but this
conception of mind fails Newton's existence condition, which is spatial location; Newton takes
minds to be "diffused through space".217
Second, to hold that minds are unextended makes the interaction between mind and body
unintelligible.
If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to
atheism....Nor is the distinction between mind and body in his philosophy intelligible,
unless at the same time we say that mind has no extension at all, and so is not
substantially present in any extension, that is, exists nowhere; which seems the same as if
we were to say that it does not exist, or at least renders its union with body thoroughly
unintelligible and impossible.218
So Newton takes the mind to be substantially present, and if it is united with the body, then
                                                                 
216 General Scholium, Principia, 941.  The italics are Newton's.
217 "Just as we understand the moment of duration to be diffused throughout all spaces, according to its kind, without
any concept of its parts: so it is no more contradictory that mind also, according to its kind, can be diffused through
space without any concept of its parts." (De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 26.)
218 Ibid., 31.
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substantially present in the body, though he does not claim to know the nature of the substance.219
He does not claim to know how mind-body interaction works, but this mystery does not make
parallelism a temptation; whereas a parallelist considers mind-body interaction to be merely an
appearance, Newton takes it to be real.  The mind, like God, is active, and able to move bodies:
"We find in orselves a power of moving our bodies by or thought.  Life & Will (thinking) are
active Principles by wch we move our bodies, & thence arise other laws of motion unknown to
us."220   In De Gravitatione, Newton casts our ability to move our bodies as a analogue of God's
activity of creating bodies; God makes certain areas of space impenetrable by creating bodies,
and we make certain areas of space temporarily impenetrable to other bodies by moving our
bodies into those areas of space.   So we know that we can move our bodies, though we do not
know the laws by which the mind can move the body.221
At various points, Newton attempts to determine the means by which the mind moves the
body, suggesting in the General Scholium that it might be done by means of some further
substance, an electric spirit.222  Although minds are spatially extended, they sufficiently different
from bodies, being penetrable and non-massive, that we may speak of a mind-body dualism.  Yet
                                                                 
219  Newton writes in De Gravitatione, "It would be rash to say what is the substantial foundation of minds"
(translation by Stein in "Newton's Metaphysics", 281.)   Stein takes this phrase, "the substantial foundation of minds",
to refer to the mind-body problem of understanding the relation between mental attributes and corporeal ones: "When
these relations are sufficiently understood, Newton implies, we may expect to know all that there is to know about the
'substantial foundation of minds'." (Ibid., 282.)
220 ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 619r, identified by McGuire as draft material for the Optice and quoted in "Force, Active
Principles", 171.
221 "The same question [about how God imparts] arises with regard to the way we move our bodies, and nevertheless
we do believe that we can move them. If that were known to us, by like reasoning we should also know how God can
move bodies, and expel them from a certain space bounded in a given figure…that is, cause that space to be
impenetrable and assume the form of body…..but we only move bodies; and at that not any we choose, but only our
own bodies, to which we are united not by our own will, but by divine constitution; nor can we move bodies in any way
but only in accord with those laws which God has imposed on us." (De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 29.)
222 "A few things could now be added concerning a certain very subtle spirit pervading gross bodies and lying hidden in
them; by its force and actions, the particles of bodies attract one another at very small distances and cohere when they
become contiguous; and electrical [i.e. electrified] bodies act at greater distances, repelling as well as attracting
neighboring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is
excited, and the limbs of animals move at command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this spirit being
propagated through the solid fibers of the nerves from the external organs of the senses to the brain and from the brain
into the muscles.  But....there is not a sufficient number of experiments to determine and demonstrate accurately the
laws governing the actions of this spirit." (Principia, 943-944.)
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Newton's dualism does not produce the same conflict found in Descartes, since he does not assert
that the quantity of motion in the world is preserved by contact transfer.  In Descartes' system, the
actions that minds induce in bodies appear to disrupt the quantity of motion in the world, which
he takes to be constant.  Newton, however, speculates (albeit forcefully) in Query 31 that the
quantity of motion in the world is not constant, and that new motion must be introduced by some
"active principles" to replace that which decays.  Since he denies that the quantity of motion is
constant, there is no difficulty in saying that minds introduce new motion when they act on
bodies, changing the total quantity of motion in the world.  Questions do arise, however, about
Law 3 of the Principia. It is not clear whether Law 3 applies when the interacting substances are
mind and body, and if so, what sort of reaction the body produces in the mind, and vice versa.223
Since the mind plays no part in Newton's attempts to explain gravity's physical cause,
except indirectly as an example of something that is active and that acts locally, I will have no
more to say about it.   In the next section, I will discuss in more detail those substances that figure
in Newton's attempts to discover gravity's "physical cause".
HYPOTHESES FOR GRAVITY’S CAUSE
Newton attempts to discover gravity's "physical cause" over a period of decades.  The one
hypothesis that he definitively rejects is a material, Cartesian aether having inertial properties.
The other hypotheses that he might consider include primary causation, which is to say direct
action by God; matter that has active powers and acts distantly; an immaterial natural medium
such as the electric spirit or an aether; light; and some sort of "active principle".  Since an active
principle is not a substance, I reserve most of my discussion of it for later chapters, focusing here
upon the other hypotheses mentioned.  I begin with the hypothesis about God, turning afterward
to the hypotheses about natural  (created) substances.
                                                                 
223  Prima facie, it seems that the laws of motion would not apply to minds, which are non-massive and impenetrable.
For a discussion of such problems, see Alan Gabbey, "Newton, active principles, and the mechanical philosophy", 348-
350. See also Liam Dempsey, "Written in the flesh: Isaac Newton on the mind–body relation". Dempsey argues that
Newton took the power of moving the body to belong to the same class of forces as gravity and the electrical force.
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God's Primary Causation
God is one obvious answer to Newton's question about what gravity's cause might be, and
since God is omnipresent, it is an answer that would avoid action at a distance.  Yet this answer
would imply that gravity's cause is not physical;224 bodies do not really accelerate one another in
proportions dependent upon their masses and distance, but are instead predictably moved
according to those proportions by God. 225  So according to this answer, gravity considered as a
physical force is unreal.
Our question in this section is not whether Newton accepts primary causation at all.  He
clearly thinks that God acts directly in the world at least sometimes.  The basis of Leibniz's
complaint that Newton's God is like an imperfect watchmaker, for instance, is Query 31's remark
that God directly reforms the planetary orbits: "Some inconsiderable Irregularities...may have
risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one another, and...will be apt to
increase, till this System wants a Reformation."226  Our question, then, is about the extent of
God's primary causation.  We want to know whether the range of God's direct action includes
ordinary gravitational effects.
Several passages from some unpublished manuscripts suggest that Newton does take God
to cause the planetary orbits by direct and continual action, or at least considers the hypothesis
very seriously.  The most striking passage is one written in the1690's.  There, Newton denies that
spatially separated bodies can attract one another except by the mediation of some "active
                                                                 
224 How to understand this term (and to do so while avoiding anachronism) is a question.  The physical cannot be
distinguished from the non-physical by a spatial criterion, for instance, since Newton takes God and minds to be
spatially extended.  Is the physical then that which is empirically accessible?  Presumably not, since Newton considers
the design of beasts and other phenomena to constitute empirical evidence for God.
225 Predictability has its limits, of course. Newton writes that due to universal gravitation, the planets trace new orbits
with each revolution, and understanding the full complexity of those orbits is "beyond human wit."  See De Motu
Corporum (translated as On the Motion of Bodies): "Each time a planet revolves it traces a fresh orbit, as happens also
with the motion of the Moon, and each orbit is dependent upon the combined motions of all the planets, not to mention
their actions upon each other.  Unless I am much mistaken, it would exceed the force of human wit to consider so many
causes of motion at the same time and to define the motions by exact laws which would allow of an easy calculation."
(Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 280-281.)
226 Query 31, Opticks, 402 (but Query 23 in the edition upon which Leibniz was commenting).  As H. G. Alexander
notes, Newton's suggestion here was the probable provocation to Leibniz's charge, in his 1715 Letter 1, that Newton's
God is like an imperfect watchmaker; see Leibniz-Clarke, 11, n.a.
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principle" that propagates the force; and ascribing that view to the ancients with clear
approbation, he suggests that that active principle might be God.
For two planets separated from each other by a great expanse of void do not mutually
attract each other by any force of gravity or act on each other in any way except by the
mediation of some active principle that stands between them by means of which force is
propagated from one to the other. [According to the opinion of the ancients, this medium
was not corporeal since they held that all bodies by their very natures were heavy and that
atoms themselves fall through empty space toward the earth by the eternal force of their
nature without being pushed by other bodies.]  Therefore the ancients who grasped the
mystical philosophy more correctly taught that a certain infinite spirit pervades all space,
and contains and vivifies the entire world; and this supreme spirit was their numen;
according to the poet cited by the Apostle: In him we live and move and have our being.
Hence the omnipresent God is recognized, and by the Jews is called 'place'.  To the
mystical philosophers, however, Pan was that supreme numen...By this symbol, the
philosophers taught that matter is moved in that infinite spirit and by it is driven, not at
random, but harmonically, or according to the harmonic proportions as I have just
explained.227
Another suggestive assertion is a revision that Newton drafted for the Principia's Proposition 6, a
proposition asserting that all bodies gravitate toward each of the planets.228  An ultimately
unpublished corollary reads as follows:  "Corol. 9.  There exists an infinite and omnipresent spirit
in which matter is moved according to mathematical laws.'"229
A number of commentators have appealed to passages such as the above in defense of the
claim that Newton attributed all gravitational effects to God.  The variants of this position include
both the claim that Newton consistently attributed to God all effects involving forces that appear
to act across distances, and claims of more limited scope.  Richard Westfall concludes that
privately, Newton believed that God caused the planetary motions directly, and that therefore the
                                                                 
227 ULC Ad. 3965.6 f.269, quoted in Westfall, Force, 397-98. McGuire dates this passage to "a manuscript probably
related to the "classical" scholia of the abortive 1690's edition of the Principia." See McGuire, "Force, Active
Principles", 196.
228 In the third edition, Proposition VI of Book III reads, "All bodies gravitate toward each of the planets, and at any
given distance from the center of any one planet the weight of any body whatever toward that planet is proportional to
the quantity of matter which the body contains." (Principia, 806.)
229 See Westfall: "Among the new corollaries to Proposition VI that he planned was a direct assertion of God's
causative role:  'Corol. 9.  There exists an infinite and omnipresent spirit in which matter is moved according to
mathematical laws.'" (Never at Rest, 509, and quoting Newton, ULC, Add MS 396.6, f. 266v.)
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gravitational force was not real.230  Westfall relies in particular upon the first passage quoted
above, but also takes the planned but ultimately unpublished corollary as reason to think Newton
assigned ordinary gravitational effects to primary causation.  Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs also
attributes a consistent private view to Newton, and one that implies that as a physical force,
gravity is unreal.  Yet she does not read Newton as obviously attributing gravitational effects
directly to God; more probably he attributes them to Christ.  Drawing upon Newton's alchemical
writings, Dobbs argues that Newton consistently denied that matter could be active, and that he is
best understood as taking all forces, spirits, or principles to be the work of "God's viceroy, the
Christ."231  According to Dobbs then, God's providential action could be indirect, in that God
could be acting through a divine spirit or through Christ as his agent.232
J.E. McGuire's view is similar to Westfall's, but he limits the scope by time. Newton
attributed all effects associated with distance forces to God during the post-Principia period (i.e.,
                                                                 
230 On the basis of ULC Ad. 3965.6 f.269 (see note above), Westfall concludes that Newton did not consider (distance)
forces to be real:  "From the point of view of Newton's ultimate metaphysics, then, forces were no more real entities in
the universe than they were from the point of view of orthodox mechanical philosophy.  In the one case, apparent
attractions and repulsions were the effects of invisible mechanisms, aetherial effluvia of one sort or another which
pushed bodies about and created the appearance of attractions and repulsions.  In the other case, they were the effects of
an incorporeal medium, the infinite God who, in His sensorium, controls and moves the material world even as we
control and move our bodies.  As Newton said in the General Scholium, 'a being, however perfect, without dominion,
cannot be said to be Lord God.'  Dominion his God assuredly had—every movement in the world was the immediate
effect of His power." (Westfall, Force, 398.)   See also Force, 400: "He had abandoned the mechanisms of a material
aether in favour of the Divine Medium who moves bodies as though they attract each other according to mathematical
laws."
231 See Dobbs:  "The alchemical process...he saw...as the epitome of God's providential, nonmechanical action in the
world.....The 1674 treatise on vegetation, in which Newton makes explicit the relationships between vegetable and
mechanical chemistry, makes it possible to trace an evolutionary process in which alchemy and corpusculareanism
interact to produce his published theory of matter....The active principles that operate between and among the small
particles of matter in the Opticks are identical with those that so operate in the alchemical papers.  Whether they be
called forces, virtues, media, principles, or spirits, and whether they operate by corporeal or incorporeal means...is in
the end only of secondary importance, for activity requires divinity, and nonmechanical action indicates the presence of
the divine in the natural order.  Universal gravity demonstrates the omnipresence of God the Father; vegetable actions
in micromatter indicate continuing supervision of the world by God's viceroy, the Christ. But now perhaps Newton has
finally said enough for us to grasp his meaning...'And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the
appearances of things does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.'" ("Newton's Alchemy and His Theory of Matter",
528.)
232 Dobbs writes, "Whether they [the active principles] be called forces, virtues, media, principles, or spirits, and
whether they operate by corporeal or incorporeal means...is in the end only of secondary importance, for activity
requires divinity, and nonmechanical action indicates the presence of the divine in the natural order.")  In keeping with
these priorities, Dobbs allows that the divine action could be indirect, but she holds that even an indirect cause would
have to be a divine spirit or agent:  "When Newton said 'active' in his discussions of forces, we really should understand
that a divine spirit is at work either directly or indirectly." (Ibid., 526.)
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the 1690's), he argues, but by 1705 sought an explanation within the natural order.233  From the
time of the second English edition of the Opticks, in 1706, McGuire argues, Newton shifted
toward the view that God employed secondary causation more, with natural agents being the
source of much activity.234  All of these views take Newton to deny that matter could be active or
act distantly, but another commentator takes a different view.  Joan Hawes takes Newton to
attribute some effects consistently to primary causation, but she limits the scope of God's direct
action by the type of force or phenomena.  She argues that Newton consistently attributed
gravitational effects to God, but allowed action at a distance for certain electrical effects, as we
shall see in a subsequent section.
It seems clear that Newton seriously considered the hypothesis that gravitational effects
are produced directly by God, yet the texts indicate that he considered the force to be real.  Here I
                                                                 
233 See McGuire: "Newton is against any form of mechanical or fluid aether on grounds of reason and evidence. Thus,
though he remained interested in the possibility of a mechanical explanation of gravity, he seemed more inclined to
think that it was a manifestation of the Divine presence in nature.  By the end of the 1690's, his ideas began to
crystallize in favour of the latter opinion.....In draft scholia intended for Proposition IV to IX of the Third Book of the
Principia, Newton hoped to show that the ancients had anticipated the doctrines contained in these
Propositions….these scholia were used to establish four basic theses which Newton attributed to antiquity: that matter
is atomic in structure and moves by gravity through an infinite void; that gravitational force acts universally: that its
action diminishes as the inverse square of the distance between bodies: and that God's direct action is the true cause of
gravity.  This material confirms our interpretation of Newton's opinion regarding the causative nature of gravity in the
nineties, namely, God himself who is ubiquitously present in space." ("Force, Active Principles", 163-164.) McGuire
continues this thread of argument in subsequent pages: "In a manuscript probably related to the 'classical' scholia of the
abortive 1690's edition of the Principia, Newton was quite unambiguous about the status of active principles....In this
passage, which strongly emphasises the existence of divinity in nature, Newton unmistakenly refers to God, as the
cause of the 'force of gravity', by means of the term 'active principle'.....In 1705 in a draft for Query 23 of the Optice, he
still exclusively used the term in referring to God:  'Life and will are active principles' and 'if there be an universal life
and all space be the sensorium of a thinking being...then laws of motion arising from life or will may be of universal
extent.'  Without doubt Newton's voluntarist theology is to the fore."  (Ibid., 195-196.  Here McGuire is commenting
upon ULC Ad. 3965.6 f.269, in which Newton writes, "By this symbol, the philosophers taught that matter is moved in
that infinite spirit and by it is driven, not at random, but harmonically".)
234 McGuire's chronology of the periods during which Newton favored natural hypotheses, as opposed to
occasionalism, may be found in "Force, Active Principles". According to McGuire, Newton tended to attribute
gravitational effects directly to God during the period following the Principia, from the 1690's to just 1705 (i.e., until
just before the 1706 Optice, which included an expanded number of queries, including Query 23, which would become
Query 31 in the 1717/18, second English translation which contained still more queries).  During these years, McGuire
argues, Newton tended to attribute gravitational effects directly to God because Newton at this time emphasized void
space.  Subsequently, McGuire argues, during the period from the 1716 Optice to 1718, the time of the second English
edition of the Opticks, Newton restricted the scope of God's direct action, attributing more phenomena, including most
gravitational effects, to God's secondary causes, natural agents.   As a voluntarist, Newton still held that God
sometimes acts directly, via his potentia absoluta, for instance when he acts occasionally to reform the orbits, as
Newton asserts in Query 31.  During this later period, McGuire argues, Newton was strongly influenced by chemical
phenomena as he tried to explain the small forces of nature operating at the level of unobservable particles (and also
considered explanations of those forces in terms of electricity, magnetism, and light.) McMullin, however, rejects
McGuire's "neat periodization", arguing that Newton never repudiated any of the explanatory models he considered,
and continued to explore all of them; see McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 79.
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intend the first of the two senses I distinguished in the previous chapter, such that a real force is
due to secondary rather than primary causation.235 Even during the post-Principia period, Newton
repeatedly treats the gravitational force as something that requires nothing more than divine
concurrence, and operates independently of God.  This is indicated by his response to a question
about whether the gravitational force could lead to collapse.  Once people came to accept an
attractive force between the sun and the planets, a question arose about the "fixed stars"—fixed
because the stars were believed to lack the planets' transverse motions.236  Why does the universe
not collapse—why are the fixed stars and the sun not pulled together by the gravitational force?
Newton replies to this question in several ways, all of which imply that the gravitational force is
real.  When Bentley raises this question to Newton in 1692, Newton explains that the system will
not collapse so long as space is infinite.237 (He reiterates this explanation in the General
Scholium,238 writing that God has placed the stars at immense distances from one another to
                                                                 
235 As noted in chapter III, I also defend the view that Newton takes the gravitational force to be real in the second
sense of having genuine causal efficacy.  In a subsequent chapter, I present textual evidence in favor of the view that
Newton considered the gravitational force to be causally efficacious, rather than the mere instrumental device that
Berkeley took it to be.  As noted previously, I do not address the question of how Newton could hold that view.
Andrew Janiak addresses that question in chapter 3 of Newton as Philosopher, and in "Newton and the Reality of
Force".
236 See, for example, the Phenomena at the beginning of Principia, Book III, which mention the fixed stars.
Phenomenon 1, for example, states, "The circumjovial planets [or satellites of Jupiter], by radii drawn to the center of
Jupiter, describe areas proportional to the times, and their periodic times—the fixed stars being at rest—are as the 3/2
powers of their distances from that center." (Principia, 797).
237 In his first letter to Bentley, December 10, 1692, Newton writes that collapse would happen only in a finite space,
not in an infinite one: "If the matter of our Sun & Planets & all ye matter in the Universe, were evenly scattered
throughout all the heavens, & every particle had an innate gravity towards all the rest & the whole space throughout
wch this matter was scattered, was but finite; the matter on ye outside of this space would by its gravity tend towards
all ye matter on the inside & by consequence fall down into the middle of the whole space & there compose one great
spherical mass.  But if the matter was evenly diffused through an infinite space, it would never convene into one mass
but some of it would convene into one mass & some into another so as to make an infinite number of great masses
scattered at great distances from one to another throughout all yt infinite space.  And thus might ye Sun and Fixt stars
be formed supposing the matter were of a lucid nature.  But how the matter should divide it self into two sorts & that
part of it wch is fit to compose an opake body, should coalesce, not into one great body like ye shining matter but into
many little ones...I do not think explicable by mere natural causes, but am forced to ascribe it to ye counsel and
contrivance of a voluntary Agent." (Correspondence of Issac Newton, 234.)
238 "So that the systems of the fixed stars will not fall upon one another as a result of their gravity, he [God] has placed
them at immense distances from one another." (General Scholium, Principia, 940.)  In Query 28, Newton infers the
existence of a designer from the fact that the stars do not aggregate together.  He does not tell us whether collapse is
prevented through direct or indirect action, but again the gravitational force is implied to be something distinct from
divine action, in that some of its effects may need to be countered by divine action:  "What hinders the fix'd Stars from
falling upon one another?....Does it not appear from Phenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, intelligent,
omnipresent?" (Query 28, Opticks, 369-370.)
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prevent their collapse under gravity, and again in Query 28.)  If God were producing all
gravitational effects, directly, then the lack of collapse would be explained simply by God's will,
not by any feature of the universe.  Thus by saying that the stars do not collapse into the sun
because they are in infinite space, Newton implies that there is a real force of attraction between
the bodies.   Another of Newton's replies is recorded in David Gregory's 1694 Memoranda from
his conversations with Newton.  Gregory attributes to Newton the claim "that a continual miracle
is needed to prevent the Sun and the fixed stars from rushing together through gravity".239  If we
can accept the veracity of the Memoranda, Newton is again implying a distinction between the
gravitational force, which could cause the system to collapse absent divine action, and the divine
action that does in fact prevent it.  If there were no physical force of attraction among the bodies,
and instead only God's action, no such distinction would need to be drawn.  In short, if God were
moving the celestial bodies directly, he would not need to prevent collapse; he would simply need
to refrain from pushing the stars into the sun.  Even during the 1690's, then, the period to which
McGuire's chronology dates Newton's strongest attraction to the primary causation hypothesis,
Newton takes the gravitational force to operate independently of God.240
There are other indications that Newton limits the extent of primary causation.  The
following excerpt from the 1694 Gregory Memoranda suggests that in the usual course of events,
God merely sustains or cooperates with the secondary causes he has instituted, acting directly
only relatively rarely:   "And [God is] constantly co-operating with all things according to
accurate laws, as being the foundation and cause of the whole of nature, except where it is good
to act otherwise."241  And in a 1692 letter to Bentley, Newton explains that the planetary orbits
                                                                 
239 446 Memoranda of David Gregory, 5, 6, 7 May 1694, Correspondence of Isaac Newton, Latin original at 3:334 and
translation at 3:336.  Interestingly, the notion that there could be a continual miracle is at odds with the notion of a
miracle found in Clarke's letters; since all activity derives from God, Clarke classifies unusual events as miracles, and
regular events as natural.
240 Once again, by 'independent' I mean that it requires nothing more than that required by all natural phenomena,
namely, God's concurrence.
241 David Gregory MS. 245, fol. 14a, Latin original published in Crauford Gregory's article, "Notice concerning an
autograph manuscript of Isaac Newton", and quoted by McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 190.
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could not result from "natural cause alone" (my emphasis), since, among other things, the planets
lie in the same plane.  He then continues,
To make this systeme therefore wth all its motions, required a Cause wch understood &
compared together the quantities of matter in ye several bodies of ye Sun & Planets, & ye
gravitating powers resulting from thence.242
This remark—"gravitating powers" result from the "quantities of matter"—is again suggestive of
secondary rather than primary causation.
The view that in the normal course of events, the planetary system is self-sustaining, via
secondary causation, is again evident in this unpublished letter, c. 1712.
Certainly God could create planets that should move round of themselves without any
other cause than gravity that should prevent their removing through the tangent.  For
gravity without a miracle can keep the planets in.  And to understand this without
knowing the cause of gravity, is as good a progress in philosophy as to understand…the
frame of the bones and muscles and their connection in the body of an animal and how
the bones are moved by the contracting or dilating of the muscles without knowing how
the muscles are contracted or dilated by the power of the mind, is [in] the philosophy of
animal motion.243
Newton reiterates this position in the 1713 General Scholium, writing, "They will indeed
persevere in their orbits by the laws of gravity."  So while the planets acquired their co-planar
positions through divine action, this is not the means by which they maintain those positions and
orbits.   Finally, the General Scholium contains a remark that bears on a passage to which
Westfall appeals in supporting the primary causation hypothesis.  Newton at one point speaks of
space as God's "sensorium", and in the General Scholium he writes, "In him all things are
                                                                 
242 The first letter to Bentley, December 10, 1692, Correspondence of Isaac Newton, 235.
243  Newton to the Editor of the Memoirs of Literature, unpublished, written c. May 1712, Philosophical Writings, 116-
117.  This passage is a bit tricky because of Newton's use of the word 'miracle'.  Samuel Clarke, the expositor of
Newton's position in the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, rejects Leibniz's notion of a miracle as direct action by God,
countering that all events are caused directly by God, and thus the term 'miracle' simply refers to the unusual events
among them.  Yet we cannot assume that Clarke always represents Newton's own views, and in this letter Newton
rejects the view that gravity is due to primary causation, for he says that its cause is unknown.
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contained and move, but he does not act on them nor they on him."244  This supports a literal
reading of Newton's draft Corollary, which reads, "There exists an infinite and omnipresent spirit
in which matter is moved according to mathematical laws."245  While it does assert the existence
of God, this statement says that matter is moved in that spirit, not by it.
Thus I reject the view that Newton attributed gravitational effects to primary causation, and
I reject both the limited and the broad versions of the view.  In his specific discussions of the
gravitational force, Newton treats it as real, and in general he tends toward thinking God works
largely through secondary causation.246  One reason that Newton might be hesitant to attribute
gravitational effects to God's direct action is that doing so would significantly limit the domain of
secondary causation.   As we will see in the next chapter, Newton classifies not only gravity but
also a vast range of phenomena as "new motions".  Therefore, if Newton attributed gravitational
effects directly to God, there would be no reason to conceive of other sources of new motion
differently; it would instead make sense to attribute all new motions to primary causation.  This
would leave very little to secondary causation, saddling God with all the mundane chores of the
world.  The view that God often works through secondary causes creates a pressure to deny that
gravitational effects are produced by primary causation.
Active Powers in Matter
Does Newton attribute active powers of attraction and repulsion to matter, including the
power of gravitational attraction?   Such an attribution would mean abandoning the principle of
the passivity of matter and also allowing action at a distance.  In this section I consider texts in
                                                                 
244 General Scholium: "He is omnipresent not only virtually but also substantially; for action requires substance.   In
him all things are contained and move, but he does not act on them nor they on him.  It is agreed that the supreme God
necessarily exists, and by necessity he is always and everywhere." (Principia, 940-942.)
245 Newton's draft Corollary, from ULC, Add MS 396.6, f. 266v, is discussed by Westfall: "Among the new corollaries
to Proposition VI that he planned was a direct assertion of God's causative role:  'Corol. 9.  There exists an infinite and
omnipresent spirit in which matter is moved according to mathematical laws.'" (Never at Rest, 509.)
246 Newton's letter to Burnet, 1680-81: "Where natural causes are at hand God uses them as instruments of his work."
(Correspondence of Isaac Newton, 2.334 and quoted in McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 206.)
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which he initially appears to allow this, and I argue that despite those appearances, he at most
allows the possibility that such powers belong directly to particles, such that no intermediary is
needed for affecting other, spatially removed matter.  (In the final chapter, I consider the narrower
proposal that Newton accepts active powers as inessential properties of matter.)
Although Newton appears in his letter to Bentley to reject the notion that distant bodies
could causally interact without a medium, in some texts he appears to attribute forces directly to
matter.  In the unpublished Conclusio (c. 1687), for instance, he suggests, "Almost all the
phenomena of nature will depend on the forces of particles, if only it be possible to prove that
forces of this kind do exist."247  Newton again attributes forces directly to particles in De Natura
Acidorum, c. 1692: "The particles of acids are coarser than those of water and therefore less
volatile; but they are much finer than those of earth, and therefore much less fixed than they.
They are endowed with a great attractive force and in this force their activity consists by which
they dissolve bodies and affect and stimulate the organs of the senses."248  And Query 31 opens
by suggesting that particles have powers or forces, by which they act at a distance:   "Have not
the small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a distance,
not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting, and inflecting them, but also upon one
another for producing a great Part of the Phenomena of Nature?"249
Yet the passage does not end there, as we shall see shortly, and in general, there are
difficulties in supposing that Newton is allowing that the causal interaction between the spatially
                                                                 
247 Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 345.
248 "The particles of acids are coarser than those of water and therefore less volatile; but they are much finer than those
of earth, and therefore much less fixed than they.  They are endowed with a great attractive force and in this force their
activity consists by which they dissolve bodies and affect and stimulate the organs of the senses.  They are of a middle
nature between water and [terrestrial] bodies and they attract both.  By their attractive force they surround the particles
of bodies by they stony or metallic, and they adhere to them very closely on all sides, so that they can scarcely be
separated from them by distillation or sublimation.  When they are attracted and gathered together on all sides they
raise, disjoin and shake the particles of bodies one from another, that is, they dissolve the bodies; and by their force of
attraction by which they rush to the [particles of] bodies, they move the fluid and excite heat and shake asunder some
particles to such a degree as to turn them into air and generate bubbles: and this is the reason of dissolution and violent
fermentation." (De Natura Acidorum, c. 1692 in Newton: Texts, Backgrounds, Commentaries, 312.)
249 Query 31, Opticks, 375-376.
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separated particles takes place without any spatial intermediary, such as God or an immaterial
medium.  One problem is that these seeming attributions of active powers to matter are
counterbalanced by suggestions that matter is passive.  Newton's 1693 description of matter as
"inanimate" and "brute" is echoed in draft material for the 1706 Optice, where Newton writes that
matter is a "passive principle", and that Bodies "alone considered" are passive.
Matter is a passive principle & cannot move itself.  It continues in its state of moving or
resting unless disturbed.  It receives motion proportional to the force impressing it, and
resists as much as it is resisted.250
For Bodies (alone considered as long, broad & thick...) are passive. By their vis inertiae
they continue in their state of moving or resting & receive motion proportional to ye
force impressing it & resist as much as they are resisted; but they cannot move
themselves; & without some other principle than the vis inertiae there could be no motion
in the world.251
Similarly, while Query 31 opens by seemingly attributing active powers to particles, it refrains
from attributing active powers directly to matter, attributing only the vis inertiae directly to
matter.  There must be some active principle, he writes, for by the vis inertiae alone, "there never
could have been any motion in the world".252  And while the particles "have" the passive principle
                                                                 
250 ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 619r, written in English and quoted by McGuire in "Force, Active Principles", 170-171, and
identified by him as draft variants of 1706 Optice.  As the passage continues, Newton points to life and will as active
principles, in contrast to matter:  "These are passive laws & to affirm that there are no other is to speak against
experience.  For we find in orselves a power of moving our bodies by or thought.  Life & Will (thinking) are active
Principles by wch we move our bodies, & thence arise other laws of motion unknown to us." (Ibid.)
251 ULC Add. 3970, folls. 255r-256r, draft variants of 1706 Optice, in McGuire, ibid. The more extended passage (from
ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 620r) closes with a vitalist suggestion: "If there be another Principle of motion there must be
other laws of motion depending on that Principle.  And the first thing to be done in Philosophy is to find out all the
general laws of motion (so far as they can be discovered) on which the frame of nature depends....We find in orselves a
power of moving our bodies by or  thoughts (but the laws of this power we do not know & see ye same power in other
living creatures but how this is done & by what laws we do not know.  And by this instance & that of gravity it appears
that there are other laws of motion (unknown to use) than those wch arise from Vis inertiae (unknown to us) wch is
enough to justify & encourage or search after them.  We cannot say that all nature is not alive." (Ibid.)
252 "The Vis inertiae is a passive principle by which Bodies persist in their Motion or Rest, receive Motion in
proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted.  By this Principle alone there never could
have been any Motion in the world.  Some other Principle was necessary for putting bodies into Motion; and now they
are in Motion, some other Principle is necessary for conserving the Motion." Query 31, Opticks, 397.)
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of the vis inertiae, they "are moved by" active principles.253  This allows that the active principle
does not belong to matter, but is instead something external to it. Yet these passages are not
decisive.  For one thing, the phrase "are moved by" merely suggests that active principles do not
belong to matter; it does not close the door to the possibility that they do.  (Additionally, Newton
writes in the Optice draft that "bodies alone considered" are passive, thereby raising the
possibility that he attributes inessential active powers to matter.  I delay an examination of this
suggestion until the final chapter.)
A second difficulty with supposing that Newton attributes active powers directly to
particles is that most of the remarks that might be construed to that effect have the following in
common.  They speculate about the existence of "lesser forces" to explain phenomena such as
cohesion and fermentation (chemical reactions) –and they do so by taking gravity, along with
electricity and magnetism, as a model.  Thus in the Conclusio, Newton invokes the "conformity
of Nature" as a reason for thinking gravitational attractions may have analogues in "lesser forces"
between unobserved particles.
There are, however, innumerable other local motions which on account of the minuteness
of the moving particles cannot be detected, such as the motions of the particles in hot
bodies, in fermenting bodies, in putrescent bodies, in growing bodies, in the organs of
sensation and so forth.  If anyone shall have the good fortune to discover all these, I might
almost say that he will have laid bare the whole nature of bodies so far as the mechanical
causes are concerned.... Nature is exceedingly simple and conformable to herself.
Whatever reasoning holds for greater motions should hold for lesser ones as well.  The
former depend upon the greater attractive force of larger bodies, and I suspect that the latter
depend upon the lesser forces, as yet unobserved, of insensible particles.254
Gravity is the model in draft material for a projected Book IV of the Opticks, written in the early
                                                                 
253 "It seems to me farther, that these Particles have not only a Vis inertiae, accompanied with such passive Laws of
Motion as naturally result from that Force, but also that they are moved by certain active Principles, such as is that of
Gravity." (Query 31, Opticks, 401.)
254 Draft of Conclusio for Principia I, in Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 333, and quoted by McMullin,
Newton on Matter and Activity, 50.
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1690's but not ultimately included.255
Hypoth 2   As all the great motions in the world depend upon a certain kind of force (wch
in this earth we call gravity) whereby great bodies attract one another at great distances:
so all the little motions in ye world depend upon certain kinds of forces whereby minute
bodies attract or dispell one another at little distances.  How the great bodies of ye Earth
Sun Moon & Planets gravitate towards one another what are ye laws & quantities of their
gravitating forces at all distance from them & how all ye motions of those bodies are
regulated by their gravities I shewed in my Mathematical Principles of Philosophy to the
satisfaction of my readers.  And if Nature be most simple & fully consonant to her self
she observes the same method in regulating the motions of smaller bodies wch she doth in
regulating those of the greater.256
And again in Query 31:
For it's well known, that Bodies act one upon another by the attractions of Gravity,
Magnetism, and Electricity; and these Instances show the Tenor and Course of Nature,
and make it not improbable but that there may be more attractive Powers than these.
For Nature is very consonant and conformable to herself.257
So gravity is the model for the speculated short-range, lesser forces (which many commentators
refer to as 'interparticle forces', though that appellation describes gravity as well). But if gravity is
a basis for inferring the existence of lesser forces, then to suppose that Newton takes these lesser
forces to be powers that belong directly to matter and which can affect distant matter without an
intermediary presumes that gravity is already accepted as itself being such a power of matter.
There is one text in which Newton at first glance appears to be saying just that.  In the
carefully composed258 but ultimately unpublished Draft Conclusion to the Principia, Newton
                                                                 
255 See Westfall: "The Opticks that Newton published in 1704 was not the Opticks he had planned in the early 1690's.
That work had reached its climax in a Book IV dedicated to the demonstration that forces that act at a distance
exist....In the Opticks he did publish, he eliminated Book IV and focused the work sharply on optical problems." (Never
at Rest, 640.)
256 Hypothesis 2 is ULC Add. MS. 3970.3, ff. 338-8v, and appears in Westfall, Force, 379.  (Westfall notes that the
bracketed words are his reconstructions, due to damage to the paper; ibid., 411, n.128.)
257 Query 31, Opticks, 376.
258 See Cohen, "Guide", 283:  "Most of this document is written neatly (in Newton's hand) and is not a rough draft with
passages crossed out and rewritten, although the very last part is more tentative."
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compares gravity to the electrical and magnetic forces, and makes this dramatic statement:
"Magnetic force is communicated by contact; the other forces are not."259  Is Newton asserting
here that gravity and the electrical force involve action at a distance, without any medium
between causally interacting bodies?  Despite initial appearances, it seems that he is not.  It was
accepted in the 17th century that magnetic bodies emit material effluvia, which act as a medium
within the area to which they reach.260  In saying that the magnetic force is communicated by
contact, then, Newton means that the force is communicated by the magnetic body's material
effluvia.  Against this he contrasts gravity and the electrical force.  These do not operate by the
contact of material effluvia.  Yet they might operate by the contact of some immaterial medium.
Newton's above-quoted remark does not exclude that possibility, and a later passage in the text
supports it.  Later in the Draft Conclusion he writes,
By these experiments it is fully enough clear that glass at small distances always abounds
in electric force, even without friction, and therefore abounds in an electric spirit which is
diffusd through its whole body and always surrounds the body with a small atmosphere,
but never goes out far into the air unless stirred up by friction.261
Thus from the fact that glass attracts light bodies at small distances, even without friction, he
infers the existence of a short-range medium, namely the electric spirit, which is immaterial.  The
inference depends upon an assumption that the material bodies do not act distantly; without that
assumption, there is no basis for inferring the existence of the electric spirit.
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
259 A longer excerpt reads, "I have now set forth the forces, properties, and effects of gravity.  It is most certain from
phenomena that electric and magnetic attractions also exist.  But the laws of these [attractions] are very different from
the laws of gravity.  Electrical and magnetic attractions are intended and remitted; gravity cannot be intended and
remitted.  Magnetism and electricity sometimes attract and sometimes repel; gravity always attracts.  They act at small
distances, gravity at very great distances.  Magnetic force is communicated by contact; the other forces are not." (A
Draft Conclusion to the Principia, Cohen, "Guide", 292.)
260 See Hawes,  "Newton and the 'Electrical Attraction Unexcited'", 122.
261 A Draft Conclusion to the Principia, Cohen, "Guide", 289.
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Additionally, Newton denies knowing gravity's causal story.  In a 1693 letter to Leibniz,
he implicitly indicates that he does not know gravity's causal story; for after asserting that the
celestial motions and the tides "follow from" gravity, he adds that he will not object if someone
can show that gravity and its laws are explained by the action of "some subtle matter".262
 We find the same position much later in Newton's 1712, unpublished response to
Leibniz's charges.  In that letter, he states that it is within God's power to create a world in which
the planets could move by gravity alone.  "Certainly God could create planets that should move
round of themselves without any other cause than gravity that should prevent their removing
through the tangent.  For gravity without a miracle can keep the planets in."263  Here Newton
indicates that gravity is real in the second sense that I distinguished earlier; gravity can keep the
planets in, and thus the force itself has causal efficacy.  But if we think he means to close the
causal question about gravity by attributing attractive powers directly to matter, Newton
immediately disabuses us of this, writing that the gravitational force has some cause yet to be
discovered:
And to understand this without knowing the cause of gravity, is as good a progress in
philosophy as to understand to understand….how the bones are moved by the contracting
or dilating of the muscles without knowing how the muscles are contracted or dilated by
the power of the mind, is [in] the philosophy of animal motion. 264
                                                                 
262 "Since all the phenomena of the heavens and of the sea follow precisely, so far as I am aware, from nothing but
gravity acting in accordance with the laws described by me; and since nature is very simple, I have myself concluded
that all other causes are to be rejected and that the heavens are to be stripped as far as may be of all matter, lest the
motions of planets and comets be hindered or rendered irregular.  But if, meanwhile, someone explains gravity along
with all its laws by the action of some subtle matter, and shows that the motion of planets and comets will not be
disturbed by this matter, I shall be far from objecting." (Newton to Leibniz, 1693, Philosophical Writings, 108-109.)
The phrase "subtle matter" raises some questions. If Newton is thinking of a very rare material medium, it would have
to act by some means other than impact, for Newton has disproved the existence of a material medium having sufficient
inertial properties to push the planets.  We cannot simply assume that the phrase is just a manner of speaking, one that
because of that disproof must refer to an immaterial medium.  One reason is that this letter to Leibniz was written not
long after the first edition of the Principia, which contained a hypothesis eliminated from the second, 1713 edition.
This is Hypothesis III, which asserts the transformability of matter.
263 Newton to the Editor of the Memoirs of Literature, unpublished, written c. May 1712, Philosophical Writings, 116-
117. Newton is responding to criticism that Leibniz stated in a letter originally written to Nicholas Hartsoeker, and later
published in the Memoirs of Literature.
264 "And to understand this without knowing the cause of gravity, is as good a progress in philosophy as to understand
the frame of a clock and the dependence of the wheels upon one another without knowing the cause of the gravity of
the weight which moves the machine is in the philosophy of clockwork; or the understanding of the frame of the bones
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This position is restated in the 1713 General Scholium, as we saw. There, Newton asserts that
"gravity really exists" and that its laws are sufficient for the planets to "persevere in their orbits",
but he has not assigned it a cause.265
Finally, Newton's seemingly direct attribution of active powers to matter in Query 31 is
almost immediately followed by one of his characteristic qualifying remarks: "How these
Attractions may be perform'd, I do not here consider.  What I call Attraction may be perform'd by
impulse, or by some other means unknown to me."266  While one might think this comment is
simply a stratagem, intended to deflect criticism about his acceptance of action at a distance, I
think there is a better way to understand it, a way that makes sense of the difficulties I have been
discussing.
In the texts containing the most provocative suggestions that matter possesses active
forces, virtues, or powers by which it acts distantly, Newton is speculating about the existence of
"lesser forces".  Just as there were two problems to solve when Newton began his work on
gravity—that of presenting the force "through calculation and geometry", as Kepler put it, and
that of finding the physical, causal explanation—so there are two problems for the cohesion and
chemical phenomena.  Whereas only the physical, causal problem remains outstanding in the case
of gravity, both problems remain outstanding for these other phenomena.  In Query 31 and
elsewhere, Newton speculates that these phenomena might be due to some lesser forces.
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
and muscles and their connection in the body of an animal and how the bones are moved by the contracting or dilating
of the muscles without knowing how the muscles are contracted or dilated by the power of the mind, is [in] the
philosophy of animal motion." (Newton to the Editor of the Memoirs of Literature, ibid.)
265 General Scholium: "They [the celestial bodies] will indeed persevere in their orbits by the laws of gravity, but they
certainly could not originally have acquired the regular position of the orbits by these laws….I have explained the
phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the force of gravity, but I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity.....It is
enough that gravity really exists and acts according to the laws that we have set forth and is sufficient to explain all the
motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea."  (Principia, 940 and 943.)
266 Query 31, Opticks, 376.
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 If we suppose that in Query 31 and the other texts noted above, Newton is trying to
answer the physical, causal question, then he appears to suggest as an answer that matter
possesses powers to act distantly; and he then appears to retract that answer a few sentences later,
by saying that he is not considering how the attractions may be performed. 267  All this supposes
that Newton thinks it proper to proceed to the physical, causal question without having answered
the mathematical one; for while he speculates that there may be some forces analogous to gravity,
in that they act between spatially separated particles, he does not yet know their "mathematical
proportions".  For example, he cannot specify how the speculated force of cohesion might vary
with distance.  (Perhaps it varies with the inverse cube, for instance, as Newton finds to be
approximately the case for the magnetic force.)  Nor can he say whether one force or many are at
work.  It might be only a single, dual-natured force that is attractive at some distances but
repulsive at others; for he speculates in Query 31, that as numbers pass from negative to positive,
so a force might pass from repulsive to attractive.268
                                                                 
267 Ibid.
268 "As in Algebra, where affirmative Quantities vanish and cease, there negative ones begin; so in Mechanicks, where
Attraction ceases, there a repulsive Virtue ought to succeed.  And that there is such a Virtue, seems to follow from the
Reflexions and Inflexions of the Rays of Light....It seems also to follow from the Emission of Light; the Ray so soon as
it is shaken off from a shining Body by the vibrating Motion of the Parts of the Body, and gets beyond the reach of
Attraction, being driven away with exceedingly great Velocity....It seems also to follow from the production of Air and
Vapour. The Particles when they are shaken off from Bodies by Heat or Fermentation, so soon as they are beyond the
reach of the Attraction of the Body, recede from it, and also from one another with great Strength, and keep at a
distance, so as sometimes to take up above a Million of Times more space than they did before in the form of a dense
Body.  Which vast Contraction and Expansion seems unintelligible, by feigning the Particles of Air to be springy...or
by any other means than a repulsive Power." (Query 31, Opticks, 395.)  There is disagreement among commentators
about whether Newton is here suggesting a dual-natured force.  Joan Hawes and also the Halls read Newton as making
that suggestion.  See the Halls' commentary:
His general theory of matter postulated the existence of both repulsive and attraction forces in all phenomena
except gravitation, which was unique; as he put it vividly in Quaery 31, 'as in algebra where affirmative
quantities vanish and cease, there negative ones begin: so in mechanicks where attraction ceases, there a
repulsive virtue ought to succeed'.  Electrical phenomena offered a particularly significant combination of the
two kinds of force.  (It was a more significant example than the case of magnetism, which was specialized
and limited to one kind of matter)  This duality of force remained a perpetual problem. In his mathematical
treatment of the force of gravity in the Principia it did not concern him, except in Book II, Proposition
XXII....In other cases, in the qualitative discussions of cohesion, capillary attraction, solution, and so forth,
Newton could do no more than merely assert the simultaneous existence of dual forces without further
reconciling them; it was without doubt one of the merits of the aether hypothesis that it seemed to offer some
possibility of doing this. (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 210-11.)
Marie Boas, however, appears to interpret this passage as indicating regions of attraction and repulsion, rather than a
single, dual-natured force.  Commenting upon the passage from Query 31, she writes, "Each particle was surrounded by
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Yet in general, Newton does not recommend answering the physical, causal question
first.  In the Scholium to Book I, Section 11, Newton writes that we must first investigate the
"quantities of forces and their proportions that follow from any conditions that may be supposed".
It is only after this that we can "come down to physics" and begin to determine, among other
things, the "physical species"269 and "physical causes" of the forces.  The mathematical problem
is the first stage, then.    So instead of supposing that he is leapfrogging over the mathematical
problem and speculating about the physical, causal problem, we should understand his remarks in
Query 31 as addressing the prior, mathematical problem.  Understood this way, Newton is not
making a physical, causal claim only to retract it.  He is beginning with the mathematical
problem, by speculating that phenomena such as cohesion might be due to forces that act between
spatially separated particles.   Those forces might be distance-variant, as opposed to ones acting
by contact.  To discover the distance relations between particles undergoing attraction or
repulsion would constitute progress on the mathematical problem.  His subsequent remark, to the
effect that he is not here considering how the attractions might be performed, indicates that his
speculations are confined to this first, mathematical stage, and do not address the physical, causal
problem.
The Electric Spirit
In the 1713 General Scholium, Newton writes that gravity's cause, whatever it may be,
"penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and planets."270  He then goes on to speculate about a
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
a sphere or area of attraction; where this stopped, a sphere of repulsion succeeded; beyond this again, there was a
second sphere of attraction, that of gravitation, extending outward indefinitely." ("The Establishment of the Mechanical
Philosophy", 516.)  Since Newton clearly takes the gravitational force to reach to the very center of bodies, Boas
presumably means that within a certain region, a repulsive force is dominant, counteracting the effects of the
gravitational force.  Since she sees no reason to state that the gravitational force is thus distinct from the repulsive
force, she presumably thinks that the repulsive force may also be distinct from the attractive force operating at the inner
sphere around the particle (i.e., the cohesive force).
269 For a discussion of the physical species of force, see Janiak, Newton as Philosopher, 58-65.
270 General Scholium: "I have not yet assigned a cause to gravity.  Indeed, this force arises from some cause that
penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and planets without any diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in
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"very subtle spirit" that initially appears to meet this condition, because it pervades the pores of
bodies.
A few things could now be added concerning a certain very subtle spirit pervading gross
bodies and lying hidden in them; by its force and actions, the particles of bodies attract
one another at very small distances and cohere when they become contiguous; and
electrical [i.e. electrified] bodies act at greater distances, repelling as well as attracting
neighboring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats
bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the limbs of animals move at command of the
will, namely, by the vibrations of this spirit being propagated through the solid fibers of
the nerves from the external organs of the senses to the brain and from the brain into the
muscles.  But....there is not a sufficient number of experiments to determine and
demonstrate accurately the laws governing the actions of this spirit.271
Although the General Scholium does not identify this subtle spirit, most commentators agree that
it is the electric spirit.272  This identification is based upon draft materials, including the Draft
Conclusion to the Principia (c. 1704-1712),273 which both names the electric spirit and discusses
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
proportion to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in
proportion to the quantity of solid matter, and whose action is extended everywhere to immense distances, always
decreasing as the squares of the distances."  (Principia, 943.)
271 Ibid., 944.
272 This identification was first made by Hall and Hall in Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 1962, based
upon unpublished drafts.  The identification of the subtle spirit as an electrical spirit gains additional support from A
Draft Conclusion to the Principia (ULC MS Add. 3965, fols. 351-352; MS 3970, fols. 602-604, c. 1704–1712),
translated by Cohen, "Guide", 287-292.  Joan Hawes, writing long before the publication of the Draft Conclusion, but
after the Halls, rejects their identification of the spirit as electric.  Hawes argues that the 'subtle spirit' of the General
Scholium is not the electric spirit discussed in the draft manuscripts, but is instead an aether.  She holds that aether is
not the same as the aether in the Boyle letter, but is similar to it in one important respect:  in both cases, an aether is
used to explain inter-particulate forces:
I expressed doubt on the possible identification of the subtle spirit, described in the Scholium Generale of the
1713 edition of the Principia, with the electric spirit described in some of its draft manuscripts.  If one
believes that at this stage Newton considered that particle forces were explicable in terms of electrical forces
of repulsion and attraction, evident without friction, and independent of the electric spirit, then there is no
doubt as to the non-equivalence of the two entities.  For, in the Scholium Generale as printed in 1713, particle
phenomena are effected 'by the force and action' of the subtle spirit.  It is generally agreed, I think, that the
'Aethereal Medium' of the Opticks was a development of the aetherial conjecture about gravity with which
Newton concluded his letter to Boyle (although the concept of an aether composed of mutually repulsive
particles, introduced in De Aere et Aethere, has its importance.)  I doubt, however, that anyone would suggest
the equivalence of the aether hypotheses contained in the two works, even if Newton had re-written the entire
letter using the concept of an aether of continually variable density.  This is because, in the latter work,
particle forces had an aetherial explanation, whereas the Opticks is renowned for its non-aetherial explanation
of particle forces.  On the other hand, the similarity between the aether of Boyle's letter and the subtle spirit
of the Scholium Generale...is remarkable for the fact that in both works the inter-particulate forces are
explained through the action of an aether. ("Newton and the 'Electrical Attraction Unexcited'", 129-130.)
273 Cohen, "Guide", 283.
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it in much greater detail than the brief paragraph quoted above.  (This paragraph was omitted
from the Principia's third edition, perhaps because it is speculative, and perhaps also because
after the second edition, Newton's hopes for the electric spirit begin to wane.)  Though the Draft
Conclusion remained unpublished, much of it was nearly prepared for publication, so it probably
expresses thoughts that, while speculative, were nonetheless carefully considered.274  In the
period that the Draft Conclusion was composed, Newton was strongly impressed by some
experiments by Francis Hauksbee, including that of an evacuated, rotating globe made to glow by
friction.  Newton attributed this effect, as well as capillary action, to an electric spirit,275 and
began to consider the electrical spirit as an explanation for a wide range of phenomena.
Reductionism and the Phenomena Associated with the Electric Spirit
In the Draft Conclusion, Newton attributes to this spirit the capacity to produce light and
thereby to heat bodies, to change the trajectory of light, and to cause sensation by vibrating in the
nerves and organs that connect the brain and muscles.  He also suggests the electric spirit as the
answer to a problem that the ancient atomists had failed to solve, cohesion.  Newton remarks in
Query 31 that their solution of hooked atoms begs the question.276  (If the atoms do not enclose
one another but instead have hooks, such that they can separate from old aggregates to form new
ones, one may wonder how they then stay in these new aggregates.)
If the electric spirit were continuous and pervaded the entire heavens, it might produce or
convey gravitational effects by contact, avoiding action at a distance. Yet Newton does not intend
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
274 Ibid.
275 Ibid., 286.
276 "The Parts of all homogeneal hard Bodies which fully touch one another, stick together very strongly.  And for
explaining how this may be, some have invented hooked Atoms, which is begging the Question; and others tell us that
Bodies are glued together by rest, that is, by an occult Quality, or rather by nothing; and others, that they stick together
by conspiring Motions, that is, by relative rest among themselves.  I had rather infer from their Cohesion that their
Particles attract one another by some Force, which in immediate Contact is exceeding strong, at small distances
performs the chymical Operations above-mention'd, and reaches not far from the Particles with any sensible Effect."
(Query 31, Opticks, 388-389.)
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the electric spirit as a hypothesis for gravity's physical cause.277  (One wrinkle that I will not
explore is the possibility that Newton's electrical spirit is identical to the aether of the Opticks,
which figures in Query 21's aethereal hypothesis about gravity.278)  Neither the General
Scholium's abbreviated discussion nor the much lengthier Draft Conclusion lists gravity among
the phenomena that might be caused by the electric spirit.279  Moreover, the electric spirit does
not meet the condition Newton sets upon gravity's cause.  While it does pervade gross bodies, it
does not fill the heavens, reaching to the very centers of the sun and planets.  It pervades some
bodies, but its reach is limited.  It surrounds glass bodies, for instance, but it does not reach far
from them, even with friction.280
                                                                 
277 Concurring with this assessment are McGuire ("Force, Active Principles", 175), and Hawes ("Newton's Two
Electricities", 102).  According to McGuire, Newton thought of the electric force during this period (1706-1713) as a
"primordial agent or spirit" responsible for motions taking place at the level of unobservable particles; the range of
phenomena to be unified by this spirit, however, does not include gravity. Cohen at one point suggests that around the
period of the General Scholium, Newton did hope to explain gravity by electrical phenomena, but he later makes the
weaker claim that Newton hoped that electrical phenomena would lead to a better understanding of attractive forces
generally.  See Cohen:  "By the time of the third edition, Newton seems to have abandoned his earlier attempts to
explain the action of gravity by reference to electrical phenomena and had come rather to hope that an explanation
might be found in the actions of an "aethereal medium" of varying density."  See also "Guide", 286: "In this
presentation [i.e., the Draft Conclusion], as in the General Scholium, Newton does not include the force of gravity
among the actions of this [electric] spirit.  The final impression given a reader is that if more were known about the
action of this spirit, then we would understand the nature of attractive forces in general and so be in a better position to
understand the action of gravity." ("Guide", 25.)
278 Cohen notes that some scholars identify the electric spirit with the Opticks' aether, though he rejects that
identification: "Some four years after the second edition of the Principia, Newton published the second edition of the
Opticks (London, 1717/18), in which he explored the properties and effects of an 'aethereal medium,' a somewhat
different entity from the Cartesian or dense aether which he had rejected earlier.  Scholars are divided in their judgment
concerning whether this aethereal medium is identical with the electric spirit.  An exploration of that question would
take us far afield.  What is of concern here is not so much to explore all of Newton's speculations about spirit and force,
but rather to understand what Newton had in mind when he wrote the paragraph of the General Scholium with which
the later editions of the Principia conclude.  As the draft conclusion printed here shows plainly, and as the documents
published by the Halls made clear, Newton's 'spirit' is an 'electric spirit,' whose properties were demonstrated to him by
Hauksbee."    ("Guide", 287.)
279 Similarly, in draft material that McGuire interprets as relating to some proposed new queries for the Opticks,
Newton again lists a range of phenomena that the electric spirit might explain, without including gravity; see "Force,
Active Principles", 176. In a draft that McGuire interprets as something Newton probably intended to follow one of the
new Queries for the 1717/18 Opticks, (specifically, a proposed successor to the last of the new Queries, numbers 17-
24), Newton again lists a range of phenomena that the electric spirit might explain, without including gravity: "Do not
all bodies therefore abound with a very subtile, but active, potent, electric spirit by wch light is emitted, refracted.  &
reflected, electric attractions and fugations are performed, & the small particles of bodies cohere when contiguous,
agitate one another at small distances...For electric...uniting the thinking soul & unthinking body.  This spirit may also
be of great use in vegetation, wherein three things are to be considered, generation, nutrition & preparation of
nourishment." (U.L.C. Add. 3970, fols. 235v, in McGuire, ibid., 176).
280 "By these experiments it is fully enough clear that glass at small distances always abounds in electric force, even
without friction, and therefore abounds in an electric spirit which is diffusd through its whole body and always
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So the electric spirit is not a candidate for gravity's cause, and the connection between the
two forces is that both are distance forces, which is to say that they operate between spatially
separated bodies, without the contact of any material effluvia.  Newton also remarks upon an
intriguing similarity in the forces' proportions, describing an experiment in which the electric
force varied almost with the inverse square of distance.281  Then, having explained cohesion in
terms of the electric force, he compares the shape it produces in a drop of liquid to that produced
by the gravitational force in a planet:  "Just as the earth takes on a spherical shape by the gravity
of its parts toward the center, so the drops of liquid constantly affect spherical shapes by the
electrical attraction of their parts toward themselves."282
Yet there are also notable differences between the forces, so while Newton is hoping that
a range of phenomena might be attributed to the electric spirit, and several forces reduced to the
electric force associated with that spirit, gravity is not among them.  The Draft Conclusion to the
Principia begins by emphasizing the differences between gravity and the electric and magnetic
forces.  He writes, for example, "Electrical and magnetic attractions are intended and remitted;
gravity cannot be intended and remitted."283  Gravity's intensity depends only upon distance, that
is, whereas the electrical force can be increased by friction or impeded by the interposition of
bodies (a difference he notes somewhat later in the Draft Conclusion to the Principia).  Another
notable difference is that the gravitational force only attracts, whereas the electrical and magnetic
forces "sometimes attract and sometimes repel."  Newton elsewhere tries to explain this by
suggesting what commentators have termed the 'duality of force'284; the electric force might
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
surrounds the body with a small atmosphere, but never goes out far into the air unless stirred up by friction." (A Draft
Conclusion to the Principia, Cohen "Guide", 289.)
281 "In the latest experiment, the force of attraction came out very nearly inversely in the ratio of the square of the
distance." (Ibid.)
282 Ibid., 290.
283 A Draft Conclusion to the Principia, Cohen, "Guide", 287.
284 The Halls comment on the oddness of the suggestion:
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attract at some distances but become a repulsive force at other distances, he suggests in Query 31,
just as numbers pass from positive to negative.285   The attribution of this duality to the electrical
force would pose an obstacle to unifying it with the gravitational force, which is only attractive,
and there is no indication that Newton expects to unify these two forces.  His aim in the Draft
Conclusion instead seems to be the same one expressed much earlier, in his Author's Preface to
the 1687 Principia and in his unpublished Conclusio (also written in 1687).  There, he hoped that
understanding the "lesser forces" holding among "insensible particles" would illuminate
phenomena other than gravity, and he treated the gravitational force not as something that could
be reduced to the lesser forces but as a basis for inferring their probable existence.286  His
discussion of the electric force decades later is consistent with that expectation.
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The propositions [from a draft for the General Scholium, Section IV, no. 8, MS.C, ibid., 355-364] are
Newton's last private thoughts upon the origin of the natural forces by which particles are moved and visible
phenomena occasioned, and they are very hard to interpret.  The electric spirit is the cause of cohesion, for it
causes a strong attraction between contiguous particles; at the same it causes repulsion at greater
distances....Newton appears to suggest that whereas in experiments in electricity large forces give rise to
conspicuous effects of attraction, repulsion and luminous discharge, in the minute world of material particles
electric forces might cause the invisible motions of the particles that are sensed as heat, light, or chemical
change.  But it is hard to understand how Newton could imagine that the electric force between particles
which is a force of attraction at microscopic distances could become a force of repulsion between bodies at
macroscopic distances, if that is what he means. (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 209.)
See also Hawes:
The accompanying experiment [to Proposition 5], 'On the solution of metals', is, of course, well known for its
postulate of attraction and repulsion between material particles.  The interesting point now seems to be, that
both particle attraction and repulsion, originate in electrical forces.  In other words, the particles of matter are
endowed with an electric force (evident without excitation by friction) which can be simultaneously attractive
and repulsive. Now, force duality concepts in the explanation of natural phenomena are not an innovation in
Newton's writings, for in the suppressed Conclusio, intended for publication in the 1687 edition of the
Principia, Newton writes concerning the immiscibility of oil and water as follows: 'There must be one force
whereby particles of oil attract each other, and another whereby they repel the particles of water'....Newton
has often incorporated the idea of one entity endowed with the double force of attraction and repulsion.
("Newton's Two Electricities", 127-128.)
285 Query 31, Opticks, 395.  Again, see the Halls' discussion of this passage, and also that of Boas, mentioned earlier in
note 266.
286  See the Author's Preface, written c. 1687: "Then the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea are
deduced from these forces, by propositions that are also mathematical.  If only we could derive the other phenomena of
nature from mechanical principles by the same kind of reasoning!"  (Principia, 382.)  See also the unpublished
Conclusio, written in the same period:  "There are, however, innumerable other local motions which on account of the
minuteness of the moving particles cannot be detected, such as the motions of the particles in hot bodies, in fermenting
bodies, in putrescent bodies, in growing bodies, in the organs of sensation and so forth.  If anyone shall have the good
fortune to discover all these, I might almost say that he will have laid bare the whole nature of bodies so far as the
mechanical causes are concerned....Nature is exceedingly simple and conformable to herself.  Whatever reasoning
holds for greater motions should hold for lesser ones as well.  The former depend upon the greater attractive force of
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The Nature of the Electric Spirit and the Question of Distant Action
It is difficult to tell whether Newton considers the electric spirit to be continuous or
particulate.  Some of his remarks about heat transfer might suggest a continuous spirit.
Hence also the heat of a body is most easily and most quickly propagated into contiguous
bodies.  For when the electric spirit that lies hidden in two bodies (a hot body and a cold
body) becomes continuous through the contact of the bodies, its vibrations in the hot
body will not be reflected at the common surface of the bodies but will be propagated
into the second body through the continuous spirit.287
Yet perhaps Newton's point here is not that the spirit itself is continuous, but that a cloud of the
particulate spirit surrounding one body may come to abut or intersect the cloud surrounding
another body.  For in Query 22 he refers to the electric spirit as being "rare and subtile", which is
to say having very fine particles288 and a very low density.289
Does Newton ever allow that particles that accelerate one another by the electric force are
acting distantly upon one another? That is, whatever the nature of the electric spirit may be, do
particles themselves possess the power to attract and does the electric force ever involve distant
action?  Some texts appear to imply that it does.   In Query 31, Newton writes, "Perhaps electrical
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
larger bodies, and I suspect that the latter depend upon the lesser forces, as yet unobserved, of insensible particles."
(Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 333.)
287 A Draft Conclusion to the Principia, Cohen, "Guide", 287.
288 Newton indicates that for a fluid to be 'subtle' is for it to be divided: "If the aether were a corporeal fluid entirely
without vacuous pores, however subtle its parts are made by division, it would be as dense as any other fluid." (De
Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 35.)
289 See Query 22: "An electrick Body can by Friction emit an Exhalation so rare and subtile, and yet so potent, as by its
Emission to cause no sensible Diminution of the weight of the electrick Body." (Opticks, 353.)  This unpublished
passage also suggests that the electric spirit is particulate, since it can be rarefied: "Friction may rarefy the [electric]
spirit, not of all the particles in the electric body, but of those which are on the outside of it." (ULC, Add. 3970, f. 235r,
an early draft for the last set of queries that Newton wrote, in McMullin, ibid., n.98.)  McMullin notes the disparity
between the passages suggesting a particulate electric spirit, and the General Scholium, which gives no such indication:
"In the General Scholium there is no hint of the electric spirit's itself being particulate….[but in Query 22] the
"exhalation" is represented in corporeal terms with some suggestion of its being particulate ('subtle' was most often
used to emphasize the small size of constituent particles).  Newton quite evidently moved easily from one to the other
model, which is not too surprising since he regarded them both as quite speculative." (Newton on Matter and Activity,
149.)
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Attraction may reach to such small distances [as escape Observation], even without being excited
by Friction."290  In draft material for the General Scholium, we find an elaboration of that thought.
As the System of the Sun, Planets and Comets is put in motion by the forces of gravity and
its parts persist in their motions, so also the smaller systems of bodies seem to be set in
motion by other forces and their particles to be moved among themselves in different ways,
and especially by the electric force.  For the particles of very many bodies seem to be
endowed with an electric force and to act upon each other at small distances even without
friction, and those which are most electric, through friction, emit a spirit to great distances,
by means of which straws and light bodies are now attracted, now repelled and now moved
in diverse ways.291
We might initially think that Newton is reasoning as follows:  If an emitted spirit conveys the
force with friction, yet the force acts over shorter distances without friction, then without friction
the particles may be acting upon one another without any intervening medium.292
Yet closer inspection of this and other texts indicates that Newton is not attributing the
attractive powers directly to material particles, nor asserting action without any medium.  The two
passages just quoted leave open the possibility that even without friction, it is the electric spirit
that communicates the force.  The absence of friction does not entail the absence of a medium,
thus Query 31's remark leaves the possibility of a medium open; and so does the longer draft
passage just quoted, for there Newton says only that the bodies seem to be endowed with an
electric force.  Moreover, in other texts Newton affirms this possibility; in the absence of friction,
it is still the electric spirit that communicates the force.  In the Draft Conclusion he writes, "the
                                                                 
290 Query 31, Opticks, 376.
291 Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 353-54.
292 Hawes argues that Newton accepts two distinct electric forces, one of which belongs directly to particles and
involves distant action by matter, without a medium: "It is to this draft of the Scholium Generale that we must look for
the source of the amendment to the 31st Query, as outlined above. [i.e., the additional phrase, "perhaps electrical
Attraction may reach to such small distances, even without being excited by Friction."]  But more important here, is
Newton's suggestion that the particles themselves possess an electric force which is effective over small distances and
is active without the medium of an electric spirit: for the latter spirit is only manifest when electric bodies are excited
by friction and when greater distances are involved....If, then, Newton has dispensed with the aether hypothesis for the
explanation of inter-particulate forces, he must now be supposing that these forces act at a distance, without the
operation of an intervening medium." ("Newton's Revival of the Aether Hypothesis and the Explanation of
Gravitational Attraction", 205-206.)  See also Hawes, "Newton's Two Electricities", 95, where she again emphasizes
two distinct kinds of electrical attraction.
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same spirit constantly attracts bodies at small distances from the electric body, even without
friction and heat".293  Later in the same text he indicates that the electric spirit is a medium
communicating the force.  The glass "abounds in an electric spirit"; this spirit "surrounds the
body" and is "diffused through" the body, even without friction.  Finally, in drafts that McGuire
identifies as versions of the new Opticks Queries,294 Newton suggests that friction does not cause
bodies to emit the electric spirit, but only causes the expansion of the spirit that already surrounds
the body: "that virtue may not be generated by friction but only expanded" (italics added).295
Despite initial appearances in Query 31, then, the electric force does not belong directly to
particles, but instead operates through the electric spirit.
The Aether
At various points in his investigations, Newton considers different aether hypotheses, and
often the aether is, like the electric spirit,296 an attempt to reduce many phenomena to the action
                                                                 
293 "That same spirit is also emitted from some bodies (as from electrum [i.e., amber] and adamant [i.e., the hardest
substance, diamond]) by heat alone without friction, and attracts small light bodies.  Furthermore, the same spirit
constantly attracts bodies at small distances from the electric body, even without friction and heat, for stagnant liquids
ascend in thin glass tubes immersed into them to their lowest parts, and do so in a vacuum just exactly as in open air."
(A Draft Conclusion to the Principia, Cohen, "Guide", 288; my italics.)
294 Queries 17-24 were written last and then inserted between versions of queries written earlier; see Westfall, Never at
Rest, 644.
295 The extended passage (U.L.C. Add. 3970, fol. 235v) appears in Westfall, Force, 394: "Quaest. 24.  May not the
forces by wch the small particles of bodies cohere & act upon one another at small distances for producing the above
mentioned phenomena of nature be electric? For altho electric bodies do not act at a sensible distance unless their virtue
be excited by friction, yet that virtue may not be generated by friction but only expanded.  For the particles of all bodies
abound with an electric spirit wch reaches not to any sensible distance from the particles unless agitated by friction or
by some other cause & rarified by the agitation.  And the friction may rarify the spirit not of all the particles in the
electric body but of those only wch are on the outside of it: so that the action of the particles of the body upon one
another for cohering & producing the above-mentioned phenomena may be vastly greater than that of the whole
electric body to attract at a sensible distance by friction.  And if there be such an universal electric spirit in bodies,
certainly it must very much influence the motions & actions of the particles of the bodies amongst one another, so that
without considering it, philosophers will never be able to give an account of the Phaenomena arising from those
motions & actions.  And so far as these phaenomena may be performed by the spirit wch causes electric attraction it is
unphilosophical to look for any other cause."
296 As noted earlier, some commentators take the electric spirit to be identical with the aether of at least some of
Newton's hypotheses.
132
of a single substance.297  In an early manuscript about alchemy, On Nature's Obvious Laws in
Vegetation (c.  1669), Newton suggests that an aether might explain fermentation (i.e., chemical
reactions298) and vegetative action; a "subtile spirit" might enter into the pores of bodies and
divide their parts.  At this early point, he does not attempt to explain light behavior in terms of an
aether, but instead suggests that the aether might be only "a vehicle to some more active spirit",
with light being one possibility for that more active spirit.  Later, in the Opticks' queries,
however, he casts the relationship between the aether and light the other way around, suggesting
that the aether may be responsible for light refraction and diffraction. (Historically, the aether
hypothesis would endure longest as an expected medium for light waves, however Newton thinks
light consists in particles.)  Cohesion might also be caused by an aether, Newton sometimes
speculates, writing in a drafted revision to Query 31, that the aether is an "agent in Nature" that
makes particles stick together.299  Finally, Newton provides two aethereal hypotheses for gravity.
The first of these two aethereal hypotheses about gravity is set out in the 1679 Letter to
Boyle, and thus well before the Principia's assertion that matter universally gravitates.  In the
letter, Newton tentatively suggests that gravitational effects are produced by an aether comprising
particles of varying size.  The finer particles are more apt to lodge in a body's pores than the
grosser particles, and the grosser particles move away from the Earth in order to make way for the
                                                                 
297 See McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 156.  See also Hall and Hall: "In De Aere et Aethere the particles of air
are, so to speak, active agents in phenomena in virtue of their intrinsic repulsive force.  In the Letter to Boyle, this is no
longer the case: particles of air or of other matter, even light-rays, are passively subjected to the force exerted by aether
particles, to which the intrinsic repulsive force has now been transferred.  Some economy of explanation is gained by
the change.  For instead of supposing that material particles are endowed with a variety of forces, gravitational,
chemical, electrical and so forth, it may be possible to reduce all these to one force in the aether—but unfortunately for
economy, Newton did not succeed in this.  On the other hand, there has necessarily been a multiplication of entities in a
fashion to invite the slash of Ockham's razor. One does not make much progress by supposing that repulsion between
material particles is caused by the repulsion between aetherial particles, for this leave the latter just as unexplained as
the former was previously." (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 189.)
298 Newton uses the term 'fermentation' to refer to chemical phenomena generally.  See Hesse, Forces and Fields, 154-
155.
299 "There are, therefore, agents in Nature able to make the particles of bodies attract one another very strongly to stick
together strongly by those attractions.  One of the agents may be the aether above-mentioned, whereby light is
refracted.  Another may be the agent or spirit which causes electrical attraction....And as there are still other  mediums
which may cause attractions such as are the magnetic effluvia, it is the business of experimental philosophy to find out
all these mediums with their properties." (ULC, Add. 3970, f. 622r, in McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 97.
McMullin identifies the passage as a revision of Query 31; ibid.
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finer particles; bodies above the Earth must move downward in order for this rearrangement to
take place.300   What is the nature of this aether?  Air and vapors, which comprise the atmosphere,
are material; these are "nothing else but the particles of all sorts of bodies, of which the earth
consists, separated from one another, and kept at a distance " by their tendency to recede from
one another.301   The 1679 aether is similar to air in at least two respects.   First, it is capable of
contraction and dilation; the difference is in degree, since it is more strongly elastic than air.
Second, it is material.  In the letter Newton writes that the aether is "much like air in all respects,
but far more subtle";302 and chapter two of De aere et aethere states explicitly that just as air
comprises particles broken away from bodies, the aether comprises broken particles of air.303
Moreover, prior to asserting the universal gravitation of matter, Newton has no reason to think
that an aether would be immaterial—but subsequent to that assertion he may, as I explain below.
The other aethereal hypothesis for gravitational effects is the one set out much later in
Query 21.  Like the aether of the Boyle letter, the Query 21 aether is particulate and very elastic.
But while the aether of the Boyle letter comprised particles of varying size, whose tendencies to
                                                                 
300  "I will set down one more conjecture....It is about the cause of gravity.  For this end I will suppose aether to consist
of parts differing from one another in subtlety by indefinite degrees: that in the pores of bodies there is less of the
grosser aether, in proportion to the finer, than in open spaces, and consequently that in the great body of the earth there
is much less of the grosser aether, in proportion to the finer, than in the regions of the air: and that yet the grosser aether
in the air affects the upper regions of the earth, and the finer aether in the earth the lower regions of the air, in such a
manner that from the top of the air to the surface of the earth, and again from the surface of the earth to the centre
thereof, the aether is insensibly finer and finer.  Imagine now any body suspended in the air, or lying on the earth, and
the aether being by the hypothesis grosser in the pores, which are in the upper parts of the body, than in those which are
in its lower parts, and that grosser aether being less apt to be lodged in those pores, than the finer aether below, it will
endeavour to get out and give way to the finer aether below, which cannot be without the bodies descending to make
room above for it to go out into." (Newton to Boyle, 28 February 1678/9, Philosophical Writings, 10.)
301 Newton to Boyle, ibid., 4.  A similar view of air and vapors may be found in Query 31.  There, Newton indicates
that they are produced as fine particles are shaken off of bodies; then as they become very small, they acquire a
tremendous repulsive power that produces the spring of the air: "That there is such a [repulsive] Virtue, seems to
…follow from the Emission of Light; the Ray so soon as it is shaken off from a shining Body by the vibrating Motion
of the parts of the Body, and gets beyond the reach of Attraction, being driven away with exceedingly great
Velocity....It seems also to follow from the production of Air and Vapour. The Particles when they are shaken off from
Bodies by Heat or Fermentation, so soon as they are beyond the reach of the Attraction of the Body, recede from it."
(Query 31, Opticks, 395.)
302 Newton to Boyle, 28 February 1678/9, Philosophical Writings, 1.
303 The Halls conclude that De aere et aethere was composed c. 1673-1675, and thus prior to the Boyle letter; see
Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 189.  Westfall, however, takes De aere et aethere to have been written
after the Boyle letter, as an attempt to systematize the thoughts expressed earlier in the Boyle letter.  See Westfall,
Force, 373 and 374 respectively concerning the dating and the nature of the aether.
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lodge in the pores of bodies varied according to size, this new aether comprises uniformly fine
particles.  These particles repel one another with a tremendous force, and extend in a density
gradient outward from the sun.304  The pressure from the density gradient pushes the planets
inward toward the sun, where the aether is rarer.
Qu.21.  Is not this Medium [the Aethereal Medium] much rarer within the dense Bodies
of the Sun, Stars, Planets and Comets, than in the empty celestial Spaces between them?
And in passing from them to great distances, doth it not grow denser and denser
perpetually, and thereby cause the gravity of those great Bodies towards one another, and
of their parts towards the Bodies; every Body endeavoring to go from the denser parts of
the Medium towards the rarer?  For if this Medium be rarer within the Sun's Body than at
its Surface, and rarer there than at the hundredth part of an Inch from its Body, and rarer
there than at the fiftieth part of an Inch from its Body, and rarer there than at the Orb of
Saturn; I see no reason why the Increase of density should stop any where, and not rather
be continued through all distances from the Sun to Saturn, and beyond.  And though this
Increase of density may at great distances be exceeding slow, yet if the elastick force of
this Medium be exceeding great, it may suffice to impel Bodies from the denser parts of
the Medium towards the rarer, with all that power which we call Gravity.  And that the
elastick force of this Medium is exceeding great, may be gather'd from the swiftness of
its Vibrations....As Attraction is stronger in small Magnets than in great ones in
proportion to their Bulk, and Gravity is greater in the Surfaces of small Planets than in
those of great ones in proportion to their bulk, and small Bodies are agitated much more
by electric attraction than great ones; so the smallness of the Rays of Light may
contribute very much to the power of the Agent by which they are refracted.  And so if
any one should suppose that Aether (like our Air) may contain Particles which endeavor
to recede from one another (for I do not know what this Aether is) and that its Particles
are exceedingly smaller than those of Air, or even than those of Light: The exceeding
smallness of its Particles may contribute to the greatness of the force by which those
Particles may recede from one another, and thereby make that Medium exceedingly more
rare and elastick than Air, and by consequence exceedingly less able to resist the motions
of Projectiles, and exceedingly more able to press upon gross Bodies, by endeavoring to
expand itself.305
                                                                 
304 This aether is not a "mechanical aether", such as the one that Richard Bentley rejects in his Seventh Boyle Lecture.
It bears more resemblance to a hypothesis discussed by Hooke.  In his Micrographia, Hooke asks "whether the
Phaenomena of gravity might not by this means be explained, by supposing the Globe of Earth, Water, and Air to be
included with a fluid, heterogeneous to all and each of them, so subtil as not only to be every where interspersed
through the Air (or rather the air through it), but to pervade the bodies of Glass, and even the closest Metals, by which
means it may endeavor to detrude all earthly bodies as far from it as it can; and partly thereby, and partly by other of its
properties, may move them towards the Center of the Earth." (Micrographia, quoted in Henry, "Occult Qualities and
the Experimental Philosophy", 347-48.) Commenting upon this passage, Henry remarks (ibid., 348), "This universal
incongruous subtle fluid may well have provided a model for Newton's aether speculations."  Henry also speaks of
Hooke's subtle fluid as having an "occult power of detrusion or repulsion", similar to the repulsive action in Newton's
aether.  This is not a flight of fancy, Henry writes, for Hooke had a "familiar exemplar of a fluid whose parts seemed to
detrude one another to a remarkable extent", namely air.  When placed in a Torricellian vacuum, a sheep's bladder
filled with air would expand to become taut.  "So began a major effort to understand the mysteries of the 'spring' of the
air." (Henry, ibid.)
305 Query 21, Opticks, 350-352.
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Most commentators deny that Newton intended this as a hypothesis to be seriously investigated
(for the purpose of hypotheses, Newton writes, is to "furnish experiments"306).  Since the
hypothesis has serious conceptual difficulties, some commentators argue that Newton probably
intended it only as a means of silencing his critics, who charged him with accepting action at a
distance.307   And the Halls argue that to suppose that Newton took the aether hypothesis seriously
is to suppose that he did not take the gravitational force to be real.308  Against this position,
Andrew Janiak argues that Newton was justified in thinking that his mathematical
characterization of gravity identified a real force, one with causal efficacy, even though he had
not discovered its physical characterization.  To note just one point of Janiak's argument, even if
gravity's physical characterization turned out to involve an aether, it would remain true that the
only salient variables in the accelerating bodies would be their masses and distance of
separation.309
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
306 Newton to Oldenburg, for Pardies, 10 June, 1672, Philosophical Transactions 85, 5014, quoted in Harper and
Smith, "Newton's New Way of Inquiry", 120.
307 See McGuire ("Force, Active Principles", 187) and Hawes ("Newton's Revival of the Aether Hypothesis and the
Explanation of Gravitational Attraction", 209-210); Hawes argues that Newton simply wished to end the disputes over
Leibniz's charges.  A dissenting voice come from Laudan, who argues that Newton did accept the aethereal
speculations of the Opticks.  Yet as McMullin notes (Newton on Matter and Activity, 151), Laudan's discussion of the
Opticks aether focuses upon optical and chemical phenomena, not upon the Query 21 hypothesis about gravitation.
308 See Hall and Hall:  "The main objection to wholehearted endorsement of the view that Newton was (at best) a
discreet aetherist, is the obvious fact that it makes a nonsense of the Principia and of all of that achievement in
mechanics for which Newton has been venerated above all.  For...if Newton meant what he said when he spoke of
forces in physics (in the Principia texts as printed, and in so many manuscript passages), then he was indeed
introducing a great new idea, analogous to and preparing the way for that of the field in nineteenth century physics.
The force concept introduced by Newton enabled him to transcend Cartesian, billiard-ball mechanism, the mechanism
of impact.  If particle A moves, it is not necessarily because it has been struck by particle B; it may be that a force
(which is gravitational, magnetic, electrical, or chemical in nature) has acted upon it. It was this second-order
mechanism that permitted Newton to extend the mathematization of physics so far, to construct celestial mechanics,
and to reestablish the void.  In fact it enabled Newton to reestablish atomism by returning to concepts closer to those of
Epicurus than was the corpuscularian mechanism of the Cartesians; it was precisely the addition of the idea of force
that made mathematical atomism feasible....Newton's late discovery of the true power of the law of gravitation—after
1680—was a blow to his aetherial hypotheses….With the law came the intersteller vacuum." ("Newton and the Theory
of Matter", Newton: Texts, Backgrounds, Commentaries 79-83.)
309 For this argument against the Halls' position, and a concomitant supposition that Newton did take Query 21's aether
hypothesis seriously, see Janiak, "Newton and the Reality of Force".
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It is difficult simply to dismiss Query 21's hypothesis as simply a method of silencing
critics. For one thing, it is difficult to dismiss any of Newton's published claims, given that he
was so cautious, holding so much back from publication and so carefully drafting and redrafting
what he did publish.  Additionally, it would leave Newton's reasons for including Query 21
unexplained.  Its hypothesis about gravity was unlikely to placate his critics, since instead of
doing away with action at a distance; it merely replaced long-range attractions among the celestial
bodies with shorter-range repulsions among the aethereal particles.310
Still, the hypothesis is at best extremely puzzling.  The difficulty is not that Newton is
explaining gravitational effects by surface action, as some commentators have suggested.311  The
hypothesis does not repudiate the General Scholium's remark that gravity acts in proportion to the
quantity of solid matter rather than in proportion to the bodies' surfaces.  To repudiate that claim
would require saying that the aether is stopped at the bodies' surfaces, but even though Newton
writes that the aether an "press upon gross bodies", he also writes that it penetrates the bodies'
pores.  So the hypothesis does not propose an operation by or proportional to surface action.  Yet
even so, it is difficult to see how the hypothesis could bear out the result that gravity is a function
of mass.  If we consider two planets, located at the same distance from the sun and having the
same volume but different densities, the denser one would have fewer pores; it therefore might
contain fewer aether particles (assuming for the moment that the aether particles could only be
lodged in the pores, as opposed to penetrating the hard particles of matter).  Without some
addition to the story, this denser and more massive planet would seem to be subject to a lesser
gravitational force, rather than the greater force expected in virtue of its greater mass.
                                                                 
310 If Newton did consider the hypothesis seriously, perhaps it is connected to Query 30's speculations about the
transformability of light and matter.  Could his long-standing speculations about such transformations be the source of
his speculation that as light diffuses, in an inverse-square relation, in proceeding outward from the sun, a density
gradient of aethereal particles increases?  The evidence seems too thin to pursue such questions, yet so long as they
persist it is difficult to dismiss Query 21 entirely.
311 See Hawes:  "The larger the surface area of the gravitating body, the greater the force that would act on it because of
the increase in the quantity of the surrounding aether." ("Newton's Revival of the Aether Hypothesis and the
Explanation of Gravitational Attraction", 210.)
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A further difficulty is that the density gradient does not account for universal gravitation.
By universal gravitation, accelerations should occur not only between, say, a pair of bodies lying
along the density gradient, such as the sun and the Earth, but also between a pair of bodies lying
perpendicular to the gradient.   If these bodies lying perpendicular to the gradient gravitate toward
one another, it is not in virtue of Query 21's density gradient, for that impels the bodies only
inward, toward the area of lesser aethereal density, not toward one another.  Might there be
additional gradients to explain these cases, in the manner of Descartes' minor vortices?  This is
difficult to conceive; since gravitation is universal, some gradient would be required between any
given pair of particles.  Another possibility is that the mutual accelerations of bodies not lying
along the gradient have a different cause than those lying along the gradient.  Yet it would be
quite unsatisfactory to invoke two distinct causes of gravitational phenomena.
It is also notable that Query 21's hypothesis does not do away with action at a distance,
since the aether is mostly empty space, and the aethereal particles repel one another.  It therefore
would not preserve the expectation that all causation is local, unless there existed a further,
continuous medium that caused the repulsions among the aethereal particles.  Yet if Newton were
to invoke a continuous medium at that level, to avoid distant action among the aethereal particles,
why not posit the continuous medium from the outset, without invoking an immaterial aether?
Without any further, continuous medium, the most that the Query 21 hypothesis could preserve is
the expectation that matter cannot act distantly.  To do that, however, one would need to hold that
the aethereal particles are not material.
One reason to hold that the aethereal particles, if they exist, are not material is this: to
explain gravitational effects via a material aether invites a regress.  For if the aethereal particles
are material, then by universal gravitation, they too must gravitate.  Some further substance must
then be invoked to explain the approach of the aethereal particles toward one another, but if it too
must be material, then it too will gravitate, requiring a further substance.   Newton was well
aware that regress would ensue, and in the first edition of the Principia used the consequence of a
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regress in arguments to show that one cannot explain gravitational effects by invoking an aether
that either lacks gravity or has a lesser tendency to gravitate, in proportion to its quantity of
matter.312  Might one try to block the regress by arguing that the aether particles have sufficient
repulsive force to counteract their gravitational tendency to approach one another?  No, for even
if the effects of the gravitational tendency of the particles to approach one another were obscured
by their repulsive force upon one another, the tendency itself would still require explanation.
To suppose an immaterial aether is also problematic, however.  Without matter's sensible
effects, such as resistance, it is difficult to see how an immaterial aether could have any basis in
the phenomena.  This is a problem I explore in detail in my final chapter.
Concluding Remarks
I have argued that despite Newton's expectation that matter is passive and unable to act
distantly, he does not attribute gravitational effects to primary causation.  He instead treats gravity
as a real physical force, and seeks the cause of gravitational effects in the natural order.  I have
also argued that despite initial appearances, we cannot conclude that Newton attributes active
powers of attraction or repulsion directly to the particles of matter, such that no intermediary is
                                                                 
312 For the 1713 edition of the Principia, Newton writes but ultimately does not publish a corollary setting out the
regress argument.  In all editions of the Principia, Corollary 1 to Proposition 6 of Book III states that the weights of
bodies depend only upon the quantity of matter, not upon forms or textures.  In the 1687 edition, Corollary 2 then states
that there cannot be a material aether, or any other matter, that either fails to gravitate or else gravitates less in virtue of
its form (and here Newton presumably means the fineness of its particles).  Newton's reasoning here depends upon a
hypothesis that he will eliminate for successive editions of the Principia (i.e., Hypothesis III, which states: "Every body
can be transformed into body of any other kind, and can assume successively all intermediate degrees of quality.")  In
accordance with the elimination of that hypothesis, Newton revises Corollary 2 for the 1713 edition, but the content of
the Corollary remains much the same.  Another revision—a further corollary that he writes but ultimately does not
include—states the regress argument about the aether.  Any attempt to explain gravitational effects by postulating a rare
material medium that lacks gravity or has a lesser gravitational tendency will end in a regress:
If anyone should deny these Hypotheses and have recourse to a third hypothesis, namely, that one admit some
matter with no gravity by which the gravity of the perceptible matter may be explained; it is necessary for him
to assert two kinds of solid particles which cannot be transmuted into one another: the one [kind] of denser
[particles] which are heavy (have gravity) in proportion to the quantity of matter, and out of which all matter
with gravity and consequently the whole perceptible world is compounded, and the other [kind] of less dense
particles which have to be the cause of the gravity of the denser ones but themselves have no gravity, lest their
gravity might have to be explained by a third kind and that (again by a fourth) and so on to infinity. (MS.
U.L.C. Add. 3965.6, folio 267r; the passage appears in McGuire, "Transmutation and Immutability: Newton's
Doctrine of Physical Qualities", 264.)
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required for bodies to affect one another.  The possibility does remain though, in particular the
possibility that he attributes inessential active powers to matter, and I address that possibility in
the final chapter.   The electric spirit does not extend through the heavens, and is not a hypothesis
for the physical cause of gravitational effects.  The aether of the Query 21 is presented as such a
hypothesis, but as presented, it would not account for universal gravitation.  Concurrently, then,
Newton continues to explore the notion of some "active principles", which since they are not
substances will be considered in the next chapters.
The discussion of active principles will show just how pressing the problem about gravity
is.  Although in one respect the gravitational force stands alone, differing from the electrical and
magnetic forces in being only attractive, in another respect it is not sui generis.  Newton
speculates that nearly all the motion we observe is "new motion", that is, motion that is generated
by some active source.  Gravitational effects are just one kind in a vast class of new motions.
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CHAPTER V
NEW MOTION AND ACTIVE PRINCIPLES
Why does Newton suggest that the universe contains an active source of new motion, how are
active principles related to distance forces, and what might active principles be?
Impressed by what William Thomson would in the next century call "the universal
tendency in nature to the dissipation of mechanical energy"313, but lacking the concept of energy,
Newton writes in Query 31, "Motion is much more apt to be lost than got, and is always upon the
Decay."314  He goes on to argue that passive principles alone cannot explain the phenomena, and
that the universe must contain some sort of active principles—some generative source of new
motions.  Since these arguments are confined to one of the Opticks' queries, they have the status
of hypotheses, intended only "to furnish experiments".315  (This should be borne in mind, though
for convenience I often use phrases such as 'Newton argues' and 'Newton concludes'.)  Yet
Newton's tone is strikingly confident, and it is clear that he expects active principles to be
fundamental to the workings of nature.  In this chapter, I examine Newton's reasons for thinking
that the universe contains some generative source of new motion—some "active principles".  I
then examine the relationship between distance forces and active principles, and I ask what these
active principles might be.
                                                                 
313 William Thomson (the future Lord Kelvin), 1852, quoted in Price, Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point, 24.
314 Query 31, Opticks, 398.
315 As Newton wrote to Oldenburg (1672), hypotheses were valuable only "in so far as they may furnish experiments".
(Letter to Oldenburg, Newton's Philosophy of Nature: Selections from his Writings, 6.)
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THE ARGUMENT FOR NEW MOTION
Although Newton has a principle of conservation of motion, he does not have additional
concepts that might prevent him from concluding that the universe contains an active source of
new motion.  He does not share Descartes' metaphysically based belief that the universe's quantity
of motion must remain constant, nor does he have the principle of the conservation of angular
momentum or a concept of energy.   The concepts that he lacks are factors external to his
reasoning process, and a full discussion of them, in particular of energy, would lead us into the
complex debate about vis viva.  I focus instead upon the internal reasoning by which Newton
defends a belief in active principles.
The Principle of Conservation of Motion (Linear Momentum)
In developing his principle of the conservation of motion, Newton has Descartes' work on
collisions and motion to use as a foil or at least as a point of reference.  Descartes' incorrect laws
of collision must have been useful to Newton, for as clearly articulated claims, they could be
evaluated and overturned.316  Descartes also set out a principle that he derived from God's
immutable nature: that the quantity of motion in the universe remains constant.  Newton will
draw upon this principle but ultimately reject it, and I shall therefore distinguish Newton's own
principle of the conservation of motion from Descartes' principle by calling the latter 'the
principle of the preservation of motion'.  According to Descartes, a body can lose motion only by
transferring it to other bodies, and motion can no more be generated than lost (except insofar as
the entire universe is continually recreated by God317).  So as bodies collide with one another, the
quantity of motion remains constant.
                                                                 
316 See Herivel: "The laws of collision given by Descartes in Part II of his Principia were notoriously full of error.
Nevertheless they represented the first widely known published attack on the problem based on the notion of
momentum and its conservation, and as such would inevitably influenced Newton's approach, if only indirectly."
(Background, 52.)
317 As noted in chapter II, this position has led some commentators to attribute occasionalism to Descartes.  That view
is explored and opposed by Daniel Garber; see Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, especially 301-302.
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 Descartes construes motion in terms of speed and volume—speed because he does not
have the concept of vector quantities, and volume because he lacks the concept of mass.   Let us
suppose a universe comprising two identical bodies, which approach one another at equal speeds
and then come to a stop upon collision.  This supposition would conflict with Descartes' principle
of the preservation of motion.  If motion is a scalar quantity, the claim that the total quantity of
motion is preserved conflicts with the claim that there is a positive quantity of motion prior to the
collision but zero motion afterward.  So if one insists upon Descartes' principle of the
preservation of motion, one must conclude that in this two-body universe, the motion has not
been extinguished but only transferred, presumably to the level of unobservable bits of matter. In
our actual universe, which comprises many bodies, we observe a positive quantity of motion, and
by Descartes' principle, this scalar quantity motion of motion cannot be changed.  Motion can
only be transferred, so the universe cannot run down.
Newton, however, understands motion as the vector quantity that we know as 'linear
momentum'.  As Newton states in Definition 2 of the Principia, the quantity of motion is the
measure of motion arising "from the velocity and the quantity of matter jointly." Corollary 3 to
Law 3 indicates that velocity and thus motion is a vector quantity.
Corollary 3. The quantity of motion, which is determined by adding the motions made in
one direction and subtracting the motions made in the opposite direction, is not changed
by the action of bodies on one another.318
Corollary 4 then tells us that the center of gravity of a system is not changed by the actions of its
bodies upon one another.319
                                                                 
318 Principia, 420.
319 Corollary 4 appeared earlier as Law 4 in De Motu, the draft that served as the basis for the Principia.  See De Motu:
"Law 4.  By the mutual actions between bodies the common centre of gravity does not change its state of motion or
rest.  It follows from Law 2." (Background, 299.)
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Corollary 4. The common center of gravity of two or more bodies does not change its
state whether of motion or of rest as a result of the actions of the bodies upon one
another, and therefore the common center of gravity of all bodies acting upon one another
(excluding external actions and impediments) either is at rest or moves uniformly straight
forward.320
Because Newton understands velocity as a vector quantity, his principle of the conservation of
motion is crucially different from Descartes' preservation principle.  The supposition that the two
bodies mentioned in our earlier supposition come to a halt upon collision does not conflict with
Newton's principle of the conservation of motion.  Since velocity and thus momentum are vector
quantities, the total momentum of the system is zero both before and after collision.  So Newton's
principle is not by itself sufficient to guarantee that the universe will not run down.
In Query 31, Newton contests the related Cartesian claims that (a) a body can lose motion
only by transferring that motion to other bodies; and (b) the quantity of motion in the universe
remains constant. He first presents a thought experiment designed to show that motion can be lost
and gained, and he then presents cases involving collisions designed to show that motion decays.
Losses and Gains by the Composition of Motion: Query 31's Two-Globe Case
It is "very certain" from the composition of motions, Newton argues in Query 31, that the
quantity of motion in the world is not constant.  To show this, he presents the following thought
experiment, involving a system of two globes connected by a rod (a dumbbell), which rotates as
its center of gravity moves in a right line.  So it rotates while moving in absolute translation
across absolute space.
For from the various Composition of two Motions, it is very certain that there is not
always the same quantity of Motion in the world.  For if two Globes joined by a slender
Rod revolve about their common Centre of Gravity in an uniform Motion, while that
Centre moves on uniformly in a right Line drawn in the Plane of their circular Motion,
the Sum of the Motions of the two Globes, as often as the Globes are in the right Line
described by their common Centre of Gravity, will be bigger than the Sum of their
                                                                 
320 Principia, 421.
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Motions, when they are in a Line perpendicular to that right Line. By this Instance it
appears that Motion may be got or lost.321
This conclusion, that the quantity of motion is greater when the rod is aligned with the right line
motion than it is when perpendicular to it, has an interesting irony.  Much earlier, in De
Gravitatione, Newton leveled the following criticism as a reason to reject Descartes' doctrine of
relative motion: "It follows from the Cartesian doctrine that motion can be generated where there
is no force acting."322  Yet with Query 31's two-globe case, Newton seems to abjure that criticism;
since the result of a changing quantity of motion is generated by the composition of motions,
Newton implies that motion can be generated without force.
The case is puzzling for another reason: we cannot produce Newton's result of unequal
values for the two orientations if we take him to be performing a vector sum.  If we assume he is
performing a vector sum, the quantities of motion are equal for the two orientations of the rod.
(See Appendix for details.)  If, however, we suppose instead that Newton is performing a
numerical sum,323 first taking the magnitude of each globe's motion (momentum) and then adding
them, we do produce Newton's result. (See Appendix for details.)  The numerical sum is greater
when the rod connecting the globes lies with the right line of absolute translation rather than
perpendicular to it.
As the dumbbell rotates while moving along a right line, then, the quantity of motion
changes; motion is "got and lost".  The case therefore contests both of the Cartesian claims
                                                                 
321 Query 31, Opticks, 397-398.
322 See De Gravitatione: "It follows from the Cartesian doctrine that motion can be generated where there is no force
acting.  For example, if God should suddenly cause the spinning of our vortex to stop, without applying any force to the
earth which could stop it at the same time, Descartes would say that the earth is moving in a philosophical sense—on
account of its translation from the vicinity of the contiguous fluid—whereas before he said it was at rest, in the same
philosophical sense....It also follows from the same doctrine that God himself could not generate motion in some bodies
even though he impelled them with the greatest force.  For example, if God impelled the starry heaven together with all
the most remote part of creation with any very great force so as to cause it to revolve around the earth (suppose with a
diurnal motion): yet by this, according to Descartes, the earth alone and not the sky would be truly said to move (Part
III, article 38), as if it would be the same whether, with a tremendous force, he would cause the skies to turn from east
to west, or with a small force turn the earth in the opposite direction.  But who will suppose that the parts of the earth
endeavor to recede from its center on account only of a force impressed upon the heavens?" (Philosophical Writings,
18.)
323 I thank Lon Becker for suggesting this possibility.
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mentioned above.  Contra (b), the quantity of motion in the universe does not remain constant,
since contra (a), each globe loses motion at various points in the rotation, but does so without
communicating that motion to another body.  This result is consistent with that part of Newton's
Corollary 3 which states, "the quantity of motion...is not changed by the action of bodies on one
another", since the losses (and gains) of motion do not result from any action between the bodies.
They result from the "composition of two motions".
The notable point about the two-globe case is that Newton does have a means of
supporting rather than denying Descartes' claim that the quantity of motion in the universe
remains constant.  If he were inclined to accept that claim, he could support it by taking the vector
sum.324  Instead, he takes the numerical sum, and concludes that the universe's quantity of motion
is not constant.  This conclusion is especially striking because allowing that the quantity of
motion in the universe can change as a result of the composition of motions, rather than by a
force, makes him guilty of the same charge he leveled at Descartes much earlier, as noted above.
All of this suggests that Newton's expectation that the universe contains some active source of
new motion is very strong.
Losses of motion in collisions: the weakness of elasticity of solids
 As Newton understands the two-globe case, it tells against the previously mentioned
Cartesian claims that (a) a body can lose motion only by transferring that motion to other bodies;
and (b) the quantity of motion in the universe remains constant.  He continues his attack upon
these claims in the following passage.
                                                                 
324 Vis viva offers another means of emphasizing that which is constant. Newton does not address the vis viva debate,
and so he does not bring the developing concept of energy into his analysis.  If one makes use of Huygens and Leibniz's
vis viva— mv2 and thus kinetic energy but for the factor 1/2—there is no inequality between the right and perpendicular
orientations of the rotating dumbbell.  The controversy about vis viva began with Leibniz's work on collisions,
specifically with his 1686 publication in Acta Eruditorum of "A Brief Demonstration of a Notable Error of Descartes
and Others Concerning a Natural Law."  Leibniz noticed that the sums of bodies' vis viva, that is, mv2, is conserved in
elastic collisions.  This was a significant step toward a general principle of conservation of energy.   However, the
debate was complex and focused largely upon the question of whether the true measure of force was vis viva, or change
of momentum.  Newton became aware of the debate at some point following the first edition of the Principia, but did
not address it in later editions. On the history of the vis viva controversy, see George Smith: "The vis viva dispute: A
controversy at the dawn of dynamics", 31.
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But by reason of the Tenacity of Fluids, and Attrition of their Parts, and the Weakness of
Elasticity in Solids, Motion is much more apt to be lost than got, and is always on the
Decay.   For Bodies which are either absolutely hard, or so soft as to be void of Elasticity,
will not rebound from one another.  Impenetrability makes them only stop.  If two equal
Bodies meet directly in vacuo, they will by the Laws of Motion stop where they meet and
lose all their Motion, and remain in rest, unless they be elastick and receive some new
Motion from their Spring.  If they have so much Elasticity as suffices to make them re-
bound with a quarter, or half, or three quarters of the Force with which they come
together, they will lose three quarters, or half, or a quarter of their Motion.  And this may
be tried, by letting two equal Pendulums fall against one another from equal Heights.  If
the Pendulums be of Lead or soft Clay, they will lose all or almost all their Motions: If of
elastick Bodies, they will lose all but what they recover from their Elasticity.  If it be said,
that they can lose no Motion but what they communicate to other Bodies, the
consequence is, that in vacuo they can lose no Motion, but when they meet they must go
on and penetrate one another's Dimensions.325
Here Newton mentions several causes of the decay of motion, including the weakness of
elasticity in collisions, and he concludes the passage with the following argument against the
above-noted Cartesian claim (a).  If the Cartesians were correct in saying that a body loses only
the motion that it communicates to other bodies, then colliding bodies that do not communicate
motion to one another should instead pass through one another.  Thus partially elastic bodies,
which lose some of their motion, should partially interpenetrate one another, and bodies that lose
all of their motion should fully interpenetrate, and then pass through one another.  Yet this does
not happen.  Colliding bodies that fail to communicate motion to one another do not pass through
one another; pendulums made of clay, for example, simply stop.  So contra the Cartesians, a body
can lose motion without communicating it to another body.  In the two-globe case, such losses
were a result of the composition of motions, but here the losses result from the weakness of
elasticity.
The case accords with Newton's principle of conservation of motion; in accordance with
Corollary 3, the pre- and post-collision momenta are equal.  But like the two-globe case, it does
not agree with Descartes' preservation principle, for the world is very different after the collision
                                                                 
325 Query 31, Opticks, 398.
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than it was before.  This is underscored in the cases of absolutely hard bodies, and bodies so soft
as to be void of elasticity,326 since prior to the collisions there was absolute motion, but afterward
there is absolute rest.  (I am disregarding, of course, the earth's motion, and that "bodies
commonly regarded as being at rest are not always truly at rest".327)  The tenacity of fluids
accounts for further decay of motion.328 With enough such cases, the world would run down,
absent anything to provide new motion, and this is the claim toward which Newton is heading.
Yet just as in the two-globe case, Newton could avoid the conclusion that motion decays,
if he were so inclined.  If he hoped to preserve Descartes' claim that the quantity of motion in the
universe remains constant, he could speculate that the losses of motion from friction and
collisions are only apparent.  In reality, he could argue, motion lost at the macro level has simply
been transferred to the micro level, as heat.   Such an argument had precedents, for instance in
Boyle.329  Yet Newton does not take that path, and instead associates heat with forces that appear
to act at a distance, and concomitantly with active principles.
                                                                 
326 Bodies that are hard but not perfectly so are elastic, as is evident in the following passage from the Conclusio:  "Just
as that vibratory motion of which sound consists is as well propagated through wood and other long solid bodies by
transmission through their contiguous parts as through air by transmission through the forces of non-contiguous
particles; so the vibratory motion of which heat possibly consists can be propagated as well through the forces of non-
contiguous parts as through the impulses of contiguous ones.  For all bodies when they have become sufficiently hard
are elastic and hence, as it seems to me, if fluids are composed of hard particles these also will be elastic." (Conclusio,
c. 1687, in Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 346-47)  However, Newton classifies the idealized case of
perfectly hard bodies together with soft bodies.  Both, he indicates in Query 31, will fail to rebound, which is to say that
they are inelastic. Wilson Scott and Christian Boudri have argued that Newton's definition of hardness as an inability to
rebound weighed against acceptance of the view that mv2, known as vis viva, was conserved, and thus hindered
progress toward a principle of conservation of kinetic energy.  See Scott, The Conflict between Atomism and
Conservation Theory (1644-1860). See also Christian Boudri, What was Mechanical about Mechanics?  The Concept
of Force between Metaphysics and Mechanics from Newton to Lagrange, 105-106
327 Philosophical Writings, 60.
328 "If three equal round Vessels be filled, the one with Water, the other with Oil, the third with molten Pitch, and the
Liquors be stirred about alike to give them a vortical Motion; the Pitch by its Tenacity will lose its Motion quickly, the
oil being less tenacious will keep it longer, and the Water being less tenacious will keep it longest, but yet will lose it in
a short time.  Whence it is easy to understand, that if many contiguous Vortices of molten Pitch were each of them as
large as those which some suppose to revolve about the Sun and fix'd Stars, yet these and all their Parts would, by their
Tenacity and Stiffness, communicate their Motion to one another till they all rested among themselves.  Vortices of Oil
or Water, or some fluider Matter, might continue longer in Motion; but unless the Matter were void of all Tenacity and
Attrition of Parts, and Communication of Motion, (which is not to be supposed,) the Motion would constantly decay."
(Query 31, Opticks, 398-399.)
329 See Boas, citing Boyle:  "He noted that, 'When a hammer striking on a nail, makes the head of it grow hot, the
hammer is but a purely mechanical agent, and works by local motion' ([Boyle], 209).  But the hammer did not make the
nail grow hot as long as its force served to drive the nail into the wall; it was only when the nail itself could no longer
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Now admittedly, in considering heat and heat transfer, Newton does suggest that heat is
the vibrating motion of particles.  In Query 5, for instance, he writes that light upon bodies "puts
their parts into a vibrating motion wherein heat consists."330  However, Newton also clearly
associates heat with activity.  According to Query 30, light is the source of a great deal of
activity, and the emission of light by heated bodies is offered as evidence of this.331  Moreover, he
long ago began trying to explain heat transfer in terms of distance forces.  In the unpublished,
1687 Conclusio, he suggests that while the vibrations constituting heat may be transferred among
contiguous particles by impulse, they are transferred among non-contiguous particles by forces:
Just as that vibratory motion of which sound consists is as well propagated through wood
and other long solid bodies by transmission through their contiguous parts as through air
by transmission through the forces of non-contiguous particles; so the vibratory motion of
which heat possibly consists can be propagated as well through the forces of non-
contiguous parts as through the impulses of contiguous ones.  For all bodies when they
have become sufficiently hard are elastic and hence, as it seems to me, if fluids are
composed of hard particles these also will be elastic.332
Much later, in Query 18 of the Opticks, he suggests that heat is transferred by an aether, and since
the aether of the Opticks operates by repulsive forces, he is again associating heat with distance
forces.333  It seems then that Newton does not consider heat transfer as a means of avoiding the
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
move that the force of the hammer, now moving the particles composing the nail, made the nail grow hot." ("The
Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy", 471.)
330 See for instance, Query 5: "Do not Bodies and Light act mutually upon one another....Light upon Bodies for heating
them, and putting their parts into a vibrating motion wherein heat consists?" Also, in Query 28, Newton writes, "A
dense fluid [i.e., such as the Cartesians propose] can be of no use for explaining the Phaenomena of Nature, the
Motions of the Planets and Comets being better explain'd without it.  It serves only to disturb and retard the Motions of
those great Bodies, and make the Frame of Nature languish: And in the Pores of Bodies, it serves only to stop the
vibrating Motions of their Parts, wherein their Heat and Activity consists." (Opticks, 368.)
331 "Are not gross Bodies and Light convertible into one another, and may not Bodies receive much of their Activity
from the Particles of Light which enter into their Composition?  For all fixed Bodies being heated emit Light so long as
they continue sufficiently hot, and Light mutually stops in Bodies as often as its Rays strike upon their Parts, as we
shew'd above.  I know no Body less apt to shine than Water; and yet Water by frequent Distillations changes into fix'd
Earth, as Mr. Boyle has try'd; and then this Earth being enabled to endure a sufficient Heat, shines by Heat like other
Bodies." (Query 30, Opticks, 374.)
332 Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 346-47.
333 "Is not the Heat of the warm Room convey'd through the Vacuum by the Vibrations of a much subtiler Medium than
Air, which after the Air was drawn out remained in the Vacuum?  And is not this Medium the same with that Medium
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acceptance of active principles, because he has already associated heat with activity and with
distance forces.  So just as in the two-globe case, Newton passes up opportunities to deny that
motion is genuinely lost, and thus to deny the existence of new motion.
The Inference to a Generative Source of New Motion
Unlike the two-globe case, cases involving collisions and friction do not have a built-in
means of compensating losses of motion with gains.  In the two-globe cases, there was a cycle of
losses and gains in motion, both explained by the composition of motions.  The cases of
collisions and friction produce only the decay of motion, which means that if lost motion is to be
replenished by new motion, that new motion must have some independent source.  Newton
argues in Query 31 that the source of this new motion cannot be the "passive principles" by which
bodies persist in their state, receive motion in proportion to impressed forces, and resist as much
as they are resisted.  In other words, the source of new motion cannot be the three laws of motion.
There must be some further principle that both produces and conserves motion.
Nature will be very conformable to herself and very simple, performing all the great
Motions of the heavenly Bodies by the Attraction of Gravity which intercedes those
Bodies, and almost all the small ones of their Particles by some other attractive and
repelling Powers which intercede the Particles.  The Vis inertiae is a passive Principle by
which bodies persist in their Motion or Rest, receive Motion in proportion to the Force
impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted.  By this Principle alone there never
could have been any Motion in the World.  Some other Principle was necessary for
putting bodies into Motion; and now they are in Motion, some other Principle is
necessary for conserving the Motion.334
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
by which Light is refracted and reflected, and by whose Vibrations Light communicates Heat to Bodies, and is put into
Fits of easy Reflexion and easy Transmission?  And do not the Vibrations of this Medium in hot Bodies contribute to
the intenseness and duration of their Heat?  And do not hot Bodies communicate their Heat to contiguous cold ones, by
the Vibrations of this Medium propagated from them into the cold ones?  And is not this Medium exceedingly more
rare and subtile than the Air, and exceedingly more elastick and active?  And doth it not really pervade all Bodies?
And is it not (by its elastick force) expanded through all the Heavens?" (Query 18, Opticks, 348-49.)
334 Query 31, Opticks, 397.
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As the passage continues, Newton calls these further principles "active principles", and he
attributes a vast and diverse class of phenomena to them.
Seeing therefore the variety of Motion which we find in the World is always decreasing,
there is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it by active Principles, such as are the
cause of Gravity, by which Planets and Comets keep their Motions in their Orbs, and
Bodies acquire great Motion in falling; and the cause of Fermentation, by which the
Heart and Blood of Animals are kept in perpetual Motion and Heat; the inward Parts of
the Earth are constantly warm'd...and the Sun continues violently hot and lucid, and
warms all things by his Light.  For we meet with very little Motion in the World, besides
what is owing to these active Principles.  And if it were not for these Principles, the
Bodies of the Earth, Planets, Comets, Sun, and all things in them, would grow cold and
freeze, and become inactive Masses; and all Putrefaction, Generation, Vegetation and
Life would cease, and the Planets and Comets would not remain in their Orbs....It seems
to me farther, that these particles have not only a Vis inertiae, accompanied with such
passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that Force, but also that they are moved
by certain active Principles, such as is that of Gravity, that which causes Fermentation,
and the Cohesion of Bodies."335
What exactly does Newton mean by saying that we meet with very little motion except
that due to active principles?  I take up this question in my final chapter.  There, I argue that
Newton does not expect the scope of the collision model merely to be reduced.   In Cartesian
systems, which have come to be known as the orthodox mechanical philosophy, collisions served
as the model for causal interactions among material bodies.  Motion could be transferred in
collisions, but could not be generated and destroyed; and these collisions were assumed to operate
by contact action.   I will argue that Newton's departure from this mechanical philosophy is more
radical than has previously been recognized, because his speculations about collisions indicate
that he expects even these to operate by distance forces, force that, whatever their causal story
may be, do not act by material contact.   Indeed, I will argue, Newton expects all motions other
than the absolute translations caused by the vis inertiae to be due to active principles.  At the
moment, however, I turn to the question of what these active principles might be.
                                                                 
335 Query 31, Opticks, 399-401.
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ACTIVE PRINCIPLES
Newton's speculations about active principles begin at an early point.  Although he is
strongly influenced by the Cartesian mechanical philosophy, which attempted to eliminate
animistic elements from the material world, mechanical explanations in terms of surface impacts
had difficulty with a range of phenomena.  Not only did vortex theories, which were based upon
the impact model, founder with Kepler's laws, comets, and the proportionality of gravity to mass
rather than surface area, the impact model seemed inapplicable to magnetic effects, the cohesion
of bodies, and the spring of the air.  (For it was known that a sheep's bladder filled with air would
expand once placed in a vacuum, indicating that the air particles endeavor to recede from one
another.)  Even more difficult to reconcile with the reduction of all material processes to surface
impacts were biological processes and chemical reactions, which do not appear to operate by a
Cartesian-style transfer of motion.  The strongest adherents of the orthodox mechanical
philosophy were typically those who did not attempt to solve the riddles of biological and
chemical processes. And when orthodox mechanical philosophers did apply themselves to such
problems, they often turned to disguised animistic elements, as Westfall has observed.336  Newton
attempts to understand chemical and biological phenomena, and in doing so he invokes active
principles directly.  In doing so, he is influenced by several sources.  These include the
alchemical treatises that he studied carefully in his early years and also the neo-Platonist ideas of
Henry More and Ralph Cudworth.337   Newton is also familiar with the view, developed by some
elder English thinkers and articulated most clearly by legal theoretician Mathew Hale, that matter
has some inessential active powers.338  That view implies that matter can act distantly, and I shall
                                                                 
336 As an example, Westfall mentions John Mayow's theory:  "His nitro-aerial particles were the source of all activity in
nature—of animal life, animal motion, vegetable life, elasticity, and much else.  Without facing the question of what an
active principle could be in a mechanical universe, he had merely tricked it out in a particulate costume and deluded
himself that the issue was solved." (Force, 367.)
337 See McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 204; see also McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 43-44.
338 Concerning the influence of Hale and Charleton on Newton, see Henry, "Occult Qualities and the Experimental
Philosophy"; see also Westfall, "The foundations of Newton's philosophy of Nature", 171-82.
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address it in my final chapter.  Here I focus upon the influences from Cudworth and from
alchemy.
In the early stages of his thought, Newton's ideas about active principles focus upon a
search for active substances.  Later, distance forces come to dominate his understanding of
natural phenomena, and he connects active principles to these distance forces.  The search for an
active substance continues, however, for as Newton writes in another context, "action requires
substance".339 The effort to provide a causal story for distance forces is thus an effort to discover
which substances communicate the action and how they do so.  As Newton attempts to discover
what active principles might be, his thoughts remain extremely speculative, as we shall see.
Early Influences: Cudworth's Plastick Natures
In his True Intellectual System of the Universe, Cudworth reacts against a number of views
he considers atheistic, including that of Thomas Hobbes, which allows matter to have life.  His
own account of natural phenomena sharply distinguishes passive matter from active spirit, soul or
life.  Contrasting passive and active powers, he writes,
To the latter of which belongs both cogitation, and the power of moving matter, whether by
express consciousness or no.  Both of which together may be called by one general name
of life; so that they made these two general heads of being or entity, passive matter or bulk,
and self-activity or life.  The former of these was commonly called by the ancients…'that
which suffers and receives' and the latter…'the active principle'.340
Motions and other changes in matter are produced as living or active principles act upon it.
Matter, being passive, is lower in the chain of being than are all of the active principles or spirits
that Cudworth classifies together under the name 'life'.  This category includes not only God and
minds, but also an immaterial "plastick nature" to which Cudworth attributes all the mundane
                                                                 
339 General Scholium, Principia, 941.  In the General Scholium, Newton contests the prevailing view that God is only
virtually present throughout space, arguing that since action requires substance, God is also substantially present
throughout space.
340 Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, quoted in McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 204.
155
workings of the created world.  Cudworth employs this plastick nature as a means of explaining
natural phenomena while avoiding both the Scylla of Hobbes and the Charybdis of occasionalism.
Hobbes allows matter to be alive, and that atheistic path is to be avoided.  So too is
occasionalism, a doctrine holding that only God can be truly active, and thus that God directly
causes each event in the universe.   Cudworth takes occasionalism to be unseemly for the deity; as
Descartes remarked, we should not believe that God "employs his own hands…to hurl lightning
upon rocks".341   So Cudworth's plastick nature is not identical to God's will. It is instead
something distinct from God, having been created by him to bring about mundane effects.
What exactly is this plastick nature?   Although it is a law, or set of laws, it is not
propositional.  It is not a verbal command.
The Laws or Commands of the Deity, concerning the Mundane Oeconomy (they being
really the same thing) ought not to be looked upon, neither as Verbal things, nor as mere
Will and Cognition in the Mind of God; but as an Energetical and Effectual Principle,
constituted by the Deity, for the bringing of decreed things to pass.342
The immaterial plastick nature is simultaneously a spirit that acts upon matter—as indicated by
the term 'immaterial'—and the laws governing the world.  Thus Cudworth does not take laws to
be verbal commands or descriptions, but in his time this was not surprising.  Whereas we now
take laws to be propositional, earlier conceptions differed.  Francis Bacon uses the term 'law' to
refer to a medieval concept of essence,343 and one of Leibniz's conceptions of a law is a
substance's internal principle of action, by which its changes are realized.  Cudworth takes the
plastick nature to be a law, but while Leibniz will locate such an efficacious power in each
substance, Cudworth, like Henry More, identifies the efficacious power as the immaterial spirit
                                                                 
341 Descartes, AT VI 231, translation by David Cunning, "Systematic Divergences in Malebranche and Cudworth",
345.
342 Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 161 and quoted in Cunning, op.cit., 353; Cunning also
refers the reader also to 150, 162, and 680-81 in Cudworth.
343 See Edgar Zilsel, "The Genesis of the Concept of Physical Law", 260-261.
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that acts upon matter. 344  So the plastick nature is a law without being propositional, and it is
efficacious without being identical to God's will.  It is an active, efficacious spirit that is distinct
from God, having been created to carry out the events that God wills.  Notably, this immaterial
spirit is not conscious.   Cudworth compares its action to habits, which are unthinkingly
performed.345
In asking whether Newton's search for a causal account of gravity and the speculative
distance forces was influenced by Cudworth, we can identify some broad similarities. Like
Cudworth, Newton tries to explain the mundane workings of the world in terms of secondary
rather than primary causation, and as we shall see, in one text Newton identifies active principles
with laws.  Newton also allows for non-perceiving, active substances that might be immaterial,
including the electric spirit, the aether, and possibly light (though these latter two, and especially
light, might after all be material.)  For both Newton and Cudworth, the expectation that matter is
passive motivates the speculations about active spirits.  Yet unlike Cudworth, Newton will not
preserve that belief by simply postulating the active spirit needed to do so.  He seeks instead to
derive his conclusions from the phenomena.
                                                                 
344 Henry More describes his Spirit of Nature as follows:  ""[It is] a substance incorporeal, but without Sense and
Animadversion, pervading the whole Matter of the Universe, and exercising a Plastical power therein according to the
sundry predispositions and occasions in the parts it works upon, raising such Phaenomena in the world, by directing the
parts of the Matter and their Motion, as cannot be resolved into mere Mechanical powers."  (The Immortality of the
Soul, II.12.1, 1662, and quoted in Steven Nadler, "Doctrines of Explanation", 533-534.)
345 In the following passages, Cudworth emphasizes that the plastick nature operates without consciousness or
intention.
[A plastic nature] is not Master of that Reason and Wisdom according to which it acts, nor does it properly
Intend those Ends which it acts for, nor indeed is it Expressly Conscious of what it doth, it not Knowing but
only Doing. (True Intellectual System of the Universe, 162).
But because this may seem strange at first sight, that Nature should be said to Act for the sake of ends, and
Regularly or Artificially, and yet be itself devoid of Knowledge and Understanding, we shall therefore
endeavour to persuade the Possibility, and facilitate the Belief of it, by some other Instances; and first by that
of Habits, particularly those Musical ones of Singing, Playing upon Instruments, and Dancing. (Ibid., 157).
[There is] no Reason, why this Plastick Nature (which is supposed to move Body Regularly and Artificially)
should be thought to be an Absolute Impossibility, since Habits do in like manner, Gradually Evolve
themselves, in a long Train or Series of Regular and Artificial Motions, readily prompting the doing of them,
without comprehending that Art or Reason by which they are directed. (Ibid., 157).
For these passages and Cunning's discussion, see "Systematic Divergences in Malebranche and Cudworth", 351.
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Early Influences: Alchemy
According to the alchemical treatises that Newton studied carefully, matter could be
transformed and activated by various animating principles or substances.  Neo-Platonism
similarly distinguished active and passive principles, as we saw earlier with Kepler, and
construed light as a source of activity.  Newton's early investigations with chemical phenomena,
light and heat, reflect the alchemy's tradition of active and passive principles, as well as the belief
that light is a generative source of activity.  In his 1669 manuscript, On Nature's Obvious Laws in
Vegetation, he suggests that the Earth is like an "inanimate vegetable" whose processes require
some subtle spirit or principle of vegetation that activates the "material soul" of matter.  An aether
is one candidate for this activating substance, but Newton also suggests that the aether might be
only a vehicle to a more active substance.  Given its connection with heat and necessity for
growth, that more active substance could be light.346  Later, in An Hypothesis Explaining the
Properties of Light, which Newton presented to the Royal Society in 1675, he again appeals to
active principles in connection with light and chemical phenomena.  In this early work, then,
active principles are associated only with substances, and not with the distance forces that later
dominate his natural philosophy.
                                                                 
346 "This Earth resembles a great animall or rather inanimate vegetable, draws in aethereall breath for its dayly
refreshment and vital ferment and transpires again with gross exhalations….This is the subtil spirit which searches the
most hiden recesses of all grosser matter which enters their smallest pores.…And thus perhaps a great part…of sensible
matter is nothing but Aether congealed and interwoven into various textures….Note that tis more probable the aether is
but a vehicle to some more active spirit….This spirit perhaps is the body of light 1 becaus both have a prodigious active
principle both are perpetuall workers 2 because all things may bee made to emit light by heat, 3 the same cause (heat)
banishes also the vitall principle.  4 Tis suitable with infinite wisdom not to multipy causes without necessity  5 Noe
heat is so pleasant and brigh as the suns, 6 light and heat have a mutual dependence on each other and noe generation
without heat.  heat is a necessary condition to light and vegetation. heate excites light and light and light excites heat,
heat excites the vegetable principle and that increaseth heat.  6 Noe substance soe indifferently, subtily and swiftly
pervades all things as light." (On Nature's Obvious Laws in Vegetation , c.  1669, Newton: Texts, Backgrounds,
Commentaries, 304-305.)
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The Association among Active Principles, Spirits, and Distance Forces
By the publication of the Principia in 1687, Newton's thought has been redirected toward
distance forces.  The connection between distance forces and active principles, however, is not
evident in the Principia because there his references to active principles are oblique.347  He
suggests that life on earth requires the vapor from comet tails,348 and that such vapors may be
transformed into salts and sulphurs, mud and clay, stones and other earthy substances.349  The
point about the transmutation of a comet's vapor, retained in all editions of the Principia, is an
instance of a more general hypothesis that appears in only the 1687 edition.  That more general
hypothesis is the afore-mentioned Hypothesis III,350 the suggestion that a body of any kind can be
transmuted into a body of any other kind, and Newton may be thinking that some active
substance is required for the transformation.  His ideas about this possibility are not transient;
while Hypothesis III would be eliminated by the 1713 edition of the Principia, a narrower claim
                                                                 
347 McGuire writes that active principles are discussed at the end of Book III in the first edition of the Principia.   He
seems to be referring to Newton's claim that the vapours from comets have a high degree of causal efficacy, that they
are required for nourishing vegetables and replenishing rivers, and can be transmuted into other substances by slow
heat, including water, salts, mud and stones.   This is indeed much less direct than the discussion one finds in the
Opticks.  However, McGuire speaks as though Newton discusses active principles more directly at the end of Book III
in the 1687 edition. (See "Transmutation and Immutability: Newton's Doctrine of Physical Qualities", 263 and 275-276,
where McGuire notes that the claims about comets supplying replenishing vapours that can be transmuted into other
substances is present in all editions of the Principia.)
348 This suggestion is reminiscent of Aristotle's belief that motion in the sublunary realm would cease if not for some
source in the superlunary realm.
349 Newton suggests in Book III, Proposition 41 that comets might supply the spirit needed for life on earth: "Just as the
seas are absolutely necessary for the constitution of this earth, so that vapors may be abundantly enough aroused from
them by the heat of the sun, which vapors either—being gathered into clouds—fall in rains and irrigate and nourish the
whole earth for the propagation of vegetables, or—being condensed in the cold peaks of mountains (as some
philosophize with good reason)—run down into springs and rivers; so for the conservation of the seas and fluids on the
planets, comets seem to be required, so that from the condensation of their exhalations and vapors, there can be a
continual supply and renewal of whatever liquid is consumed by vegetation and putrefaction and converted into dry
earth.  For all vegetables grow entirely from fluids and afterward, in great part, change into dry earth by putrefaction,
and slime is continually deposited from putrefied liquids.  Hence the bulk of dry earth is increased from day to day, and
fluids—if they did not have an outside source of increase—would have to decrease continually and finally to fail.
Further, I suspect that that spirit which is the smallest but most subtle and most excellent part of our air, and which is
required for the life of all things, comes chiefly from comets." (Principia, 926; see also 938.)
350 Again, Hypothesis III appears only in the 1687 edition of the Principia.  It asserts that all matter is the same, and so
any body can be transformed into a body of any other kind: "Every body can be transformed into a body of any other
kind whatever and endued successively with all the intermediate grades of qualities." The Conclusio, written c. 1687
for the Principia but suppressed, makes a similar claim: "The matter of all things is one and the same, which is
transmuted into countless things by the operation of nature." Both passages appear in Westfall, Force, 388.
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about transmutability would appear in Query 30 of the Opticks,351 now paired with a claim about
activity. Thus Query 30 begins by asking, "Are not gross Bodies and Light convertible into one
another, and may not Bodies receive much of their Activity from the Particles of Light which
enter into their Composition?"352  But while the association between light and activity persists,
Newton does not associate activity exclusively with light.  This is not surprising, since light is a
poor candidate for explaining some new motions, in particular gravitational effects, which depend
upon mass rather than light distribution.353  Increasingly, Newton associates activity with distance
forces.
Now, active powers and distant action are conceptually distinct.  There is no conceptual
obstacle to supposing, for instance, that two entities possessing active powers could affect one
another while contiguous.  There is nothing incoherent, for instance, about the hypothesis that
certain chemicals have active powers, that when combined, their parts become contiguous, and
that upon becoming contiguous these parts generate new motion in one another, producing an
explosion.  And in any case, there is no indication that Newton amasses conceptual reasons for
associating active principles with distance forces (nor would we expect such reasons.)  The
association between active principles and distance forces instead arises as Newton's investigations
lead him to conjecture that in fact, nearly all motion is new motion, that is, motion due to active
principles; and in fact, nearly all phenomena are due to distance forces rather than to material
contact.
                                                                 
351 "Are not gross Bodies and Light convertible into one another, and may not Bodies receive much of their Activity
from the Particles of Light which enter into their Composition?  For all fixed Bodies being heated emit Light so long as
they continue sufficiently hot, and Light mutually stops in Bodies as often as its Rays strike upon their Parts, as we
shew'd above.  I know no Body less apt to shine than Water; and yet Water by frequent Distillations changes into fix'd
Earth, as Mr. Boyle has try'd; and then this Earth being enabled to endure a sufficient Heat, shines by Heat like other
Bodies.  The changing of Bodies into Light, and Light into Bodies, is very conformable to the Course of Nature, which
seems delighted with Transmutations.  Water, which is a very fluid tasteless Salt, she changes by Heat into Vapour,
which is a sort of Air." (Query 30, Opticks, 374.)
352 Ibid.
353 Cohen makes this point in his "Guide", while McMullin disagrees, claiming that light was one of Newton's four
explanatory models for gravitational phenomena; see Newton on Matter and Activity, 79.
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The connection between active principles and distance forces is evident in Query 31.
Indeed, two of its related goals are to propose that phenomena such as cohesion and chemical
reactions are produced by distance forces operating between the particles of matter, and that most
motion is due to active principles.  These ideas, as published in the 1717/18 Opticks, reach back
to the Principia period or earlier.  This is evident from Query 31's roots; an earlier version of it
appeared as Query 23 of the 1706 Optice, and that version in turn had a predecessor, composed c.
1687.  The connection between active principles and distance forces is also evident in the draft
Conclusio for the Principia, composed c. 1687 but ultimately unpublished.  "There are
innumerable other local motions", Newton suggests in the Conclusio, that cannot be detected due
to "the minuteness of the moving particles".354  These local motions, he continues, may be the
source of fermentation (chemical phenomena), growth and putrescence, and sensation—the same
phenomena that Query 31 attributes to active principles.  How do these local motions work?
Although Newton cannot provide the details, he suggests in the Conclusio that they operate by
distance forces: "Whatever reasoning holds for greater motions should hold for lesser ones as
well.  The former depend upon the greater attractive force of larger bodies, and I suspect that the
latter depend upon the lesser forces, as yet unobserved, of insensible particles."355   If contact
action is associated with passivity, then, distance forces are associated with activity.
What Might Active Principles Be?
What might these active principles be?  In trying to answer this question, we might first
consider the phrase itself, 'active principle'.  The term 'active' tells us that they generate new
                                                                 
354 Conclusio, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 333.
355 "There are, however, innumerable other local motions which on account of the minuteness of the moving particles
cannot be detected, such as the motions of the particles in hot bodies, in fermenting bodies, in putrescent bodies, in
growing bodies, in the organs of sensation and so forth.  If anyone shall have the good fortune to discover all these, I
might almost say that he will have laid bare the whole nature of bodies so far as the mechanical causes are
concerned....Nature is exceedingly simple and conformable to herself.  Whatever reasoning holds for greater motions
should hold for lesser ones as well.  The former depend upon the greater attractive force of larger bodies, and I suspect
that the latter depend upon the lesser forces, as yet unobserved, of insensible particles." (Draft of Conclusio for
Principia I, c. 1687, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 333.)
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motion, as opposed to transferring motion from one body to another.  The term 'principle' does
not provide much guidance, however, for it is notoriously vague.  For the ancients, 'principle'
could mean a source, a destination, or a fundamental constituent, which is to say a material cause.
In Newton's time, the term might refer to a proposition, but might also refer either to a material
cause or fundamental constituent, or to a fundamental cause of phenomena.356  Probably the term
'principle' is serviceable to Newton in part because it is equivocal, and therefore can be applied to
an ill-formed concept.  As he writes in an unpublished draft of Query 31, he finds active
principles and their means of affecting matter mysterious.
Without some other principle than the vis inertiae there could be no motion in the world.
(And what that Principle is & by (means of) laws it acts on matter is a mystery or how it
stands related to matter is difficult to explain).  And if there be another Principle of
motion there must be other laws of motion depending on that Principle.357
Yet he is confident in Query 31 that active principles exist.  Perhaps his remarks there suggest
some possibilities as to what they might be.
....It seems to me farther, that these particles have not only a Vis inertiae, accompanied
with such passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that Force, but also that they
are moved by certain active Principles, such as is that of Gravity, that which causes
Fermentation, and the Cohesion of Bodies. These Principles I consider, not as occult
Qualities, supposed to result from the specifick Forms of Things, but as general Laws of
Nature, by which the Things themselves are form'd; their Truth appearing to us by
                                                                 
356 In distinguishing these senses of 'principle', I am following McGuire, who writes, "In the late seventeenth century,
three traditional distinctions were still current: a principle could mean [(i)] something formulated or asserted:   [(ii)] the
primitive arche out of which all things were thought to originate: or  [(iii)] the primary cause of existing phenomena as,
for example, the "principles of matter and motion" celebrated in the mechanical philosophies. The second sense of the
term embodies the notion of being prior in time....The first sense ranged from primary truths and mathematical
propositions through normative expressions, to laws of nature. " (McGuire, "Force, Active Principles, 194)  McGuire
finds the first and third senses of the term in Query 31 and its predecessor, Query 23 of the 1706 Optice.  He goes on to
argue (ibid., 194-196) that in these texts Newton considered active principles to be natural agents, whereas prior to the
Optice he used 'active principle' to refer only to God.  I have opposed McGuire's view that Newton attributed
gravitational effects to God during that earlier period.
357 ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 620r.  McGuire dates this passage to 1705, and notes that it was written in English.
As the passage continues, Newton cites the mind's power to move the body as model of the active production of new
motion and continues with a vitalist speculation: "We cannot say that all nature is not alive."  By the published,
1717/18 version of Query 31, Newton has eliminated these vitalist connotations, but in the unpublished manuscript
remarks (quoted in McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 171), Newton's thinking about active principles shows the
continued influence of thinkers such as Cudworth.
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Phaenomena, though their Causes be not yet discover'd.  For these are manifest Qualities,
and their Causes only are occult. And the Aristotelians gave the Name of occult Qualities,
not to manifest Qualities, but to such Qualities only as they supposed to lie hid in Bodies,
and to be the unknown Causes of manifest Effects: Such as would be the Causes of
Gravity, and of magnetick and electrick Attractions, and of Fermentations, if we should
suppose that these Forces or Actions arose from Qualities unknown to us, and uncapable
of being discovered and made manifest....To tell us that every Species of Things is
endowed with an occult specifick Quality by which it acts and produces manifest Effects,
is to tell us nothing: But to derive two or three general Principles of Motion from
phaenomena, and afterwards to tell us how the Properties and Actions of all corporeal
Things follow from those manifest Principles, would be a very great step in Philosophy,
though the causes of those Principles were not yet discover'd: And therefore I scruple not
to propose the Principles of Motion above-mention'd, they being of very general Extent,
and leave their Causes to be found out.358
This passage suggests several ways of understanding active principles.  First, active principles
might be identical to distance forces. A central aim of Query 31 is to propose that forces
analogous to gravity may produce phenomena such as cohesion and fermentation.  As examples
of active principles, Newton cites gravity and these other forces; particles are moved by "certain
active principles, such as is that of gravity, and that which causes fermentation, and the cohesion
of bodies".  This suggests that active principles just are distance forces.  Second, active principles
might be identical to laws, for Newton considers these principles "as general laws of nature".
Third, active principles might be something that figures in the causal story of distance forces,
without being identical to the forces themselves.  This possibility arises from Newton's remark,
toward the end of the passage, that the causes of these manifest principles of motion have not yet
been discovered.  We could understand this to mean that something causes the active principles
that in turn cause the motions, and that our search is for the cause of the active principles.  Yet it
seems doubtful that this literal reading is what Newton has in mind.  After all, he has already said
that active principles are mysterious, and that they are causally efficacious.  So it seems that they,
and not their cause, are the objects of his search.  A better way to understand this remark, then, is
to suppose that the mysterious active principles figure in the causal story of distance forces,
which is the third possibility just noted.  Let us consider these possibilities in more detail.
                                                                 
358 Query 31, Opticks, 402.
163
Might active principles be identical to distance forces?  This possibility is suggested, as
mentioned above, by the examples Newton gives of active principles, namely, gravity and the
cause of cohesion. We might therefore think that active principles are only rationally distinct
from distance forces.  They are forces as we attend to their mathematical proportions, but active
principles as we attend to their causal means of action.  This suggestion respects De
Gravitatione's general definition of force as a causal principle of motion and rest, since according
to Newton's speculations, active principles are causally efficacious in producing new motions.359
Yet at best the identification is uncertain, for elsewhere we find Newton distinguishing between
forces and active principles. In a draft for the 1706 Optice, for example, he writes, "These Forces
may be reckoned among the laws of motion (& referred to an active principle) but whether they
depend on bodies alone may be a question."360  So here the forces are not identical to active
principles, but are rather "referred to" them.  In any case, to identify forces with active principles
would be uninformative.  The goal is to discover the causal means by which distance forces act,
and allowing that these forces also have the name 'active principles' does not provide any details
about the causal story.  We are still left with the question of which substances figure in producing
the effects attributed to distance forces, and how it all works.
The second possibility raised by the above quoted passage is that active principles are
identical to laws.  At one point, Newton writes that active principles are not "occult qualities", the
                                                                 
359 I suggested in chapter III that Newton might retain De Gravitatione's general definition of force, however there are
difficulties with that suggestion, as a note in that earlier chapter indicates.  As Andrew Janiak pointed out to me, one
might object to the suggestion on the grounds that Newton did not have the concept of mass in De Gravitatione; and
that he is unlikely to retain a definition of force developed without the concept of mass.  This objection merits further
investigation.  It also raises further questions, generated by questions about the concept of mass.  If mass is resistance,
for instance, as characterized by the three laws of motion, then Newton has made some steps toward a concept of mass
by De Gravitatione, simply in virtue of sharing the widely acknowledged view of matter as resistive.
360 In a draft for the 1706 Optice, Newton identifies forces with laws, and then writes that these may be "referred to an
active principle". He writes,  "I have hitherto been arguing from the effects to their causes & carried the argument (as
high as) up to certain forces (the powers) by wch little bodies act on one another at small distances.  These Forces may
be reckoned among the laws of motion (&referred to an active principle) but whether they depend on bodies alone may
be a question."  (ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 620r, quoted by McGuire "Force, Active Principles", 170-171; McGuire notes
that these variants were written in English.)
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ad hoc tendencies that the Aristotelians assigned to each kind of substance or object,361 but are
instead "general principles" that have been derived from the phenomena, and "general laws of
nature".  But what does Newton mean by saying that active principles are laws?  In identifying
active principles with laws, is he suggesting that laws are causally efficacious?   This depends
upon what he understood a law to be.  If a law is a description, then it is not the sort of thing to be
causally efficacious.  Contemporary dispositionalist accounts of laws, for instance, take laws
simply to express or describe the phenomena produced by the dispositions.  The causal efficacy
lies not in the laws, but in the dispositions of bodies or systems to behave in certain ways, as
copper is disposed to conduct electricity under certain conditions.
Yet not all conceptions of laws take them to be descriptions.  At least three alternative
conceptions of laws were available to Newton, all of which took laws to be causally efficacious.
First, one might conceive of the laws of nature as being only rationally distinct from God's will.
This is the sort of view one finds in Malebranche, at least on some commentators' interpretations.
According to Nicholas Jolley, the laws of nature are the propositional contents of God's volitions.
More specifically, the laws are God's general volitions or ideas, ideas that bear more resemblance
to Platonic forms than to Cartesian thoughts.362  Jolley intends this notion of general volitions to
construe laws as structural features of the created world, as opposed to individual divine desires,
even though they are ontologically indistinct from God and thus primary rather than secondary
causes.363   On this reading of Malebranche, God's general volitions applied to the initial
conditions created by God are sufficient to bring about events, and so the laws of nature are
causally efficacious.   This cannot be what Newton has in mind, however, when he writes that
active principles are laws of nature.  Gravity is one of Query 31's examples of active principles,
and as I argued earlier, Newton repeatedly treats the gravitational force as something that God
                                                                 
361 For a discussion of the many qualities introduced by the late Scholastics, see Nadler, "Doctrines of Explanation in
Late Scholasticism and in the Mechanical Philosophy", III-IV.
362 Jolley, "Occasionalism and Efficacious Laws in Malebranche", 255.
363 Ibid., 252.
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must oppose and hence as something that is ontologically distinct from God.  This same position
is evident in Query 31.
Now by the help of these Principles, all material Things seem to have been composed of
the hard and solid Particles above-mention'd, variously associated in the first Creation by
the Counsel of an intelligent Agent.  For it became him who created them to set them in
order.364
Here active principles are God's tools; it is "by the help of these principles" that God sets things in
order.  So the active principles associated with gravity and the forces causing fermentation and
cohesion are secondary causes.  They are not simply rationally distinct from God. They are really
distinct.
A second conception of causally efficacious laws takes them to be the essences or
internal principles belonging to matter, and thus to be only rationally distinct from matter.
According to Leibniz, who resurrects Aristotle's substantial forms, primary matter is passive; yet
matter as we know it is active, since God creates substances out of primary matter.  He does this
by impressing upon matter "a soul or a form analogous to a soul, or a first entelechy, that is, a
certain urge [nisus] or primitive force of acting, which itself is an inherent law".365  So a law is
not a description but is instead an internal essence.  The laws or essences of substances do not
causally interact with one another, according to Leibniz's doctrine of pre-established harmony; a
substance's changes do not follow from any "influx", that is, causal interactions with other things.
Instead, a substance's changes follow from "the inherent force and laws of its own nature".366  On
this view, then, laws are causally efficacious in virtue of being these active internal essences, and
                                                                 
364 Query 31, Opticks, 402.
365 Leibniz, "On Nature Itself", published in the September 1698 issue of the Acta Eruditorum and reprinted in
Philosophical Essays, 162-163.
366 Ibid., 161. Leibniz refers to his doctrine of pre-established harmony in the 1711 Letter to Hartsoeker that was
published in Memoirs of Literature.  (Newton's unpublished response, discussed earlier, does not mention the doctrine.)
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they are also genuine secondary causes. It is likely that this Leibnizean view was known to
Newton, since Clarke discusses it in his correspondence with Leibniz.367
Since Newton takes active principles to be secondary causes, the Leibnizean view is
congenial to him in this respect.  Yet the view is not congenial to Newton in another respect, as
we see by considering causal interactions among bodies.  Suppose for the moment that Newton
accepted the doctrine of pre-established harmony.  Doing so would undermine his relational
conception of the gravitational force.  If gravitating bodies did not causally interact, but instead
moved because of their internal principles, attraction would be two distinct actions instead of the
single, mutual action that Newton compares to the contraction of a rope.  And in any case,
Newton thinks that causal interactions among bodies are genuine.  What does a Leibnizean
conception of laws imply when combined with this realism about causal interactions?  To the
extent that we can make sense of the combination, it too implies that the gravitational force is not
a single mutual action, but is rather two distinct forces, one contained in each body.  And absent
any addition to the story, it also implies action at a distance, with each body attracting the other
across empty space, in virtue of its internal essence.  So the view that the laws are only rationally
distinct from matter is perhaps more alien to Newton than the view that they are only rationally
distinct from God.
Between the extremes of laws being in matter and laws being in God, there is a third
option for Newton—that suggested by Ralph Cudworth.   As we saw earlier, Cudworth identifies
laws with an immaterial plastick nature—an "energetical principle" or living spirit that causes the
mundane motions that God should not stoop to perform.  Since the laws as Cudworth conceives
them just are the immaterial plastick nature that causes mundane motions, they are causally
efficacious.  We already saw some points of resemblance between this view and Newton's ideas.
Cudworth's plastick spirit is active, immaterial, and non-perceiving, and Newton allows for such
                                                                 
367 See Alexander, Leibniz-Clarke.  I was unable to locate any explicit references to the view in Newton's own writings,
however Newton knew a good deal about Leibniz's views by the time of the priority dispute over calculus, c. 1708.
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spirits too.  His electric spirit is active and non-perceiving, and it is immaterial as well.  In saying
that only the magnetic force operates by contact—by the contact of material effluvia, that
is—Newton implied the electric spirit to be immaterial.  The aether, if it exists, is active and non-
perceiving, and though it might be material, it also might not. Although he clearly takes it to be
material in some texts, notably the pre-Principia manuscript, De aere et aethere, the Principia's
claim of universal gravitation creates pressure to say that if an aether exists and can explain
gravity, it must be immaterial on pain of regress.
Yet these similarities are thin, and Newton's discussion of laws does not follow
Cudworth.  Whereas Cudworth identifies his plastick spirit with the laws, Newton never identifies
any substance, such as the aether or the electric spirit (or light), with laws.  And while his remark
that active principles are general laws of nature suggests that the laws are causally
efficacious—active—elsewhere in Query 31 he distinguishes laws from causal efficacy.  In
explaining that he does not know how the attractions between spatially separated particles are
performed, he writes that we must first learn "the Laws and Properties of the Attraction, before
we enquire the Cause by which the Attraction is perform'd".368  So to learn the laws is not to
discover the attraction's causal story, which is to say that the causally efficacious active principles
are not the laws.
The third possibility mentioned for active principles is that they figure in the causal story
of distance forces without being identical to those forces.  If active principles are neither in matter
nor in God, perhaps they are the properties or powers of an immaterial substance.  But while
Cudworth is willing to postulate a spirit in order to preserve his principle that God does not
perform mundane tasks with his own hands, Newton is not willing to do the same in order to
preserve the metaphysical principles to which he is drawn.  In the closing chapter, I consider the
difficulties Newton faces in trying to discover the location of active powers, and this in trying to
discover gravity's causal story.
                                                                 
368 Query 31, Opticks, 376.
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CHAPTER VI
GRAVITY, METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, AND NEWTON'S
SUBSTANCE COUNTING PROBLEM
How do metaphysical principles intersect with Newton's empiricism to generate the problem
about gravity, and can that problem be solved?
Introduction
In the history of physics, metaphysical principles have seen changing fortunes.  Such
principles, which have intuitive appeal but cannot or else simply have not been adduced from
evidence, might function as explicit and absolute constraints upon a physical theory, or they
might serve merely as guidelines for interpretation.369  Today, metaphysical principles tend to
play the lesser role, with the principle of local causation, for instance, motivating some
interpretations of quantum mechanics.  Looking back to the time before physics had emerged
from natural philosophy, however, we often find metaphysical principles playing the greater role.
For Leibniz there can be no void because the perfection of the world implies a plenum, and for
Descartes, the preservation of motion is a metaphysical principle, derived from God's
                                                                 
369 When I speak of metaphysical principles, I mean to contrast them with empirically supported propositions.  This is
not the sense of the term 'metaphysical' that Newton employs in A Draft Conclusion to the Principia.  There, he holds
that a proposition may be part of both metaphysics, which was in his time understood either as the study of being qua
being, or as the study of that which is not physical, and physics; if it is derived from phenomena, it belongs to physics,
even if it is about something immaterial.  In this way, immaterial God can be part of natural philosophy, as Newton
says in the General Scholium that he is.  Thus the sense of 'metaphysical' that I have in mind is that which Newton
refers to as 'dreaming' in this passage from the Draft Conclusion: "What is taught in metaphysics, if it is derived from
divine revelation, is religion; if it is derived from phenomena through the five external senses, it pertains to physics
["ad Physicam pertinet"]; if it is derived from knowledge of the internal actions of our mind through the sense of
reflection, it is only philosophy about the human mind and its ideas as internal phenomena likewise pertain to physics.
To dispute about the objects of ideas except insofar as they are phenomena is dreaming.  In all philosophy we must
begin from phenomena and admit no principles of things, no causes, no explanations, except those which are
established through phenomena.  And although the whole of philosophy is not immediately evident, still it is better to
add something to our knowledge day by day than to fill up men's minds in advance with the preconceptions of
hypotheses."  (Unpublished Preface to the Principia, ULC MS Add. 3968, fol. 109, Cohen, "Guide", 54.)
171
immutability.  Indeed, Descartes assigns such principles their greatest power yet, deriving the
whole of physics from a metaphysics esteemed as the first philosophy.  With Newton, however,
matters are more complex.  Turning his back upon the Cartesian program, he famously writes that
he feigns no hypotheses, and he often evinces great confidence that the method of experimental
philosophy can by itself reveal the causal workings of the universe.  It is from the phenomena, his
preface to the Principia explains, that one discovers the forces of nature.  Yet the gravitational
force is a persistent problem for Newton.  His gravitational theory raises the spectre of matter
acting at a distance, with sun and planets attracting one another across empty space, yet as he
writes to theologian Richard Bentley, he considers such unmediated action absurd.
What exactly is so vexing to Newton about the gravitational force, and how do
metaphysical principles intersect with his empiricism370 to generate the problem?  I examine three
explanations of Newton's view of gravity, matter, and action at a distance, all of which suppose
that there is a genuine problem for him about the role of metaphysical principles in natural
philosophy.  That problem would dissolve if he drew a sharp line between physics and
metaphysics by attributing such troublesome phenomena as gravitational effects to God.  After
setting out the focal remarks from Newton's letters to Bentley, I therefore briefly present
considerations against that position.  I then turn to the three explanations.  According to the first
argument I examine, the gravitational force was in fact for Newton no problem at all; although he
denied that matter essentially possessed the power to attract across distances, he accepted it as an
                                                                 
370 When I speak of Newton's experimentalism or empiricism, I intend to contrast his approach to the a priori or
metaphysical approach to physics pursued by Descartes and Leibniz. Descartes derives the laws of nature from an a
priori understanding of God, and Leibniz derives the existence of a material vortex to explain gravitational effects from
his metaphysical principle that by their nature, bodies act only upon contiguous bodies by surface action. The laws of
nature that Descartes and Leibniz ground in metaphysical principles are not revisable, precisely because of that ground.
Newton, by contrast, claims to derive his laws and propositions from phenomena.  This is not to say that he fully frees
himself of metaphysical principles; I argue that certain metaphysical principles guide his physical investigations.  Nor
is it to say that his empiricism resembles that championed by the logical positivists, who attempted to take sense
experience as foundational and as independent of theory. Law 1, for instance, is not derived from perceptions of bodies
free of impressed forces, and the law of universal gravitation indicates that we encounter no such bodies.  In general,
the phenomena from which Newton derives his propositions could be termed theory-laden.  The point is that Newton
considers the laws and propositions he derives from phenomena to be revisable.  With Rule 4, Newton allows that
further investigation may reveal the need to make the propositions "more exact", or show that they are "liable to
exceptions"; and in his Author's Preface to the Principia, he allows for more dramatic revisions, writing that perhaps
his work will shed light on this mode of philosophizing, or upon "some truer one".
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inessential or superadded property, endowed upon matter by God.  Against this, I argue that
Newton's empiricism does not sit easily with this thesis of superaddition or its concomitant strong
sense of essential properties.  Still, even as Newton abstains from assertions about matter's
essence, he reveals some opinions, notably that matter cannot act where it is not.  Thus the closely
related second and third explanations I consider are that Newton accepts a general principle of
local causation, and that he accepts the principle that matter is passive.  Since he lacks empirical
warrant for these principles, they should serve only as guides as he searches for an immaterial
medium, hoping to locate the active principles he associates with gravitational effects outside of
matter.  Still, the principle of local causation exerts a strong influence in that it determines the
nature of the only available models for an inanimate immaterial medium, God and minds.  Is
there any means, however, of inferring the existence of such an immaterial substance as the
medium, and if there were, would it be possible to associate active powers with it rather than with
matter?  I argue that there would not.  I identify what I call 'Newton's Substance Counting
Problem' as the source of the difficulty, and I argue that as Newton conceives it, his problem of
finding a complete causal explanation of gravity is one that cannot be solved.
Two preliminary remarks are in order.  First, I use the term 'distance forces' to refer to
forces that appear to involve action at a distance, because they operate between spatially
separated bodies.  But while their mathematical expressions tell us the relations between bodies
as functions of distance, the causal means by which these forces operate is very much in question,
and I therefore intend the term 'distance force' to be neutral.  Second, Newton distinguishes
speculations and hypotheses from asserted propositions, that is, propositions he considers to be
derived from phenomena.  Texts such as the Principia and the body of the Opticks contain
asserted propositions, while hypotheses are confined to speculative writings.  Much of Newton's
discussion of the problem about gravity is to be found in his speculative writings, a class
including his unpublished manuscripts, the queries of the Opticks, and also his letters to Bentley,
to which I now turn.
173
Newton's Remarks to Bentley
Newton's most vehement remarks on the question of whether matter could act at a
distance are contained in his letters to theologian Richard Bentley, some five years after the
Principia's first edition.  The exchange between the two men was occasioned by Bentley's desire
to understand the central points of the Principia, for the late Robert Boyle had endowed a lecture
series in defense of the Christian faith, and Bentley was preparing to publish his aptly entitled
sermons, "A Confutation of Atheism from the Origin and Frame of the World".  Newton had
advised Bentley about which parts of the Principia to read.  Then in the epistolary exchange that
followed Bentley's oral delivery of his lectures, Newton replied to questions about the theological
implications of his view, and commented upon Bentley's draft of his Seventh Boyle Lecture,
which Bentley was preparing for publication. Thus the oral versions of Bentley's lectures precede
his correspondence with Newton, and his altered, published versions of those lectures follow that
correspondence.371   Bentley preserved all four of Newton's letters, but only one of Bentley's
letters is extant, that containing the abstract or draft of his seventh lecture.
It seems that in a letter that did not survive, Bentley misrepresented Newton's views on
gravity, and in his response, Newton protests; he denies knowing gravity's cause, and denies that
gravity is essential to matter.
                                                                 
371 The chronology of events (omitting mention of those letters of Bentley's that are not extant) is as follows.
     November, 1692: Bentley delivers some version of what is later published as his 7th Lecture.
     December 5, 1692: Bentley delivers some version of what is later published as his 8th Lecture.
     December 10, 1692: Newton's first letter to Bentley.
     January 17, 1692/3: Newton's second letter to Bentley, asserting that gravity is not essential to matter.
     February 11, 1692/3: Newton's third letter to Bentley.
     February 18, 1692/3: Bentley's letter to Newton, containing an "abstract and thread" of his then-unpublished
Seventh Boyle Lecture.
     February 25, 1692/3: Newton's fourth letter to Bentley, containing his remarks about matter acting without
mediation.
     1693: The published versions of Bentley's lectures appear.
     1756: Newton's letters to Bentley are first published, as Four Letters from Sir Isaac Newton to Doctor Bentley.
The letters written during January and February are written with a slash between the years 1692 and 1693 because of a
change in custom for marking the new year.  According to an older tradition, the new year did not begin until March
25th, with the Feast of the Annunciation.  The newer practice, ushered in with the change from the Julian to the
Gregorian calendar (a change made in England in 1752), was to take January 1st as the beginning of the new year.
Documents written during the transitional period before this new custom had fully taken hold, and between January 1st
and March 25th, are often dated with a slash between the years.
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You sometimes speak of Gravity as essential and inherent to Matter.  Pray do not ascribe
that Notion to me; for the Cause of Gravity is what I do not pretend to know, and
therefore would take more Time to consider it.372
In a subsequent letter commenting upon the draft of a lecture that Bentley has sent him, Newton
makes his now-famous remarks about matter acting at a distance.
The last clause of your second Position I like very well.  Tis unconceivable that inanimate
brute matter should (without ye mediation of something else wch is not material) operate
upon & affect other matter without mutual contact; as it must if gravitation in the sense of
Epicurus be essential and innate in it. And this is one reason why I desired you would not
ascribe innate gravity to me.  That gravity should be innate inherent & essential to matter
so yt one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the
mediation of any thing else by & through wch their action or force may be conveyed
from one to another is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man wh has in
philosophical matters any competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.  Gravity
must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws, but whether this
agent be material or immaterial is a question I have left to ye consideration of my
readers.373
Physics Divorced from Metaphysics:  Primary Causation and Gravitational Effects
According to a number of commentators, Newton is merely being coy with this last
remark; while he leaves his readers to consider whether gravity's cause is material or immaterial,
he privately attributes the planetary motions directly to God, that immaterial being who is
substantially present throughout all of space.  There is no action by matter, since the immaterial
deity produces the actions, and no action at a distance, since the extended deity is present at the
site of the bodies he moves.
It is uncontroversial that Newton's God sometimes acts directly in the world; he acts
directly to reform the planetary orbits, for instance, which the mutual actions of planets and
comets render irregular over time.374  I shall use the term 'primary causation' to refer to such
                                                                 
372 Newton's second letter to Bentley, Jan. 17, 1692/3, Correspondence of Isaac Newton, 240.
373 Newton's fourth letter to Bentley, Feb. 25, 1692/3, ibid., 253-254.
374 "Some inconsiderable Irregularities...may have risen from the mutual Actions of Comets and Planets upon one
another, and...will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Reformation." (Query 31, Opticks, 402, but Query 23 in
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direct actions by God, and the term 'secondary causation' to refer to natural causes, that is, the
means that God has established in the created order.  It is the range of primary causation that is
controversial.  Some commentators argue that Newton ultimately explained gravity in terms of
primary causation, and this view has a number of variants.  Joan Hawes limits the range of
phenomena for which Newton accepted primary causation; she argues that Newton attributed
gravitational effects directly to God, but allowed action at a distance for the electric force.375  J.E.
McGuire limits the time during which Newton accepted primary causation; he argues that
Newton held the view during the post-Principia period, but after the 1706 Optice pushed distance
forces into the realm of secondary causation, believing that gravity and the other distance forces
about which he speculated had causes within the natural order.376  Richard Westfall, by contrast,
sees no such limitations.  He argues that privately, Newton believed that all of the "new motions"
associated with distance forces were in reality the effects of God's direct and immediate action.
The implication of Westfall's view, then, is that physics is cordoned off from metaphysics.  The
metaphysical story, about causal efficacy, is a story of God's primary causation; apart from the
"passive principles" of the vis inertiae and the three laws of motion arising from it, which Newton
believes to explain very little motion, secondary causes are rejected.  Here we are reminded of
Leibniz, who allows forces and bodies at one level of description, but avoids problems about
causation by ultimately restricting his ontology to percipients, denying causal interaction among
the monads, and attributing all activity to God.  If Westfall's interpretation is correct, then
Newton similarly drew a sharp line between physics and metaphysics by explaining distance
forces in terms of primary causation.
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
the edition upon which Leibniz was commenting.) Newton's suggestion here was the probable provocation to Leibniz's
charge, in his 1715 Letter 1, that Newton's God is like an imperfect watchmaker.  See H. G. Alexander, Leibniz-Clarke,
11, n.a.
375 Hawes, "Newton's Revival of the Aether Hypothesis and the Explanation of Gravitational Attraction", 205.
376 See McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 207-208.
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Although Newton's unpublished manuscripts indicate that he considered the path these
commentators suggest, and did so very seriously, I do not think the texts support any stronger
conclusion.  Two considerations will have to suffice here. First, Query 31 clearly presents
distance forces as God's tools.  There, Newton identifies the active principles he associates with
distance forces as "general laws of nature, by which the things themselves are formed"; and, he
continues, referring to the speculated force of cohesion, God composes bodies "by the help of
these principles".  Thus in Query 31, distance forces, or at least the active principles associated
with them,377 are secondary causes. Second, even in the post-Principia period, when Newton
sometimes suggests God as the explanation of gravity, he also repeatedly treats the gravitational
force as something that God must work against, and thus as independent of God; God works
against the gravitational force, for instance, to prevent the stars from collapsing into the sun.378
The first claim weighs against Westfall's stronger conclusion, while the second weighs against
both that and the more limited conclusions of Hawes and McGuire.  If on the basis of such claims
                                                                 
377 As noted in the previous chapter, active powers and distance forces are conceptually distinct.  There is nothing
incoherent, for instance, about supposing that certain chemicals possess active powers of generating new motion, and
that they do so when combined because in combination their parts become contiguous.  Yet Newton does associate
active principles with distance forces.  This association arises from his dual conjectures that nearly all motion is new
motion, that is, motion due to active principles, and that nearly all phenomena are due to distance forces rather than to
material contact.  (These phenomena may be due to the contact of some immaterial medium, however.  Again, I use the
term 'distance force' to refer to any force operating between spatially separated bodies, and the term does not imply the
absence of an immaterial medium.)
378 In the first of his four letters to Bentley, Newton explains that the system will not collapse so long as space is
infinite.  This claim suggests a belief that the gravitational force is real.  If God were producing all gravitational effects,
directly, then no explanation would be needed to explain why the system does not collapse, beyond God's will. By
suggesting that if space were not infinite, the stars would collapse upon the sun, and that they do not only because
space is infinite, Newton implies that the heavenly bodies really do attract one another. (See Newton to Bentley,
December 10, 1692, Philosophical Writings, 95-96.) Similarly, David Gregory's 1694 Memoranda attributes to Newton
the claim "that a continual miracle is needed to prevent the Sun and the fixed stars from rushing together through
gravity". Interestingly, the notion that there could be a continual miracle is at odds with the notion of a miracle found in
Clarke's letters; since all activity derives from God, Clarke classifies unusual events as miracles, and regular events as
natural.  The central point here, however, is that Newton implies a distinction between the gravitational force, which
could cause the system to collapse absent divine action, and the divine action that does prevent it.  If there were no
attractions, but only God's action, no such distinction would need to drawn. Indeed, if God caused all these motions
directly, no positive action would be needed to prevent collapse; God would simply fail to push the stars into the sun.
(See 446 Memoranda by David Gregory, 5, 6, 7 May 1694, Correspondence of Isaac Newton, 3:334 original and 3:336
translation.)  The same distinction between the gravitational force and the action God takes to counter it is also evident
in later writings, specifically the General Scholium assertion that God has placed the stars at immense distances from
one another to prevent their collapse under gravity (Principia, 940), and again in Query 28.  In Query 28, Newton
infers the existence of a designer from the fact that the stars do not aggregate together.  He does not tell us whether
collapse is prevented through direct or indirect action, but again the gravitational force is implied to be something
distinct from divine action, in that some of its effects may need to be countered by divine action:  "What hinders the
fix'd Stars from falling upon one another?  How came the Bodies of Animals to be contrived with so much Art....Does
it not appear from phenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, intelligent."  (Opticks, 369.)
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we take Newton's natural philosophy to include secondary causes, as I shall now do, we then face
the question of whether he allowed metaphysical principles to play any role in determining what
the secondary causes of gravitational and other phenomena might be.
THE ATHEISTIC THREAT AND SUPERADDED ACTIVE POWERS
Was Newton's concern about the gravitational force that it carried the threat of atheism?
In the early modern period, the investigations of nature that constituted natural philosophy often
included or in some cases were dominated by considerations about God.379  Descartes attempted
to derive the laws of nature from the nature of God,380 and though Galileo eschewed that a priori
approach to natural philosophy, he understood his investigations as an inquiry into God's creation.
Those defending corpuscular theories of matter, such as Gassendi and Boyle, typically avoided
citing their ancient atomist predecessors, such as Democritus and Epicurus, because these figures
were associated with atheism. Since the doctrines attributed the atoms' motion to their own
nature, rather than to a deity's guidance, those doctrines were suspect.  As an atomist, Newton
might be expected to share Gassendi's and Boyle's concerns.
Such concerns do figure in one of the charges Newton brings against the Cartesian theory
of matter in the unpublished, pre-Principia manuscript, De Gravitatione.  In reference to
Descartes' identification of matter with extension, Newton writes, "However we cast about we
find almost no other reason for atheism than this notion of bodies having, as it were, a complete,
absolute, and independent reality in themselves."381 According to Newton,
extension—space—would be the effect of anything that existed, and since we therefore can have
                                                                 
379 For a discussion of seventeenth century attitudes toward the proper stance of natural philosophy with respect to God,
see Grant, A History of Natural Philosophy, 293-302.
380 As a practical consideration, Descartes had Galileo's treatment at Rome in mind when he suppressed Le Monde and
wrote that strictly speaking, the earth is always at rest, since it remains contiguous to neighboring celestial matter even
as it orbits the sun.
381 De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 32.  Newton brings this charge not only against the Cartesian view of
matter but also against the idea of prime matter, though he considers the notion of prime matter "unintelligible".
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an idea of extension without an idea of God, the Cartesian concept of matter sets a path to
atheism.382
Yet Newton's own results in the Principia had the potential to raise the threat of atheism
in a new way.  If the gravitational force is a mutual attraction universal to matter, then the atheist
might attempt to explain the present state of the universe without appeal to God.  Atoms might
accrete into bodies, the atheist could say, by means of their intrinsic power to attract one another.
Richard Bentley's View: Superaddition and Action at a Distance
This was a threat that Richard Bentley considered serious enough to challenge, and in the
published version of his Seventh Boyle Lecture, he sets out the threat.  The Epicurean theory of
gravity, Bentley notes, without naming it as such, would not serve the atheist's purpose.  A
tendency for atoms to veer away from a perpendicular and tend toward a vacuum, or toward
nothing in specific, would not explain the accretion of atoms into bodies.  But if gravity is mutual
attraction, the atheist might argue that matter has an inherent, essential power to unite to other
matter, creating the celestial bodies we observe.
Having identified the threat, Bentley counters it by arguing that mutual attraction could
not be eternal to matter nor could it be acquired by matter of its own accord; it could only have
been infused into matter by God.  According to Bentley's supposition, the atheist suggests that
particles once in chaos convened into bodies by their mutual powers of attraction.  Yet this could
not be, Bentley argues, taking tutelage from Newton's letters, for if mutual attraction were
inherent in eternally existing particles, those particles would always have gravitated and so never
could have been in chaos.  Ignoring the possibility of eternally existing aggregate bodies, Bentley
concludes that gravity could not have been eternal to matter.  He then attempts to show that far
from abetting atheism, the mutual attraction of matter proves God's existence.  In support of this
                                                                 
382 "If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to atheism, both because
extension is not created but has existed eternally, and because we have an idea of it without any relation to God, and so
in some circumstances it would be possible for us to conceive of extension while supposing God not to exist?" (Ibid.,
31.)
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claim, Bentley recrafts a sentence from his one extant letter to Newton—"'Tis unconceivable, yt
inanimate brute matter should (without a divine impression) operate upon & affect other matter
without mutual contact: as it must, if gravity be essential and inherent in it"—replacing his own
phrase, "divine impression", with the phrase Newton used in his reply, "mediation".  And so
Bentley's published Seventh Lecture contains the following passage.
'Tis utterly unconceivable, that inanimate brute Matter (without the mediation of some
Immaterial Being) should operate upon and affect other Matter without mutual Contact;
that distant Bodies should act upon each other through a Vacuum without the intervention
of something else by and through which the action may be conveyed from one to the
other....Now mutual Gravitation or Attraction...is the same thing with This: 'tis an
operation or vertue or influence of distant Bodies upon each other through an empty
Interval, without any Effluvia or Exhalations or other corporeal Medium to convey and
transmit it.  This power therefore cannot be innate and essential to Matter.  And if it be
not essential; it is confrequently most manifest (seeing it doth not depend upon Motion or
Rest or Figure or Position of Parts, which are all the ways that Matter can diversify itself)
that it could never supervene to it, unless impress'd and infused into it by an immaterial
and divine Power.383
It is notable, for reasons I shall indicate subsequently, that at the end of this passage, Bentley
strays away from Newton's term, 'mediation', and back to his own, earlier talk of God impressing
gravity into matter.  In the published version of his Eighth Lecture—a lecture for which Newton
did not review a draft—Bentley states his view of gravity explicitly: "Gravitation…is a constant
Energy infused into Matter by the Author of all things."384  Here we have Bentley's thesis of
superaddition; gravity is an active power that is not part of matter's essential nature but was
superadded by God.
The implication of Bentley's superaddition thesis is of course that matter can act at a
distance.  Although matter's essential nature does not include active powers of attraction, God has
                                                                 
383 Papers and Letters, 340-341.
384 Bentley, "Eighth Boyle Lecture", preached December 5, 1692 and published 1693, Papers & Letters, 363. The
passage continues as follows: "But now admitting that Gravity may be essential to Matter; and that a transverse
Impulse might be acquired too by Natural Causes, yet to make all the Planets move about the Sun in circular Orbs;
there must be given to each a determinate Impulse...." (Ibid.)   However, the context indicates that this is intended as a
counterfactual, not a possibility. Earlier, Bentley stated that he has proved that gravity cannot be innate, in a sentence
showing the style in which he poses counterfactuals: "Now although Gravity could be innate (which we have proved
that it cannot be)." (Ibid., 347.)
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infused matter with those inessential powers, thereby enabling the sun and planets to affect one
another across vast reaches of empty space, without any intervening medium to convey the effect.
John Henry's Argument:  Bentley as Newton's Spokesman
Did Newton share Bentley's position? In some texts, Newton does seem to allow the
possibility of action at a distance.  The opening of Query 31 is enough to raise eyebrows: "Have
not the small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a
distance...For it's well known, that Bodies act one upon another by the attractions of Gravity,
Magnetism, and Electricity...and make it not improbable but that there may be more attractive
Powers than these."  Yet Newton immediately disclaims knowing the causes of these attractive
powers.385  His point seems to be that in formulating hypotheses for unsolved problems, such as
cohesion, we can draw only upon what is known about gravity, which is to say its mathematical
proportions.  The analogy of nature supports only this much, since we are ignorant of gravity's
cause.386  This is consonant with one of Query 31's goals, which is to show that many phenomena
may be produced by short range forces analogous to gravity, which is to say forces acting
between spatially separated bodies; but as we are ignorant of gravity's full causal story, we have
no full causal story to extend to these speculated forces.
To say that Newton allowed even the possibility of matter acting distantly is to invite
controversy.  To say that despite his remonstrance to Bentley and his repeated denials of knowing
                                                                 
385 I refer to the following remark from Query 31: "How these Attractions may be perform'd, I do not here consider.
What I call Attraction may be perform'd by impulse, or by some other means unknown to me.  I use that Word here to
signify only in general any Force by which Bodies tend towards one another, whatsoever be the Cause." (Opticks 376.)
386 As Query 31 continues, Newton speculates that electrical attraction may reach to small distances even without
friction, and this remark initially suggests action at a distance.  It initially suggests that if an emitted spirit conveys the
force with friction, yet the force acts over shorter distances without friction, then without friction the particles may be
acting upon one another without any intervening medium.   However, examination of related texts reveals this not to be
the case.  Newton holds that there is a spirit that abounds even without friction, and that friction simply extends its
range.  So there is a medium, both with and without friction, by which the electrical attraction is conveyed.   The
relevant passage is contained in A Draft Conclusion to the Principia: "By these experiments it is fully enough clear that
glass at small distances always abounds in electric force, even without friction, and therefore abounds in an electric
spirit which is diffusd through its whole body and always surrounds the body with a small atmosphere, but never goes
out far into the air unless stirred up by friction." ("Guide", 289.)
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gravity's physical cause, Newton wholeheartedly accepted action at a distance would be quite a
dramatic claim.  One commentator defends such a view, however, taking Bentley and also John
Locke as Newton's spokesmen.  John Henry interprets Newton as consistently allowing action at
a distance by matter, by considering activity to be a superadded, which is to say inessential,
property of matter.  Newton considered it theologically problematic to allow gravity as an
essential property, Henry argues, since doing so would abet the atheist's claim that the particles of
matter could have accreted into large bodies without God; the clue to Newton's theological
concern is his mention of Epicurus in the earlier-quoted remarks to Bentley.  The notion of
superadded active powers, a view held by Newton's elder English contemporaries, alleviated
Newton's theological concerns, and so he accepted activity as an inessential but internal power of
matter, superadded to it by God.
When Newton said 'Pray do not ascribe that notion to me', the notion he was objecting to
was not that gravitational attraction might be a property of matter, but that gravitational
attraction might be held to be an essential property of matter, in the way that extension
was held to be.  Extension was generally agreed to be an essential attribute of matter.
Matter could not be conceived of without extension but it could easily be conceived of
without gravitational attraction.387
Gravity was not to be seen as a property which was logically entailed by the nature of
matter itself, in the way that extension was.388
If Newton believed that matter had superadded active powers, why did he deny knowing gravity's
cause, most famously in the General Scholium, but also in Query 31 and elsewhere?   Henry
explains this by attributing a disjunctive belief to Newton:  God has added an active principle to
matter, "either to all matter, or merely to the matter of the aether, depending upon which
speculation Newton favoured at the time".389  So Newton is uncertain about which sort of matter
has superadded active powers, but he is confident that some sort does, and thus that matter can act
                                                                 
387 Henry, "God and Newton's Gravity", 128.
388 Ibid., 131.
389 Ibid., 133.
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distantly.  What are we to make of Newton's remark to Bentley that the gravitational effects could
not occur without the "mediation" of something that conveys the force and action?  According to
Henry, Newton's meaning is this: by endowing matter with active powers, God mediated between
the way matter is essentially, and the way he actually created it.390
A Critical Look at Henry's Argument:  Superaddition and Newton's Empirical Concept of
Matter
There are a number of problems with trying to infer Newton's view from Bentley's.391
The main questions, however, are whether Newton's central concern about gravity was the
atheistic threat that Bentley identifies, and whether the notion of superaddition is consistent with
Newton's concept of matter.  It is certainly true that Newton would not want his views associated
                                                                 
390 "For both Newton and Bentley, God was the immaterial mediator whose omnipotence enabled him to impose upon
matter an agent of gravitational attraction which acts constantly according to certain laws." (Ibid., 130.)
391  To infer Newton's views from Bentley's is to infer that Newton was fully confident that God infused active powers
directly into the particles of ordinary matter, so that they could causally affect one another from a distance.  And that of
course conflicts with Newton's repeated statements that he does not know gravity's cause.
     There are further difficulties in trying to infer Newton's views from Bentley's claims.  First of all, Bentley's most
explicit statement is made in the published version of Lecture Eight.  We have no reason to think that Newton ever saw
or approved the published version of Lecture Seven, for which he had seen Bentley's abstract, let alone the published
version of Lecture Eight.  At the time of the their correspondence, Bentley has not sent his lectures to the publisher.  He
is still revising them, it seems.  Clearly he is doing so partly in response to Newton's comments, but since the
correspondence shows him to be someone introducing his own questions and ideas, and pursuing his own project, we
must allow that his ideas might differ from some of Newton's.  Where Newton expressed uncertainty, or left room for
several interpretations, Bentley may have opted for the interpretation that best suited the goals of his lectures.  It is the
texts that serve as the evidence.
     Henry overstates the importance of Newton's mention of Epicurus because he suggests that Newton is the one to
introduce the notion of gravity associated with Epicurus; Henry writes that Bentley is "following Newton's lead" when
he attacks the Epicurean notion of gravity in his published lecture.  It is true that Newton is the first to mention
Epicurus by name, as he does in his fourth letter, and it is true that Bentley's published Seventh Lecture names Epicurus
in connection with the theory that Bentley and Newton have been discussing.  However, it is Bentley who first
introduces the theory, together with a variation on it.  He does this in his one extant letter to Newton; it is to this letter,
which contains the draft of his Seventh Lecture, that Newton replies when he mentions Epicurus by name.
     As a point of clarification, Newton's mention of Epicurus is not intended as a reference to Epicurus' own theory.
When Newton writes that it is inconceivable that inanimate matter should, without the mediation of something not
material, "affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must be if gravitation in the sense of Epicurus be essential
and innate in it", he is referring to a hybrid hypothesis that Bentley attacks—hybrid in that it combines an Epicurean
element (the claim that gravity, whatever it is, is essential to matter) with Newton's concept of gravity as mutual
attraction.  Thus Newton is referring to the atheistic hypothesis that atoms could have an essential and innate quality of
mutual attraction, and not to Epicurus' own theory, which does not assert mutual attraction among the particles.  (This
is clear from the context, for Newton explicitly notes that he is responding to Bentley's second point, and thus not to the
first one, in which Bentley discusses Epicurus' theory of gravity as "common motion without attraction".   Moreover,
Newton's next remark indicates that he cannot be referring to Epicurus' own theory.  He says, "And this is one reason
why I desired that you would not ascribe innate gravity to me."  Clearly he does not think Bentley would attribute
Epicurus' own theory of gravity to him, for Epicurus did not defend mutual attraction.  What he does not want
attributed to him, then, is a theory of mutual attraction that includes the claim that gravity is essential, inherent or
innate.)  The central point, however, is the one that I have already made, namely that Newton does not use the term
'essential' in the way needed for Henry's interpretation.
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with atheism, and as we saw earlier, one charge he brought against Descartes' theory of matter in
De Gravitatione was that it led to atheism.  (Newton considers his own concept of matter in that
manuscript, which antedates his theory of gravitation and concept of mass, to be immune from
the charge of atheism.  Only extension can be conceived without God, and bodies are not
identical to extension; an entity qualifies as a body only if it has powers to produce sensations in
us.392)  Does Newton think that the concept of gravity as mutual attraction would likewise set a
path to atheism?  No, for as his letters to Bentley and other texts indicate, gravity alone could not
explain the present state of the universe, even if material particles had existed eternally and had
inherent powers of gravitational attraction.  To explain the planets' transverse motions and the
fact that they lie in the same plane, one must invoke God.  So the threat identified by Bentley is
not the source of Newton's concern about gravity.
This does not show, however, that Newton did not for some other reason accept the thesis
of superaddition.  A belief that God could bestow active powers upon matter is certainly
consistent with Newton's belief in an omnipotent deity.  It is also clear that Newton was
acquainted with the doctrine of superaddition, including the clearly ontological version set out by
legal theoretician Matthew Hale393, and the version defended by his friend John Locke, which I
shall discuss in more detail below.  For the moment, let us consider a suggestion implicit in
Henry's remarks.
In passages quoted earlier, Henry writes that gravity was not considered a property
"logically entailed by the nature of matter itself", and that matter could be "conceived of without
gravitational attraction", but not without extension.  Yet is it extension against which Newton
                                                                 
392 For this argument, see De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 33-34.
393 For Matthew Hale, the claim that matter has superadded active powers is clearly ontological. He writes, "Matter it
self simply considered as such, though it be susceptive of Motion (as we daily see) is not the immediate principle of
Motion in those subjects that seem to be self-moving....And this entity I call Vis or Virtue activa, superadded to Matter,
and giving immediately those motions to it…without which, Matter would be stupid, dull, unactive, and alwayes at rest
in its self unless accidentally moved ab extrinseco." (Observations touching the principles of natural motions, quoted
in Henry, "Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy", 342.)  Research by Henry (ibid.) and also by Westfall
("The foundations of Newton's philosophy of Nature") reveals that Newton was acquainted with doctrines of
superaddition that antedated Locke's expression of it.
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contrasts gravity?  Is logical implication, in the sense of what we can conceive, Newton's ground
for calling a property essential, and has he thus reached his concept of matter a priori?
By 1713 at least, the answer to these questions is clearly no.  In the second edition of the
Principia, a new rule of reasoning, Rule 3, appears.  This rule explains how to reason inductively
about qualities that cannot be increased or decreased, and the explanatory remarks following the
rule answer the first question noted above.  It is not extension against which Newton contrasts
gravity, but the vis inertiae, or 'force of inertia' as it is translated:394  "I am by no means affirming
that gravity is essential to bodies.  By inherent force I mean only the force of inertia.  This is
immutable.  Gravity is diminished as bodies recede from the earth."395  This by itself begins to
answer the second question noted above.  For Newton's force of inertia, by which bodies
persevere in their states of rest or motion,396 according to the Principia's Definition 4, is not
logically implied by the concept of matter.  Matter could be and until the 17th century was
conceived to exist without Newton's force of inertia; Kepler for instance imagined matter to have
a very different property of inertia, namely, a tendency toward rest.397
                                                                 
394 I do not here address the question of whether Newton considered the vis inertiae to be a genuine force. He does use
the term 'force' to refer to it in some of his English writings, for instance in Query 31 of the English edition of the
Opticks (see Philosophical Writings, 137 for instance.)  However as Cohen explains in "Newton's concepts of force and
mass" (Cambridge Companion, 60 in particular), Newton adopted a term already in use, vis insita, assigned it his own
meaning, and then introduced vis inertiae as a co-referring term.  The issue is more complex than this, however,
because Newton's definition of the vis inertiae is subject to different interpretations.
395 Rule 3, Principia, 795-796.
396 In the unpublished pre-Principia manuscript, De Motu, the suggestion that the innate force, or force of inertia,
causes the persistence of state, is even more pronounced.  Using the Aristotelian term 'endeavor', Newton writes,
"Definition 2.  And I call that the force of a body or the force innate in a body by reason of which it endeavors to persist
in its motion along a straight line. (Background, 299).
397 Here one might object that since inertia is essential to matter, then while thinkers who lacked an understanding of
inertia might have applied the term 'matter' to matter, they could not have been conceiving of matter without inertia, but
must rather have been conceiving of something other than matter.  (I do not mean to suggest that Newton's
predecessors, including Kepler, applied the term 'matter' to all matter; Kepler did not apply the term to the sun, for
instance.)  And so, to continue the objection, the concept of matter does in fact logically imply inertia (if not the force
of inertia).   One might then defend Henry by attributing to him the claim that Newton's concept of matter was
empirical, and then interpreting Henry's talk of what the concept of matter logically implies as follows: to say that a
trait is logically implied by a concept is not to say it was derived a priori, but rather to say that it is essential rather than
accidental, and known to be such empirically.  This line of thinking brings us directly to the question of whether
Newton has any basis for claiming a distinction between properties that are essential and those that are inessential but
universally realized.  I address this question in a subsequent section.
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Descartes, of course, did derive his concept of inertia by reason,398 however Rule 3
indicates that Newton considers his own grounds to be empirical.  His list of the properties that
are inherent and essential includes extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility and the force of
inertia; and the explanatory comment of the Principia's Rule 3 unequivocally states that the
ground for concluding these properties—even extension—to be inherent and essential to matter is
not reason but the senses.399  Of extension and impenetrability, for instance, he writes, "The
extension of bodies is known to us only through our senses....That all bodies are impenetrable we
gather not by reason but by our senses.  We find those bodies to be impenetrable, and hence we
conclude that impenetrability is a property of all bodies universally."400
Gravity is distinguished from essential properties, such as extension and hardness, not on
the basis of an a priori examination of how matter can be conceived, but because it varies with
distance.401  Newton considers extension, hardness, and the like to be intensity-invariant, to
borrow Ernan McMullin's term, and he has adopted the Scholastic classification of essential
properties as those that cannot be "intended or remitted", that is, increased or decreased.402
                                                                 
398 "That it is in the very nature of motion to come to an end, or to tend towards a state of rest….is utterly at variance
with the laws of nature; for rest is the opposite of motion, and nothing can by its own nature tend towards its opposite,
or towards its own destruction." (Principles of Philosophy, II.37, CSM, 241.)
399 Which properties Newton considers essential is a matter of controversy.  Some commentators (McMullin) argue that
Newton considered only inertia to be essential to matter, while other commentators (McGuire, Koyre) argue that
Newton considered the larger set, including extension, hardness, and impenetrability, to be essential properties.  Janiak
also accepts the latter view; see Newton as Philosopher, 113.
400 The claim that it is only from phenomena that we learn that bodies do not penetrate one another also appears in his
Draft Conclusion for the General Scholium: "We do not know the substances of things.  We have no idea of them.  We
gather only their properties from the phenomena and from the properties [we infer] what the substances may be.  That
bodies do not penetrate each other we gather from the phenomena alone; that substances of different kinds do not
penetrate each other does not at all appear from the phenomena.  And we ought not rashly to assert that which cannot
be inferred from the phenomena." (Draft Conclusion for General Scholium, MS. C (MS. Add 3965 fols. 360-362),
Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 360-361.)
401 Although Newton claims an empirical basis for concluding all bodies, including each atom, to possess the properties
he lists in Rule 3, one may question his claim.  For a discussion of this point, see McMullin, Newton on Matter and
Activity, 22-27.  See also my discussion in chapter IV.
402 We might question whether all of these properties are indeed either universally experienced in bodies or intensity-
invariant.  One might argue that hardness, for instance, is not.  On this point, see McMullin, Newton on Matter and
Activity, 1.4, especially 22-26.
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Rule 3 was written long after Newton's letter to Bentley, however. Might Newton have
accepted the notion of superaddition earlier?  In De Gravitatione, written long before the
exchange with Bentley,403 things are trickier, in part because extension—space—does have a
unique status.  Space would be the effect of any first existing thing, whether that first existent be
God, mind, or matter; and so, Newton writes, space is the one thing that could be conceived
independently of God.404  Additionally, Newton uses the term 'essential' differently here than he
does later in Rule 3, allowing that bodies might have a real essence—some "essential and
metaphysical constitution".405  It is possible, then, that matter has some real essence, and that
extension belongs to its essence, just as extension belongs to all existents in De Gravitatione.
Still, Newton's concept of matter or body in this early manuscript is already strongly
empirical.  To develop a concept of body or matter, Newton begins with ordinary bodies and
determines what they are like—what properties they have, and what laws they obey.  We call
something a body, he writes, if it has powers to produce sensations in us, is mobile and
impenetrable, has resistance, and is reflected in accordance with certain laws.406  And it is clear
                                                                 
403 The manuscript is undated. The Halls argue that it belongs to a very early period, c. 1664-1668 (see Unpublished
Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 89).  B.J. T. Dobbs argues for a much later date, shortly before Principia.  Stein's
remarks in "Newton's Metaphysics" weigh against Dobbs, and in favor of an earlier dating.  According to Stein, the
Halls' translation of De Gravitatione contains a number of errors, including an incorrect suggestion that in the opening
sentence, Newton indicates that he will discuss a "science of gravity".  Relying upon this, Dobbs concludes that the
manuscript represents, as Stein puts it, "an abortive draft of an introduction to Newton's Principia."   In fact, Stein
writes, "Newton's phrase has nothing to do with a 'science of gravity'; he is speaking of the weight of fluids and of
solids in fluids, which is the exact subject of the classic treatise, 'On Floating Bodies' of Archimedes." (Stein,
"Newton's Metaphysics", 298-299, n. 27; see also 302-303, n.39.)
404 This follows from two passages in De Gravitatione.  Newton states that space is the effect of the first existent:  "No
being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way.  God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere,
and body is in the space it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist.  And hence it
follows that space is an emanative effect of the first existing being." (Philosophical Writings, 25.) Subsequently, in
charging Descartes' concept of matter as paving the way to atheism, Newton states that space can be conceived without
God: "If we say with Descartes that extension is body, do we not manifestly offer a path to atheism, both because
extension is not created but has existed eternally, and because we have an idea of it without any relation to God, and so
in some circumstances it would be possible for us to conceive of extension while supposing God not to exist?"
(Philosophical Writings, 31.)
405 De Gravitatione, ibid., 27.
406 "We can define bodies as determined quantities of extension which omnipresent God endows with certain
conditions.  These conditions are: (1) that they be mobile...(2) that two of this kind cannot coincide anywhere, that is,
that they may be impenetrable, and hence that oppositions obstruct their mutual motions and they are reflected in
accord with certain laws; (3) that they can excite various perceptions of the senses...in created minds and conversely be
moved by them."  (Ibid., 28-29.)
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from the context that Newton is not attempting to say what bodies are, essentially, but is rather
identifying the characteristics of those things that we call bodies, in virtue of the properties we
perceive.  Newton is here setting out a view that he will articulate again in much later texts:  we
have access only to properties, and so we must infer substances from properties.407  Thus we
could never distinguish between two entities that differed in their essential or metaphysical
constitution, but shared all their perceptible properties.408  The basis for classifying something as
a body—as matter—is not anything derivable a priori.  It is a set of properties accessible by sense
rather than reason, just as it is later, in Rule 3.   Both before and after his letters to Bentley, then,
Newton considers his concept of matter to be empirical.  He is not investigating the essential and
metaphysical nature of bodies that the notion of superaddition seems to presume.
Yet showing that Newton's concept of matter was empirical does not immediately close
the discussion of superaddition.  For Locke too considered his concept of matter empirical, and
yet came to believe that gravity was a superadded power of matter. So Locke's thoughts about
superaddition merit a closer look.
                                                                 
407 In the his Draft Conclusion for the General Scholium, Newton writes, "We do not know the substances of things.
We have no idea of them.  We gather only their properties from the phenomena and from the properties [we infer] what
the substances may be." (Draft Conclusion for General Scholium, MS. C (MS. Add 3965 fols. 360-362), Unpublished
Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 360-361.)
408 This view is further suggested by the rest of the passage from De Gravitatione:  "Although it scarcely seems
credible that God could create beings similar to bodies which display all their actions and exhibit all their phenomena,
and yet would not be bodies in essential and metaphysical constitution, as I have no clear and distinct perception of this
matter I should not dare to affirm the contrary, and hence I am reluctant to say positively what the nature of bodies is,
but I would rather describe a certain kind of being similar in every way to bodies." (Philosophical Writings, 27.)  The
view suggested here is one that Newton may never have abandoned, for it reappears in the Query 31 remark that God
might vary the laws of nature by varying the forces and properties of matter.  One might object, however, by arguing
that to vary the forces and properties of matter would be to create a substance that is not matter.  Also, some
commentators would object to my suggestion that Newton's skeptical stance toward matter's essence extends past De
Gravitatione; a number of commentators interpret the Principia as asserting the essential qualities of matter.  (And here
I intend a strong sense of 'essential', such that to be an entity of a given kind, the entity must possess the essential
property.  I am not referring to the Scholastic sense of 'essential' that I take Newton to mean in Rule 3, which is, in
McMullin's terms, "intensity-invariant.") For a discussion of matter's essence in that stronger sense, see Janiak, Newton
as Philosopher, 118-129.
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A Closer Look at Superaddition
The essence of matter, Locke explains to Stillingfleet, is solidity and extension, however
an omnipotent God may do anything that is not contradictory, including superadding inessential
qualities to matter.409  One such superadded quality might be thought; our inability to understand
how matter could think does not show that it cannot do so.  Motion is another quality superadded
to some bodies but not others.  And after initially holding that all motion must be communicated
by impulse,410 because only that can be derived from our idea of body, Locke accepts gravity as a
superadded quality of matter.  We do not understand how matter attracts matter at a distance,
"much less at the distance of 1,000,000 miles",411 however "Mr. Newton's incomparable book"
has convinced Locke that it does so.
The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways inconceivable to me, is not only a
demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into bodies powers and ways of operation,
above what can be derived from our idea of body, or can be explained by what we know
of matter, but also an unquestionable and every where visible instance, that he has done
so.412
According to Locke, then, matter does act upon other matter from a distance, but this is not
essential to its nature.  God might have made a world containing matter, without including any
thought, motion, or gravitational attractions among bodies.413
                                                                 
409 "The idea of matter is an extended solid substance; wherever there is such a substance, there is matter, and the
essence of matter, whatever other qualities, not contained in that essence, it shall please God to superadd to it.  For
example, God creates an extended solid substance, without the superadding anything else to it, and so we may consider
it at rest: to some parts of it he adds motion….It is farther urged, that we cannot conceive how matter can think.  I grant
it; but to argue from thence, that God therefore cannot give to matter a faculty of thinking, is to say God's omnipotency
is limited." (Locke to Stillingfleet.)
410 The first three editions of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding contained these lines: "How bodies operate
one upon another...is manifestly by impulse and nothing else.  It being impossible to conceive that body should operate
on what it does not touch." (Essay, II.viii.11, 171; see Fraser's annotations.)
411 Locke to Stillingfleet, The Works of John Locke, Vol. 3, 467.
412 Ibid.
413 Locke writes that the essence of matter is solid extended substance, saying nothing of mass.  Yet Roger Woolhouse
argues in "Locke and the Nature of Matter" that Locke does take bodies to be massive.  As Andrew Janiak pointed out
to me in an influential discussion, Woolhouse's interpretation makes it difficult to see how Locke could conceive
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The notion of superadded thought commands the bulk of Locke's attention, as that is the
notion most provoking to Stillingfleet.  However, it is the suggestion of superadded motion and
gravitational powers that is more difficult to reconcile with Locke's empiricist program. For
Locke appears to speak of superadded qualities in two ways.   First, to classify properties as
superadded is to say that "matter in general, or every part of matter, as matter, has them not",
which is to say that the properties do not belong to matter by its nature.  Second, superadded
properties are those "which matter in general has not",414 which is to say that these properties are
possessed by some bodies but not by all.  Close examination of the text indicates that Locke in
fact has only the first definition in mind, but it will nonetheless be instructive to consider both
definitions.  I begin with the second: superadded qualities are those not possessed by matter in
general.  According to this condition, solidity and extension are essential, because they are
possessed by matter in general, but thinking is superadded, since we have experience of bodies
that show no signs of thinking.  But what about motion and gravitation—do we have experiences
of bodies that are not in motion, or that do not gravitate, as is required for superadded status under
the condition we are presently considering?  As a self-appointed under laborer of Newton, Locke
means to bring his own beliefs into line with Newton's Principia.  Yet as Newton wrote in the
Scholium to the Principia's definitions, many bodies that seem to be at rest are not really at rest,
and "it is possible that there is no body truly at rest".415  If we cannot confidently claim to have
experience of any bodies truly at rest, and thus cannot claim that only some bodies move, we
could not employ the second condition to claim that motion is a superadded property.  By the
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
worlds having matter that did not gravitate.  It is easier to see how Locke thinks there could be such worlds if Locke
does not think of bodies as essentially massive.  See Newton as Philosopher, 120-122, for Janiak's discussion of
Woolhouse's interpretation and more generally of superaddition in Locke.
414 "The superinducement of greater perfections and nobler qualities destroys nothing of the essence or perfections that
were there before, unless there can be shown a manifest repugnancy between them; but all the proof offered for that, is
only, that we cannot conceive how matter, without such superadded perfections, can produce such effects; which is, in
truth, no more than to say, matter in general, or every part of matter, as matter, has them not; but is no reason to prove
that God, if he pleases, cannot superadd them to some parts of matter: unless it can be proved to be a contradiction, that
God should give to some parts of matter qualities and perfections, which matter in general has not." (Italics added.
Locke to Stillingfleet, The Works of John Locke, Vol. 3.)
415 Principia, 411.
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same token, if essential properties are those possessed by matter in general, then since all matter
gravitates, the condition under consideration implies that gravity is an essential property rather
than a superadded one.  Now, this difficulty is no doubt one reason that Locke does not classify
superadded qualities according to the condition just examined.  The condition that he does
suggest, however, the first one noted earlier, raises its own difficulties.
According to the first condition, qualities are superadded if "matter in general, or every
part of matter, as matter, has them not".  This condition suggests a distinction between qualities
that are essential to matter, "as matter", and those that are universally realized by all matter but
inessential, in that matter could exist without them.  With that distinction in hand, one might
classify not only thought, but also motion and gravitation as inessential properties superadded to
matter; unlike thought, gravitation is universal to matter, but if it does not belong to matter as
matter, then it is superadded, just like thought. What might be the empirical basis, however, for
distinguishing essential properties—properties belonging to matter as matter—from those that are
merely universally realized?  It is difficult to see what the basis might be.  For Locke, the problem
might be resolved by supposing that his claims about superaddition are not intended as an
ontological thesis, about the real essence of matter, but rather as an epistemic thesis about the
limits of our understanding.416
For Newton, however, what is at issue is an ontological thesis of superaddition, and that
thesis is not easily reconciled with his views.  His empiricism permits superaddition only
according to the second condition identified above, on which superadded properties are those not
possessed by matter in general; yet such a claim would classify gravity as essential rather than
superadded.  His empiricism does not permit superaddition according to the first condition
identified above; it does not permit the strong view of essential properties needed to say that
gravity could be universal to matter and yet inessential or superadded.  For just as with Locke, it
                                                                 
416 On this issue, see Margaret Dauler Wilson, "Superadded Properties: The Limits of Mechanism in Locke"; James
Hill, "Locke's Account of Cohesion", 627.
191
is difficult to see what empirical grounds Newton could find for claiming that gravity is
universally realized, yet inessential in the sense that matter could exist without it.  As we have
seen, Newton makes no official claim about what matter is "essentially and metaphysically".417
He does not assert anything about matter's nature in his non-speculative writings, such as the
Principia, and his view, set out initially in De Gravitatione and reiterated in a much later text,418
is that we can only infer substances, since we have access only to properties.
If we look to Newton's official position, then, we can reject both the notion of
superaddition and Henry's concomitant sense of 'mediation', in which God mediates between the
way matter is essentially and the way God actually created it.  Still, I will need to return to
questions about the essential nature of matter, for though Newton officially makes no assertions
about it, in texts that must be classified as speculative, including the letter to Bentley, Newton
seems very much concerned with matter's essential and metaphysical nature.  I postpone those
considerations, however, since a closer look at Newton's letter indicates that he has spatial
mediation in mind.
Spatial Mediation and the Principle that Matter Cannot Act Where It Is Not
When Newton writes that it is inconceivable that matter could affect other matter without
mutual contact, unless by the mediation of something immaterial, he is not simply paraphrasing
Bentley's own words, for he makes a crucial modification.  Bentley himself had said that such
distant action by matter is inconceivable without a "divine impression" and in his published
lectures he continues to speak of God "impressing" active powers upon matter, and "infusing"
                                                                 
417 Here I am paraphrasing a comment from De Gravitatione.  Newton allows that matter has some  "essential and
metaphysical constitution", but does not attempt to say what that is.  See Philosophical Writings, 27.
418 "We do not know the substances of things.  We have no idea of them.  We gather only their properties from the
phenomena and from the properties [we infer] what the substances may be.  That bodies do not penetrate each other we
gather from the phenomena alone; that substances of different kinds do not penetrate each other does not at all appear
from the phenomena.  And we ought not rashly to assert that which cannot be inferred from the phenomena." (Draft
Conclusion for General Scholium, MS. C (MS. Add 3965 fols. 360-362), Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac
Newton, 360-361.)
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matter with energy.   This sort of language expresses Bentley's thesis of superaddition by
suggesting a single divine action.   In repeating Bentley's words back to him, however, Newton
uses a term that does not suggest a single action.  He speaks not of a divine impression but of the
"mediation" of something immaterial: it is absurd, he writes, to suppose "yt one body may act
upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of any thing else by &
through wch their action or force may be conveyed from one to another". Evidently, Newton has
spatial mediation in mind.419  This is the natural way to understand the term 'mediation' in this
context, since that which mediates conveys the force or action from one point in space to another,
for instance from the center of the sun to the center of Jupiter.420  In other words, there must be
some entity that occupies the space between the bodies and conveys their gravitational effects
upon one another.  To think otherwise is an absurdity, which is to say a contradiction.
What exactly is contradicted?  One possibility is suggested by the subsequent section of
Newton's letter, which speaks of a "contradiction in nature" as something that is not "really in
nature".421  So perhaps the notion of matter acting at a distance is not an impossibility, but
something that just as a matter of fact is not really in nature.  But this raises the question of
                                                                 
419 This spatial interpretation of the term 'mediation' is the prevailing interpretation.  See for example McMullin,
Newton on Matter and Activity, 59.
420 Additionally, if Newton were trying to make the point that Henry attributes to him, namely, that God infused matter
with active powers, thereby mediating between the nature it would have had, had it existed in a godless universe, and
the nature it actually has as God created it, there were ways to make the point more directly. After all, both Hale, whom
Henry elsewhere explains that Newton read, and Bentley, manage to explain very clearly that they think that active
powers have been "superadded" or "infused" in matter by God, and their remarks do not suggest spatial mediation, as
do Newton's. The spatial interpretation of the term 'mediate' that I defend reflects Newton's use of the related word
'intermediate', as he describes the gravitational force in the posthumously published A System of the World.  At several
points, Newton speaks of the force that is intermediate between two bodies, and clearly the force is spatially
intermediate, for he gives the analogy of a rope connecting the bodies.  The passage I reference appears in Stein,
"Newton's Metaphysics", 288, and is quoted elsewhere in this chapter.   
421 In the next section of his fourth letter, Newton comments upon one of Bentley's earlier suggestions, explaining that
he has failed to prove as "absurd" the claim "that there should be positively an infinite sum or number". It can happen,
Newton explains, that a "contradiction in terms", which is "an impropriety in speech", may be used to refer to
something that is not a "contradiction in nature".  Two examples Newton gives are a silver inkhorn and an iron
whetstone.  The names imply, respectively, an object that is made of horn yet made of silver, and an object that is made
of iron yet made of stone.  Yet the actual objects referred to by these phrases are made only of silver in the one case,
and only of iron in the other.  So while "contradictious phrases" are used to name these objects, those objects are not
contradictions in nature because they are "really in nature".  Newton begins his discussion of contradictions in nature
with a mathematical example, which raises the intriguing question of whether Newton thought of mathematical truths
as being part of nature, in the sense that their truth status would be dependent upon God.
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evidence.  What is the ground for saying that matter does not in fact act at a distance?   The
Principia implies the possibility that bodies can without any intermediary affect one another
across empty space, and although Newton is profoundly dissatisfied with that possibility, he has
not found an alternative causal explanation.  Is Newton, who would go on to write in the 1713
General Scholium that he does not feign hypotheses, here declaring, as a metaphysical principle,
the Scholastic maxim, matter cannot act where it is not?422
Before investigating that question, let us consider this principle more closely, as it
appears to be a derived principle.  It might be derived from a general principle of local causation
(PLC):
PLC:  Nothing can act where it is not.
We can see this principle operating in one interpretation of Samuel Clarke's remarks about action
at a distance.  Clarke, who defends a Newtonian position in the exchange that became known as
the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, writes in his Fourth Reply: "That one body should attract
another without any intermediate means, is indeed not a miracle but a contradiction: for 'tis
supposing something to act where it is not."423 Since Clarke speaks generally about "something",
rather than about matter in particular, we might understand him to mean that all causation must be
local.   The contradiction he sees in the notion of matter acting at a distance would then be as
follows.  To say that a thing acts implies that it is present at the site of the effect, and so to say
                                                                 
422 As Mary Hesse notes in "Action at a Distance in Classical Physics", 337, "matter cannot act where it is not" is a
metaphysical principle of the Scholastics. Its history extends back to the ancients, however.
423 "That one body should attract another without any intermediate means, is indeed not a miracle but a contradiction:
for 'tis supposing something to act where it is not.  But the means by which two bodies attract each other, may be
invisible and intangible, and of a different nature than mechanism; and yet, acting regularly and constantly, may well
be called natural; being much less wonderful than animal-motion, which yet is never called a miracle." (Clarke's fourth
reply, Leibniz-Clarke, 53.)
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that a thing acts at a distance without any intermediate means is to imply that it both is and is not
located at a given place.424  So PLC is one potential source of Newton's objection.
Another fundamental principle is suggested, however, by Newton's remark in draft
material relating to the Optice, "Matter is a passive principle, and cannot move itself".425  This
suggests a general principle of the passivity of matter (PPM).
PPM: Matter is passive, and cannot move itself.
                                                                 
424 A different interpretation of this passage, together with Clarke's subsequent remarks in his Fifth Reply, is given by
John Henry in "God and Newton's Gravity". On Henry's reading, Clarke can be understood as accepting the same
position that Henry attributes to Newton, namely, that matter has active powers that were superadded by God; for
Clarke does not name God as the cause of gravitational motions, and instead changes the subject, to the question of
whether there could be an effect without a cause.  I disagree with this interpretation, for the following reasons.  When
Clarke takes up the issue of action at a distance again in his Fifth Reply, there is no indication that he has abandoned
this principle, but the main question he is answering now is, are we justified in claiming to know that bodies attract one
another, even if we cannot specify the causal means by which this happens? He says that "the sun attracts the earth
through the intermediate void space", however he then explains that the claim that the space is void is simply an
experimental result, in that nothing having sensible resistance has been detected in that space.  (This is consistent with
Newton's use of the term 'void'.)  There must be some means that produces this effect, but even if we cannot find the
cause, we still have sufficient evidence to claim to know the effect.
That the sun attracts the earth...and that the space betwixt them is void, that is, hath nothing in it which
sensibly resists the motion of bodies passing transversely through: all this, is nothing but a phenomenon, or
actual matter of fact, found by experience. That this phenomenon is not produced sans moyen, that is without
some cause capable of producing such an effect; is undoubtedly true.  Philosophers therefore may search after
and discover that cause, if they can; be it mechanical or not mechanical.  But if they cannot discover the
cause; is therefore the effect itself, the phenomenon, or the matter of fact discovered by experience , (which is
all that is meant by the words attraction and gravitation) ever the less true?  Or is a manifest quality to be
called occult, because the immediate efficient cause of it (perhaps) is occult, or not yet discovered?  (Clarke's
fifth reply, Leibniz-Clarke, 118.)
Henry notes (ibid., 137) that Clarke does not name God as the direct cause, "nor any kind of immaterial entity".  This is
true, but he does not rule these things out either (and God always remains an option, given that in objecting to the claim
that Newton's gravity is due to a miracle, Clarke explains that there is no difference between the natural and the
miraculous, except that the former is common and the latter unusual.)  While it is possible that Clarke has abandoned
his earlier claim that there must be some intermediate means, on pain of contradiction, there is no indication that he
has; the point he is emphasizing is that we call the space a void because we have no evidence of a medium, but that
does not indicate there is none.
425 "Whence it seems to have been an ancient opinion that matter depends upon a Deity for its (laws of) motion as well
as for its existence.  The Cartesians make God the author of all motion & its as reasonable to make him the author of
the laws of motion. Matter is a passive principle & cannot move itself.  It continues in its state of moving or resting
unless disturbed.  It receives motion proportional to the force impressing it, and resists as much as it is resisted.  These
are passive laws & to affirm that there are no other is to speak against experience.  For we find in orselves a power of
moving our bodies by or thought.  Life & Will (thinking) are active Principles by wch we move our bodies, & thence
arise other laws of motion unknown to us."  (ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 619r, quoted in McGuire, "Force, Active
Principles", 171.)
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Newton might accept one of these principles, both, or neither, and his grounds might or might not
be empirical.  In the next sections, I shall consider more carefully what each of these principles
might mean for Newton, and what grounds he might have for holding them.
LOCAL CAUSATION
What exactly constitutes local causation?  Since Newton's ontology includes spirits as
well as matter, the answer to this question depends upon the sorts of entities involved.
Interactions between Material Bodies
Material bodies cannot interpenetrate.426  In cases involving material bodies alone,
therefore, a causal interaction is local if it occurs by contact between the bodies' surfaces.  To this
extent, Newton may be said to agree with Descartes.  As will become evident later, however,
Newton expects only a strikingly small range of effects to be explained in this way.
Interactions between Material and Immaterial Entities
For causal interactions involving both material and immaterial entities, we should not
expect surface action to be the means. The explanation here is decidedly un-Cartesian. According
to a Cartesian, the reason that immaterial and material entities could not causally interact by
surface action is that immaterial entities, being unextended, have no surfaces.  Thus for a
Cartesian, no two things of any kind can be in the same place at the same time.  Two bodies,
being identical with extension, exclude one another;427 and as for entities of different kinds, an
                                                                 
426 See De Gravitatione; Rule 3 of the Principia; Query 31 of the Opticks.
427  As Descartes explicates the Scholastic view that two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time,
impenetrability is implied by the essence of extension.  Responding to Henry More's claim that they are separable,
Descartes writes, "We cannot even understand one part of an extended thing penetrating another part equal to it without
understanding by that very fact half of that extension eliminated or annihilated.  But what is annihilated does not
penetrate another thing.  And thus, in my judgment, it is demonstrated that impenetrability pertains to the essence of
extension." (Quoted in Garber et. al., "New Doctrines of Body and its Powers, Place and Space", The Cambridge
History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, Vol. 1, 579.)
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immaterial entity can neither exclude a material body nor share its spatial location.  Newton's
view is quite different.  While he agrees that no two bodies can be in the same place at the same
time, the same cannot be said for entities of different kinds.
According to Newton, everything that exists is extended.  Spatial location is a condition
of existence, he writes in De Gravitatione; that which is neither everywhere nor somewhere does
not exist.428  God is everywhere, which is to say that God is substantially present throughout all of
infinite space; for as related below, Newton argues that it is not only God's virtus or active power
but also God himself that is omnipresent.  Minds are somewhere; they too are extended, being
"diffused through space".429   For to say that the mind is not substantially present in any
extension—insofar as this is even intelligible, Newton writes—is to say that it does not exist.430
Although Newton has relatively little to say about minds in his later writings, there is no reason to
think that he strays from this early view, and he clearly retains the belief that God is substantially
present throughout space.
Since bodies and minds are somewhere but God is everywhere, it follows that two things
will be in the same place at the same time if one of those things is God.  God shares the places
occupied by all other existents, and this means that in acting locally, God is not restricted to
acting only upon a body's surface.  Whereas each of two material bodies is stopped at the surface
of the other, omnipresent God can act locally by penetrating to the very centers of material
bodies.
                                                                 
428 "No being exists or can exist which is not related to space in some way.  God is everywhere, created minds are
somewhere, and body is in the space it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere does not exist.  And
hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of the first existing being." (De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings,
25.)
429 "Just as we understand the moment of duration to be diffused throughout all spaces, according to its kind, without
any concept of its parts: so it is no more contradictory that mind also, according to its kind, can be diffused through
space without any concept of its parts." (Ibid., 26.)
430 "Nor is the distinction between mind and body in his philosophy intelligible, unless at the same time we say that
mind has no extension at all, and so is not substantially present in any extension, that is, exists nowhere; which seems
the same as if we were to say that it does not exist, or at least renders its union with body thoroughly unintelligible and
impossible." (Ibid., 31.)
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If additional immaterial substances exist, ones that are inanimate such as an electric spirit
or immaterial aether, then these too might be able to act locally by co-occupying place with
material bodies.  We have no empirical grounds for denying this, Newton writes in the ultimately
unpublished Draft Conclusion to the General Scholium:  "That substances of different kinds do
not penetrate each other does not at all appear from the phenomena.  And we ought not rashly to
assert that which cannot be inferred from the phenomena."431
So, local causation for material bodies involves surface action, but local causation
between material and immaterial entities may involve the sharing of spatial location, as the
immaterial entity penetrates the particles of matter that are impenetrable by one another.  It is the
latter sort of local causation that Newton has in mind as he states the condition for gravity's cause
in the General Scholium.
This force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and
planets without any diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the
surfaces of the particles on which it acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in
proportion to the quantity of solid matter.432
This condition of local causation would be fulfilled by God, clearly enough, but might also be
fulfilled by some inanimate (or at least non-perceiving) immaterial substance.433  Newton
continues to speculate about such substances, notably the aether.  But while such substances
                                                                 
431 Draft Conclusion for General Scholium, MS. C (MS. Add 3965 fols. 360-362), Unpublished Scientific Papers of
Isaac Newton, 360-361.
432 General Scholium: "This force arises from some cause that penetrates as far as the centers of the sun and planets
without any diminution of its power to act, and that acts not in proportion to the surfaces of the particles on which it
acts (as mechanical causes are wont to do) but in proportion to the quantity of solid matter."  (Principia, 943.)  In a
draft for the General Scholium, Newton makes the same point: "[Gravity] proceeds from some cause that penetrates to
the very centers of the Sun and Planets without any diminution of its virtue, and which acts not on the surfaces of
particles alone, but on all matter to the very centre since its action is proportional to the quantity of matter in all bodies.
It proceeds from a cause by which the single particles of bodies act at immense distances with a virtue decreasing in the
duplicate ratio of the distances reciprocally."  (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 353.)
433 I add this parenthetical note, distinguishing non-perceiving substances from inanimate ones, because in keeping with
the vitalist strain of influence upon his thinking, Newton does at some points speculate that "all nature" might be
"alive".   See ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 620r, quoted in McGuire: "It appears that there are other laws of motion (unknown
to us) than those wch arise from Vis inertiae (unknown to us) wch is enough to justify & encourage or search after
them.  We cannot say that all nature is not alive." ("Force, Active Principles", n.52.)
198
might, if they are immaterial, be capable of acting locally by penetrating material particles, this
does not imply that they cannot also act non-locally.  This will become evident in the next
section, which examines the question of whether Newton adheres strictly to a general principle of
local causation.
Newton's Commitment to the Principle of Local Causation
Does Newton accept the general principle, PLC, that regardless of the kinds of entities
involved, all causation must be local?  He does not assert PLC, nor any other principles he
recognizes as hypotheses; it does not appear in the Principia, for instance.  Yet we can still ask
about the status of PLC in writings that may be classified as speculative, including unpublished
manuscripts, the Opticks queries, and the letters to Bentley.  The remarks to Bentley are
inconclusive.  Since Newton speaks there only of interactions between material bodies, it is
possible that he allows distant action by immaterial substances, but it is also possible that he
accepts PLC, on the grounds that non-local causation is unintelligible.
One text initially seems to dispense with the sorts of intelligibility requirements seen in
Descartes and Leibniz.  Descartes rejected action at a distance on the grounds that it implicitly
attributes to bodies an awareness of one another's existence,434 and Leibniz charged Newton's
theory with failing to provide an understandable story about how gravitational effects are
produced.  One of Newton's responses initially appears to suggest that since an omnipotent God
could endow matter with active powers of attracting or repelling other matter at distances, there is
nothing further to understand. "Certainly God could create planets that should move round of
themselves without any other cause than gravity that should prevent their removing through the
tangent", he writes, in an ultimately unpublished letter responding to Leibniz's charges.435  And
                                                                 
434 On this point, see Jammer, Concepts of Force, 104.  For a discussion of Descartes' criticism of Roberval's
explanation of the solar system, which employed attractions acting at a distance, see Westfall, Force, 86-87.
435 Newton to the Editor of the Memoirs of Literature, unpublished, written c. May 1712, Philosophical Writings, 116-
117.
199
while Leibniz expects some further explanation of gravity, beyond a law of God or a primitive
quality, Newton at one point seems to allow primitive qualities as the end of the explanation;
gravity is no more occult than hardness, he writes, for neither one can be explained
mechanically.436 Yet the letter's full remarks clearly indicate that Newton is not allowing
gravitational attraction as a primitive.  It is progress to know that gravity can keep the planets in,
even if we do not know its cause, he writes, implying that since the cause remains to be
discovered, gravity is not a primitive.437  Since Newton thinks there remains something to be
discovered, namely the causal story how gravitational effects are produced, he does not take
gravitational attraction to be a primitive power.  So the text in the end is fully consistent with
PLC.
Newton's commitment to PLC does come into question, however, when we examine the
aether of the Opticks.  In the final set of queries that he wrote for the Opticks, queries 17-24,438
Newton again speculates about an aether that might explain a wide range of phenomena,
including light behavior, heat transfer, and more dubiously, gravitational effects.439  The
                                                                 
436 "No man ever attempted to explain these qualities [i.e., the vis inertiae, the extention, the duration and mobility of
bodies] mechanically, or took them for miracles or supernatural things or fictions or occult qualities.  They are the
natural, real, reasonable, manifest qualities of all bodies seated in them by the will of God from the beginning of the
creation and perfectly incapable of being explained mechanically, and so may be the hardness of primitive particles of
bodies.  And therefore if any man should say that bodies attract one another by a power whose cause is unknown to us,
or by a power seated in the frame of nature by the will of God, or by a power seated in a substance in which bodies
move and float without resistance and which has therefore no vis inertiae but acts by other laws than those that are
mechanical: I know not why he should be said to introduce miracles and occult qualities and fictions into the world.
For Mr. Leibniz himself will scarce say that thinking is mechanical as it must be if to explain it otherwise be to make a
miracle, an occult quality, and a fiction." (Newton to the Editor of the Memoirs of Literature, unpublished, written c.
May 1712, Philosophical Writings, 116-117.)
437  "Certainly God could create planets that should move round of themselves without any other cause than gravity that
should prevent their removing through the tangent.  For gravity without a miracle can keep the planets in.  And to
understand this without knowing the cause of gravity, is as good a progress in philosophy as to understand…the frame
of the bones and muscles and their connection in the body of an animal and how the bones are moved by the
contracting or dilating of the muscles without knowing how the muscles are contracted or dilated by the power of the
mind, is [in] the philosophy of animal motion." (Ibid.)
438 Queries 17-24 were written last, and inserted between some earlier queries for the 1717/18 English edition of the
Opticks.  What became Query 31 for the 1717/18 edition was a revision of the essay that had appeared in the 1706
Optice as Query 23; and the version in the 1706 edition was itself a revision of an earlier essay.  On this point, see
Westfall, Never at Rest, 644.  The reader is also referred to McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", for an extensive
discussion of differences between the earlier and later versions of Query 23/31.
439 It would at best fail to explain the universal gravitation among ordinary particles of matter, and at worse, violate that
conclusion from the Principia.  Some commentators hold that Newton meant the aether more seriously as an
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extremely rare aether that figures in Query 21's hypothesis about gravity operates by repulsive
action among the aethereal particles, whose elastic force is "exceedingly great".  Increasing in
density as it extends outward from the sun, the aether sets up a pressure gradient that impels the
planets inward toward the sun.  As an explanation of gravity, the hypothesis is quite tenuous.  The
point here, however, is that in speculating about the tremendous elastic force by which the
aethereal particles "endeavor to recede from one another", Newton suggests a picture of aethereal
particles acting upon one another from a distance.440
This result could be avoided if the repulsive action of the aethereal particles were due to
some further medium, a continuous one that operated by contact.  During the period of the 1713
General Scholium, Newton had high hopes for the electric spirit, which in one text he takes to be
continuous.441  Yet when speculating about the repulsive forces in a particulate aether, Newton
does not mention the need for a continuous spirit.  One possible explanation weighs against PLC:
invoking a continuous medium would make the aether superfluous.  If the goal were to preserve
PLC, one could postulate a continuous medium as a direct explanation for light behavior, heat
transfer, and gravitational effects, cutting out the aethereal middleman.  It is also notable that the
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
explanation of optical phenomena than he did for gravitational effects.   Laudan argues that Newton did accept the
aethereal speculations of the Opticks, however as McMullin notes, Laudan's discussion of the Opticks aether focuses
upon optical and chemical phenomena, not upon the Query 21 hypothesis about gravitation. See McMullin, Newton on
Matter and Activity, 151.
440 Some commentators think that the aethereal particles act distantly (Cohen; Hawes), while others disagree  (Halls,
Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 207).   Janiak, tending toward the latter view, suggests that the aether
might operate locally: "The aether's ubiquity throughout space might ensure that its action is only local in character."
See Janiak's Introduction, Philosophical Writings, xxiv. We know from the Draft Conclusion to the General Scholium
(Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 360-361) that Newton thinks substances of different kinds might be
able to penetrate one another, and in accordance with this, Janiak notes that the aether particles might be able to
penetrate the particles of matter.  It is not clear how this suggestion could dispel the appearance of action at a distance
among the aethereal particles themselves, however, given that the aether is both extremely rare, and extremely elastic,
with the fine particles having tremendous repulsive force.  It is difficult to see how the aethereal particles' elastic
motions could be explained by contact; they lack resistance, and even if they could collide, Newton's explanation of
elastic collisions itself involves distance forces.
441 In that same text, Newton also writes that the electric force is not communicated by contact.  Initially, this is
puzzling. Why would the spirit not act by contact, if it is continuous?  The answer is that Newton means that the spirit
does not act by material contact. He is comparing it to the magnetic force, which he says does act by contact, and
which was widely accepted in Newton's time to act by means of material effluvia.   See my earlier discussion in chapter
IV.   The relevant passage appears in A Draft Conclusion to the Principia: "Magnetic force is communicated by
contact; the other forces are not." (Cohen, "Guide", 287-292.)
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suggestion Newton gives for the strength of the aether's repulsive force does nothing to preserve
PLC: he attributes it to the smallness of the aethereal particles.
Is Newton invoking action at a distance in one arena in order to avoid it in another?  He
seems to be doing just that, not only in Query 21, which invokes an aether to explain away the
apparent distant action by sun and planets upon one another, but also in Query 18's speculations
about heat transfer.  In that latter query, Newton describes an experiment in which two
thermometers are placed in glass cylinders, one evacuated of air and the other not. When the
cylinders are carried from a cold place into a warm one, Newton writes, the thermometers will
grow warm at nearly the same rate; and will cool at nearly same rate when taken back to a cold
place.  Newton infers that there might exist some very subtle, vibrating medium that can travel
through the glass and communicate heat from the air to the thermometer.442 (And presumably the
aether, rather than the air, would effect the heat transfer in the case of the unevacuated cylinder,
as well as the evacuated one.)  Thus he seems to be invoking the aether in part to avoid the result
that the air outside the cylinder is affecting the thermometer within it from a distance.443
 There is, however, an obvious means of avoiding the unsatisfactory result that Newton is
both allowing and trying to avoid action at a distance.  Perhaps he does not object to non-local
causation generally, but only to distant action by matter.  (Indeed, he may object to any action by
matter, as we shall see in a later section.)  In other words, it is not PLC that he aims to preserve,
but only the narrower principle identified earlier, namely, that matter cannot act where it is not.
In support of this, we may point to Newton's uncertainty about the aether's nature; it might well be
                                                                 
442 See Query 18, Opticks, 348-349.
443 The aether also has reductionist appeal.  It potentially offers a means of explaining a wide range of phenomena by
means of a single substance.  However, the same reductionist goals might be accomplished by the dual-natured force
that Newton speculates about in Query 31—a force that attracts at some distances, but repels at others.  So one means
of reducing the number of forces would be to attribute this dual-natured force directly to the particles of matter.  Since
the aether is not the only hope of achieving the reductionist goal, it is reasonable to think that it is appealing in part as a
means of avoiding the result that matter acts distantly.
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immaterial, in which case there could be action at a distance, but only by an immaterial
substance.444
Still, attributing the narrower principle to Newton avoids one oddity only by ushering in
another. If we suppose that Newton allows distant action by an immaterial aether, then since he
has no direct evidence of this aether, we should expect it at least to resemble his models of
immaterial substances.  Yet the immaterial substances that Newton considers better known, minds
and God, do not provide a model for distant action by an inanimate immaterial substance—for
Newton considers minds and God to act locally, as I explain in the next section.
Models for Local Causation
It is difficult to find an unproblematic case of local causation.  Collisions between
material bodies served for some time as exemplars, however as I show in a subsequent section,
Newton speculates that the explanation of elastic collisions between aggregate bodies will involve
distance forces, specifically the force of cohesion.  How might one explain phenomena involving
distance forces, such as gravity and the cohesive force, without abandoning either secondary
causation or the principle of local causation?  The natural step is to seek an immaterial medium
that could act locally.  If there is no direct evidence of such a medium, one might provide some
grounding for the hypothesis by looking to other immaterial substances as models.  The
immaterial substances in Newton's ontology are God and, though he does not claim to know their
substantial nature,445 probably minds as well.
The mind is an abstraction from experience, and as Locke points out in his Essay, the first
notion of active power comes from the experience of moving one's body.  If one takes minds to
be substances, this experience provides empirical support for the claim that the mind is an active
                                                                 
444 The nature of the aether is unclear; Newton states directly in Query 21, "I do not know what this Aether is."
(Opticks, 352.)
445 De Graviatione, Philosophical Writings, 33.
203
substance.  But is there empirical support for saying that in moving the body, the mind acts
locally?  Newton has relatively little to say about minds, but the early manuscript, De
Gravitatione does suggest that the mind is extended.  Why should we think that the mind is
extended?  It must be extended he writes, in order to be unified with the body.  To say the mind is
unextended "renders its union with the body thoroughly unintelligible and impossible."446   This
suggests that causation is local, but it also suggests that Newton's belief in local causation is
driving the view of the mind rather than the other way around.  Only if the mind is extended
could it be located where the body is located, as it must be to be unified with and to move the
body.  This is not empirical.
Neither is Newton's reasoning about God's substantial omnipresence empirical.  He does
claim empirical evidence of God's existence; he claims that in the design of animals and the
planets' orbital planes.  He does not, however, have empirical evidence that God himself is
present at all points in space, that is, that God is substantially omnipresent.  While it was
universally accepted that God is virtually omnipresent—which is to say that God's virtus or active
power reaches to all points in space—Newton argues for the unorthodox claim that God is also
substantially omnipresent.  In the General Scholium, he writes of God, "He is omnipresent not
only virtually but also substantially; for action requires substance [lit. for active power [virtus]
cannot subsist without substance.]"447  Having assumed the universally shared belief in God's
virtual omnipresence, Newton here argues that God himself must also be omnipresent, and he
reaches that conclusion on the grounds that an active power cannot subsist without substance.  If
we ask how exactly this reason is meant to show that God is omnipresent, however, we find the
assumption that causation must be local.  We know that Newton shares the general view that
                                                                 
446 Ibid., 31.
447 General Scholium, Principia, 941.  In his exchange with Leibniz, Clarke similarly holds that in virtue of his
immensity, God is substantially omnipresent; see Leibniz-Clarke.
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there cannot be properties without substances.448  But why does Newton think that in order for
God's power to be omnipresent, the substance, God himself, must be present everywhere in
space?  The answer, it appears, is that Newton assumes that a substance must be present where it
acts.449  For a third alternative to both the view that God is not spatially extended and the view
that he is spatially omnipresent is the claim that God is spatially extended in only in a limited area
of space.  (And that claim would meet Newton's condition that existence requires spatial
extension.)  Yet Newton disregards that alternative, instead taking God to be omnipresent.450  As
with minds, then, the principle of local causation determines God's nature, driving the view that
God exists at all points in space.451
At least with respect to minds and God, then, the principle of local causation appears to
be a metaphysical principle.  This produces a tension.  To the extent that God and minds are
active immaterial substances, they are the only available models for speculation about inanimate
immaterial substances.  Yet in keeping with his experimental method, Newton does not transplant
his reasoning about them into his effort to explain gravity; he does not postulate a continuous
                                                                 
448 See De Gravitatione: "The idea of accident involves the concept of created substance." (Philosophical Writings, 32.)
449 Howard Stein takes Newton's reasoning to be empirical: "It might well be asked how experience could be said to
ground Newton's assertion that "God is everywhere."  But first—although the claim that God is everywhere present in
space was a controversial one, and even somewhat dangerous to advocate—Newton thought the doctrine of the
ubiquity or omnipresence of God amply founded in the tradition of revealed truth; and second, he clearly thought
experience shows that minds can act only where they are; so the doctrine of God's omnipotence (likewise founded in
revelation) itself entails his omnipresence." ("Newton's Metaphysics", 270.)  Yet how would God's omnipotence entail
his omnipresence?  Revelation seems to provide no claims that, together with omnipotence, would entail omnipresence
(for as Stein notes, Newton's claim that God is substantially omnipresent was controversial).  It appears, then, that as I
have argued, God's omnipresence is entailed not by the claim of omnipotence alone, but by that claim together with an
assumption of local causation.
450 One might resist my claim that Newton assumes God to act locally via the following reasoning.  Given that Newton
takes action to require substance, and on this basis thinks that God must be spatially extended, he could hold that God
is extended in only a limited part of space.  Yet to say that an extended God has only limited extension is incompatible
with God's infinity.  And so if Newton takes God to be extended at all, then so long as he takes God to be infinite, he
must take God to be infinitely extended and thus omnipresent.  So, it is not an assumption of local causation that
determines God's omnipresent nature, it is the combined claims that there cannot be action without substance and that
God is infinite.  While I allow this possibility, I still think that Newton may be relying upon an assumption of local
causation, since he does so in reasoning about the mind's extended nature. Again, in defense of his claim that the mind
is extended, Newton suggests that only an extended mind could be unified with the body, and the notion that the mind
must be unified with the body in order to move it suggests that the mind could move the body only by acting locally
upon it.
451 I thank Andrew Janiak for a discussion of these issues.
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spirit in order to do away with action at a distance.  Instead, the intuitively appealing principle of
local causation lingers as a desirable result that he hopes the phenomena will support.   Let us
now turn to the principle of the passivity of matter.
THE PASSIVITY OF MATTER
For Descartes, there is in general no difference between action and passion; a single event
will be an action with respect to one thing, but a passion with respect to some other thing.452  In
the realm of material substance, this must be so, because Descartes asserts a material plenum.
Since matter is identical to extension or space, there is no such thing as empty space between any
particle—any area of extension—and its neighbors.  Therefore, a particle that is pushed by the
neighbor on its right must inevitably push against the neighbor on its left, and is simultaneously
both active and passive.  It is passive with respect to the particle pushing it, and active with
respect to the one it in turn pushes.
Newton, however, rejects Descartes' material plenum.  His investigations also extend to a
great range of phenomena, including "fermentations" or chemical reactions, which appear to
involve the spontaneous generation of motion.  Lacking a concept of energy, Newton concludes
that to replenish the motion that is "always on the decay", the natural order must contain some
active principles that generate "new motions", a vast class of phenomena that includes
gravitational attractions, electrical and magnetic effects, growth, and chemical reactions.  Now,
the belief in a material plenum and the belief that the quantity of motion in the world remains
constant are the supports of Descartes' merely rational distinction between action and passion.
Having rejected those beliefs, Newton sees a real distinction between action and passion.   And so
active principles could not belong to matter if matter is passive.  Yet what exactly does it mean
                                                                 
452 "What is a passion with regard to one subject is a always an action in some other regard....Although an agent and
patient are often quite different, an action and passion must always be the same thing which has these two names on
account of the two different subjects to which it may be related." (The Passions of the Soul, I.1, CSM, 328.)
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for matter to be passive, and which phenomena does Newton expect to be explained by matter
alone?
The Meaning of Passive Matter in Newton's System
As we saw earlier, Newton writes in some 1706 draft material, "Matter is a passive
principle and cannot move itself", and this gave us an initial definition of passivity.  To spell out
the details of what this could mean, however, it will be helpful to review a number of
possibilities.
(1) Matter is passive if it plays no role in causing changes of state in itself or in anything else.
There are a number of ways of understanding this definition, all of which Newton rejects.
One might understand it as a claim that matter is unable to act upon anything, either by causing
other matter to move or by exciting sensations or perceptions in us.  Newton sees the second
disjunct as an unsatisfactory consequence of the Cartesian identification of matter with extension,
and thus a reason to reject the Cartesian view.  A substance, Newton writes in De Gravitatione, is
an entity that acts upon things.  We would not consider something a body if it could not move or
excite sensations and perceptions in minds.453
One might also understand the definition in terms of a materialist version of pre-
established harmony; created entities do not causally affect one another, but only appear to do so,
as each carries through its divinely prescribed set of changes.  Or one might understand it as an
assertion that all causation is primary causation, that is, the direct action by God.  Malebranche's
version of this holds that only God can produce effects, and though bodies appear to cause effects
in one another, as they collide, in fact God is at each instant recreating the bodies, at different
points in space.
                                                                 
453 "Although philosophers do not define substance as an entity that can act upon things, yet everyone tacitly
understands this of substances….They would hardly allow that body is a substance if it could not move, nor excite any
sensation or perception in any mind whatsoever." (De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 21-22.)
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As we saw earlier, however, Newton inclines strongly toward secondary causation.
Although God sometimes intervenes in the established order, to reform the planetary orbits for
instance, God accomplishes most of his ends through secondary causation.   Newton usually tries
to explain even distance forces as secondary causes, and the vis inertiae, which gives rise to the
three passive laws of motion is consistently a secondary cause. The subsequent possibilities I
consider therefore assume secondary causation, each telling us what it might mean for matter to
be passive if matter still plays some part in the story of causal interactions.
(2) Matter is passive if it cannot resist any attempt to change its state.
As Kepler noted, "If the matter of the celestial bodies were not endowed with inertia,
something similar to weight...the smallest motive force would suffice to impart to them an infinite
velocity."454  Such effects are contrary to observations, and we therefore do not find any of
Newton's predecessors or contemporaries directly asserting that bodies may be accelerated to
infinite or arbitrary velocities.  Such was the unintended consequence, however, of any view that
made no specific provision for resistance.  Locke, for example, takes the primary qualities of
body to be solidity, extension, figure, and mobility,455 but while solidity suggests that a body
colliding with an obstacle cannot pass through it, these qualities are still consistent with the result
that Kepler wants to rule out, namely, that the body could accelerate the obstacle to an infinite
velocity.  Newton, like the Scholastics, Kepler, and Descartes, attributes a resistive power to
matter, and having distinguished weight from mass, he connects matter's resistive power to its
quantity, that is, to its mass.
(3) Matter is passive if it cannot change its own state.
In Query 31, Newton writes of his three laws of motion as "passive laws of motion" that
                                                                 
454 Kepler, De causis planetarum; the passage appears in Jammer, Concepts of Mass, 55.
455 Essay, I.viii.9, 170.
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result from the vis inertiae, or force of inertia.456   According to these laws, a material particle
cannot change its own state; it cannot accelerate itself by redirecting any motion it has or by
changing its speed, and will remain in its state unless some impressed force is exerted upon it.  So
a particle's inability to accelerate itself is part of the meaning of passivity.  Matter cannot move
itself in the sense that one bit of matter cannot move itself.
However, the three laws just by themselves leave open the possibility that matter could
move itself in another sense.   The three laws do not rule out the possibility that one bit of matter
could move another bit of matter.  One bit of matter could move another if it could impress a
force upon it.  Now as Newton tells us in Definition 4, there are different kinds of impressed
forces, including not only percussion and pressure, but also centripetal forces, including gravity.
And as Newton makes plain in Query 31 and elsewhere, he does not consider gravity to be
passive.  The gravitational force is either identical to, or caused by, some "active principle", for it
is a generative source of new motions.  Since Newton considers the generation of new motion to
be incompatible with passivity, we need to supplement our definition.
(4) A material particle is passive if it cannot change its own state, and it cannot generate "new
motion" in other matter.
According to this definition, matter alone cannot generate new motion, so matter alone
cannot explain gravitational effects, or the sudden accelerations of resting particles away from
one another, as might occur in some "fermentations", that is, chemical reactions.   If matter is
passive, then the generation of new motion indicates that some active entity, and thus something
other than matter, is at work.
                                                                 
456 In Query 31, Newton writes, "It seems to me farther, that these particles have not only a Vis inertiae, accompanied
with such passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that Force, but also that they are moved by certain active
Principles." (Opticks, 401.)  In draft material for the1706 Optice (Query 23/31), dated by McGuire as c. 1705, Newton
is more specific, mentioning each of the three laws: "Matter is a passive principle & cannot move itself.  It continues in
its state of moving or resting unless disturbed.  It receives motion proportional to the force impressing it, and resists as
much as it is resisted.  These are passive laws & to affirm that there are no other is to speak against experience.  For we
find in orselves a power of moving our bodies by or thought.  Life & Will (thinking) are active Principles by wch we
move our bodies, & thence arise other laws of motion unknown to us." (ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 619r, a draft variant of
the 1706 Optice's Query 23, quoted in McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 171.)
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I take this definition to be the meaning of the earlier-stated principle of the passivity of
matter, and with this refinement, we can restate the principle of the passivity of matter (PPM) as
follows.
PPM:  Matter is passive, in that a particle of matter can neither change its own state, nor
generate new motion in other matter.
Let us now consider what passive matter could do.  Specifically, we want to know whether a
passive material body could communicate its own motion to another body, or redirect existing
motion in another body.  Such communication of existing motion will be compatible with the
passivity of matter, obviously, only if it is genuine communication, as opposed to the mere
appearance of communication that in fact involves the generation of new motion.  Newton tells us
in Query 31 that we meet with very little motion in the world except that caused by active
principles, and that if the world contained only passive principles, the sun would become a cold
inactive mass, life would cease, and the planets would not remain in their orbits.457  Is he thinking
that the only motions explicable in terms of matter alone are the absolute translations caused by
the vis inertiae, that is, the constant rectilinear motions across absolute space?
What Can Passive Matter Do?
What can a material particle do while still qualifying as passive?  We know that by its vis
inertiae, it can remain in a state of absolute rest, that is, rest in absolute space, or in a state of
absolute translation across space.   It can also resist impressed forces.  Can it redirect the motion
of other matter, or communicate its own motion to other matter?  Perhaps if it could do this by
contact—perhaps if the impressed forces of pressure or percussion operated by contact—matter
                                                                 
457 "For we meet with very little Motion in the World, besides what is owing to these active Principles.  And if it were
not for these Principles, the Bodies of the Earth, Planets, Comets, Sun, and all things in them, would grow cold and
freeze, and become inactive Masses; and all Putrefaction, Generation, Vegetation, and Life would cease, and the
Planets and Comets would not remain in their Orbs." (Query 31, Opticks, 399-400.)
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would still qualify as passive.  How exactly could a body communicate its own motion to another
body, however?
Henry More tried to dispel the mystery with a metaphor, suggesting that one body rouses
the other, as if from sleep, and Locke remarked upon the puzzle in his Essay; experience makes
the communication of motion by impulse familiar to us, yet the causes and manner of production
are obscure.458  Leibniz explained the communication of motion in terms of the active vis viva.
Does Newton think that it is possible for motion to be communicated from one body to
another, so that the causal story of collisions includes only passive matter?  Or does the apparent
communication of motion really boil down to the decay of one motion, and the generation of a
new motion by some active entity?  There are two cases to consider here: collisions between
aggregate bodies, and collisions between individual particles.
Newton's remarks in Query 31 suggest that when aggregate bodies collide, their
rebounding motions are not transferred motion but new motion.
If two equal Bodies meet directly in vacuo, they will by the Laws of Motion stop where
they meet and lose all their Motion, and remain in rest, unless they be elastick and receive
some new Motion from their Spring....This may be try'd, by letting two equal Pendulums
fall against one another from equal heights...if of elastick bodies, they will lose all but what
they recover from their Elasticity.459
So the elastic bodies receive "new motion" from their spring.  While Newton's subsequent use of
the term 'recover' might seem to undermine this interpretation, because it arguably connotes
preserved motion, in other texts he attributes elasticity or "springiness" to the distance forces he
associates with activity and new motion.   In some drafts for a projected (but ultimately
unpublished) Book IV of the Opticks, which McGuire dates to the early 1690's,460 he considers it
                                                                 
458 Locke, Essay, II.xxiii.28.
459 Query 31, Opticks, 398.
460 See McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 165.
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"very probable" that a great number of phenomena in nature  "depend upon certain kinds of forces
whereby minute bodies attract or dispell one another at little distances".  Among these
phenomena he includes "ye springiness or elasticity of hard bodies".461
Let us consider how "ye springiness" of aggregate bodies could be new motion produced
by distance forces. Aggregate bodies have pores and are made up of many particles.462 Newton
speculates that these particles are held together by a force that has some sensible effect at short
distances from the particles, and is exceedingly strong once the particles are in immediate
contact.463 Thus according to Newton's speculations, a single force performs at least these two
functions, impelling separated but near particles toward one another, and then binding them once
they are contiguous.464   In virtue of its impelling function, this is a distance force, and Newton
                                                                 
461  "Hypoth 2   As all the great motions in the world depend upon a certain kind of force (wch in this earth we call
gravity) whereby great bodies attract one another at great distances: so all the little motions in ye world depend upon
certain kinds of forces whereby minute bodies attract or dispell one another at little distances.  How the great bodies of
ye Earth Sun Moon & Planets gravitate towards one another what are ye laws & quantities of their gravitating forces at
all distance from them & how all ye motions of those bodies are regulated by their gravities I shewed in my
Mathematical Principles of Philosophy to the satisfaction of my readers.  And if Nature be most simple & fully
consonant to her self she observes the same method in regulating the motions of smaller bodies wch she doth in
regulating those of the greater.  This principle of nature being very remote from the conceptions of Philosophers I
forbade to describe it in that Book leas[t it] should be accounted an extravagant freak & so prejudice my Readers
against all those things wch were ye main designe of the Book: & yet I hinted [at them] both in the Preface & in ye book
it self where I speak of the [refraction] of light & of ye elastick power of ye Air: but [now] the design of yt book being
secured by the approbation of Mathematicians, [I have] not scrupled to propose this Principle in plane words.  The truth
of this Hypothesis I assert not because I cannot prove it, but I think it very probable because a great part of the
phaenomena of nature do easily flow from it wch seem otherwise inexplicable: such as are chymical solutions
precipitations philtrations, detonizations, volatizations, fixations, rarefactions, condensations, unions, separations,
fermentations: the cohesion texture firmness fluidity & porosity of bodies, the rarity & elasticity of air, the reflexion &
refraction of light, the rarity of air in glass pipes & ascention of water therein, the permiscibility of some bodies &
impermiscibility of others, the conception & lastingness of heat, the emission & extinction of light, the generation &
destruction of air, the nature of fire & flame, ye springiness or elasticity of hard bodies." (ULC Add. MS. 3970.3, ff.
338-8v, in Westfall, Force, 379; his reconstructions of text that is missing due to damage to the paper appear in
brackets, as he indicates, ibid., 411, n.128.) For a discussion of this passage, see also McGuire, "Force, Active
Principles", 165; McGuire dates this draft to the early 1690's.
462 Query 31, Opticks, 394.
463 "The Parts of all homogeneal hard Bodies which fully touch one another, stick together very strongly.  And for
explaining how this may be, some have invented hooked Atoms, which is begging the Question; and others tell us that
Bodies are glued together by rest, that is, by an occult Quality, or rather by nothing; and others, that they stick together
by conspiring Motions, that is, by relative rest amongst themselves.  I had rather infer from their Cohesion, that their
Particles attract one another by some Force, which in immediate Contact is exceeding strong, at small distances
performs the chymical Operations above-mention'd, and reaches not far from the Particles with any sensible Effect."
(Query 31, Opticks, 388-389.)
464  Passages suggesting this may be found in the General Scholium, in the unpublished Draft Conclusion for the
General Scholium, and in Query 31.  In the General Scholium, Newton writes:
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speculates that  it may explain elasticity and thus the rebounding motions in elastic collisions.  In
a collision, the cohesive force prevents the particles comprising an aggregate body from sliding
away from one another, so that instead of deforming, the body springs back by returning to its
original shape.465  (Since an aggregate body is porous, it might deform without the particles losing
contact with one another; the areas between the body's parts could diminish, for instance.) Since
Newton has speculated that a single force both impels particles toward one another when they are
separated but near, and then binds them together once they are contiguous, it seems that impacts
between aggregate bodies involve the operation of distance forces.466
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
A few things could now be added concerning a certain very subtle spirit pervading gross bodies and lying
hidden in them; by its force and actions, the particles of bodies attract one another at very small distances and
cohere when they become contiguous. (Principia, 943-944.)
Similarly, he writes in the Draft Conclusion for the General Scholium,
Proposition 1.  That very small particles of bodies, whether contiguous or at very small distances, attract one
another.
Proposition 2. Or Scholium.  That attraction is of the electric kind.
Proposition 3.  That attraction of particles at very small distances is exceeding strong (by Experiment 5) and
suffices for the cohesion of bodies. (Unpublished Scientific Papers, 361.)
And in Query 31 he speculates,
The Parts of all homogeneal hard Bodies which fully touch one another, stick together very strongly.  And for
explaining how this may be, some have invented hooked Atoms, which is begging the Question; and others
tell us that Bodies are glued together by rest, that is, by an occult Quality, or rather by nothing; and others,
that they stick together by conspiring Motions, that is, by relative rest amongst themselves.  I had rather infer
from their Cohesion, that their Particles attract one another by some Force, which in immediate Contact is
exceeding strong, at small distances performs the chymical Operations above-mention'd, and reaches not far
from the Particles with any sensible Effect. (Opticks, 388-389.)
465  "If a Body is compact, and bends or yields inward to pressure without any sliding of its Parts, it is hard and elastic,
returning to its Figure with a Force arising from the mutual attraction of its Parts.  If the Parts slide upon one another,
the Body is malleable or soft." (Query 31, Opticks, 394.)
466 This has implications for a definition of activity, since it might turn out that distinct forces perform the binding and
impelling functions, rather than a single force, as Newton supposes.
     Statics presents cases in which forces act, yet because the net force is zero there is no acceleration or in some cases
no motion at all.  For example, we can suppose a cold universe containing a single, aggregate body, at absolute rest in
space.  If we suppose the body to be cold, then none of its particles vibrates with heat, and if we suppose the body to be
perfectly hard, so that its particles are in contact with one another, then none of the particles moves toward another or is
in any other way in motion.  There is a force acting, however, for this is an aggregate body whose constituent particles
are not merely contiguous but held in contact with one another by the cohesive force. (The gravitational force acts as
well, between the centers of any two particles, but let us focus upon the cohesive force.)
     As noted above, Newton speculates that a single force performs both the function of impelling distant particles
toward one another, and the function of binding them strongly once they become contiguous.  So we can classify the
cohesive force as a distance force on the basis of a counterfactual: if any particles were to become separated, the force
would act across the distance, to impel them back toward one another.  As a distance force, the cohesive force is
associated with activity, so we seem to have a situation in which there can be activity without any new motion.  Yet
there should be no oddity in this precisely because the force is a distance force.  Although its cohesive function may be
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What about the case of individual particles?  Here the cohesive force is not a factor. We
might therefore expect Newton to say that if a moving particle collides with a resting one, the
former communicates motion to the latter by contact.  That does not appear to be Newton's view,
however.   He suggests in Query 31 that like soft bodies, bodies that are absolutely hard will not
rebound from one another. "Impenetrability makes them only stop", he writes.467  He also
suggests that particles are hard and impenetrable.468  Since they have no pores, we may presume
that he considers them absolutely hard.  This suggests that the impact of two hard particles will
not produce an elastic rebound.  Without any cohesive force operating, the particles will simply
stop.  Instead of communicating motion, the impact between individual particles produces a
decay of motion.  This decay of motion is the strikingly small range of effects due to contact
action, mentioned earlier.
According to the picture sketched here, then, what appears in elastic collisions to be the
communication of motion from one body to another is in fact the decay of motion followed by the
generation of new motion.  This picture is consistent with Newton's reference to elastic rebounds
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
performed at absolute rest, it also has the ability to draw particles together should they become separated, and thus to
generate new motion.
     What if the force that makes particles cohere turns out to be distinct, however, from the force that impels separated
particles together?  In Newton's speculations, a single force performs these two functions, acting both when the
particles are spatially separated and when they are in contact.  Since these are only speculations, however, it is also
possible that two distinct forces are responsible for these distinct functions—one force impelling particles toward one
another when they are separated but near, and another holding them together once they are in contact.  On this
supposition, the cohesive force would act only upon particles in contact, and therefore could not be considered a
distance force in virtue of action it would take upon spatially separated particles.  Yet it prevents the separations that
would occur if the particles were merely contiguous, and were subjected to an impressed force.   Since Newton does
not consider the cohesive force as performing only that one function, we cannot point to any texts to say that he would
still classify it as active, yet it seems fair to say that he would.  If so, this suggests that there can be activity even though
the only force operating lacks the ability to generate new motion.
     Whether this result is odd or not really depends, however, upon where the causal efficacy lies.  If the causal efficacy
lies in the forces, then it might be odd to consider a force to be active or an "active principle" (for at one point in Query
31, Newton identifies active principles with gravity and the forces causing cohesion and fermentation) if it lacks the
ability to generate new motion.  If the causal efficacy lies in a substance, however, and the forces are distinct only to
the extent that they represent distinct functions performed by that substance, then since that substance has the ability to
accelerate particles as well as make them cohere, we can retain the identification of activity with the ability to generate
new motion.
467 Query 31, Opticks, 398.
468 Query 31, Opticks, 394.
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in Query 31 as the "new motion" that bodies gain from their spring,469 and it agrees with his
explicit remark there that we meet with very little motion in the world, except that due to active
principles.470  If matter is passive, and thus is not the bearer of these active principles, then the
only motions explicable in terms of matter alone are the absolute translations caused by matter's
vis inertiae.
This is a dramatic departure from the orthodox mechanical philosophy, in which
collisions served as a model for causal interactions among material bodies.  That picture involved
two claims.  First, motion could be only transferred in collisions, as opposed to being
extinguished and then generated anew, and second, the transfer of motion was effected by
contact.  According to the interpretation I have sketched here, Newton expects the mechanical
philosophy's model of material contact action to be overthrown for nearly all phenomena, for he
expects that not even elastic collisions transfer motion or operate by material contact.  The details
of Newton's replacement model are not known, of course, because the means by which distance
forces operate remains unknown.  But if their operation is by contact, it will be by the contact of
some immaterial substance.
Newton's Commitment to the Principle of the Passivity of Matter
Does Newton accept PPM, at least in his speculative writings?    One complication for
answering this question is that Newton is uncertain about the nature of the aether, if it exists.  He
considers it active,471 if it exists, and at various points he seems to suppose that if it exists, it is
                                                                 
469 "If two equal Bodies meet directly in vacuo, they will by the Laws of Motion stop where they meet and lose all their
Motion, and remain in rest, unless they be elastick and receive some new Motion from their Spring....This may be try'd,
by letting two equal Pendulums fall against one another from equal heights...if of elastick bodies, they will lose all but
what they recover from their Elasticity." (Query 31, Opticks, 398.)
470 "We meet with very little Motion in the World, besides what is owing to these active Principles." (Query 31,
Opticks, 399.)
471 In Newton's pre-Principia alchemical writings, the aether is active, and remains so in later speculations.  In Query
18, for instance, Newton writes, "Is not the Heat of the warm Room convey'd through the Vacuum by the Vibrations of
a much subtiler Medium than Air.…And is not this Medium exceedingly more elastick and active?" (Opticks, 349.)
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material. And in the later queries, he returns to some earlier speculations about the
transformability of matter.  Yet there are reasons for thinking that Newton at least sometimes
speculated about an immaterial aether.  For one thing, in Query 21's speculative aethereal
explanation of gravitational effects, he writes that he does not know what this aether is.
Additionally, to invoke a material aether in order to explain gravitational effects would threaten a
regress, as discussed earlier, since the material particles of that aether would themselves
gravitate.472
If we set aside the aether and consider ordinary matter, Newton is strongly drawn to
PPM, asserting it directly in some texts, as we have seen.  He approvingly adopts Bentley's
phrase, 'inanimate brute matter', and in draft material for the 1706 Optice, he confines activity to
spirits, writing, "Matter is a passive principle, and cannot move itself....Life and will (thinking)
are active principles, by which we move our bodies."473  All matter is attended with signs of life,
                                                                 
472 As noted in an earlier chapter, Newton is well aware of the regress threat.  For the 1713 edition of the Principia, he
writes but ultimately does not publish a corollary setting out the regress argument.  In all editions of the Principia,
Corollary 1 to Proposition 6 of Book III states that the weights of bodies depend only upon the quantity of matter, not
upon forms or textures.  In the 1687 edition, Corollary 2 then states that there cannot be a material aether, or any other
matter, that either fails to gravitate or else gravitates less in virtue of its form (and here Newton presumably means the
fineness of its particles).  Newton's reasoning here depends upon a hypothesis that he will eliminate for successive
editions of the Principia (i.e., Hypothesis III, which states: "Every body can be transformed into body of any other
kind, and can assume successively all intermediate degrees of quality.")  In accordance with the elimination of that
hypothesis, Newton revises Corollary 2 for the 1713 edition, but the content of the Corollary remains much the same.
Another revision—a further corollary that he writes but ultimately does not include—states the regress argument about
the aether.  Any attempt to explain gravitational effects by postulating a rare material medium that lacks gravity or has
a lesser gravitational tendency will end in a regress:
If anyone should deny these Hypotheses and have recourse to a third hypothesis, namely, that one admit
some matter with no gravity by which the gravity of the perceptible matter may be explained; it is necessary
for him to assert two kinds of solid particles which cannot be transmuted into one another: the one [kind] of
denser [particles] which are heavy (have gravity) in proportion to the quantity of matter, and out of which all
matter with gravity and consequently the whole perceptible world is compounded, and the other [kind] of less
dense particles which have to be the cause of the gravity of the denser ones but themselves have no gravity,
lest their gravity might have to be explained by a third kind and that (again by a fourth) and so on to infinity.
(MS. U.L.C. Add. 3965.6, folio 267r; the passage appears in McGuire, "Transmutation and Immutability:
Newton's Doctrine of Physical Qualities", 264.)
To block the regress, one could of course suppose that the actions of the material aether particles are due to some
further medium, one that was immaterial and therefore did not gravitate.  But such a move would render the aether
superfluous; since there is no more evidence for an aether than for this further, immaterial medium, one might just as
well invoke the immaterial medium from the outset to explain gravitational effects, cutting out the aethereal
middleman.
473 "Whence it seems to have been an ancient opinion that matter depends upon a Deity for its (laws of) motion as well
as for its existence.  The Cartesians make God the author of all motion & its as reasonable to make him the author of
the laws of motion. Matter is a passive principle & cannot move itself.  It continues in its state of moving or resting
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he writes, in more draft material for the Optice, suggesting by the term 'attended' that this life is
external rather than internal to matter.474
One might argue that there is a shift in tone by Query 31, as revised for the 1717/18
Opticks. Whereas Newton's draft material for the 1706 Optice states that matter is a passive
principle, in Query 31, it is no longer matter itself, but matter's inherent force of inertia that is the
passive principle: "The Vis inertiae is a passive Principle by which Bodies persist in their motion
or rest."475  Drawing upon that remark, one might read Newton as suggesting that while matter
possesses a passive principle, namely, the vis inertiae, it might also possess an active principle.
And one might then see that possibility sketched in this draft passage for the General Scholium:
"The particles of very many bodies seem to be endowed with an electric force and to act upon
each other at small distances even without friction".476
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
unless disturbed.  It receives motion proportional to the force impressing it, and resists as much as it is resisted.  These
are passive laws & to affirm that there are no other is to speak against experience.  For we find in orselves a power of
moving our bodies by or thought.  Life & Will (thinking) are active Principles by wch we move our bodies, & thence
arise other laws of motion unknown to us." (ULC, Add. 3970, fol. 619r, a draft variant of the 1706 Optice's Query 23,
quoted in McGuire, "Force, Active Principles, 171.)
474 "Life & will are active Principles by wch we move our bodies, & thence arise other laws of motion unknown to us.
And since all matter duly formed is attended with signes of life & all things are framed wth perfect art & wisdom &
Nature does nothing in vain: if there be an universal life & all space be the sensorium of a thinking being who by
immediate presence perceives all things in it...the laws of motion arising from life or will may be of universal extent."
(Draft material for Query 23 of the Optice, ULC Ad. 3970.9 f.619, Force, 397; my italics.)  In addition to Westfall's
discussion of this passage (ibid.), see McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, 80, and McGuire, "Force, Active
Principles", 205.
475 "Nature will be very conformable to herself and very simple, performing all the great motions of the heavenly
Bodies by the Attraction of Gravity which intercedes those Bodies, and almost all the small ones of their Particles by
some other attractive and repelling Powers which intercede the Particles.  The Vis inertiae is a passive Principle by
which Bodies persist in their motion or rest, receive Motion in proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as much
as they are resisted." (Query 31, Opticks, 397.)
476 Draft material for the General Scholium appears to attribute electric forces to particles, which is to say to matter:
As the System of the Sun, Planets and Comets is put in motion by the forces of gravity and its parts persist in
their motions, so also the smaller systems of bodies seem to be set in motion by other forces and their
particles to be moved among themselves in different ways, and especially by the electric force.  For the
particles of very many bodies seem to be endowed with an electric force and to act upon each other at small
distances even without friction, and those which are most electric, through friction, emit a spirit to great
distances, by means of which straws and light bodies are now attracted, now repelled and now moved in
diverse ways. (Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, 353-54.)
See also Hawes, "Newton's Revival of the Aether Hypothesis and the Explanation of Gravitational Attraction", 205.
On the basis of the quoted passage and similar texts, Hawes argues that Newton accepted action at a distance via the
electric force, while rejecting it for gravitational effects.
217
At first glance, this remark does appear to suggest action at a distance; it appears to
suggest that while friction produces an electric spirit that conveys the electric force, the force acts
over shorter distances without friction, and thus without the electric spirit as a medium.  Yet a
look at the Draft Conclusion to the Principia indicates that this is not what Newton has in mind.
He does not credit friction with producing the electric spirit, but only with expanding its range.
Without friction, the electric spirit still abounds, it simply does not reach as far.477  And as
mentioned earlier, while Newton opens Query 31 by asking whether particles of matter have
powers or forces by which they act on one another at a distance, he soon adds that he does not
know how such attractions between spatially separated bodies are performed.
At bottom, the dominant tone in Query 31 is uncertainty, and PPM seems to be driving
that uncertainty, as Newton leaves the question of where active principles or powers are located
unanswered.  In earlier draft material, Newton wrote that the nature of the active principle, and its
relation to matter, was mysterious,478 and by Query 31 the mystery remains unsolved.  Newton
continues to speak of active principles as something extrinsic to matter, but without assigning
them any definite location.479
                                                                 
477 Thus Newton's point in the following passage is that while particles act upon one another at greater distances with
friction than without, in both cases an electric spirit is present that conveys the force. "By these experiments it is fully
enough clear that glass at small distances always abounds in electric force, even without friction, and therefore abounds
in an electric spirit which is diffused through its whole body and always surrounds the body with a small atmosphere,
but never goes far out into the air unless it is stirred up by friction.  And the case is the same for other electric bodies."
(A Draft Conclusion to the Principia, Cohen, "Guide", 289.)
478 "Without some other principle than the vis inertiae there could be no motion in the world.  (And what that Principle
is & by (means of) laws it acts on matter is a mystery or how it stands related to matter is difficult to explain)." (ULC
Add. 3970, folls. 255r-256r, quoted by McGuire, "Force, Active Principles", 170-171.)  The passage, which was
written in English, is from a draft variant of the 1706 Optice's Query 23, a revised version of which would later become
Query 31.  McGuire dates this draft material, which was written in English, to c. 1705.
479 Whereas the particles of matter possess the vis inertiae, which gives rise to the three passive laws of motion, they
are "moved by" active principles: "It seems to me farther, that these particles have not only a Vis inertiae, accompanied
with such passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that Force, but also that they are moved by certain active
Principles, such as is that of Gravity, that which causes Fermentation, and the Cohesion of Bodies. These Principles I
consider, not as occult Qualities, supposed to result from the specifick Forms of Things, but as general Laws of Nature,
by which the Things themselves are form'd; their Truth appearing to us by Phaenomena, though their Causes be not yet
discover'd." (Query 31, Opticks, 401.)
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Grounds for the Principle of the Passivity of Matter
What grounds might Newton have for PPM?   He does not seem to have inductive
warrant for it.  Inductive warrant for the three laws of motion does not constitute inductive
warrant for PPM, since as we saw earlier, PPM is more restrictive upon matter than are the three
laws of motion; the three laws tell us that a bit of matter cannot alter its own state, but they do not
rule out the possibility that one particle of matter might have an attracting power by which it can
generate motion in another particle.
One might ask why Newton does not assert PPM, given that he does assert the laws of
motion—and yet those laws are not based upon uninterpreted experience.  Law 1, for instance, is
not derived from any theory-free observations, for we do not have experience of any bodies that
are wholly free of impressed forces. PPM consists in a conjunction, and Newton asserts the first
conjunct—that a particle of matter cannot change its own state—for that boils down to the laws of
motion.  The second conjunct—that a particle of matter cannot generate new motion in other
matter—he does not assert.  Why does Newton not assert the second conjunct as well as the first,
given that he accepts interpreted observations as an empirical basis for his propositions?  The
answer, I think, is that the first conjunct is necessary for doing dynamics, whereas the second is
not.480  To do dynamics, Newton needs the laws of motion, but he does not need the claim that
matter cannot initiate new motion in other matter; while he gravely doubts that matter could act
distantly without a medium, or otherwise generate new motion, his ability to derive forces from
effects and to predict further effects from those forces would be untouched by an acceptance of
action at a distance.  The laws of motion, and thus the first claim comprising PPM, have empirical
bona fides that the second claim lacks, such as the successful predictions of further effects.
Newton does not have inductive grounds for PPM considered as a whole, then, and he confines it
to his speculative writings because it is a hypothesis.
                                                                 
480 My response draws upon DiSalle's work in Understanding Space-Time.
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CONCLUSION
In this final section, I briefly review some conclusions from the foregoing sections.  Then
drawing upon those conclusions, I argue that Newton's problem about gravity is a problem about
counting substances and apportioning properties to substances.  I show how that problem arises
from the empirical and metaphysical elements of his thought, and I argue that by its nature, the
problem as Newton conceives it cannot be solved.481
A Brief Review
Newton does not allow gravity as a superadded property of matter, and in general, it is
difficult to see how his empiricism could accommodate an ontological thesis of superaddition for
gravity.  For to defend such a thesis empirically would require an empirical means of
distinguishing between properties that are essential in the strong sense that matter could not exist
without them, and properties that are inessential or superadded, though universally realized.
Accordingly, Newton does not claim to know which properties are essential to matter in that
strong sense.  When he denies that gravity is essential to matter, in Rule 3, he employs a different
sense of 'essential', classifying gravity as inessential on the grounds that its intensity varies with
distance.  But while Rule 3's sense of 'essential' purports to be the empirically defensible
condition of being intensity-invariant, not all properties that Newton classifies as essential clearly
fulfill that condition, hardness being one problematic case.  This suggests that Newton's
classification, which isolates gravity as universal but inessential to matter, may be driven by some
non-empirically based beliefs about matter's essential nature, in the strong sense of 'essential'.
Newton allows that matter has an "essential and metaphysical nature", and though he
makes no assertions about what that nature is, his beliefs about matter's nature in this strong sense
                                                                 
481 Since my arguments concern the problem as Newton conceives it, I shall not be concerned with factors external to
his reasoning process.  An analysis of factors external to his reasoning might point to his atomism and his lack of a full-
fledged field concept as the obstacles to solving the problem about gravity. For he takes atoms to be the fundamental
constituents of nature, and while he advances toward a field concept, those advances do not include the requirement
that effects be transmitted over time; the notion that gravitational effects could be transmitted instantaneously is still
unproblematic in the 17th century.
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of 'essential' are evident in his letters to Bentley.  In that letter, which may be classified as a
speculative text, Newton indicates his belief in what appears to be the metaphysical principle,
matter cannot act where it is not.  He is also drawn to two more fundamental principles from
which that narrower principle may derive, a general principle that all causation must be local, and
a principle that matter is passive.  Yet he asserts none of the three principles, lacking empirical
warrant for them.  The principle that matter is passive, in that it can neither change its own state
nor generate new motion in any other matter is not empirically warranted.  This principle is more
restrictive upon matter than the three laws of motion, and moreover, the attractions and repulsions
of gravitational, electrical, and magnetic phenomena, together with the seemingly spontaneous
generation of motion in biological and chemical phenomena, suggest that matter might not obey
the principle.  The principle that all causation is local similarly lacks empirical warrant.  Even
collisions fail to provide a model of local causation; for Newton speculates that they may involve
distance forces and the generation of new motion, and he has no empirical evidence of the
continuous medium needed to deny all action at a distance.
His speculations about a particulate medium, namely the aether, suggest a means of
maintaining the narrower principle that matter at least cannot act distantly; for while the aethereal
particles seem to repel one another by distance forces, they could be immaterial.  If we suppose
Newton to be guided by this narrower principle, rather than by the general principle that all
causation must be local, then it becomes understandable that he would try to avoid action at a
distance in such phenomena as heat transfer and gravitational effects by speculatively invoking a
distantly acting aether.  For if the aether were immaterial, these speculations would preserve the
narrower principle.
Yet this narrower principle does not sit easily with some aspects of Newton's thought.
Specifically, it is odd to suppose that an immaterial substance is more likely to act distantly than a
material one, given that God and minds, which are positioned firmly in Newton's ontology and
are the only available models for inanimate immaterial substances, act locally.  And indeed as we
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saw, it is the general principle of local causation that seems to determine the nature of Newton's
God and minds, rather than the other way around.
Finally, we saw that animate immaterial substances act locally upon material entities not
by surface action but by the co-occupation of place.  The same could be true of inanimate
immaterial substances, and this sharing of place is the condition upon gravity's cause that Newton
states in the General Scholium and elsewhere—it penetrates to the very center of material
particles.
Gravity and Newton's Substance Counting Problem
At one level, Newton's problem about gravity is the problem of discovering some
immaterial substance that might possess active powers to produce gravitational effects.  So it is a
problem about finding a suitable substance in which to locate active powers.  Yet there is a deeper
problem.  The claim that substances of different kinds may be able to co-occupy place leads to an
epistemological problem, namely, that he has no means of determining how many kinds of
substance to infer from a set of properties.  I shall call this problem 'Newton's Substance Counting
Problem'.  There is therefore no means of apportioning properties—most notably active
powers—among substances.  Let us see how Newton's Substance Counting Problem arises.
Newton does not want to say that God is the active power causing gravitational effects.
He thinks that the gravitational force is real, and that gravity's cause is something in the natural
world.  Nor does he want to say that the active powers belong to material particles.  To say that
would mean giving up his expectations that matter is passive, and that it cannot act at a distance
without any medium.  To preserve these expectations, he needs to find some immaterial medium
that bears the active powers, and acts locally upon matter.
For an immaterial medium to act locally upon matter might mean co-occupying space
with matter.  The animate, known spirits (God and minds) act locally upon matter by co-
occupying space with it, and Newton allows that an inanimate immaterial medium, such as an
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aether, might also penetrate matter and share space with it.  His grounds for this possibility are
inductive, in that it is not ruled out by any known phenomena.  A metaphysical principle helped
generate this possibility, in that the model for additional, locally acting substances is God, whose
extended nature is driven by the principle of local causation; and induction keeps the possibility
in play.
Now as we saw earlier, Newton thinks we have no direct access to substances, and must
infer them from perceived properties.  We infer a body by associating perceived properties with
regions of space.  Again, this is Newton's means of dispensing with the notion of prime matter; it
becomes "unnecessary to feign some unintelligible substance....Extension takes the place of the
substantial subject in which the form of the body is conserved by the divine will."482  Newton's
attention is here confined to bodies, and if we suppose that only bodies exist, we have a clear
means of counting bodies.  If we want to know how many substances are present, given the
properties we observe, and if we expect only material bodies to exist, we can individuate and
count bodies by using a spatial criterion.  When we perceive properties such as color, hardness
and impenetrability in one region of space, we say there is one billiard ball, or one planet; and
when we perceive those sorts of characteristics in two regions of space, we say that there are two
billiard balls, or two planets.  But this method of counting bodies works only because bodies are
impenetrable by one another.
If we allow more kinds of substances into our ontology, and if we further allow Newton's
possibility that two things can be in the same place at the same time, we face an obstacle in trying
to individuate and count substances. For again, all substances are spatially extended; God and
minds do share space with material bodies; and according to Newton's speculations, there could
be yet more substances of different kinds, able to penetrate one another to share the same region
of space.  Once this is allowed, how could we know how many substances to infer from a set of
                                                                 
482 De Gravitatione, Philosophical Writings, 29.  (The Halls' translation, Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac
Newton, 140, is identical.)
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properties experienced in a single spatial region?  When we perceive the properties we associate
with a billiard ball, there are at least two substances occupying that space, the material billiard
ball, and God,483 and there might be yet another—an inanimate immaterial substance such as an
aether.  Since even such inanimate immaterial substances might be able to co-occupy place with
matter, we cannot determine how many substances are present by associating properties with
different regions of space.  Since properties belonging to different substances might be present in
the very same region of space, we can no longer employ the spatial criterion mentioned above for
individuating and counting substances; a set of properties located in a given region of space might
belong to several substances rather than to one alone.  This is Newton's Substance Counting
Problem.
A further problem is this.  Even if we somehow knew the number of substances present
in a given region of space, how would we know which properties belonged to which substance?
Once again, if the substances shared the same place, we could not employ a spatial criterion for
apportioning properties to substances.  When two particles attract one another, should the power
to generate that motion be associated with the particles themselves, or with some substance that
shares their spatial location? When two chemicals are combined and produce an exothermic
reaction, there appears to be the spontaneous generation of motion.  Should the power to produce
this motion be associated with the material chemicals, or with some immaterial substance that
shares their spatial location? These are crucial questions for which Newton has no resources to
answer; the possibility that different kinds of substance could co-occupy place blocks an answer,
so long as he retains an allegiance to empiricism.
If Newton were willing to base his physics upon metaphysical, that is, non-empirical,
principles, he could solve his problem about gravity by simply asserting that PPM and PLC were
true.  He could then postulate the active immaterial substance needed to explain away the
                                                                 
483 In any region of space, there is at least one substance, immaterial God. If we perceive resistance, hardness, and
impenetrability, we say there is another substance, matter, that is, body. (If the body is a human body, then there is an
additional substance, mind.) And there could be yet another immaterial substance, such as an immaterial aether.
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appearance of sun and planets attracting one another across empty space, much as Leibniz
postulates a material vortex by employing his principle that bodies by nature can act only upon
contiguous bodies.   If Newton could take it as given that matter is unable to generate new
motions such as gravitational attractions, and unable to act across empty space, this together with
the claim that there are new motions would imply that some immaterial substance must be
producing them; some substance other than matter must exist to possess the active powers.
Taking those principles as given, however, would be a resort to metaphysics.484  Since Newton
does not permit himself such metaphysical assertions, he cannot postulate an immaterial medium
to be the bearer of active powers.
There is no empirical solution either, however.  It is difficult to see how there could be
any empirical means of associating properties with different kinds of substances that could be in
the same place at the same time.  Suppose we wanted to determine whether air is necessary to
gravitational effects.  We could test this by setting up some experiment in which we release a ball
within a glass container that has been evacuated of air.  When we see that the ball gravitates to
earth in the absence of air, just as it does in the presence of air, we conclude that the air particles
are not part of gravity's causal story.  They are not a catalyst, for instance, needed to produce the
gravitational effect. But could we perform this same experiment with the aether, to see whether it
is part of the causal story?  This cannot be done, because according to Newton's speculations, an
immaterial aether might be able to penetrate glass. So if we attempted to remove the aether from
                                                                 
484 Interestingly, in a letter written well before the Principia, Newton appears to allow that hypotheses may play some
role in explaining the properties of things, though not in determining the properties of things, except insofar as they
furnish experiments.  Does he mean that while physical hypotheses may furnish experiments, metaphysical hypotheses
too may be allowed some role, namely that of helping explain the properties of things?  If so, does he allow
metaphysical hypotheses that role because he is confronting the question I have been raising, namely, how do we
determine which things are the property-bearers?  Newton's remarks in the letter are too brief to provide answers.  The
text to which I refer is the following passage from Newton's Letter to Oldenburg, for Pardies, of 10 June, 1672:  "For
hypotheses ought to be applied only in the explanation of the properties of things, and not made use of in determining
them; except in so far as they may furnish experiments." (Letter to Oldenburg.  London, 1672, Newton's Philosophy of
Nature: Selections from his Writings, 5-6.)  Another translation of the same passage leaves somewhat less room for the
possibility I have sketched:  "For hypotheses should be subservient only in explaining the properties of things, but not
assumed in determining them; unless so far as they may furnish experiments."  (Newton to Oldenburg, for Pardies, 10
June, 1672, in Philosophical Transactions, 85, 5014; quoted in Harper and Smith's "Newton's New Way of Inquiry",
120.)
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the container in the way we removed the air, new aether might rush in through the glass walls of
the container. Since we cannot remove the aether, we cannot know whether the ball would fail to
gravitate toward other material bodies in its absence.  In general, if immaterial substances can
penetrate and share space with matter, we have no way of isolating an immaterial substance, and
testing to see what happens in its absence. So there does not seem to be any empirical means of
discovering whether there is an aether, or whether the active powers belong to it rather than to
matter.
To conclude, then, Newton's problem about gravity seems to be problem of discovering a
medium that would preserve his expectation that matter cannot act distantly, and would do so by
bearing the active powers that he avoids attributing to matter.  Yet his claim that substances of
different kinds might be able to co-occupy place gives rise to a more fundamental problem.  He
has rejected metaphysical (non-empirical) principles as grounds for determining how many
substances exist, and which sort of properties a substance might bear.  Instead, he holds that we
infer the existence of substances on the basis of the properties we perceive.  Given these grounds
for inferring the existence of substances, once Newton allows the possibility that substances of
different kinds might be able to co-occupy place, he leaves himself no means of determining how
many substances are present in a given region of space, or how the properties perceived in that
space are to be apportioned to different substances.  And if he has no grounds for saying how
many substances are present in a given region of space, or of apportioning perceived properties
among substances that might co-occupy place, then so long as he continues to eschew
metaphysical grounds, he has no means for saying that active powers belong to an immaterial
medium rather than to matter.  In this way, the Substance Counting Problem renders Newton's
quest for gravity's causal explanation a problem that cannot be solved.
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APPENDIX:
Query 31's Two-Globe Case
As Newton describes the case, the sum of the motions of the two globes will be bigger
when the slender rod connecting them lies with the right line along which the center of gravity
moves, than when it lies perpendicular to that right line.  Assuming that the globes have equal
mass, one must take the numerical sum rather than the vector sum in order to produce Newton's
result.485  Let us consider the case first by taking the vector sum, and then by taking the numerical
sum.
1) Vector sum
Suppose we take the vector sum, assigning the values stated below.
mb: mass of blue globe
mr: mass of red globe
Vcm: velocity of the system's center of mass as it moves in a right line
vb: tangential velocity of blue globe
vr: tangential velocity of red globe
pb: momentum of blue globe
pr : momentum of red globe
x : unit vector, x direction
y : unit vector, y direction
Let Vcm = vb = vr = 5m/s
Let mb = mr = 1 kg
Right Orientation Perpendicular Orientation
vb = 5x + 5y             and  pb = (1)( 5x + 5y)
vr = 5x - 5y               and  pr = (1)( 5x + 5y)
vb + vr = 10x + 0y     and  pb + pr = 10x + 0y
| vb + vr| = 10           and  | pb + pr| = 10
| vb = 5x + 5x + 0y = 10x
vr = 5x - 5x + 0y = 0
vb + vr = 10x + 0y
| vb + vr| = 10            and | pb + pr| = 10
                                                                 
485 For this example, I assume that the globes have equal masses, a natural assumption, given that Newton does not
indicate otherwise.  However, the general proof that follows this example applies to cases of unequal as well as equal
masses.
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The quantities of motion are equal for both orientations, then, given the values assigned to the
parameters.  Will the quantities of motion be equal for any values of those parameters?  The
following general proof establishes that they will be.486
w = angular velocity of the rotating rod
vb = tangential velocity of blue globe
vr = tangential velocity of red globe
mb = mass of blue globe
mr = mass of red globe
xb = distance from center of mass to blue globe
xr = distance from center of mass to red globe
Since mb xb = mr xr, then xb = mr xr / mb.  (This follows from the definition of center of mass.)
Also:  vb = wxb; vr = wxr.
Hence: mb vb = mb w xb = mb w mr xr / mb = mr w xr = mr vr.
So the magnitudes of the tangential momentums of the two globes are equal.  It follows
immediately from the geometry of the situation that these two tangential momentums point in
opposite directions.  Therefore, the two vectors sum to zero.  The only remaining component of
the system’s motion is the linear motion of the center of mass.  So the total momentum of the
system must be equal to the component of its momentum corresponding to this component of its
motion:
P = (mb + mr)Vcm
That expression has the same value no matter what orientation the rod is in; right, perpendicular
or otherwise.  Nothing in the proof depends on the values of mb and mr, or whether they are equal
or unequal.  So this is a completely general proof that Newton's claim that the quantity of motion
                                                                 
486 I thank John Roberts for supplying the general proof that follows. The proof holds for cases of unequal masses as
well as for the case of equal masses that I have assumed Newton to intend.
231
varies would be incorrect if by “quantity of motion” he meant momentum considered as a vector
quantity.
2) Numerical sum
Suppose now that Newton is performing a numerical rather than a vector sum, taking the
magnitude of each globe's momentum and then adding those magnitudes.  This produces
Newton's result that the sum is greater when the rod connecting the globes lies with the right line
of absolute translation rather than perpendicular to it.  Assigning the same quantities as in the
example above, the sum of the magnitudes of the motions (momenta) is 10(2)1/2 when the rod lies
along the right line, but only 10 when it lies perpendicular to it.
Right Orientation Perpendicular Orientation
vb = 5x + 5y
|vb| = [(5
2+ 52)]1/2 = 5(2)1/2
vr = 5x - 5y
|vr| = [(5
2+ (-5)2)]1/2 = 5(2)1/2
|vb| + |vr| = 5(2)
1/2 + 5(2)1/2 = 10(2)1/2
                                and |pb| + |pr| = 10(2)
1/2
vb = 5x + 5x + 0y = 10x + 0y
|vb| = (10
2)1/2 = 10
vr = 5x - 5x + 0y = 0x + 0y
|vr| = (0
2)1/2 = 0
|vb| + |vr| = 10 + 0 = 10
                                and |pb| + |pr| = 10
As the dumbbell rotates while moving along a right line, then, the quantity of motion changes;
motion is "got and lost".  So Newton is taking the numerical sum, and the case therefore contests
both of the Cartesian claims.
